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Efficiency in auctions: theory and practiceUpdated copies of this paper can be found at www.wws.princeton.edu/~rjmorgan. (2001). Morgan, John.
In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:20:y:2001:i:6:p:809-838.

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Cocites: 56

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  1. Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. (2013). Bresky, Michal.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:205-217.

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  2. When are Auctions Best?. (2007). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy.
    In: Economics Papers.
    RePEc:nuf:econwp:0703.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. When are Auctions Best?. (2007). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy I..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13268.

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  4. When are Auctions Best?. (2007). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy I.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6393.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Ausubel, L., 1996. An efficient ascending bid auction for multiple units. Mimeo, University of Maryland.
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  2. Ausubel, L., Cramton, P., 1998. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. Mimeo, University of Maryland.
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  3. Cramton, P., Schwartz, J., 1999. Collusive bidding: lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions Journal of Regulatory Economics, in press.

  4. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., List, J., Lucking-Reiley, D., 2000. Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions with varying numbers of bidders: theory and field experiments. Mimeo, Vanderbilt University.

  5. European Central Bank. The Single Monetary Policy in Stage 3, www.ecb.int.
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  6. Friedman, M. . 1960 Fordham University Press: New York
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  7. Jehiel, P. ; Moldovanu, B. Efficient design with interdependent valuations. 2001 Econometrica. 69 1237-1259

  8. Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 2000a. A critique of the planned rules for the German UMTS/IMT-2000 license auction. Working paper, University College London and University of Mannheim.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  9. Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 2000b. License auctions and market structure. Working paper, University College London and University of Mannheim.

  10. Kagel, J., Levin, D., 2001. Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: Experiments with uniform-price and dynamic Vickrey auctions. Econometrica, 69, 413-454.

  11. Kirchkamp, O., Moldovanu, B., 2000. An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations. SonderForschungsBereich No. 00-10.

  12. Klemperer, P., 2000. What really matters in auction design. Mimeo, Nuffield College.

  13. Krishna, V., 2000. Asymmetric English auctions. Mimeo, Penn State University.
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  14. List, J. ; Lucking-Reiley, D. Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions: evidence from a sportscard field experiment. 2000 American Economic Review. 90 961-972

  15. Manelli, A., Sefton, M., Wilner, B., 2000. Multi-unit auctions: a comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms. Mimeo, University of Nottingham.
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  16. Maskin, E. Auctions and privatization. 1992 En : Siebert, H. Privatization. Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universitat Kiel: Kiel
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  17. Perry, M., Reny, P., 1999. An ex-post efficient multi-unit ascending auction. Econometrica, in press.
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  18. Vickrey, W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. 1961 Journal of Finance. 16 8-37

  19. Weber, R., 1992. Text of June 3, 1992 opening address at Fed/Treasury ‘Forum on changes’ www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/weber/papers/treasury.html.
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  20. Wilson, R. Auction of shares. 1979 Quarterly Journal of Economics. 94 675-689

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  2. Binomial menu auctions in government formation. (2011). Breitmoser, Yves.
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  4. Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation. (2010). Moldovanu, Benny ; Gershkov, Alex.
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  5. Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types. (2009). Fey, Mark ; Ramsay, Kristopher .
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  6. Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights. (2009). Bester, Helmut.
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  7. Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals. (2009). .
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  8. On Effciency of the English Auction. (2009). Izmalkov, Sergei ; Birulin, Oleksii .
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  9. Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Uniform Price IPO Auctions. (2009). Zhang, Ping.
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  11. Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials. (2008). Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
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  12. Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller. (2008). Lamping, Jennifer.
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  13. The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching. (2008). Lamping, Jennifer.
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  14. Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling. (2008). Virag, Gábor ; Molnar, Jozsef ; Virg, Gbor ; Molnr, Jzsef.
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  15. Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information. (2007). Schmitz, Patrick.
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  16. Bad news can be good news: Early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals. (2007). Ye, Lixin ; Peck, James ; Levin, Dan.
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  17. Topologies on Type. (2006). Fudenberg, Drew ; Dekel, Eddie.
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  18. Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations. (2006). Zeckhauser, Richard ; Pratt, John H. ; Johnson, Scott ; Miller, Nolan .
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  19. An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities. (2006). Ausubel, Lawrence M..
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  20. Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. (2005). Bester, Helmut.
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  21. Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. (2005). Ostrovsky, Michael ; Edelman, Benjamin ; Schwarz, Michael.
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  22. Demand reduction in a multi-unit auction: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment: Reply. (2005). Reiley, David ; list, john ; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard .
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  25. Demand Reduction and Pre-emptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions. (2005). Sloof, Randolph ; Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob.
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  27. The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation. (2005). Zame, William ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
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  28. Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale. (2004). Garratt, Rodney ; Troger, Thomas.
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  54. Efficiency in auctions: theory and practiceUpdated copies of this paper can be found at www.wws.princeton.edu/~rjmorgan. (2001). Morgan, John.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:20:y:2001:i:6:p:809-838.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  55. .

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