Dear Tumbleweed users and hackers,

The end is near—the end of 2024, of course. This will be the last weekly review I’ll compose this year, as I’ll be logging off for the next two weeks. But worry not: Tumbleweed will continue rolling as it did in the past. So if you have spare time, feel free to submit your changes when they are ready.

During the last week, we managed to publish 5 snapshots (1213, 1215, 1216, 1217, and 1218), containing these changes:

• KDE Gear 24.12.0
• cURL 8.11.1
• GPG 2.5.2
• KDE Frameworks 6.9.0
• Mozilla Firefox 133.0.3
• lvm 2.03.29
• Ruby Rails 8.0

There are still a few things in the staging areas – whatever is being submitted will be staged. Currently, we are testing these changes:

• Ruby 3.4: subversion test suite fails
• Linux kernel 6.12.5
• systemd 257
• RPM 4.20
• Haskell 9.10

With this, I wish you a great time ahead and will be looking forward to working with you all on Tumbleweed in 2025 again.

Tumbleweed es una distribución de GNU/Linux «Rolling Release» o de actualización contínua. Aquí puedes estar al tanto de las últimas novedades.

openSUSE Tumbleweed es la versión «rolling release» o de actualización continua de la distribución de GNU/Linux openSUSE.

Hagamos un repaso a las novedades que han llegado hasta los repositorios esta semana.

Y recuerda que puedes estar al tanto de las nuevas publicaciones de snapshots en esta web:

• https://victorhck.gitlab.io/tumbleweed_snapshots/

Se nota que muchas de las personas responsables de los paquetes de software están de vacaciones, pero aún así un buen número de actualizaciones han llegado a los repositorios de Tumbleweed.

Esta semana se han publicado hasta el momento de escribir este artículo un total de 5 nuevas snapshots publicadas 1213, 1215, 1216, 1217 y 1218.

Las actualizaciones más destacadas de esta semana:

• KDE Gear 24.12.0
• KDE Frameworks 6.9.0
• Firefox 133.0.3

Pero hay mucho más que se está preparando

• Ruby 3.4 (Se publicará el 25 de diciembre y ya se está testeando la versión RC1
• Linux kernel 6.12.4
• Systemd 257
• Rails 8.0

Si quieres estar a la última con software actualizado y probado utiliza openSUSE Tumbleweed la opción rolling release de la distribución de GNU/Linux openSUSE.

Mantente actualizado y ya sabes: Have a lot of fun!!

Enlaces de interés

• ¿Por qué deberías utilizar openSUSE Tumbleweed?
• zypper dup en Tumbleweed hace todo el trabajo al actualizar
• ¿Cual es el mejor comando para actualizar Tumbleweed?
• ¿Qué es el test openQA?
• http://download.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/iso/
• https://es.opensuse.org/Portal:Tumbleweed

——————————–

YQPkg, a promising new package management tool for openSUSE, is preparing to make waves in the Linux community.

Designed as a standalone GUI, the software package offers a lightweight, intuitive alternative to traditional tools like YaST for users of openSUSE distributions.

YQPkg provides a glimpse into the future of package management on openSUSE systems. The usable alpha when packaged and released for Tumbleweed and Slowroll will include most of the key features necessary for effective package management.

YQPkg was developed during Hack Week 24 and is a standalone Qt-based package manager, free from YaST dependencies. It supports real package installation, updates, and removals with dependency resolution and user feedback. It’s alpha but usable, with read-only and root modes.

Users can run it as root for full functionality or as a regular user in read-only mode. It features a straightforward progress bar and users can toggle detailed views during operations.

However, some limitations remain. Repository refresh operations and gpg key handling are not yet implemented, so users are advised to manually refresh repositories (sudo zypper ref) before starting the program. YQPkg is still in active development, with known bugs and potential issues; IT IS RECOMMENDED TO AVOID USING IT ON CRITICAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AT THIS POINT.

