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- research-articleAugust 2023
Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting
- Edith Elkind,
- Piotr Faliszewski,
- Ayumi Igarashi,
- Pasin Manurangsi,
- Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin,
- Warut Suksompong
AbstractJustified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be fulfilled ...
- research-articleJune 2023
Parameterized complexity of multiwinner determination: more effort towards fixed-parameter tractability
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (KLU-AGNT), Volume 37, Issue 2https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-023-09610-zAbstractWe study the parameterized complexity of winner determination problems for three prevalent k-committee selection rules, namely the minimax approval voting (MAV), the proportional approval voting (PAV), and the Chamberlin–Courant’s approval voting (...
- research-articleDecember 2022
The metric distortion of multiwinner voting
AbstractWe extend the recently introduced framework of metric distortion to multiwinner voting. In this framework, n agents and m alternatives are located in an underlying metric space. The exact distances between agents and alternatives are ...
- research-articleFebruary 2020
Computing and testing Pareto optimal committees
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (KLU-AGNT), Volume 34, Issue 1https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-020-09445-yAbstractSelecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and important ...
- ArticleOctober 2019
Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules
AbstractWe investigate how robust are approval-based multiwinner voting rules to small perturbations of the preference profiles. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider ...
- research-articleJanuary 2019
Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 7, Issue 1Article No.: 3, Pages 1–39https://doi.org/10.1145/3296672Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, ...
- ArticleAugust 2018
Social Choice and the Problem of Recommending Essential Readings
At the Intersection of Language, Logic, and InformationPages 62–78https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59620-3_4AbstractWe tackle the practical problem of finding a good rule to recommend a collective set of news items to a group of media consumers with possibly very disparate individual interest in the available items. For our analysis, we adapt a formal framework ...