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Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games

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Abstract

We investigate the equivalence between several notions of bargaining sets which occur in the literature and the core of simple games.

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We would like to thank the referee for his useful suggestions.

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Einy, E., Wettstein, D. Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games. Int J Game Theory 25, 65–71 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254385

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254385

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