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Article

Do Not Rely on Clock Randomization: A Side-Channel Attack on a Protected Hardware Implementation of AES

Authors:

Martin Brisfors,

Michail Moraitis,

Elena DubrovaAuthors Info & Claims

Foundations and Practice of Security: 15th International Symposium, FPS 2022, Ottawa, ON, Canada, December 12–14, 2022, Revised Selected Papers

Pages 38 - 53

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30122-3_3

Published: 01 April 2023 Publication History

Abstract

Clock randomization is one of the oldest countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Various implementations have been presented in the past, along with positive security evaluations. However, in this paper we show that it is possible to break countermeasures based on a randomized clock by sampling side-channel measurements at a frequency much higher than the encryption clock, synchronizing the traces with pre-processing, and targeting the beginning of the encryption. We demonstrate a deep learning-based side-channel attack on a protected FPGA implementation of AES which can recover a subkey from less than 500 power traces. In contrast to previous attacks on FPGA implementations of AES which targeted the last round, the presented attack uses the first round as the attack point. Any randomized clock countermeasure is significantly weakened by an attack on the first round because the effect of randomness accumulated over multiple encryption rounds is lost.

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Cited By

Ege BSwinkels BToprakhisar DVadnala P(2024)Practical Improvements to Statistical Ineffective Fault AttacksConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_4(59-75)Online publication date: 9-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_4
Brisfors MMoraitis MLandin GJilborg T(2023)Attacking and Securing the Clock Randomization and Duplication Side-Channel Attack CountermeasureFoundations and Practice of Security10.1007/978-3-031-57537-2_23(372-387)Online publication date: 11-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-57537-2_23

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

Foundations and Practice of Security: 15th International Symposium, FPS 2022, Ottawa, ON, Canada, December 12–14, 2022, Revised Selected Papers

Dec 2022

477 pages

ISBN:978-3-031-30121-6

DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-30122-3

Editors:
Guy-Vincent Jourdan
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
,
Laurent Mounier
Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
,
Carlisle Adams
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
,
Florence Sèdes
University Toulouse III Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France
,
Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro
Telecom SudParis, Palaiseau, France

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023.

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 01 April 2023

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Cited By

Ege BSwinkels BToprakhisar DVadnala P(2024)Practical Improvements to Statistical Ineffective Fault AttacksConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_4(59-75)Online publication date: 9-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_4
Brisfors MMoraitis MLandin GJilborg T(2023)Attacking and Securing the Clock Randomization and Duplication Side-Channel Attack CountermeasureFoundations and Practice of Security10.1007/978-3-031-57537-2_23(372-387)Online publication date: 11-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-57537-2_23

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