ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is restricted to a set of ...

In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information theoretical framework—the Mutual Information Paradigm—for information elicitation mechanisms. Our framework pays every agent a measure of mutual ...

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, ...

We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent prefers to have some leader than no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a fair Nash equilibrium, where each agent has an equal probability of being ...