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WO2024166075A1 - Procédés et appareils pour protéger la confidentialité d'indications de cause dans une messagerie de gestion des ressources radio - Google Patents

Procédés et appareils pour protéger la confidentialité d'indications de cause dans une messagerie de gestion des ressources radio Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024166075A1
WO2024166075A1 PCT/IB2024/051291 IB2024051291W WO2024166075A1 WO 2024166075 A1 WO2024166075 A1 WO 2024166075A1 IB 2024051291 W IB2024051291 W IB 2024051291W WO 2024166075 A1 WO2024166075 A1 WO 2024166075A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network node
indication
cause
key
target network
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2024/051291
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English (en)
Inventor
Md MOHSIN ALI KHAN
Mattias BERGSTRÖM
Antonino ORSINO
Niraj Rathod
Vlasios Tsiatsis
Monica Wifvesson
Original Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) filed Critical Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Publication of WO2024166075A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024166075A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/19—Connection re-establishment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/27—Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states

Definitions

  • Embodiments described herein relate to methods and apparatuses to protect confidentiality of cause indications in radio resource control messaging.
  • a user equipment selects a Radio Resource Control (RRC) establishment cause value according to its access identity and access category based on the rules specified in table 4.5.6.1 and table 4.5.6.2 in TS 24.501 V18.1.0.
  • the establishment cause value is sent in the clear over-the-air in RRC Setup Request messages.
  • UEs assigned access identities 11-15 will send establishment cause values of “highPriority Access”, which affords them admission benefits when accessing the network.
  • New Radio (NR) also supports two new establishment cause values, “mps-Priority Access” and “mcs- Priority Access”, which indicate that UEs assigned access identity 1 and 2 are permitted to use multimedia priority services and mission critical services, respectively.
  • the priority access cause values are different and can be distinguished from the cause values used by ordinary user equipments (UEs) assigned access identity of 0.
  • UEs with access identity 0 use establishment cause values that include: “mt-Access”, “emergency”, “mo-Signalling”, “mo-SMS”, “mo-VoiceCall”, etc.
  • a UE resumes a suspended connection it sends an RRC resume cause value in the RRC Resume Request message.
  • the options for the resume cause values are the same as for the establishment cause values.
  • the resume cause value is also sent in the clear over-the-air.
  • the establishment cause/resume cause can also be linked to other identifiers that appear during an RRC Connection.
  • TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • C-RNTI Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier
  • RAR Random Access Response
  • MAC Medium Access Control
  • IE establishment cause value information element
  • priority users are easily distinguishable from other subscriber groups and can be tracked based on the RRC establishment cause.
  • the exposed establishment cause and resume cause reveal private user information and introduce privacy threats. This information leakage makes it possible to infer the group membership of priority users, the general location of priority users (e.g., localize users to specific cells), the number of priority users (e.g., as distinguished by different TMSIs), and the type of priority users (e.g., as distinguished by different priority establishment/resume causes).
  • Priority access UEs can be tracked within and across cells using the establishment cause coupled with the C-RNTI. Additionally, RRC Connections can be linked together until the TMSI is reassigned as there is no relationship between a TMSI allocation timespan and an RRC Connection. For example, it is left to the implementation to re-assign 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI) after a Service Request message from the UE is not triggered by the network. Inevitably, the TMSI and C-RNTI will change, but if the establishment cause remains the same, it can be determined that the UE is one with high priority. This is valid whether a UE stays within the same cell or moves across cells because the UE will likely complete the RRC connection setup procedure often, exposing the establishment cause, TMSI, and C-RNTI each time.
  • GUI Globally Unique Temporary Identifier
  • the threat varies depending on the number of priority users in the area tracked by an attacker. If there are a few priority users, it may be possible to track them individually across various connections using some assumptions (e.g., no new priority users are attaching, the same users are re-establishing connections, etc.). In a situation where there are many priority users, it may be difficult to single out and track a specific user, but the ability to track a group of priority users as they move through the network is a privacy threat, in and of itself.
  • the detection of priority access users may be a prelude to another (e.g., kinetic) attack on priority access users.
  • the privacy attack allows inference of the group membership and is independent to the number of priority users.
  • RRC_INACTIVE is an inactive RRC state where a UE remains in Connection Management connected (CM-CONNECTED) state, and can move within an area configured by the Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) (e.g. the RAN based Notification area (RNA)) without notifying NG-RAN.
  • NG-RAN Next Generation Radio Access Network
  • RNA RAN based Notification area
  • RRC_INACTIVE the last serving base station (e.g. gNB node) keeps the UE context and the UE-associated Next Generation (NG) connection with the serving Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and User Plane Function (UPF).
  • AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
  • UPF User Plane Function
  • the last serving gNB receives Downlink (DL) data from the UPF or DL UE-associated signalling from the AMF (except the UE Context Release Command message) while the UE is in RRCJNACTIVE, it pages in the cells corresponding to the RNA and may send XnAP RAN Paging to neighbour gNB(s) if the RNA includes cells of neighbour gNB(s).
  • the last serving gNB may page in the cells corresponding to the RNA and may send XnAP RAN Paging to neighbour gNB(s) if the RNA includes cells of neighbour gNB(s), in order to release UE explicitly.
  • the last serving gNB may page involved UEs in the cells corresponding to the RNA and may send XnAP RAN Paging to neighbour gNB(s) if the RNA includes cells of neighbour gNB(s) in order to explicitly release involved UEs.
  • the gNB Upon RAN paging failure, the gNB behaves according to TS 23.501 v 17.5.0.
  • the AMF provides to the NG-RAN node the Core Network Assistance Information to assist the NG-RAN node's decision whether the UE can be sent to RRC_INACTIVE, and to assist UE configuration and paging in RRC_INACTIVE.
  • the Core Network Assistance Information includes the registration area configured for the UE, the Periodic Registration Update timer, and the UE Identity Index value, and may include the UE specific DRX, an indication if the UE is configured with Mobile Initiated Connection Only (MICO) mode by the AMF, the Expected UE Behaviour, the UE Radio Capability for Paging, the Paging early indication (PEI) with Paging Subgrouping assistance information and the NR Paging extended discontinuous reception (eDRX) Information and Paging Cause Indication for Voice Service.
  • MICO Mobile Initiated Connection Only
  • the UE registration area is taken into account by the NG-RAN node when configuring the RNA.
  • the UE specific DRX and UE Identity Index value are used by the NG-RAN node for RAN paging.
  • the Periodic Registration Update timer is taken into account by the NG-RAN node to configure Periodic RNA Update timer.
