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Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence. (1995). McCallum, Bennett.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5075.

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  86. The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence. (2007). Kumar, Manmohan S ; Debrun, Xavier.
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  87. Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency. (2007). Wyplosz, Charles ; Lotz, Aïleen ; Gosselin, Pierre ; Pierre Gosselin, Aileen Lotz, .
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  88. Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic. (2007). Tesfaselassie, Mewael F. ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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  91. Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets. (2007). Moser, Christoph ; Dreher, Axel.
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  92. The Walsh Contracts for Central Bankers Are Optimal After All!. (2006). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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  93. Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle: A New Perspective. (2006). Mandilaras, Alex (Alexandros) ; Levine, Paul ; al-Nowaihi, Ali.
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  94. Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees. (2006). Mihov, Ilian ; Sibert, Anne.
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  95. The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy; Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence. (2006). Segalotto, Jean-Franois ; Arnone, Marco ; Laurens, Bernard J.
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  96. Capital taxation and electoral accountability. (2006). Magris, Francesco ; Aidt, Toke.
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  97. Might a conservative central banker reduce employment variability?. (2006). James, Jonathan G. ; Lawler, Phillip .
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  98. How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom? The Surprising Fragility of the Theoretical Foundations of Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Independence. (2006). Buiter, Willem.
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  99. How Much Information Should Interest Rate-Setting Central Banks Reveal?. (2006). Wyplosz, Charles ; Lotz, Aïleen ; Gosselin, Pierre ; Gosselin-Lotz, Aileen.
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  100. Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?. (2006). Libich, Jan ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
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  101. Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?. (2006). Debrun, Xavier.
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  102. Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries*. (2006). Vogel, Lukas ; Herz, Bernhard ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: International Finance.
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  103. Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia. (2006). Sheen, Jeffrey ; Leu, Shawn.
    In: The Economic Record.
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  104. Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment. (2006). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1361-1366.

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  105. Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia. (2005). Sheen, Jeffrey ; Leu, Shawn.
    In: Working Papers.
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  106. Central Bank Forecasts and Disclosure Policy : Why it Pays to be Optimistic. (2005). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Tesfaselassie, M F ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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  107. Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia. (2005). Sheen, Jeffrey ; Leu, Shawn.
    In: Working Papers.
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  108. Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial?. (2005). James, Jonathan ; Lawler, Phillip .
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005.
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  109. Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls. (2005). Berlemann, Michael.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:1-15.

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  110. Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries. (2005). Vogel, Lukas ; Herz, Bernhard ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim.
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  111. The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government. (2005). Eggertsson, Gauti ; Le Borgne, Eric.
    In: Staff Reports.
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  112. Optimal inflation target under uncertainty. (2005). Uchida, Hirofumi ; Fujiki, Hiroshi.
    In: Japan and the World Economy.
    RePEc:eee:japwor:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:470-479.

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  113. Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation. (2005). Debrun, Xavier ; Castellani, Francesca.
    In: International Finance.
    RePEc:bla:intfin:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:87-117.

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  114. Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers. (2005). Salsano, Francesco.
    In: Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0523.

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  115. Commitment of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences. (2004). D'Amato, Marcello.
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  116. Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?. (2004). Mishkin, Frederic S.
    In: RBA Annual Conference Volume.
    RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv2004-04.

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  117. Évolutions et asymétries des règles européennes de politique budgétaire et mise en oeuvre du Pacte de stabilité. (2004). Pommier, Sebastien .
    In: Économie et Prévision.
    RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_162_1_6935.

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  118. Improving implementation of inflation targeting in New Zealand: an investigation of the Reserve Banks inflation errors. (2004). Liu, Philip.
    In: Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:nzb:nzbdps:2004/06.

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  119. Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?. (2004). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10829.

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  120. A Small Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance - New Developments in Monetary Economics: 2 Ghosts, 2 Eccentricities, A Fallacy, A Mirage and A Mythos. (2004). Buiter, Willem.
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  121. Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency. (2004). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:131-155.

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  122. Political support for anti-inflationary monetary policy. (2004). Sabani, Laura ; Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Ginebri, Sergio .
    In: International Journal of Finance & Economics.
    RePEc:ijf:ijfiec:v:9:y:2004:i:2:p:187-200.