Unlike its predecessor, YQPkg does not depend on YaST infrastructure as it relies only on libzypp. This independence ensures a streamlined experience and reduces some complexity. Libzypp is a C++-based package management library that handles package dependency resolution and management, independent of any graphical user interface framework like Qt.

The tool will introduce flexible summary views, allowing users to review completed tasks or return to previous steps for additional changes. Preferences like summary page settings and countdown timers are saved for future sessions.

Users wanting to explore YQPkg will be able to easily get started upon its release; after refreshing repositories with sudo zypper ref, users can download the latest alpha release and run the tool in either non-root read-only mode or with root permissions for full functionality; this accessibility ensures YQPkg is ready to meet the needs of both casual users and power users alike.

Though still in development, YQPkg is steadily evolving. Future updates promise enhancements like improved error handling, GPG key management, and repository refresh prompts. YQPkg is shaping up for a bright future related to package management within the openSUSE ecosystem.

You can build it from source from its GitHub repo. The current development status and screenshots are available here; scroll down for the latest news.

Esta novena entrega del año de la iniciativa #viernesdeescritorio que vuelve a los fondos clásicos. Bienvenidos a mi escritorio Plasma de diciembre 2024, realizado sobre mi portátil Slimbook Pro, con el que llegamos a las 55 entregas compartiendo «Mi escritorio» de forma mensual.

Mi escritorio Plasma de diciembre 2024 #viernesdeescritorio

Esta va a ser la quincuagésimoquinta (55 para los que nos cuesta leer esto) vez que muestro mi escritorio Plasma 6 en público, lo cual es número nada desdeñable de entradas que sigue creciendo de forma constante. Hice un recopilatorio con los 12 escritorios del 2022 y este diciembre he hecho una con los 13 del 2023. Por fin he encontrado el momento perfecto para hacer este tipo de entradas y pronto llegará la tercera edición ya que este año llega a su fin.

Y en esta ocasión lo realizao sobre mi Slimbook Pro, el cual tiene instalado un KDE Neon con Plasma 6.2.0, sobre una versión de KDE Frameworks 6.6 y una versión de Qt 6.7.2 El servidor gráfico es Wayland y el Kernel es 6.8.0-49-generic (64 bits). Sí, estas navidades toca actualizar con una nueva versión de KDE Neo.

He cambiado al tema global básico Brisa Ocsuro, con los iconos Deepin2022-Dark, he puesto la barra de actividades a la derecha para aprovechar el ancho de la pantalla, a ver si me acostrumbro de una vez por todas.

He puesto el reloj-calendario Nemmayan de Zayronoxio, que le queda de fábula sobre un fondo navideño. He elegido este widget porque en estas fiestas está bien tener a simple vista el día de la semana en la que estás.

El resultado de mi escritorio Plasma de diciembre de 2024 es un entorno de trabajo oscuro y, como siempre, funcional que podéis ver en la imagen inferior (pinchad sobre ella para verlo un poco más grande).

La entrada Mi escritorio Plasma de diciembre 2024 #viernesdeescritorio se publicó primero en KDE Blog.

The release of Leap 15.6 on June 12 set in motion the End of Life for maintenance and security for Leap 15.5, which will happen at the end of December.

Users should upgrade to openSUSE Leap 15.6 to continue to receive security and maintenance updates. Leap versions have a six-month end-of-life period after the release of a new version.

The openSUSE Project is in the development for stage forLeap 16.0 with the pre-Alpha version people can test.

Early adopters and contributors are encouraged to explore this release and provide feedback to shape the next Leap release, which will come with the Agama installer.

Visit get.opensuse.org to try an openSUSE distribution. For users seeking extended support, SUSE offers long-term support options through its subscription services.

Os presento las novedades de Dolphin en KDE Gear 24.12, el tercer artículo de la serie de la última actualización del ecosistema de aplicaciones de KDE, otro paso adelante en la mejora continua del proyecto. Nunca está de más recordar que Dolphin es el mejor explorador de ficheros que puedes utilizar, tanto en entornos libres como privativos.