  • the NG-RAN node takes into account the Expected UE Behaviour to assist the UE RRC state transition decision.
  • the NG-RAN node may use the UE Radio Capability for Paging during RAN Paging.
  • the NG-RAN node takes into account the PEI with Paging Subgrouping assistance information for subgroup paging in RRCJNACTIVE.
  • the PEI with Paging Subgrouping assistance information may be included.
  • the NG-RAN node takes into account the NR Paging eDRX Information to configure the RAN Paging when the NR UE is in RRCJNACTIVE.
  • the NR Paging eDRX Information for RRC DLE and for RRC NACTIVE may be included.
  • the NG-RAN node takes into consideration the Paging Cause Indication for Voice Service to include the Paging Cause in RAN Paging for a UE in RRCJNACTIVE state.
  • the Paging Cause may be included.
  • the NG-RAN node may configure the UE with a periodic RNA Update timer value.
  • the gNB behaves as specified in TS 23.501 v 17.5.0. If the UE accesses a gNB other than the last serving gNB, the receiving gNB triggers the XnAP Retrieve UE Context procedure to get the UE context from the last serving gNB and may also trigger an Xn-U Address Indication procedure including tunnel information for potential recovery of data from the last serving gNB.
  • the receiving gNB Upon successful UE context retrieval, the receiving gNB shall perform the slice-aware admission control in case of receiving slice information and becomes the serving gNB and it further triggers the NGAP Path Switch Request and applicable RRC procedures. After the path switch procedure, the serving gNB triggers release of the UE context at the last serving gNB by means of the XnAP UE Context Release procedure.
  • the gNB shall fail any AMF initiated UE-associated class 1 procedure which allows the signalling of unsuccessful operation in the respective response message. It may trigger the NAS Non Delivery Indication procedure to report the non-delivery of any non Protocol Data unit (PDU) Session related Non-Access Stratum (NAS) PDU received from the AMF as specified in TS 38.413.
  • PDU Protocol Data unit
  • NAS Non-Access Stratum
  • the receiving gNB can perform establishment of a new RRC connection instead of resumption of the previous RRC connection.
  • UE context retrieval will also fail and hence a new RRC connection needs to be established if the serving AMF changes.
  • a UE in the RRC_INACTIVE state is required to initiate RNA update procedure when it moves out of the configured RNA.
  • the receiving gNB triggers the XnAP Retrieve UE Context procedure to get the UE context from the last serving gNB and may decide to send the UE back to RRC_INACTIVE state, move the UE into RRC_CONNECTED state, or send the UE to RRC_IDLE.
  • the last serving gNB decides not to relocate the UE context, it fails the Retrieve UE Context procedure and sends the UE back to RRCJNACTIVE, or to RRC_IDLE directly by an encapsulated RRCRelease message.
  • Figure 1 illustrates the UE triggered transition from RRCJNACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED in case of UE context retrieval success.
  • Step 101 The UE resumes from RRCJNACTIVE, providing the Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier (I-RNTI), allocated by the last serving gNB.
  • I-RNTI Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier
  • Step 102 The gNB, if able to resolve the gNB identity contained in the I-RNTI, requests the last serving gNB to provide UE Context data.
  • Tep 103 The last serving gNB provides UE context data.
  • Step 104/105 The gNB and UE completes the resumption of the RRC connection.
  • Step 106 User Data can also be sent in step 105 if the grant allows. Step 106. If loss of DL user data buffered in the last serving gNB shall be prevented, the gNB provides forwarding addresses.
  • Step 107/108 The gNB performs path switch.
  • Step 109 The gNB triggers the release of the UE resources at the last serving gNB.
  • step 101 above when the gNB decides to use a single RRC message to reject the Resume Request right away and keep the UE in RRC_INACTIVE without any reconfiguration (e.g. as described in the two examples below), or when the gNB decides to setup a new RRC connection, SRB0 (without security) is used. Conversely, when the gNB decides to reconfigure the UE (e.g. with a new DRX cycle or RNA) or when the gNB decides to push the UE to an idle state (RRC_IDLE), Signaling Radio Bearer SRB 1 (with integrity protection and ciphering as previously configured for that SRB) shall be used.
  • RRC_IDLE Signaling Radio Bearer SRB 1 (with integrity protection and ciphering as previously configured for that SRB) shall be used.
  • SRB1 can only be used once the UE Context is retrieved i.e. after step 103.
  • Figure 2 illustrates a UE triggered transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED in case of UE context retrieval failure.
  • Step 201 The UE resumes from RRC_INACTIVE, providing the I-RNTI, allocated by the last serving gNB.
  • Step 202 The gNB, if able to resolve the gNB identity contained in the I-RNTI, requests the last serving gNB to provide UE Context data.
  • Step 203 The last serving gNB cannot retrieve or verify the UE context data.
  • Step 204 The last serving gNB indicates the failure to the gNB.
  • Step 205 The gNB performs a fallback to establish a new RRC connection by sending RRCSetup.
  • Step 206 A new connection is setup as described in clause 9.2.1.3.1 of TS 38.300 version 15.11.0.
  • Figure 3 illustrates a rejection from the network when the UE attempts to resume a connection from RRCJNACTIVE:
  • Step 301 UE attempts to resume the connection from RRC_IN ACTIVE.
  • Step 302. The gNB is not able to handle the procedure, for instance due to congestion.
  • Step 303 The gNB sends RRCReject (with a wait time) to keep the UE in RRC_IN ACTIVE.
  • Figure 4 illustrates the network triggered transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED.
  • Step 401 A RAN paging trigger event occurs (incoming DL user plane, DL signalling from 5GC, etc.).
  • Step 402. RAN paging is triggered; either only in the cells controlled by the last serving gNB or also by means of Xn RAN Paging in cells controlled by other gNBs, configured to the UE in the RAN- based Notification Area (RNA).
  • RNA Notification Area
  • Step 403. The UE is paged with the I-RNTI .
  • Step 404 If the UE has been successfully reached, it attempts to resume from RRC_INACTIVE, as described in clause 9.2.2.4.1 of TS 38.300 version 15.11.0.
  • 5G NR introduced RRC INACTIVE state for the UE. It is in addition to already existing RRC IDLE and RRC CONNECTED states for the UE in legacy radio access technology such as LTE.
  • UE Possible state machine and state transitions in 5G NR.
  • Figure 5 illustrates UE RRC State Transitions in 5G NR.
  • RRCResumeRequest When a UE transitions from RRC INACTIVE state to RRC CONNECTED state, it sends RRCResumeRequest.
