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Zero Inflation Targets: Central Bank Commitment and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. (). Stemp, Peter J. ; Scarth, William M..
In: Computing in Economics and Finance 1996.
RePEc:sce:scecf6:_055.

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  9. DeLong, B., and L. H. Summers (1986), Is increased price flexibility destabilising'DONE', American Economic Review, 76, pp. 1031-1044.

  10. Haldane, A. (1995), Inflation targets, Bank of England Quarterly Review, 35, pp.
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  11. Jensen, H. (1994), Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 18, pp. 763-779.

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  50. Zero Inflation Targets: Central Bank Commitment and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. (). Stemp, Peter J. ; Scarth, William M..
    In: Computing in Economics and Finance 1996.
    RePEc:sce:scecf6:_055.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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