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When are Nash equillibria self-enforcing?: an experimental analysis

Published: 01 December 2000 Publication History

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  • (2019)Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental MarketManagement Science10.5555/2778309.277831060:3(753-769)Online publication date: 5-Jan-2019
  • (2013)Agent-Based simulation analysis for equilibrium selection and coordination failure in coordination games characterized by the minimum strategyTransactions on Computational Collective Intelligence IX10.5555/2554438.2554440(29-54)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2013

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Published In

cover image International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory  Volume 29, Issue 4
December 2000
147 pages

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Physica-Verlag GmbH

Germany

Publication History

Published: 01 December 2000

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Cited By

View all
  • (2019)Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental MarketManagement Science10.5555/2778309.277831060:3(753-769)Online publication date: 5-Jan-2019
  • (2013)Agent-Based simulation analysis for equilibrium selection and coordination failure in coordination games characterized by the minimum strategyTransactions on Computational Collective Intelligence IX10.5555/2554438.2554440(29-54)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2013

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