  • the RRCResumeRequest message is used to request the resumption of a suspended RRC connection or perform an RNA update.
  • the resumeCause is one of the information elements (IE) within the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the resume cause values are encoded in an ENUMERATED bit string that consist of four bits - providing 16 possible values. Of these 16 values, 11 are actually used and 5 are reserved for future use. Please note that according to TS 38.331 v 17.3.0 clause 6.3.2 the establishment cause, the resume cause, and the reestablishment cause are encoded all in the exact same way.
  • UEs using priority access can be distinguished from other subscriber groups based on the RRC resumeCause values in the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the RRCResumeRequest message’s resumeCause is set to highPriority Access, mps-Priority Access, and mcs- Priority Access.
  • the RRCResumeRequest is sent in Signalling Radio Bearer (SRB) 0 over Common Control Channel (CCCH) logical channel.
  • SRB Signalling Radio Bearer
  • CCCH Common Control Channel
  • the resumeCause IE is sent in clear over the air.
  • the clear text resumeCause is a potential vulnerability that could be exploited to be an attack vector by an adversary intercepting Uplink (UL) communication from UE to the network.
  • UL Uplink
  • the resultant privacy threat is that human users with UEs using priority access can be tracked until their RRC connection is released or until it is assigned a new or additional C-RNTI.
  • RRC Connections may be linked together until the TMSI is reassigned as there is no relationship between a TMSI allocation timespan and an RRC Connection.
  • our solution proposes to introduce confidentiality protection of the clear text ‘resumeCause’ in RRCResumeRequest message using encryption, for example, symmetric key encryption. It will be appreciated that embodiments described herein may be equally applied to other cause indications such as cause indications in establishment or re-establishment messages.
  • the gNB/ng-eNB After sending and receiving the RRCRelease with suspendConfig message, the gNB/ng-eNB enters the RRC Inactive state. While transitioning from the RRC Inactive state to RRC Connected state, the UE sends RRCResumeRequest message that includes the resumeCause in clear text. In embodiments described herein, at least the resumeCause is encrypted.
  • the proposed encryption may be performed by utilizing a symmetric key that is part of the AS security context of the UE before receiving the RRCRelsease message.
  • the key may be referred to as or derived from K g NB-
  • KRR L.IIC and K g NB are already available in the current standards (e.g. TS 133.502 v 15.1.0).
  • the required cryptographic details (e.g., keys and NONCE) for the encryption may be indicated by the gNB/ng-eNB to the UE, for example, in the RRCRelease message.
  • the encryption may be length-preserving, i.e., the length of the bit string representing the resumeCause in plaintext may remain the same for the bit string of the encrypted resumeCause.
  • the encryption may also be done using a public key in the network.
  • the public key of the network may be transported to the UE using a integrity protected message, e.g., the RRCRelease message.
  • the gNB/ng-eNB may resolves the key and other cryptographic details needed to decrypt the resumeCause.
  • the resolution may be performed using the short I-RNTI that the UE transmits in plaintext as part of the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the decryption may be done by the source network node or the target network node.
  • the synchronization details related to the UE, source network node and target network node (when they are different) are presented in Section 2.7 that explains the details.
  • using symmetric -key encryption to encrypt the resumeCause- When a symmetric key is used, using the keys that are already available or derived from available keys - reusing the existing trust model.
  • using a length preserving encryption algorithm avoids changing the existing RRCResumeRequest message’s structure.
  • using a UE capability message to indicate to the radio network node that the UE can encrypt resume cause values using a UE capability message to indicate to the radio network node that the UE can encrypt resume cause values.
  • signalling to the target gNB/ng-eNB that the resumeCause in the RRCResumeRequest message is encrypted.
  • RRC Resume Request message may not have the same length as the legacy message.
  • a method performed by a user equipment comprises transmitting a first radio resource control message to a target network node comprising an encrypted cause indication indicating why the user equipment is establishing, re-establishing or resuming a connection to the target network node.
  • a method performed by a source network node comprises transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • a method performed by a target network node comprises transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • a user equipment, UE comprises processing circuitry and memory, the memory containing instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the UE is operable to: transmit a first radio resource control message to a target network node comprising an encrypted cause indication indicating why the user equipment is establishing, re-establishing or resuming a connection to the target network node.
  • a source network node comprises processing circuitry and memory, the memory containing instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the source network node is operable to: transmit, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • a target network node comprises processing circuitry and memory, the memory containing instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the target network node is operable to: transmit, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • Certain embodiments may provide one or more of the following technical advantage(s).
  • An advantage of the embodiments described herein is providing privacy protection to high priority access UEs’ users.
  • the embodiments described herein may reuse the cryptographic keys already possessed by both the UE and the network — reusing the current trust model and procedures in relation to derivation and distribution of cryptographic keys.
  • some embodiments described herein do not require any modification in the structure of the RRCResumeRequest message. No new IE is introduced, and the length and type of any existing IES are not changed.
  • Using length preserving encryption causes some embodiments described herein to be functional without changing the existing RRCResumeRequest message’s structure. This is because every bit string in the plaintext space is a semantically valid resumeCause, and the plaintext space and the ciphertext space are the same.
  • Fig. 1 illustrated UE triggered transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED
  • Fig. 2 illustrates UE triggered transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED
  • Fig. 3 illustrates a UE being rejected from the network, and attempting to resume a connection
  • Fig. 4 illustrates a network triggered transition from RRC_INACTIVE to RRC_CONNECTED
  • Fig. 5 illustrates UE RRC State Transitions in 5G NR
  • Fig. 6 is a flow chart illustrating a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Fig. 7 is a flow chart illustrating a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Fig. 8 is a flow chart illustrating a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Fig. 9 illustrates an example implementation of figures 6, 7 and 8 in which both the source network node and the target network node supports and enables cause indication encryption;
  • Fig. 10 illustrates an example implementation of Figure 7 in which the source network node enables/supports cause indication encryption, but the target network node does not;
  • Fig. 11 illustrates an example implementation of Figure 8 in which the target network node enables/supports cause indication encryption, but the source network node does not;
  • Fig. 12 illustrates an example in which neither the target network node nor the source network node enables/supports cause value indication
  • Fig. 13 shows an example of a communication system in accordance with some embodiments
  • Fig. 14 shows a UE in accordance with some embodiments
  • Fig. 15 shows a network node in accordance with some embodiments
  • Fig. 16 is a block diagram of a host
  • Fig. 17 is a block diagram illustrating a virtualization environment in which functions implemented by some embodiments may be virtualized.
