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Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations. (2001). Freytag, Andreas.
In: BNL Quarterly Review.
RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:2001:22.

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  1. CENTRAL BANKS AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. (2018). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1878.

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  2. Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers. (2016). masciandaro, donato ; Volpicella, Alessio .
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:61:y:2016:i:c:p:101-119.

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  3. Monetary exit and fiscal spillovers. (2015). Libich, Jan ; Stehlik, Petr ; Nguyen, Dat Thanh .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:40:y:2015:i:pa:p:184-206.

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  4. .

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  5. Monetary Exit and Fiscal Spillovers. (2014). Libich, Jan ; Nguyen, Dat ; Stehlik, Petr.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:57266.

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  6. The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s. (2014). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: International Review of Economics & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:reveco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:217-227.

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  7. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements – Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:rwirep:355.

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  8. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hlj:hljwrp:34-2012.

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  9. The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s. (2012). schneider, friedrich ; Keil, Jonas ; Freytag, Andreas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1225.

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  10. Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System. (2008). Voigt, Stefan ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200812)164:4_751:icbiat_2.0.tx_2-l.

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  11. Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s. (2007). schneider, friedrich ; Freytag, Andreas.
    In: Jena Economic Research Papers.
    RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-002.

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  12. Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s. (2007). schneider, friedrich ; Freytag, Andreas.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2001.

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  13. Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting. (2007). Gosselin, Marc-Andre .
    In: Staff Working Papers.
    RePEc:bca:bocawp:07-18.

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  14. The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence. (2005). Freytag, Andreas.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:391-409.

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  15. Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System.. (2005). Voigt, Stefan ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: ICER Working Papers.
    RePEc:icr:wpicer:02-2005.

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  16. La inflación y el Banco Central: Economía de un emisor independiente. (2002). Posada, Carlos.
    In: REVISTA CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA.
    RePEc:col:000093:006850.

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  2. Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation. (2011). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
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    RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1995:13.

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