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Informational Size and Efficient Auctions. (2003). Postlewaite, Andrew ; McLean, Richard.
In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
RePEc:pen:papers:03-011.

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Cited: 8

Citations received by this document

Cites: 15

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative. (2005). Campbell, Colin.
    In: Departmental Working Papers.
    RePEc:rut:rutres:200512.

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  2. Aggregation of Expert Opinions. (2005). Postlewaite, Andrew ; McLean, Richard ; Gerardi, Dino.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:05-016.

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  3. The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclawp:839.

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  4. The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000548.

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  5. Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring. (2005). Morris, Stephen ; Mailath, George.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000340.

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  6. Multidimensional Private Value Auctions. (2004). Fang, Hanming.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000021.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations. (2003). Zeckhauser, Richard ; Johnson, Scott ; Miller, Nolan ; Pratt, John W..
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-020.

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  8. Multidimensional Private Value Auctions. (2003). Morris, Stephen ; Fang, Hanming.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. [1] Cremer, J. and McLean, R. P. (1985). Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminatory Monopolist when Demands Are Interdependent, Econometrica, 53, 345-61.

  2. [10] Moore, J. (1992). Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information, in Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress, ed. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  3. [11] Palfrey, T. (1992). Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design, in Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress, ed. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. [12] Perry, M. and Reny, P. J. (1998). Ex-Post Efficient Auctions for Agents with Interdependent Values, Econometrica, 70, 199-1213.

  5. [13] Pesendorfer, W. and J. Swinkels (2000). Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions, American Economic Review, 90, 499-525.

  6. [14] Postlewaite, A. and Schmeidler, D. (1986). Implementation in Differential Information Economies, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 14-33.

  7. [15] Roust, K. (2002). Informational Size and Behavior in an Information Aggregation Experiment, mimeo, Caltech.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  8. [2] Cremer, J. and McLean, R. P. (1988). Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica, 56, 1247-57.

  9. [3] Dasgupta, P. S. and Maskin, E. (1998). Efficient Auctions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 341-388.

  10. [4] Maskin, E. S. (1992). Auctions and Privatization, In H. Siebert (ed.), Privatization, 115-36.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. [5] McAfee, P. and P. Reny (1992). Correlated Information and Mechanism Design, Econometrica, 60, 395-421.

  12. [6] McLean, R. and A. Postlewaite (2002). Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility, Econometrica, 70, 2002, 2421-2454.

  13. [7] McLean, R. and A. Postlewaite (2001). Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Types and Multidimensional Signals, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  14. [8] McLean, R. and A. Postlewaite (2003). Implementation with Interdependent Values, mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.

  15. [9] Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J. (1982). A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.

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  7. Implementation with Interdependent Valuations. (2006). Postlewaite, Andrew ; McLean, Richard.
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