  • Fig. 18 shows a communication diagram of a host communicating via a network node with a UE over a partially wireless connection in accordance with some embodiments.
  • a UE’s connection is suspended when the UE is connected to a source network node. This may be performed by the source network node indicating to the UE to go to an RRC_INACTIVE state. It will be appreciated that the source network node provides a source cell. Later, the UE will resume its connection to the network to a target cell (note in special cases the target cell and the source cell). The target cell is provided by a target network node.
  • Figure 6 illustrates a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Figure 6 depicts a method in accordance with particular embodiments.
  • the method of Figure 6 may be performed by a UE or wireless device (e.g. the UE 1312 or UE 1400 as described later with reference to Figures 13 and 14 respectively).
  • the method begins at step 602 with transmitting a first radio resource control message to a target network node comprising an encrypted cause indication indicating why the user equipment is establishing, reestablishing or resuming a connection to the target network node.
  • the UE encrypts a cause indication for why the UE is (re)establishing or resuming the connection to the network and transmits (in step 602) the encrypted cause indication to a target network node.
  • the UE may encrypt an RRC resume cause indication.
  • the UE may indicate to the network (e.g. to the source network node), e.g. by an indication in a UE capability message, whether the UE supports encrypting the cause indication.
  • step 602 may be performed responsive to receiving an indication from a source network node that the UE can encrypt the cause indication (e.g. as described with reference to Figure 7) and/or receiving an indication from a target network node that the UE can encrypt the cause indication (e.g. as described with reference to Figure 8).
  • Figure 7 illustrates a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Figure 7 depicts a method in accordance with particular embodiments.
  • the method of Figure 7 may be performed by a source network node (e.g. the network node 1310 or network node 1500 as described later with reference to Figures 13 and 15 respectively).
  • the method begins at step 702 with transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • the source network node may transmit (in step 702) to the UE an indication that encryption of the cause indication can be performed by the UE.
  • This indication may only be transmitted if the UE has indicated to the source network node that it supports encryption of cause indications.
  • Step 702 may be performed by including a flag in a message when the source network node indicates that the UE shall suspend the connection (e.g. in a RRC release with suspend message).
  • the source network node may only indicate that the UE can encrypt the cause indication if the source network node has encryption of cause indications enabled. It will be appreciated that in some cases a source network node may support encryption of cause indications, but the feature may not be enabled. In other cases, a source network node may not support encryption of cause indications.
  • Figure 8 illustrates a method in accordance with some embodiments.
  • Figure 8 depicts a method in accordance with particular embodiments.
  • the method of Figure 8 may be performed by a target network node (e.g. the network node 1310 or network node 1500 as described later with reference to Figures 13 and 15 respectively).
  • the method begins at step 802 with transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment. It will be appreciated that step 802 may be performed by the target network node broadcasting a message.
  • the target network node may indicate to the UE whether the UE can (e.g. if supported, and if the UE is also configured to do so by the source network node) encrypt the cause indication (step 802).
  • the target network node may indicate this to the UE by utilizing an indication in system information.
  • the target network node may only indicate that the UE can encrypt the cause indication if the target network node has encryption cause indications enabled. It will be appreciated that in some cases a target network node may support encryption of cause indications, but the feature may not be enabled. In other cases, a target network node may not support encryption of cause indications.
  • the target network node may not have encryption of cause indications enabled (e.g. the feature may be disabled or unsupported).
  • the UE may decide to not encrypt the cause indication even if the source network node had previously indicated that the UE can (e.g. in step 702). In circumstances, the UE may inform the target network node of whether the cause indication has been encrypted or not. If the cause indication has been encrypted, the target network node may then ask the source network node to decrypt the encrypted cause indication, otherwise the target network node may assume that the received cause indication from the UE is unencrypted.
  • the UE may support encrypting using different keys and in some embodiments the network indicates which key the UE is to use to encrypt the cause indication.
  • This may for example be indicated to the UE by the source network node when the source network node suspends the UE’s connection, e.g. in the RRC release message.
  • the RRC release message may be extended to indicate which key the UE should use.
  • To enable the network to know which keys/types of keys the UE supports the UE may indicate the keys/types of keys the UE is capable of using for encrypting the cause indication.
  • decryption of the encrypted cause indication transmitted by the UE occurs in the source network node.
  • the method of Figure 7 may further comprise receiving an encrypted cause indication from a target network node; decrypting the encrypted cause indication; and transmitting the decrypted cause indication to the target network node.
  • the method of Figure 8 may further comprise receiving a first cause indication from the user equipment; and transmitting the first cause indication to a source network node. It will be appreciated that whilst encryption of cause indications may be enabled at the target network node, when the target network node receives a first cause indication from the UE it may not be aware of whether or not the first cause indication is encrypted as it does now know if encryption of cause indications is enabled at the source network node.
  • the target network node may transmit the received first cause indication (which in this example is encrypted) to the source node (note the target network node may indicate more information than just the cause value, for example, the target network node may forward the whole RRC resume request message,).
  • the target network node may transmit the received first cause indication (which in this example is encrypted) to the source node (note the target network node may indicate more information than just the cause value, for example, the target network node may forward the whole RRC resume request message,).
  • the source network node may then have the key for decrypting the encrypted cause indication and the resulting decrypted cause indication is transmitted to the target network node.
  • the method of Figure 8 may further comprise the target network node receiving a decrypted cause indication from the source network node.
  • the target network node may assume that the first cause value is unencrypted. It will be appreciated that the target network node may determine that encryption of cause indications is not enabled at the source network node implicitly responsive to receiving no decrypted cause indication from the source network node.
  • the method of Figure 7 may further comprise the source network node utilizing a first key to decrypt the encrypted cause indication.
  • the benefit of decrypting in the source network node may be that the first key used does not need to be shared with other network nodes, e.g., shared with the target network node.
  • the first key may comprise an existing UE AS security key (e.g. K g NB) or a key derived from an existing UE AS security key, as described later.
  • the source network node may provide a completely fresh key independent of the UE AS security context, since the source network node may be the one who ultimately uses or dispatches the first key to the target network node.
  • the source network node may need to provide the key or some derivation parameters for the first key (e.g. nonces) to the UE in e.g. the RRC Release with suspendConfig message if the first key cannot be derived by the UE from the AS security context.
  • the first key e.g. nonces
  • the source network node may need to provide the key or some derivation parameters for the first key (e.g. nonces) to the UE in e.g. the RRC Release with suspendConfig message if the first key cannot be derived by the UE from the AS security context.
