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A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)

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Abstract

Within the class of zero-monotonic games, we prove that a cooperative game with transferable utility is convex if and only if the core of the game coincides with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura, in Int J Game Theory 26:283–302, 1997).

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Correspondence to Josep M. Izquierdo.

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Izquierdo, J.M., Rafels, C. A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura). Int J Game Theory 41, 381–395 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9

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