[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
create a website
Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. (2003). Skyrms, Brian .
In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000799.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 0

Citations received by this document

Cites: 25

References cited by this document

Cocites: 24

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

    This document has not been cited yet.

References

References cited by this document

  1. Alexander, J. and Skyrms, B. (1999) Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? Journal of Philosophy 588-598.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. Aumann, R. J. (1990) Nash Equilibria are Not Self-Enforcing in Economic Decision Making, Games, Econometrics and Optimization. ed. J.J.Gabzewicz, J.-F. Richard and L.A.Wolsey North Holland:Amsterdam 201-206.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Banerjee, A, and Weibull, J. (2000) Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games Games and Economic Behavior 32, 1-24.

  4. Bhaskar, V. (1998) Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation Journal of Economic Theory 82, 110-131.

  5. Blume, A., Kim, Y-G., and Sobel, J. (1993) Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication Games and Economic Behavior 5, 547-575.

  6. Crawford, V. and Sobel, J. (1982) Strategic Information Transmission Econometrica 50, 1431-1451.

  7. Grafen, A. (1990) Biological Signals as Handicaps Journal of Theoretical Biology 144: 517-546.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  8. Kim, Y-G. and Sobel, J. (1995) An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication Econometrica 63, 1181-1193.

  9. Kullback, S. (1959) Information Theory and Statistics Wiley: New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  10. Kullback, S. and Leibler, R. A. (1951) On Information and Sufficiency Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22, 79-86.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. Lewis, D. K. (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  12. Lindley, D. (1956) On A Measure of the information Provided by an Experiment Annals of Mathematical Statistics 27, 986-1005.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  13. Nydegger, R. v. and Owen, G. (1974) Two-Person Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms International Journal of Game Theory III 239-250.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  14. Robson, A. J. (1990) Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake Journal of Theoretical Biology 144, 379-396.

  15. Roth, A. and Malouf, M. (1979) Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining Psychological Review LXXXVI 574-94.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  16. Schlag, K. (1993) Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics Discussion Paper. Bonn University.

  17. Schlag, K. (1994) When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games? Discusssion Paper. Bonn University.

  18. Skyrms, B. (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract. N.Y.: Cambridge.

  19. Skyrms, B. (1999) Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models Philosophy of Science 67, 94-113.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  20. Sobel, J. (1993) Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency Economic Letters 42, 301-312.

  21. Taylor, P. and Jonker, L. (1978) Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145-156.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  22. Van Huyck, J., Batallio, R. Mathur, S., Van Huyck, P. and Ortmann, A. (1995) On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games International Journal of Game Theory XXXIV 187-212.

  23. Warneryd, K. (1991) Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk Economic Letters 39, 295-300.

  24. Warneryd, K. (1993) Cheap Talk, Coordination and Evolutionary Stability Games and Economic Behavior 5, 532-546.

  25. Zahavi, A. (1975) Mate selection - a Selection for a Handicap Journal of Theoretical Biology 53, 205-214.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values. (2024). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:51-76.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Universalization and altruism. (2023). Laslier, Jean-François.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01426-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version). (2021). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:102926.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. The evolution of taking roles. (2020). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:174:y:2020:i:c:p:38-63.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. The Evolution of Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games. (2020). Staab, Manuel.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2011.02740.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values. (2020). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2005.05713.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values. (2019). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Heller, Yuval.
    In: Graz Economics Papers.
    RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. The evolution of taking roles. (2016). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian .
    In: BERG Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:bamber:115.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Effects of Size, Composition, and Evolutionary Pressure in Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies with Best Response Decisional Mechanisms. (2015). Naimzada, Ahmad ; Pireddu, Marina ; Cavalli, Fausto.
    In: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society.
    RePEc:hin:jnddns:273026.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Heterogeneity and the (de)stabilizing role of rationality. (2015). Naimzada, Ahmad ; Cavalli, Fausto ; Pireddu, Marina.
    In: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals.
    RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:79:y:2015:i:c:p:226-244.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment. (2013). Heller, Yuval.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:49375.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Preopening and Equilibrium Selection. (2010). Lovo, Stefano ; Calcagno, Riccardo .
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100023.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2009). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00354224.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. (2009). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:542-551.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution. (2008). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:4:p:1292-1311.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2007). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:61.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Efficiency, communication and honesty. (2006). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:hhs:hastef:0645.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication. (2006). Östling, Robert ; Ellingsen, Tore.
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. (2003). Skyrms, Brian .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000799.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners Dilemmas. Part I: Vulnerable Contingent Participators Versus Stable Contingent Cooperators. (2002). Heiner, Ronald Asher .
    In: CSLE Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:csledp:200209.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Long Cheap Talk. (2002). Hart, Sergiu ; Aumann, Robert.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners Dilemma. (2001). Yilankaya, Okan ; Wiseman, Thomas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:216-242.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information. (2001). Skyrms, Brian .
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:391749000000000001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-12-30 20:53:15 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.