  • the target network node may indicate to the source network node whether the UE’s cause indication is encrypted or not. Note above that in some cases the UE encrypts the cause value only if the target node indicates that the UE shall do so (e.g., by an indication in system information), and the source node does not necessarily know if the target node has requested the UE to encrypt the cause value. Hence the target would indicate to the source whether the target indicated to the UE to encrypt the cause value.
  • the target node performs decryption of the received encrypted cause indication.
  • the target network node may obtain a first key from the source network node. For example, the target network node may contact the source network node to acquire at least partly the first key needed to decrypt the cause indication and when acquiring the first key the target network node may decrypt the cause indication.
  • the target network node may acquire the first key together with other information from the source network node, e.g., when the target network node requests the context of the UE from the source network node, the source network node may send both the key and potential other information needed to decrypt the cause indication.
  • the method of Figure 7 may further comprise the source network node transmitting a first key to the target network node to use in decrypting an encrypted cause indication.
  • the target network node may determine if the source network node has indicated to the UE that the UE can encrypt the cause indication. It will be appreciated that the target network node does not know what the source has indicated to the UE in the release message. If the source network node does not support encryption (or for other reason it has not indicated to the UE that the UE can perform encryption of the cause indication) the target network node may not perform a decryption procedure of the (in this case unencrypted) cause indication.
  • the target network node may determine that the source network node has requested the UE to perform encryption if the source network node indicates this.
  • the source may indicate that it has indicated to the UE that the UE can perform encryption either explicitly, e.g., by including a flag in a message, or implicitly, by providing the decryption key to the target network node.
  • the target network node may determine that the UE has not encrypted the cause indication.
  • the source network node may not support any related indication: or in other words, if the source doesn’ t support encrypted cause indications it cannot tell the target network node that it doesn’t support it.
  • the target network node may determine if the source network node has indication to the UE that the UE can encrypt the cause indication based on an indication received by the UE.
  • the UE may indicate in the RRCResumeRequest message whether the indication value has been encrypted or not.
  • the UE may use a completely new RRC message where the cause indication has been encrypted and this may comprise an implicit indication for the target network node.
  • the target node may need to have additional information aside from the first key in order to decrypt the cause value.
  • This may for example be an indication of the algorithm used for encrypting the cause indication.
  • additional information may be indicated to the target network node by the source network node.
  • Figure 7 may further comprise the source network node transmitting, to the target network node, an indication of an algorithm to use to decrypt the encrypted cause indication.
  • a symmetric key may be utilized to encrypt/decrypt the cause indication.
  • the first key may be referred to as:
  • a RRCResumeRequest may only be sent by the UE when the UE is in RRC Inactive state.
  • the UE enters the RRC Inactive state from the RRC Connected state after receiving and successfully verifying the RRCRelease with suspendConfig message.
  • the key may be computed using a key from the AS security context of the UE when it was in RRC Connected state immediately before entering the RRC Inactive state.
  • the first key KRRCResenc can be obtained using one of the following options:
  • KRRCenc comprises a key for encrypting RRC messages in the UE’s AS security context.
  • KRRCenc the encryption key
  • KDF key derivation function
  • KgNB comprises a key is sent by the AMF to the gNB . All keys in a UE’ s AS security context may be derived from KgNB-
  • Source node Derived by the source node and provided (as is or its parameters) to the UE in the RRC Release with suspend config message.
  • the first key used to decrypt an encrypted cause indication may comprise one of: a first symmetric key derived from a second symmetric key derived from K g NB; a first private key (owned by the source network node).
  • a second key may be used to encrypt the cause indication at the UE.
  • the second key may comprise one of: a first symmetric key derived from a second symmetric key derived from K g NB; a public key received from the source network node.
  • the gNB/ng-eNB deletes the key KRRCenc and may also delete the key K g NB- However, according to some embodiments, the gNB/ng-eNB may not delete is used to compute Similarly, the gNB/ng-eNB may not delete is used to compute
  • the UE after receiving and verifying the authenticity of the RRCRelease with suspendConfig message from the gNB/ng-eNB, the UE deletes the key KRRCenc, and may also delete the key K g NB- However, according to some embodiments, the UE may not delete KRRCenc if KRRCenc is used to compute Similarly, the UE may not delete is used to compute
  • a public/private key pair may be used to encrypt and descrypt the cause indication.
  • the public key to encrypt the cause indication may be referred to as pkRRCResenc-
  • the corresponding private key may be denoted
  • the source network node may own this key pair.
  • the source network node may transports the public key to the UE using an integrity protected message, e.g., the RRCRelease message, before the UE enters the RRC_Inactive state.
  • a length-preserving secure symmetric encryption scheme may be used for encrypting and decrypting the cause indication in the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • 128-NEA as specified in 33.501 v 17.8.0 may be used.
  • 128-NEA is a stream cipher and requires the following input parameters to generate the keystream: 128-bit KEY, bearer specific direction dependent 32-bit COUNT, 5-bit bearer identity BEARER, 1-bit DIRECTION, and the length of the keystream required LENGTH.
  • the 128-bit is set to
  • the value of COUNT can be set to zero if the key KRRCResenc is derived from KKRCBUC or K g NB. If the key KRRCResenc is obtained directly by setting it to KRRCenc, then care may be required in choosing the value of COUNT so that the keystream is not repeated.
  • one option may be to set the COUNT value parameter to the maximal value of 2 32 -l. This value has most likely not been used before with the same KRRCenc key.
  • the size of the plaintext space of the cause indication field in the RRCResumeRequest message is 16, i.e., four bits. Therefore, to encrypt one cause indication, four bits from the keystream may be used. This means, that the COUNT will be used only once to generate the keystream.
  • any secure probabilistic encryption scheme with tolerable key size may be suitable.
  • Figure 9 illustrates an example implementation of figures 6, 7 and 8 in which both the source network node and the target network node supports and enables cause indication encryption.
  • Step 901. The first step is that the source network node releases the connection with the UE and sends the UE to RRC_INACTIVE by sending the RRCRelease message with suspend configuration.
  • the message comprise an indication that the UE can encrypt the RRC resume cause value when it later resumes its connection.
  • Step 901 therefore comprises an example implementation of step 702.
  • the source network node also provides an I-RNTI (as per existing specifications). Further, the UE source network node may also provide potential input to the encryption procedure, e.g., the encryption key itself, derivation parameters for deriving the key, or an indication of which key to use.
  • Step 902. The UE moves around while it is in RRC_INACTIVE and ends up camping on a cell belonging to the target network node.
  • the target network node indicates with a flag in system information that the UE can encrypt the resume cause. In other words, the target network node supports encryption of the resume cause.