Novedades de Dolphin en KDE Gear 24.12

Prácticamente todos los que prueban Dolphin opinan lo mismo: no tiene rival. Sus posibilidades tanto de gestión de ficheros, opciones de vistas, funcionalidades diversas, búquedas, filtros, amplicaciones con los Service Menu, etc. lo hacen imbatible… y sigue mejorando versión a versión.

Los últimos cambios realizados en el explorador y gestor de archivos de KDE para la versión de KDE Gear 24.12tienen mucho que ver con la accesibilidad^* y la usabilidad.

Para empezar, la vista principal de Dolphin se ha revisado por completo para que funcione con lectores de pantalla y se ha mejorado la navegación con el teclado: al pulsar Ctrl+L se cambia de enfocar y seleccionar la ruta de la barra de ubicación a enfocar la vista. Al pulsar Escape en la barra de ubicación se cambia ahora el foco a la vista activa.

Además, la navegación con el teclado en la barra de herramientas también se ha mejorado: los elementos obtienen ahora el foco en el orden correcto.

POr otra parte, Dolphin ordena ahora los archivos de una forma más natural y «humana» en esta versión: por ejemplo, un archivo con el nombre «a.txt» aparecerá antes que un archivo con el nombre «a 2.txt». Además, también se pueden ordenar los vídeos por su duración.

Para velar por la seguridad y facilitar la comprobación de archivos, se ha renovado la pestaña de sumas de verificación y permisos en el diálogo de Propiedades de Dolphin. También podrás ver esta mejora en otras aplicaciones de KDE.

Por último… ¡Dolphin se ha hecho móvil! Dolphin incluye ahora una interfaz optimizada para dispositivos móviles en Plasma Mobile. Tras la incorporación de un modo de selección y mejoras de compatibilidad con pantallas táctiles, Dolphin funciona sorprendentemente bien en los teléfonos. Dicho esto, todavía se necesita más trabajo y se planea hacerlo a lo largo del tiempo para alinear mejor la interfaz de usuario con las expectativas típicas de las aplicaciones móviles.

Como vemos, han sido miuchas novedades, ya que se ha trabajado mucho en la accesibilidad en esta aplicación, y esto tiene una explicación ya que ^muchas de las mejoras han sido posibles gracias a la financiación proporcionada por el NGI0 Entrust Fund, un fondo creado por NLnet con el apoyo financiero del programa Internet de próxima generación de la Comisión Europea.

Más información: KDE Gear 24.12

La entrada Novedades de Dolphin en KDE Gear 24.12 se publicó primero en KDE Blog.

Table of Contents

• 1) Introduction
• 2) Issues in krb5_child Helper
  • Upstream Fix
• 3) Issues in sssd_pam Helper
  • Upstream Fix
• 4) Notes on the selinux_child Helper
• 5) Notes on the ldap_child Helper
• 6) Issues in the sssd.service Unit
  • Upstream Fix
• 7) Further Observations
  • 7.a) Environment Variables
  • 7.b) Dumpable Process Attribute Setting
  • 7.c) Debugging Settings
• 8) Suggested Fixes
• 9) Situation on Other Distributions
• 10) Timeline
• 11) References

1) Introduction

SSSD (System Security Services Daemon) is a suite of daemons dealing with user authentication based on mechanisms like LDAP, Kerberos and FreeIPA. This report is based on SSSD release 2.10.0.

SSSD supports setting up user privilege separation by specifying the build time configure switch --with-sssd-user=.... The default in many Linux distributions is still to run SSSD as root, though. When privilege separation is enabled, then file based capabilities are assigned to a couple of helper binaries shipped by SSSD:

/usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_pam      root:sssd 0750 cap_dac_read_search=p
/usr/libexec/sssd/selinux_child root:sssd 0750 cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ep
/usr/libexec/sssd/krb5_child    root:sssd 0750 cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ep
/usr/libexec/sssd/ldap_child    root:sssd 0750 cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ep

Only members of the group of the dedicated sssd account are allowed to execute these privileged helpers. In SSSD before version 2.10.0 these helpers (with the exception of sssd_pam) had setuid-root bits. With commit 7239dd6791 this has been changed to using capabilities instead.

