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Certified Random: A New Order for Co-Authorship. (2016). Robson, Arthur ; Ray, Debraj.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22602.

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Cites: 9

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Replication in Experimental Economics: A Historical and Quantitative Approach Focused on Public Good Game Experiments. (2017). Jullien, Dorian ; Vallois, Nicolas.
    In: GREDEG Working Papers.
    RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-21.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Carney, D. R. and Banaji, M. R. (2012), “First is Best,” PLoS ONE 7(6), e35088. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035088 Chambers, R., Boath, E., and Chambers, S. (2001), “The A to Z of Authorship: Analysis of Influence of Initial Letter of Surname on Order of Authorship,” British Medical Journal 323(22-29 Dec.), 1460–1461. doi:10.1136/bmj.323.7327.1460 Einav, L. and L. Yariv (2006), “What’s in a Surname? The Effects of Surname Initials on Academic Success,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 175–188.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. Engemann, K. and H. Wall (2009), “A Journal Ranking for the Ambitious Economist,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 91, 127–39.
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  3. Engers, Maxim; Gans, Joshua S.; Grant, Simon; and King, Stephen P. (1999) “First-Author Contributions,” Journal of Political Economy 107, 859-883.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. Farrell, Joseph. (1993). “Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 5, 514-531.

  5. Feenberg, Daniel R., Ganguli, Ina, Gaule, Patrick and Jonathan Gruber (2015) “It’s Good to be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers,” NBER Working Paper No. 21141.

  6. Haque, A., and Ginsparg, P. (2009), “Positional Effects on Citation and Readership in arXiv,” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 60 (11), 2203–2218. doi:10.1002/asi.21166 Itzkowitz, J., Itzkowitz, J. and Rothbort, S. (2016), “ABCs of Trading: Behavioral Biases Affect Stock Turnover and Value,” Review of Finance, forthcoming.

  7. Jacobs, H. and Hillert, A. (2016), “Alphabetic Bias, Investor Recognition, and Trading Behavior,” Review of Finance 20, 693–723.

  8. Ray, D. (2013), “All the Names: Some Strategic Consequences of Alphabetical Order in Joint Research,” mimeo., New York University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  9. Weber, Matthias (2016) “The Effects of Listing Authors in Alphabetical Order: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence.” SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2803164, or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2803164

Cocites

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  2. Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests. (2011). De Jaegher, Kris ; van Rooij, Robert .
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  3. Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication. (2011). Smith, John ; Hertel, Johanna .
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  4. Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness. (2011). van Damme, Eric ; Serra-Garcia, Marta ; Potters, Jan.
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  5. How to talk to multiple audiences. (2011). Pavlov, Gregory ; Goltsman, Maria.
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  6. Timing of Messages and the Aumann Conjecture: A multiple-Selves Approach. (2011). Zultan, Ro'i.
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  7. Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication. (2010). Smith, John ; Hertel, Johanna .
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  8. Government Information Transparency. (2010). Vanin, Paolo ; Esteban, Joan ; Albornoz, Facundo.
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  12. Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance. (2009). Hagen, Rune.
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  13. Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information. (2009). Takizawa, Hirokazu ; Kawagoe, Toshiji.
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  14. Government Information Transparency. (2009). Vanin, Paolo ; Esteban, Joan ; Albornoz, Facundo.
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  15. A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games. (2008). Lagunoff, Roger ; Gerardi, Dino ; Anderlini, Luca.
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  23. When are Auctions Best?. (2007). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy I..
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