  • Step 902 therefore comprises an example implementation of step 802. Step 903. Since both the source network node and the target network node indicated that the UE can encrypt the cause indication, the UE transmits the resume request message with an encrypted cause indication. The UE may also indicate other information in this message, such as the I-RNTI value.
  • Step 903 comprises an example implementation of step 602.
  • Step 904. The target network node receives the resume request message and based on the I-RNTI value it may determine which node is the source network node for this UE. The target network node may then transmit a UE context fetch request message to the source network node. This request includes the I- RNTI value allowing the source network node to identify which UE’s context is requested. The request also contains the encrypted cause indication that the target received from the UE in step 903. a.
  • this indication is omitted since the source network node knows that if the target network node has indicated the cause indication in a context fetch procedure it knows that the target network node supports encryption of the cause indication. Note: A gNB which has not implemented this whole procedure may not send the resume cause value in the context fetch procedure.
  • Step 905. The source network node decrypts the cause value for the UE.
  • Step 906 The source network node returns the context to the target network node and also indicates the decrypted cause indication.
  • Step 907. The target network node now has the UE’s context and the actual decrypted cause value and may use these to determine whether to accept or reject the UEs resume request.
  • Step 908 If the UE’s connection attempt is accepted the target network node transmits the RRC resume message to the UE, otherwise the target network node may send an RRC release or RRC reject message.
  • Figure 10 illustrates an example implementation of Figure 7 in which the source network node enables/supports cause indication encryption, but the target network node does not.
  • Step 1001. the source network node releases the connection with the UE and sends the UE to RRC_INACTIVE by sending the RRCRelease message with suspend configuration.
  • the message comprise an indication that the UE can encrypt the RRC resume cause value when it later resumes its connection.
  • Step 1001 therefore comprises an example implementation of step 702.
  • the source network node also provides an I-RNTI (as per existing specifications). Further, the UE source network node may also provide potential input to the encryption procedure, e.g., the encryption key itself, derivation parameters for deriving the key, or an indication of which key to use.
  • Step 1002 The UE moves around while it is in RRCJNACTIVE and ends up camping on a cell belonging to the target network node.
  • the target network node indicates with a flag in system information that the target network node does not have encryption of resume indications enabled. a.
  • the target network node may indicate that it does not support or have enabled encryption of cause indications by omitting an indication that it supports/has enabled encryption of cause indications. In other words, the absence of a flag for supported/enabled encryption is used to indicate that the target network node does not support it.
  • the UE can transmit the resume request message with an unencrypted cause indication.
  • the UE also indicates other information in this message, such as the I-RNTI value (this option is illustrated in Figure 10).
  • c. The UE can transmit the resume request message with an encrypted cause value (e.g. as an example implementation of step 602). However, the UE may indicate in the resume request message that the resume cause has been encrypted. In an alternative of this option, the UE may use a new RRC resume request message for the case in which the resume cause has been encrypted.
  • Step 1004. The target node receives the resume request message and based on the I-RNTI value it determines which network node is the source network node for this UE.
  • the target sends a context fetch request message to the source of the UE.
  • This context request message includes the I-RNTI value allowing the source to identify which UE’ s context is requested by the target network node. If the UE has indicated in the RRC resume request message that the resume cause has been encrypted, the request will contain the cause indication so that the source network node may decrypt it. It will be appreciated that, forwarding the cause indication is only useful if it is encrypted and can be decrypted by the source network node.
  • Step 1005. The source network node returns the context to the target node with, optionally, the decrypted resume cause indication.
  • Step 1006 The target network node now has the UE’s context and the cause indication and the target network node may use these to determine whether to accept or reject the UEs resume request. d.
  • the target may decide to accept or reject the UEs connection resume attempt already based on the (unencrypted) cause value received from the UE, for example if the target is heavily loaded and the cause indication does not indicate that the UE is accessing for any high priority reason, the target may reject the UE already in response to step 4 above.
  • Step 1007 If the UE’s connection attempt is accepted the target network node may send the RRC resume message to the UE, otherwise the target network node may send an RRC release or RRC reject message.
  • Figure 11 illustrates an example implementation of Figure 8 in which the target network node enables/supports cause indication encryption, but the source network node does not.
  • the source network node is releasing the connection with the UE and sends the UE to RRC_INACTIVE by sending the RRCRelease message with suspend configuration.
  • This message may comprise an indication that the UE cannot encrypt the RRC resume cause value when it later resumes its connection (note this could be implemented as an explicit indication saying that the UE cannot encrypt, or may be implemented with absence/presence-logic, e.g., that absence of an indication saying that the UE can encrypt is interpreted that the UE cannot encrypt).
  • the source network node also provides an I-RNTI (as per existing specifications).
  • Step 1102. The UE moves around while it is in RRCJNACTIVE and ends up camping on a cell belonging to the target network node.
  • the target network node indicates with a flag in system information that the target network node supports encryption of the resume cause.
  • the flag may indicate to the UE that the UE can encrypt the resume cause indication.
  • Step 1102 comprises an example implementation of step 802. Step 1103. Since the source network node has indicated that the UE cannot encrypt the cause indication, the UE may transmit the resume request message with an unencrypted cause indication.
  • the UE also indicates other information in this message, such as the I-RNTI value. e.
  • the UE may explicitly indicate in the RRC resume request on whether the resume cause indication has been encrypted or not. The UE will indicate in the resume request message that the resume cause indication has been encrypted. In an alternative of this option, the UE may use a new RRC resume request message for the case in which the resume cause indication has been encrypted.
  • the target network node receives the resume request message and based on the I-RNTI value it determines which node is the source network node for this UE.
  • the target network node may then transmit a context fetch request message to the source network node of the UE.
  • This request includes the I-RNTI value allowing the source network node to identify which UE’s context is requested.
  • the request may comprise the cause indication. Note: the target network node may not know whether the cause indication is encrypted or not at this point in time because the target network node may not know if the source network node has requested the UE to encrypt the cause value.
  • Step 1105. The source network node returns the context to the target network node.
  • the source network node does not include a cause indication since the source network node does not support/has not enabled encrypting the cause indication.
  • Step 1106 The response from the source network is missing the cause indication and based on this the target network node may determine that the cause indication received directly from the UE in step 1103 was unencrypted and hence can act on that cause indication.
  • the target network node now has the UE’s context and the cause indication and the target network node may use these to determine whether to accept or reject the UEs resume request.
  • Step 1107 If the UE’s connection attempt is accepted the target network node sends the RRC resume message to the UE, otherwise the target network node may transmit an RRC release or RRC reject message.
