[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
create a website
Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages. (2013). Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet ; Ozdogan, Ayca .
In: MPRA Paper.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:45727.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 1

Citations received by this document

Cites: 24

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. (2016). ozdoan, Aya .
    In: Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies.
    RePEc:boz:journl:v:30:y:2016:i:1:p:1-21.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Ambrus, A., Takahashi, S., (2008). Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, Theoretical Economics, 3, 1-27.

  2. Austen-Smith, D., (1990a). Information transmission in debate, American Journal of Political Science, 34(1), 124-152.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  3. Austen-Smith, D., (1990b). Credible debate equilibria, Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 75-93.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. Austen-Smith, D., (1993a). Information acquisition and orthogonal argument, in Political Economy: Institutions Competition and Representation, proceedings of the seventh international symposium in economic theory and econometrics, eds. Barnet, W. A., Melvin. H., J. and N. Schofield. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, pages 407-36.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. Austen-Smith, D., (1993b). Interested experts and policy advice: multiple referrals under open rule, Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 3-43.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  6. Battaglini, M., (2002). Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk, Econometrica, 70, 1379-1401.

  7. Battaglini, M., (2004). Policy advice with imperfectly informed experts, Advanced Theoretical Economics, 4, Article 1.

  8. Crawford, V., Sobel, J., (1982). Strategic information transmission, Econometrica, 50(6), 1431-1451.

  9. Fischbacher, U., (2007). Z-Tree - Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments, Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.

  10. Gick, W., (2008). Cheap talk equilibria - a note on two senders, Mimeo, Harvard University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. Gilligan, T., Krehbiel, K., (1989). Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee, American Journal of Political Science, 33, 459-490.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  12. Gneezy, U., (2005). Deception: the role of consequences, American Economic Review, 95, 384-394.

  13. Gurdal, M.Y., Ozdogan, A., Saglam, I., (2011). Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention, Working Papers 1106, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.

  14. Krishna, V., Morgan, J., (2001). A model of expertise, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 747–775.

  15. Li, M., (2008). Two (talking) heads are not better than one, Economics Bulletin, 3(63), 1-8.

  16. Milgrom P., Roberts, J., (1986). Relying on information of interested parties, Rand Journal of Economics, 17(1), 18-32.

  17. Minozzi, W., Woon, J., (2011). Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment, mimeo, University of Pittsburgh.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  18. Peeters, R., Vorsatz, M., Walz, M., (2008). Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game, Economics Letters, 101(2), 148-150.

  19. Peeters, R., Vorsatz, M., Walz, M., (2012). Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender- receiver games, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

  20. Sanchez-Pages, S., Vorsatz, M., (2007). An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender receiver game, Games and Economic Behavior, 61, 86-112.

  21. Sanchez-Pages, S., Vorsatz, M., (2009). Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling, Experimental Economics, 12, 220-241.