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  123. The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience. (2004). Suslu, Bora ; Bekmez, Selahattin ; Baydur, Cem Mehmet .
    In: European Research Studies Journal.
    RePEc:ers:journl:v:vii:y:2004:i:1-2:p:143-.

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  124. The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility. (2004). Cukierman, Alex ; Leiderman, Leonardo ; Spiegel, Yossi.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:62:y:2004:i:2:p:379-408.

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  125. The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment. (2004). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:91-107.

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  126. Solving for optimal simple rules in rational expectations models. (2004). Dennis, Richard.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:28:y:2004:i:8:p:1635-1660.

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  127. Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound to Interest Rates: A Review1. (2004). Yates, Tony.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
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  128. Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem. (2003). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
    In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2003.
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  129. Rules vs. Discretion After Twenty-Five Years. (2003). Stokey, Nancy L..
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  130. Monetary Policies for Developing Countries; The Role of Corruption. (2003). Wei, Shang-Jin ; Huang, Haizhou.
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  131. Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence. (2003). Levin, Andrew ; Erceg, Christopher.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:50:y:2003:i:4:p:915-944.

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  132. Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation. (2003). Benigno, Gianluca.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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  133. Two Naked Emperors? Concerns about the Stability and Growth Pact and Second Thoughts About Central Bank Independence. (2003). Buiter, Willem.
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  134. Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem. (2003). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  135. The Monetarist Policy Debate: An Informal Survey. (2003). Mayer, Thomas.
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  136. The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence. (2003). Gerlach, Stefan ; Cukierman, Alex.
    In: Manchester School.
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  137. Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets. (2003). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
    In: Bulletin of Economic Research.
    RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:55:y:2003:i:1:p:101-112.