  • Figure 12 illustrates an example in which neither the target network node nor the source network node enables/supports cause value indication.
  • Step 1201 the source network node is releasing the connection with the UE and sends the UE to RRC_INACTIVE by sending the RRCRelease message with suspend configuration.
  • This message contains an indication that the UE cannot encrypt the RRC resume cause value when it later resumes its connection (note this indication may be implemented as an explicit indication saying that the UE cannot encrypt, or may be implemented with absence/presence-logic, e.g., that absence of an indication saying that the UE can encrypt is interpreted that the UE cannot encrypt).
  • the source network node may also provide an I-RNTI (as per existing specifications).
  • the UE moves around while it is in RRCJNACTIVE and ends up camping on a cell belonging to the target network node.
  • the target network node indicates with a flag in system information that the target node does not support encryption of the resume cause. This flag may indicate to the UE that the UE cannot encrypt the cause indication. a.
  • the target network node may indicate that it does not support encryption by omitting an indication that it supports encryption, i.e., absence of a flag for support/enable encryption is used to indicate that the target network node does not support encryption.
  • the target network node receives the resume request message and based on the I-RNTI value it determines which node is the source network node for this UE.
  • the target network node transmits a context fetch request message to the source network node of the UE. This request may comprise the I-RNTI value allowing the source network node to identify which UE’s context is requested.
  • the request does not contain the cause indication since the target does not support/enable this feature and hence doesn’t support/enable forwarding the received cause indication. Forwarding the cause indication may only be useful if it is encrypted and should be decrypted by the source network node.
  • Step 1205. The source network node returns the context to the target network node.
  • the source network node does not include a cause indication since the source network node does not support/has not enabled encrypting the cause indication, also the target network node didn’t include a cause indication in the request.
  • Step 1206 The target network node now has the UE’s context and the cause indication (the unencrypted cause indication which the UE provided directly to the target in step 1203) and the target network node will use these to determine whether to accept or reject the UEs resume request.
  • the target network node may decide to accept or reject the UEs connection resume attempt already based on the (unencrypted) cause value received from the UE, for example if the target network node is heavily loaded and the cause indication does not indicate that the UE is accessing for any high priority reason, the target network node may reject the UE already in response to step 1204 above.
  • Step 1207 If the UE’s connection attempt is accepted the target network node sends the RRC resume message to the UE, otherwise the target network node may send an RRC release or RRC reject message.
  • the resume cause information element in the RRC Resume Request message is the one which may be encrypted.
  • this idea may be generalized to encrypt and integrity protect most of the RRC Resume Request message (or other suitable RRC message) and only integrity protect or leave unprotected the rest of message which will help the target network node and/or the source newtork node to decrypt the encrypted part of the message.
  • This kind of encryption and integrity protection may be realized by a family of protection algorithms called Authentication Encryption with assocaited data (AEAD).
  • AEAD Authentication Encryption with assocaited data
  • the support of the feature is signalled to the UE in a similar way as the previous embodiments i.e. the source newtork node indicates the support via information in the RRC Release with suspend config and the target network node with indication in the system information messages. It will be apprecaited that the following types of indications in the system information messages may be equivalent:
  • the target newtork node may need some information from the RRC Resume Request message to be in plaintext(unprotected) or integrity protected. Based on this information the target node could detect: a) whether the rest of the RCC message is encrypted or not, b) which is the source newtork node which holds the UE security context c) for which UE the security context will be used to decrypt the encrypted parts of the message d) other information for the proper execution of the RRC Resume Request.
  • the unprotected RRC Resume Request message may generally have the structure illustrated in Table 1.
  • the protected RRC message may have the general structure illustrated in Table 2.
  • the order of the protected message fields (PMF1,PMF2, PMF3) does not matter.
  • the number of the protected message fields may be more than 3.
  • Table 2 Example of a protected RRC Resume Request message with an AEAD type of algorithm
  • AEAD encryption/integrity protection algorithms which take as input the message fields which needs to be confidentiality and integrity protected and the message fields which need to be only integirty protected as additional data (AD). Then the alogirthm produces a similar ouput as the protected message.
  • Figure 13 shows an example of a communication system 1300 in accordance with some embodiments.
  • the communication system 1300 includes a telecommunication network 1302 that includes an access network 1304, such as a radio access network (RAN), and a core network 1306, which includes one or more core network nodes 1308.
  • the access network 1304 includes one or more access network nodes, such as network nodes 1310a and 1310b (one or more of which may be generally referred to as network nodes 1310), or any other similar 3 rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) access node or non- 3GPP access point.
  • 3GPP 3 rd Generation Partnership Project
  • the network nodes 1310 facilitate direct or indirect connection of user equipment (UE), such as by connecting UEs 1312a, 1312b, 1312c, and 1312d (one or more of which may be generally referred to as UEs 1312) to the core network 1306 over one or more wireless connections.
  • UE user equipment
  • Example wireless communications over a wireless connection include transmitting and/or receiving wireless signals using electromagnetic waves, radio waves, infrared waves, and/or other types of signals suitable for conveying information without the use of wires, cables, or other material conductors.
  • the communication system 1300 may include any number of wired or wireless networks, network nodes, UEs, and/or any other components or systems that may facilitate or participate in the communication of data and/or signals whether via wired or wireless connections.
  • the communication system 1300 may include and/or interface with any type of communication, telecommunication, data, cellular, radio network, and/or other similar type of system.
  • the UEs 1312 may be any of a wide variety of communication devices, including wireless devices arranged, configured, and/or operable to communicate wirelessly with the network nodes 1310 and other communication devices.
  • the network nodes 1310 are arranged, capable, configured, and/or operable to communicate directly or indirectly with the UEs 1312 and/or with other network nodes or equipment in the telecommunication network 1302 to enable and/or provide network access, such as wireless network access, and/or to perform other functions, such as administration in the telecommunication network 1302.
  • the core network 1306 connects the network nodes 1310 to one or more hosts, such as host 1316. These connections may be direct or indirect via one or more intermediary networks or devices. In other examples, network nodes may be directly coupled to hosts.
  • the core network 1306 includes one more core network nodes (e.g., core network node 1308) that are structured with hardware and software components. Features of these components may be substantially similar to those described with respect to the UEs, network nodes, and/or hosts, such that the descriptions thereof are generally applicable to the corresponding components of the core network node 1308.
