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A Survey among Network Operators on BGP Prefix Hijacking

Authors:

Pavlos Sermpezis,

Vasileios Kotronis,

Alberto Dainotti,

Xenofontas DimitropoulosAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 48, Issue 1

Pages 64 - 69

https://doi.org/10.1145/3211852.3211862

Published: 27 April 2018 Publication History

Abstract

BGP prefix hijacking is a threat to Internet operators and users. Several mechanisms or modifications to BGP that protect the Internet against it have been proposed. However, the reality is that most operators have not deployed them and are reluctant to do so in the near future. Instead, they rely on basic - and often inefficient - proactive defenses to reduce the impact of hijacking events, or on detection based on third party services and reactive approaches that might take up to several hours. In this work, we present the results of a survey we conducted among 75 network operators to study: (a) the operators' awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks, (b) presently used defenses (if any) against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses. We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as contribute towards designing new defense mechanisms that satisfy the requirements of the operators.

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Cited By

Scott BJohnstone MSzewczyk PRichardson S(2025)BGP anomaly detection as a group dynamics problemComputer Networks10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110926257(110926)Online publication date: Feb-2025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110926
Scott BJohnstone MSzewczyk P(2024)A Survey of Advanced Border Gateway Protocol Attack Detection TechniquesSensors10.3390/s2419641424:19(6414)Online publication date: 3-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/s24196414
Gao HLi NXie Y(2024)Hidden-SAGE: For the Inference of Complex Autonomous System Business Relationships Involving Hidden LinksElectronics10.3390/electronics1309161713:9(1617)Online publication date: 23-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13091617
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Index Terms

A Survey among Network Operators on BGP Prefix Hijacking
1. Networks
  1. Network protocols
    1. Network layer protocols
      1. Routing protocols
  2. Network services
    1. Network management
2. Security and privacy
  1. Network security

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review

ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Volume 48, Issue 1

January 2018

80 pages

ISSN:0146-4833

DOI:10.1145/3211852

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2018 Authors.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 27 April 2018

Published in SIGCOMM-CCR Volume 48, Issue 1

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Cited By

Scott BJohnstone MSzewczyk PRichardson S(2025)BGP anomaly detection as a group dynamics problemComputer Networks10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110926257(110926)Online publication date: Feb-2025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110926
Scott BJohnstone MSzewczyk P(2024)A Survey of Advanced Border Gateway Protocol Attack Detection TechniquesSensors10.3390/s2419641424:19(6414)Online publication date: 3-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/s24196414
Gao HLi NXie Y(2024)Hidden-SAGE: For the Inference of Complex Autonomous System Business Relationships Involving Hidden LinksElectronics10.3390/electronics1309161713:9(1617)Online publication date: 23-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13091617
Kaiyu C(2024)BGP prefix hijack detection algorithm based on MOAS event featureInternational Conference on Computer Network Security and Software Engineering (CNSSE 2024)10.1117/12.3032047(66)Online publication date: 6-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.1117/12.3032047
Zeng MHuang XZhang PLi DXie K(2024)Improving Prefix Hijacking Defense of RPKI From an Evolutionary Game PerspectiveIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2024.337164421:6(5170-5184)Online publication date: Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2024.3371644
Zhao SHuang XZhang PZhang BLv Z(2024)A Multidimensional Node Selection Method Towards MOAS Outsourcing Mitigation2024 IEEE 16th International Conference on Advanced Infocomm Technology (ICAIT)10.1109/ICAIT62580.2024.10807904(43-48)Online publication date: 16-Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAIT62580.2024.10807904
Scott BJohnstone MSzewczyk PRichardson S(2024)Matrix Profile data mining for BGP anomaly detectionComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110257242:COnline publication date: 1-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110257
Muosa AAli A(2024)Detecting BGP Routing Anomalies Using Machine Learning: A ReviewForthcoming Networks and Sustainability in the AIoT Era10.1007/978-3-031-62871-9_13(145-164)Online publication date: 26-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-62871-9_13
Sediqi KFeldmann AGasser O(2023)Live Long and Prosper: Analyzing Long-Lived MOAS Prefixes in BGP2023 7th Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA)10.23919/TMA58422.2023.10198973(1-10)Online publication date: 26-Jun-2023
https://doi.org/10.23919/TMA58422.2023.10198973
Miao CXiao YCanini MDai RZheng SWang JBu JKuzmanovic AWang YSchulzrinne HKohler EMaltz DMisra V(2023)TENSOR: Lightweight BGP Non-Stop RoutingProceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2023 Conference10.1145/3603269.3604852(108-121)Online publication date: 10-Sep-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3603269.3604852
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