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  138. Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?. (2002). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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  139. Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency. (2002). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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  140. Interests and Independence: The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy. (2002). Forder, James.
    In: International Review of Applied Economics.
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  141. When should central bankers be fired?. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
    In: Economics of Governance.
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  142. Macroeconomic Policy Rules in Theory and in Practice. (2002). Allsopp, Christopher .
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  143. Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees. (2002). Mihov, Ilian ; Sibert, Anne.
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  144. Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make? - commentary. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
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  145. Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?. (2002). Cukierman, Alex.
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  146. Socially optimal monetary policy institutions. (2002). Jerger, Jurgen .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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  147. Reconsidering central bank independence. (2002). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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  148. Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank. (2002). Missale, Alessandro ; Falcetti, Elisabetta.
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  149. Debt-contingent inflation contracts and targets. (2002). Kutsoati, Edward.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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  150. Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers. (2002). Huang, Haizhou ; Padilla, Jorge A..
    In: Annals of Economics and Finance.
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  151. Nonlinear monetary policy rules: some new evidence for the US. (2002). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Maria-Dolores, Ramón ; Dolado, Juan.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
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  152. Non-Linear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the US. (2002). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Maria-Dolores, Ramón ; Dolado, Juan.
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  153. Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees. (2002). Sibert, Anne ; Mihov, Ilian.
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  154. Rules Rather Than Discretion After Twenty Five Years: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?. (2002). Ireland, Peter.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
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  155. Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy. (2001). Farvaque, Etienne ; Lagadec, Gael.
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  156. Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?. (2001). Cukierman, Alex.
    In: Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies.
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  157. Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination. (2001). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd ; BADRAN, rema.
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  158. The Theory of Credibility and the Reputation-bias of Policy. (2001). Forder, James.
    In: Review of Political Economy.
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  159. Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations. (2001). Freytag, Andreas.
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  160. Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations. (2001). Freytag, Andreas.
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  161. A Prudent Central Banker. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
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  162. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
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  163. El cambio de Banco Central desde el punto de vista regional. (2001). Capó Parrilla, Javier.
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  164. Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy. (2001). Wagner, Helmut.
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  165. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
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  166. Monetary Policy under Zero Interest Rate: Viewpoints of Central Bank Economists. (2001). Shiratsuka, Shigenori ; Fujiki, Hiroshi ; Okina, Kunio .
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  167. The Role of Openness in the Debate on Rules vs. Discretion: A Simple Exposition.. (2001). Guender, Alfred ; McCaw, Sharon.
    In: Australian Economic Papers.
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  168. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences. (2001). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
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  169. Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets. (2000). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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  170. Debt-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Targeting. (2000). Kutsoati, Edward.
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  171. The Financial System and Monetary Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2000). Jamshidi, A..
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  172. Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?. (2000). Rotondi, Zeno.
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  173. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?. (2000). Rotondi, Zeno.
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  174. Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?. (2000). Rotondi, Z..
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
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  175. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?. (2000). Rotondi, Z..
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
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  176. Credibility and Commitment of Monetary Policy in Open Economies. (2000). Martina, Riccardo ; D'Amato, Marcello.
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  177. Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?. (2000). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, Marco .
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  178. Could Reputation-Bias be a Bigger Problem than Inflation-Bias?. (2000). Forder, James.
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  179. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (2000). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  180. Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis. (2000). Debrun, Xavier.
    In: Open Economies Review.
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  181. Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator. (2000). de Haan, Jakob ; Kooi, Willem J..
    In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
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  182. Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets. (2000). Jensen, Henrik.
    In: European Economic Review.
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  183. The inflationary bias in a model of the open economy: a note. (2000). Guender, Alfred ; McCaw, Sharon.
    In: Economics Letters.
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  184. Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy. (2000). Schellekens, Philip.
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  185. Escaping Nash inflation. (2000). Sargent, Thomas ; Cho, Inkoo.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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  186. Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy. (2000). Schellekens, P..
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  187. Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union. (2000). Jensen, Henrik ; Dixit, Avinash.
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  188. Issues in New Political Economy: An Overview.. (2000). Sayer, Stuart.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
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  189. Underpinnings of the European System of Central Banks. (1999). Hahn, Franz ; Mooslechner, Peter .
    In: WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports).
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  190. Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification. (1999). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob ; Amtenbrink, F. ; S. C. W. EIJFFINGER, .
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
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  191. Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification. (1999). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob ; Amtenbrink, F. ; S. C. W. EIJFFINGER, .
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
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  192. Expectations, Credibility, and Time-Consistent Monetary Policy. (1999). Ireland, Peter.
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  193. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (1999). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  194. Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?. (1999). Jensen, Henrik.
    In: EPRU Working Paper Series.
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  195. Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom. (1999). Martijn, Jan Kees ; Samiei, Hossein.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
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  196. United Kingdom; Selected Issues. (1999). International Monetary Fund, .
    In: IMF Staff Country Reports.
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  197. Optimal discretion. (1999). Orphanides, Athanasios ; Lengwiler, Yvan.
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
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  198. Model uncertainty, robust policies, and the value of commitment. (1999). Kasa, Kenneth.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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  199. International experiences with different monetary policy regimesMishkin, 1998b). Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia University or the National Bur. (1999). Mishkin, Frederic.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
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  200. Whose monetary policy is it anyway?. (1999). Tootell, Geoffrey.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
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  201. Understanding the disinflations in Australia, Canada and New Zealand using evidence from smooth transition analysis. (1999). Mizen, Paul ; Leybourne, Stephen.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:18:y:1999:i:5:p:799-816.

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  202. Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence. (1999). Moser, Peter.
    In: European Economic Review.
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  220. Incentive schemes for central bankers under uncertainty: inflation targets versus contracts. (1998). Schaling, Eric ; Hoeberichts, Marco ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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  227. Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?. (1997). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, M..
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  228. Crucial issues concerning central bank independence. (1997). McCallum, Bennett.
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  235. Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules. (1996). Ritter, Joseph ; Haubrich, Joseph.
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References

References cited by this document

  1. Alesina, Alberto, and Tabellini, Guido, Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies, Economic Inauiry, August 1987, 25, 619-30.

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  3. Bennett McCallum (1993). There it is argued that the distinction between the two types of policymaking behavior is not well conveyed by the rules vs. discretion terminology. The distinction is, 11 instead, between rules that do and do not accurately take account of private sector expectational behavior in their design.
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  4. Blanchard, Olivier J., and Fischer, Stanley, Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989.

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  7. Debelle, Guy, and Fischer, Stanley, How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? Working Paper, May 1994, MIT.

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