Our openSUSE SSSD packagers enabled privilege separation for the first time in conjunction with the update to version 2.10.0. This caused the privileged helpers to pop up on our radar, and we reviewed them. We found that these helper binaries do not currently provide proper privilege separation in SSSD. Some of them offer attack vectors to escalate to root again, or obtain powerful capabilities. Also the systemd service unit of SSSD has issues when privilege separation is active. The privileged helpers are not world-accessible, so no immediate exploitation by local users beyond the dedicated sssd account is possible.

We privately reported the findings described below to the Red Hat Security team on Nov 15. A coordinated disclosure process was in place for about a month, until the SSSD developers decided that the issues are not security issues, based on the following reasons:

• the issues are not directly exploitable, but only affect defense-in-depth.
• the sssd user and group are powerful by design, since these daemons influence the outcome of authentication.
• privilege separation has been introduced as additional hardening, not as a strong security layer.
• privilege separation was also introduced for some cosmetic purposes: “to allow running SSSD in restricted environment that do not support/allow running apps under uid=0/in user-ns (like restricted OCP profiles)”.

In our opinion, these issues are still security relevant. Consider for example a scenario where a system administrator or packager would allow execution of the privileged binaries to all users in the system, either by accident or by a false expectation of security. While it is common practice to deny world access to privileged binaries, in our experience this is usually done as a hardening measure only, not to protect against known weaknesses in programs. While the permissions of the helpers are correctly applied in SSSD’s installation routine, there is no documentation found that these helpers are security sensitive and must not be accessible to accounts other than sssd.

We did not press for CVE assignments, although we believe that formally they would still be justified. We recognize that it can still be an improvement to run SSSD processes as non-root, even if the privileged helpers allow escalation back to root.

Upstream has nonetheless worked and still works on a range of fixes to address findings from this report. The individual issues we identified are discussed in the following sections.

2) Issues in krb5_child Helper

Like most of the other helpers, this program accepts binary input on STDIN. The krb5_child helper reads the large and complex data structures struct krb5_req and struct pam_data. Interesting struct fields in this context are krb5_req.ccname and krb5_req.keytab, which specify file paths to process.

The ccname field is used in the code path privileged_krb5_setup() → k5c_ccache_setup() → k5c_precreate_ccache(). This ends up in a loop that creates all the parent directories of the path specified via STDIN, using uid and gid values also received from STDIN.

This proof-of-concept shows how to create arbitrary new directories with arbitrary ownership this way. This very likely allows a full local root exploit by skillfully creating directories under attacker control, e.g. directories used during lookup for trusted system binaries or libraries, or directories in /etc that are used for trusted configuration files or privileged services.

Upstream Fix

This specific escalation path has been addressed in the SSSD 2.10.1 bugfix release. Given the extensive interface offered by this helper program it is likely that further such escalation vectors exist. Since upstream does not consider this a strong security barrier, we have not looked any deeper into this component.

3) Issues in sssd_pam Helper

This helper starts a server instance which offers a socket-based IPC interface for passing PAM operation requests to it. This is the only helper that has more limited capabilities, namely only CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, which allows to override any read-access permission checks.

In the code path server_setup() → confdb_init() the following environment variables are interpreted in ldb_init() (which is part of Samba library code):

• LDB_MODULES_PATH
• LDB_MODULES_ENABLE_DEEPBIND
• TDB_NO_FSYNC

The LDB_MODULES_PATH variable allows the caller to specify a directory from which arbitrary shared objects are loaded via dlopen(). This simple proof-of-concept shows how to exploit this situation to gain access to the contents of /etc/shadow.

Contrary to the other helper programs, sssd_pam was not assigned setuid-root bits previously. The CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH has only more recently been added via commit 0562646cc261, to allow it to access keytabs without having to run as root.

