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When are Auctions Best?. (2007). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy I..
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13268.

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  1. Technology market intermediaries to facilitate external technology exploitation: The case of IP auctions. (2008). Tietze, Frank.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:tuhtim:55.

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  2. Optimal takeover contests with toeholds. (2008). Loyola, Gino.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we083217.

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References

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