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A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. elections

Published: 16 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

We report on a large-scale case study of a combinatorial prediction market. We implemented a back-end pricing engine based on Dudik et al.'s (2012) combinatorial market maker, together with a wizard-like front end to guide users to constructing any of millions of predictions about the presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections in the United States in 2012. Users could create complex combinations of predictions and, as a result, we obtained detailed information about the joint distribution and conditional estimates of election results. We describe our market, how users behaved, and how well our predictions compared with benchmark forecasts. We conduct a series of counterfactual simulations to investigate how our market might be improved in the future.

References

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Chen, K., Ingersoll, J., and Kaplan, E. 2008a. Modeling a presidential prediction market. Management Science 54, 8, 1381--1394.
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Chen, Y., Fortnow, L., Lambert, N., Pennock, D. M., and Wortman, J. 2008b. Complexity of combinatorial market makers. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 190--199.
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Chen, Y. and Pennock, D. M. 2007. A utility framework for bounded-loss market makers. In Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. 49--56.
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Dudík, M., Lahaie, S., and Pennock, D. M. 2012. A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generation. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
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Galambos, J. and Simonelli, I. 1996. Bonferroni-Type Inequalities with Applications. Springer, New York.
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Hanson, R. D. 2003. Combinatorial information market design. Information Systems Frontiers 5, 1, 107--119.
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Hanson, R. D. 2007. Logarithmic market scoring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation. Journal of Prediction Markets 1, 1, 1--15.
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Hummel, P. and Rothschild, D. 2013. Fundamental models for forecasting elections. ResearchDMR.com/HummelRothschild_FundamentalModel.
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Rothschild, D. 2009. Forecasting elections: Comparing prediction markets, polls, and their biases. Public Opinion Quarterly 73, 5, 895--916.
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Cited By

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  • (2018)Graphical model market maker for combinatorial prediction marketsJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research10.1613/jair.1.1124963:1(421-460)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2018
  • (2016)An empirical game-theoretic analysis of price discovery in prediction marketsProceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060693(510-516)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
  • (2016)Mathematical foundations for social computingCommunications of the ACM10.1145/296040359:12(102-108)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
    June 2013
    924 pages
    ISBN:9781450319621
    DOI:10.1145/2492002
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 16 June 2013

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    Author Tags

    1. combinatorial security
    2. elections
    3. market maker
    4. prediction market

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    EC '13
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    EC '13: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    June 16 - 20, 2013
    Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

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    EC '13 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 223 submissions, 32%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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    Cited By

    View all
    • (2018)Graphical model market maker for combinatorial prediction marketsJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research10.1613/jair.1.1124963:1(421-460)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2018
    • (2016)An empirical game-theoretic analysis of price discovery in prediction marketsProceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060693(510-516)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
    • (2016)Mathematical foundations for social computingCommunications of the ACM10.1145/296040359:12(102-108)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
    • (2014)Market making with decreasing utility for informationProceedings of the Thirtieth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3020751.3020768(152-161)Online publication date: 23-Jul-2014

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