Upstream Fix

There is a pending upstream pull request to clear the environment of this helper to prevent this specific privilege escalation path.

4) Notes on the selinux_child Helper

We haven’t found any specific privilege escalation paths in this helper. The nature of this helper is to allow modification of SELinux MLS mappings, though. It accepts the new MLS range for arbitrary usernames via a binary protocol on STDIN. In an SELinux MLS managed system this is a pretty strong privilege for SSSD to have. Since this is likely by design, we suppose there is little that can be done about that, except for documenting the sensitive nature of the helper and that access to it must be well restricted.

The helper performs calls into shared SSSD library code and into libsemanage and libselinux. Luckily we couldn’t find any cases where overly problematic environment variables are interpreted (beyond the common variables listed in section 7.a).

This helper also changes its UID and GID to 0 early on. When transitioning to UID 0, the kernel does not assign the full set of capabilities to the process again. This means that the process runs under restricted root privileges, having UID and GID 0 but only the capabilities assigned to the selinux_child binary. Additionally, the SSSD processes run with the systemd hardening feature SecureBits=noroot noroot-locked, thus preventing the helper from using setuid binaries like sudo to regain full root privileges.

The security of restricted root privileges in Linux is lacking, though. The Linux kernel uses capabilities for its permission checks, but userspace utilities normally only rely on other process’s UID and GID credentials. Also some APIs lack the possibility to express restricted root privileges, e.g. in UNIX domain sockets the SO_PEERCRED option is used to determine the credentials of a peer process, which only provides a struct ucred, containing the peer process’s PID, UID and GID. Thus this helper runs with privileges close to full root.

5) Notes on the ldap_child Helper

We couldn’t find any bigger problems in this helper, beyond the generic comments in section 7) that also apply to this helper.

6) Issues in the sssd.service Unit

The sssd.service systemd unit contains the following ExecStartPre lines:

ExecStartPre=+-/bin/chown -f -R root:@SSSD_USER@ @sssdconfdir@
ExecStartPre=+-/bin/chmod -f -R g+r @sssdconfdir@
ExecStartPre=+-/bin/sh -c "/bin/chown -f @SSSD_USER@:@SSSD_USER@ @dbpath@/*.ldb"
ExecStartPre=+-/bin/chown -f -R @SSSD_USER@:@SSSD_USER@ @gpocachepath@
ExecStartPre=+-/bin/sh -c "/bin/chown -f @SSSD_USER@:@SSSD_USER@ @logpath@/*.log"

The directories /var/log/sssd and /var/lib/sssd are owned by the unprivileged sssd user. The chown and chmod lines above, which are run as root, allow a compromised sssd user to stage symlink attacks and thus gain ownership of, or access to, privileged system files.

This is a simple proof-of-concept demonstrating the issue:

# stage a symlink attack to gain ownership of /etc/shadow
sssd$ cd /var/log/sssd
sssd$ ln -s /etc/shadow my.log
# as root trigger a sssd (re)start
# sssd needs to be configured (i.e. /etc/sssd & friends need to exist) for this to work
root# systemctl restart sssd.service
root# ls -lh /etc/shadow
-rw------- 1 sssd sssd 889 Nov 13 11:40 /etc/shadow

As the directories that are affected by this are not world-writable and don’t carry a sticky bit, the Linux kernel’s symlink protection does not come to the rescue here. Path arguments that are named directly on the command line of chown or chmod will be followed, if they’re symlinks, unless --no-dereference is passed. Passing this option is also the recommended fix for this.

In our opinion such automatic permission “fixes” should be treated with care. If this is to avoid any trouble with migration from older installations (without privilege separation) then we would rather offer an explicit utility for system administrators to run. This would make clear that the logic only runs once and not every time sssd is started. It also would prevent any configuration errors from persisting or from being masked (e.g. other components in the system that assign bad permissions to SSSD files, thus fighting against the automatic permission fixes).

