Structural Robustness of Large Games

Ehud Kalai

No 1431, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This short survey discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategic games with many semianonymous players. It describes the notion of structural robustness and its general consequences, as well as implications to particular games, such as ones played on the web and market games.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; ex-post Nash; anonymous games; market games; rational expectations; structural robustness; information proofness; web games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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