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Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication. (2006). Östling, Robert ; Ellingsen, Tore.
In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634.

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Cited: 5

Citations received by this document

Cites: 38

References cited by this document

Cocites: 21

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information. (2009). Takizawa, Hirokazu ; Kawagoe, Toshiji.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:238-255.

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  2. When Does Communication Improve Coordination?. (2008). Östling, Robert ; Ellingsen, Tore.
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:hhs:hastef:0680.

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  3. Price competition, level-k theory and communication. (2008). Wengstrm, Erik .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:66:p:1-15.

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  4. Price competition, level-k theory and communication. (2008). Wengström, Erik ; Wengstrom, Erik.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70032.

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  5. Setting the Anchor: Price Competition, Level-n Theory and Communication. (2007). Wengström, Erik ; Wengstrom, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2007_006.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

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  1. Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version). (2021). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:102926.

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  2. The evolution of taking roles. (2020). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:174:y:2020:i:c:p:38-63.

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  3. The Evolution of Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games. (2020). Staab, Manuel.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2011.02740.

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  4. Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values. (2020). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2005.05713.

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  5. Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values. (2019). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: Graz Economics Papers.
    RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-10.

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  6. The evolution of taking roles. (2016). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian .
    In: BERG Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:bamber:115.

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  7. Effects of Size, Composition, and Evolutionary Pressure in Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies with Best Response Decisional Mechanisms. (2015). Naimzada, Ahmad ; Pireddu, Marina ; Cavalli, Fausto.
    In: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society.
    RePEc:hin:jnddns:273026.

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  8. Heterogeneity and the (de)stabilizing role of rationality. (2015). Naimzada, Ahmad ; Cavalli, Fausto ; Pireddu, Marina.
    In: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals.
    RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:79:y:2015:i:c:p:226-244.

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  9. Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment. (2013). Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:49375.

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  10. Preopening and Equilibrium Selection. (2010). Lovo, Stefano ; Calcagno, Riccardo .
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100023.

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  11. Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2009). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00354224.

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  12. Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. (2009). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:542-551.

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  13. Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution. (2008). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:4:p:1292-1311.

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  14. Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2007). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:61.

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  15. Efficiency, communication and honesty. (2006). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:hhs:hastef:0645.

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  16. Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication. (2006). Östling, Robert ; Ellingsen, Tore.
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. (2003). Skyrms, Brian .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
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  18. Long Cheap Talk. (2002). Hart, Sergiu ; Aumann, Robert.
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  19. Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners Dilemma. (2001). Yilankaya, Okan ; Wiseman, Thomas.
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  20. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. (2001). Skyrms, Brian .
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  21. What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?. (1998). Weibull, Jörgen.
    In: Working Paper Series.
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Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

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