Upstream Fix

There is a pending upstream pull request to pass --no-dreference to the chown invocations found in the systemd service unit.

7) Further Observations

7.a) Environment Variables

There are further environment variables interpreted by the helper programs:

• TALLOC_FREE_FILL: will cause memory free()‘d via talloc_free() to be overwritten with the byte set in this variable.
• _SSS_DOM: will influence systemd journal log messages and thus allow a bit of log spoofing.

While these variables have only minor influence on program execution, privileged programs should not allow arbitrary environment settings to affect their behaviour.

7.b) Dumpable Process Attribute Setting

All of the privileged helpers support a --dumpable command line switch to control whether the process will have the dumpable bit set or not. The default for this even is to mark the process as dumpable (SUID_DUMP_USER). This somewhat unexpectedly overrides the sysctl setting fs.suid_dumpable, which is usually 0 or 2.

The dumpable setting of a process is a sensitive property that plays an important role in the ptrace() system call to determine whether tracing another process is allowed. From man 2 ptrace:

These checks are performed in cases where one process can inspect sensitive information about, or in some cases modify the state of, another process. The checks are based on factors such as the credentials and capabilities of the two processes, whether or not the “target” process is dumpable […]

We believe the only barrier left that prevents the unprivileged sssd user from being allowed to trace the privileged binaries is this (further excerpt from man 2 ptrace):

(5.2) Deny access if neither of the following is true: - The caller and the target process are in the same user namespace, and the caller’s capabilities are a superset of the target process’s permitted capabilities.

Attaching via ptrace() is only denied because the target processes have raised capabilities. However, this is only a kind of kernel security extension, provided by the kernel security module security_ptrace_access_check().

Besides this, the dumpable setting allows the unprivileged user to send e.g. a SIGSEGV signal to the privileged processes and force them to dump core. What happens from here depends on the core dump handler installed in the system. systemd-coredump safely handles such core dumps and the unprivileged user cannot access them. If only core is configured as a core pattern, like it is the case on Debian Linux by default, for example, then the unprivileged user can cause the core file to be created in arbitrary directories, by first changing into them, starting the privileged process, then killing it. The core file will not be readable for the unprivileged user, but it still allows to clutter the file system and maybe even overwrite legit files that are named core.

7.c) Debugging Settings

The privileged programs also offer rich command line settings for enabling debugging output and redirecting it to various locations. Generally, privileged programs should be very careful about what kind of information is leaked to the caller. The debugging logs can contain information that weakens security features (like stack overflow protection) or leak privileged information that has been read in from privileged files.

8) Suggested Fixes

For privileged setuid-root-like binaries the usual precautions should be taken:

• change into a safe current working directory (CWD).
• apply a safe umask (this already happens)
• cleanse the environment from any untrusted variables, only keep a whitelist of vetted variables. E.g. also set a safe PATH.
• make sure none of the interfaces (command line parameters, STDIN data input) offers possibilities for the unprivileged caller to escalate their privileges beyond the scope of what the privileged program is supposed to do.

The last item will likely be the most difficult to realize for the programs in question - especially in the krb5_child helper we expect more attack surface to exist, for example in the handling of the ccache and keytab files. These are dealt with in various other code paths via krb5 library routines that are unaware of the untrusted input. We suggested upstream to carefully think through all the possible inputs and code paths and to tighten them.

We would furthermore strip down the supported command line switches, or limit critical switches to callers that are root, notably the switches that influence debugging and logging as mentioned in section 7.c.

The dumpable setting should be left unchanged in the privilege escalation context.

Finally we suggest to clearly document what can be expected of the privilege separation feature and how the privileged helpers need to be packaged in order to achieve a safe installation (especially that they must not be world executable). This already happened in the description of the 2.10.1 bugfix release.

9) Situation on Other Distributions

We looked into a number of other Linux distributions and found that on Fedora, Debian and Ubuntu the SSSD privilege separation is not currently used. On Arch Linux the current 2.10.0 version is used together with privilege separation, though, which is affected by the issues covered in this report. Upstream informed us that there are plans for Fedora Linux to use the privilege separation feature soon as well.

