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SeeMLess: Security Evaluation of Logic Locking using Machine Learning oriented Estimation

Published: 12 June 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Although logic locking has been widely known as a promising countermeasure against intellectual property (IP) piracy and overproduction risks, it has been challenged by different attack breeds over the years. Attacks on logic locking, either algorithmic or structural, have been always known as a time-consuming resource-intensive effort. For instance, the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attack might take weeks to be completed. In this paper, we introduce SeeMLess, a first-of-its-kind ML framework for the security evaluation of logic locking, design and locking agnostic. SeeMLess leverages feature sets computed from different aspects, graph-based, functional, propositional, etc. to accurately estimate the attack time with no attacks running. Our experimental results, on a case study over the SAT attack, show the trained model on a dataset of 5K+ designs locked by various techniques, where SeeMLess achieves <Formula format="inline"><TexMath><?TeX $\sim 95\%$?></TexMath><AltText>Math 1</AltText><File name="glsvlsi24-138-inline1" type="svg"/></Formula> accuracy in predicting the time of the attack, offering valuable insights into the locking mechanism effectiveness pre-implementation.

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cover image ACM Conferences
GLSVLSI '24: Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2024
June 2024
797 pages
ISBN:9798400706059
DOI:10.1145/3649476
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Publication History

Published: 12 June 2024

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Author Tags

  1. Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF)
  2. Graph
  3. Logic Locking
  4. Machine Learning
  5. SAT Attack.
  6. Security Estimation

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  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed limited

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  • Synopsys and DARPA

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GLSVLSI '24
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GLSVLSI '24: Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2024
June 12 - 14, 2024
FL, Clearwater, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 312 of 1,156 submissions, 27%

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