Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
Christopher Cotton
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In competition for access, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that provide the highest contributions win access. Groups with access present information that may influence the politician's beliefs about the socially optimal policy. Because equilibrium contributions are chosen endogenously, the politician learns about the information quality of all interest groups, even when he grants access to only some of the groups. Contribution limits reduce the signaling power of the equilibrium contributions, resulting in a less informed politician, and strictly reducing expected social welfare.
Keywords: All-pay auction; political access; lobbying; campaign contributions; contribution limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1842/1/MPRA_paper_1842.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5747/1/MPRA_paper_5747.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1842
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