10) Timeline

11) References

• sssd GitHub project
• sssd 2.10.1 release containing a first batch of fixes addressing issues from this report
• Pending hardening pull request containing further fixes

Hace mucho tiempo publiqué el mapa generado en Google de los usuarios de KDE. Ese mapa era colaborativo y voluntario pero generado sobre Software Privativo. En varias ocasiones pedí que alguien lo cambiara a OpenStreetMap y mis súplicas fueron escuchadas. Ya casi había olvidado este proyecto pero este agosto lo recuperé, publicitándolo en el grupo de Telegram KDE – Cañas y Bravas y parece que el proyecto ha tomado impulso, así que he decidido seguir ppublicitándolo durante unos meses. Así que, tras un mes de descando, os doy la bienvenida a la actualización de diciembre_24 del mapa de usuarios KDE que, como vais a ver, se ha sigue llenand pero todavía no tenemos a nadie en Cáceres ,Lleida, Cuenca, Salamanca o Huesca, por poner algunas capitales de provincia. ¿No podemos solucionar este vacío?

Actualización de diciembre_24 del mapa de usuarios KDE

Si vais a ver el mapa de la Comunidad KDE de España marzo 2018, podréis ver una imagen estática de los usuarios que se habían puesto voluntariamente , y digo estática, porque alguien borró (queriendo o sin querer) los «pines» del mapa.

Ese incidente fue comentado en el grupo de Telegram KDE – Cañas y Bravas, y un usuario dijo que trabajaría en ello aprovechando que se debía empezar de nuevo el mapa.

Este compañero de grupo era @wakutiteo y creó, utilizando los servicios de uMap sobre OpenStreetMap el nuevo mapa de la usuarios KDE en España en el que podemos empezar a registrarnos.

En un principio había poca poca gente apuntada (mirad la entrada de junio de 2018) pero poco a poco se ha ido llenando, a pesar de la poca promoción que ha tenido. A ver si a partir de ahora voy dándole más cancha y el mapa crece . De momento pongo la captura de pantalla de este mes de agosto, la del mes de septiembre y la de este octubre del 2024 para que veamos la evolución, lenta pero constante.

Agosto 2024

Septiembre 2024

Octubre 2024

Diciembre 2024

Como vemos, siguen apareciendo poco a poco más usuarios, con una espectacular crecimiento en Andalucía, Galicia, todo el norte y este peninsular.

Pero seguimos sin usuarios en capitales de provincia como Cáceres, Lleida, Cuenca, Salamanca, Huelva, Ciudad Real, Albaceta, Zamora, Lugo, Soria, Teruel, Segovia, Tarragona, Girona, Alicante, Guadalajara, Santiago de Compostela, Pontevedra o Ávila, si no he mirado mal (que es posible).

Evidentemente, es voluntario y apuntaros es bajo vuestra propia responsabilidad. Os dejo también el mapa incrustado que se irá actualizando poco a poco.

Mostra-ho a pantalla completa

Pincha para ver en pantalla completa

Y también os dejo un vídeo de cómo editar el mapa para poder apuntaros.

¿Qué es Umap?

Básicamente, con uMap puedes crear mapas con capas de OpenStreetMap en un minuto e incrustarlo en tu página web, de código libre. Con uMap puedes realizar las siguientes acciones:

• Elegir las capas de tu mapa
• Añadir PDIs: marcadores, líneas, polígonos…
• Elegir los colores y los iconos de los PDIs
• Gestionar opciones del mapa: mostrar un minimapa, localizar al usuario al cargar…
• Importar por lotes datos geoestructurados (geojson, gpx, kml, osm…)
• Elegir la licencia de tus datos
• Embeber y compartir tu mapa

La entrada Actualización de diciembre_24 del mapa de usuarios KDE se publicó primero en KDE Blog.