  22. Sutter, M., (2009). Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams, Economic Journal, 12, 220-241.

  23. Vespa, E., Wilson, A.J., (2012a). Communication with multiple senders: an experiment, mimeo.

  24. Vespa, E., Wilson, A.J., (2012b). Communication with multiple senders and multiple dimensions: an experiment, Working Paper Series No: 384, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent. (2021). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Diehl, Christoph.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00774-0.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Receiver’s sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk. (2021). Ogawa, Hiromasa.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00747-9.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Decentralized advice. (2020). Gradwohl, Ronen ; Feddersen, Timothy.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300197.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Non-competing persuaders. (2020). Wu, Jiemai.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300866.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk. (2019). Nafziger, Julia ; de Barreda, Ines Moreno ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:2597.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Strategic information transmission despite conflict. (2019). Semirat, Stephan.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00668-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication. (2019). Saglam, Ismail ; Ozdogan, Ayca ; Gurdal, Mehmet Y ; Bayindir, Esra E.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:97152.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers. (2019). Jeong, Daeyoung.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:50-80.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games. (2019). Woon, Jonathan ; Minozzi, William.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:144-162.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. (2018). Foerster, Manuel.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:3056.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies. (2018). Hennessy, David ; Saak, Alexander E.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1053-0.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Attention Manipulation and Information Overload. (2017). Persson, Petra.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23823.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games. (2017). Lu, Shih En ; En, Shih .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:168:y:2017:i:c:p:177-208.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:789.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: Economics Papers.
    RePEc:nuf:econwp:1602.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility. (2016). Grillo, Edoardo.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:130:y:2016:i:c:p:126-143.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Competitive cheap talk. (2016). Li, Zhuozheng ; Yang, Huanxing ; Rantakari, Heikki .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:65-89.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk. (2016). Nafziger, Julia ; Moreno de Barreda, Ines ; Meyer, Margaret.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11224.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission. (2016). Squintani, Francesco ; Argenziano, Rossella ; Severinov, Sergei .
    In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:3:p:119-55.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games. (2015). Zhao, Jinhua ; Simon, Leo ; Rausser, Gordon.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:59:y:2015:i:1:p:109-146.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Proximate preferences and almost full revelation in the Crawford–Sobel game. (2015). Agastya, Murali ; Chakraborty, Indranil ; Bag, Parimal Kanti.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
    RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0042-8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Multidimensional Cheap Talk and Delegation. (2015). Kim, Jaehoon ; Rothenberg, Lawrence S..
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201506)171:2_263:mctad_2.0.tx_2-0.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk. (2015). Wang, Joseph ; Lim, Wooyoung ; Lai, Ernest K..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:114-144.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk. (2014). Ivanov, Maxim.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:55:y:2014:i:c:p:129-135.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Expert advice for amateurs. (2014). Lai, Ernest K..
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:103:y:2014:i:c:p:1-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders. (2014). Lu, Shih En ; Ambrus, Attila.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:174-189.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages. (2014). Miura, Shintaro .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:419-441.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Communication in bargaining over decision rights. (2014). Lim, Wooyoung.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:159-179.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Communication and authority with a partially informed expert. (2014). Bag, Parimal ; Agastya, Murali ; Chakraborty, Indranil.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:1:p:176-197.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. The expert problem: a survey. (2013). Valsecchi, Irene.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:303-331.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages. (2013). Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet ; Ozdogan, Ayca .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:45727.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information. (2013). McGee, Andrew.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201306)169:2_229:dacwci_2.0.tx_2-o.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Eliciting information from a committee. (2013). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:2049-2067.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Strategic information transmission networks. (2013). Squintani, Francesco ; Ghiglino, Christian ; Galeotti, Andrea.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1751-1769.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Decision rules revealing commonly known events. (2013). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:8-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Eliciting Information from a Committee. (2012). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp692.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Eliciting Information from a Committee. (2012). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:692.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. (2012). MARTIMORT, David ; Koessler, Frederic.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1850-1881.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information. (2010). Chen, Ying.
    In: 2010 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed010:1159.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests. (2010). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp674.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests. (2010). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:674.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests. (2010). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:kse:dpaper:5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Spread of (mis)information in social networks. (2010). Acemoglu, Daron ; ParandehGheibi, Ali ; Ozdaglar, Asuman.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:194-227.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Accountability and Cheap Talk. (2009). Di Maggio, Marco ; Dimaggio, Marco .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:18652.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Integrated Political Strategy. (2009). de Figueiredo, John M..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15053.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Persuasion by Cheap Talk. (2009). Harbaugh, Rick ; Chakraborty, Archishman.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2006-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Strategic Information Transmission in Networks. (2009). Galeotti, Andrea ; Squintani, Francesco ; Ghiglino, Christian.
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:esx:essedp:2974.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case. (2009). Mylovanov, Tymofiy ; Kovac, Eugen.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1373-1395.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Strategic communication networks. (2008). Hagenbach, Jeanne .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586847.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria. (2005). Schummer, James ; Eso, Peter.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1406.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-02-06 14:15:51 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.