  • Example core network nodes include functions of one or more of a Mobile Switching Center (MSC), Mobility Management Entity (MME), Home Subscriber Server (HSS), Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), Session Management Function (SMF), Authentication Server Function (AUSF), Subscription Identifier Deconcealing function (SIDF), Unified Data Management (UDM), Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP), Network Exposure Function (NEF), and/or a User Plane Function (UPF).
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
  • SMF Session Management Function
  • AUSF Authentication Server Function
  • SIDF Subscription Identifier Deconcealing function
  • UDM Unified Data Management
  • SEPP Security Edge Protection Proxy
  • NEF Network Exposure Function
  • UPF User Plane Function
  • the host 1316 may be under the ownership or control of a service provider other than an operator or provider of the access network 1304 and/or the telecommunication network 1302, and may be operated by the service provider or on behalf of the service provider.
  • the host 1316 may host a variety of applications to provide one or more services. Examples of such applications include the provision of live and/or prerecorded audio/video content, data collection services, for example, retrieving and compiling data on various ambient conditions detected by a plurality of UEs, analytics functionality, social media, functions for controlling or otherwise interacting with remote devices, functions for an alarm and surveillance center, or any other such function performed by a server.
  • the communication system 1300 of Figure 13 enables connectivity between the UEs, network nodes, and hosts.
  • the communication system may be configured to operate according to predefined rules or procedures, such as specific standards that include, but are not limited to: Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Long Term Evolution (LTE), and/or other suitable 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G standards, or any applicable future generation standard (e.g., 6G); wireless local area network (WLAN) standards, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards (WiFi); and/or any other appropriate wireless communication standard, such as the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMax), Bluetooth, Z-Wave, Near Field Communication (NFC) ZigBee, LiFi, and/or any low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) standards such as LoRa and Sigfox.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • the telecommunication network 1302 is a cellular network that implements 3GPP standardized features. Accordingly, the telecommunications network 1302 may support network slicing to provide different logical networks to different devices that are connected to the telecommunication network 1302. For example, the telecommunications network 1302 may provide Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication (URLLC) services to some UEs, while providing Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) services to other UEs, and/or Massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC)ZMassive loT services to yet further UEs.
  • URLLC Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication
  • eMBB Enhanced Mobile Broadband
  • mMTC Massive Machine Type Communication
  • the UEs 1312 are configured to transmit and/or receive information without direct human interaction.
  • a UE may be designed to transmit information to the access network 1304 on a predetermined schedule, when triggered by an internal or external event, or in response to requests from the access network 1304.
  • a UE may be configured for operating in single- or multi -RAT or multi-standard mode.
  • a UE may operate with any one or combination of Wi-Fi, NR (New Radio) and LTE, i.e. being configured for multi-radio dual connectivity (MR-DC), such as E-UTRAN (Evolved-UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network) New Radio - Dual Connectivity (EN-DC).
  • MR-DC multi-radio dual connectivity
  • the hub 1314 communicates with the access network 1304 to facilitate indirect communication between one or more UEs (e.g., UE 1312c and/or 1312d) and network nodes (e.g., network node 1310b).
  • the hub 1314 may be a controller, router, a content source and analytics node, or any of the other communication devices described herein regarding UEs.
  • the hub 1314 may be a broadband router enabling access to the core network 1306 for the UEs.
  • the hub 1314 may be a controller that sends commands or instructions to one or more actuators in the UEs.
  • the hub 1314 may be a data collector that acts as temporary storage for UE data and, in some embodiments, may perform analysis or other processing of the data.
  • the hub 1314 may be a content source. For example, for a UE that is a VR headset, display, loudspeaker or other media delivery device, the hub 1314 may retrieve VR assets, video, audio, or other media or data related to sensory information via a network node, which the hub 1314 then provides to the UE either directly, after performing local processing, and/or after adding additional local content.
  • the hub 1314 acts as a proxy server or orchestrator for the UEs, in particular in if one or more of the UEs are low energy loT devices.
  • the hub 1314 may have a constant/persistent or intermittent connection to the network node 1310b.
  • the hub 1314 may also allow for a different communication scheme and/or schedule between the hub 1314 and UEs (e.g., UE 1312c and/or 1312d), and between the hub 1314 and the core network 1306.
  • the hub 1314 is connected to the core network 1306 and/or one or more UEs via a wired connection.
  • the hub 1314 may be configured to connect to an M2M service provider over the access network 1304 and/or to another UE over a direct connection.
  • UEs may establish a wireless connection with the network nodes 1310 while still connected via the hub 1314 via a wired or wireless connection.
  • the hub 1314 may be a dedicated hub - that is, a hub whose primary function is to route communications to/from the UEs from/to the network node 1310b.
  • the hub 1314 may be a non-dedicated hub - that is, a device which is capable of operating to route communications between the UEs and network node 1310b, but which is additionally capable of operating as a communication start and/or end point for certain data channels.
  • a UE refers to a device capable, configured, arranged and/or operable to communicate wirelessly with network nodes and/or other UEs.
  • a UE include, but are not limited to, a smart phone, mobile phone, cell phone, voice over IP (VoIP) phone, wireless local loop phone, desktop computer, personal digital assistant (PDA), wireless camera, gaming console or device, music storage device, playback appliance, wearable terminal device, wireless endpoint, mobile station, tablet, laptop, laptop-embedded equipment (LEE), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), smart device, wireless customer-premise equipment (CPE), vehicle-mounted or vehicle embedded/integrated wireless device, etc.
  • VoIP voice over IP
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • LME laptop-embedded equipment
  • LME laptop-mounted equipment
  • CPE wireless customer-premise equipment
  • UEs identified by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), including a narrow band internet of things (NB-IoT) UE, a machine type communication (MTC) UE, and/or an enhanced MTC (eMTC) UE.
  • 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
  • NB-IoT narrow band internet of things
  • MTC machine type communication
  • eMTC enhanced MTC
  • a UE may support device-to-device (D2D) communication, for example by implementing a 3GPP standard for sidelink communication, Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), or vehicle-to-everything (V2X).
  • D2D device-to-device
  • DSRC Dedicated Short-Range Communication
  • V2V vehicle-to-vehicle
  • V2I vehicle-to-infrastructure
  • V2X vehicle-to-everything
  • a UE may not necessarily have a user in the sense of a human user who owns and/or operates the relevant device.
  • a UE may represent a device that is intended for sale to, or operation by, a human user but which may not, or which may not initially, be associated with a specific human user (e.g., a smart sprinkler controller).
  • a UE may represent a device that is not intended for sale
  • the UE 1400 includes processing circuitry 1402 that is operatively coupled via a bus 1404 to an input/output interface 1406, a power source 1408, a memory 1410, a communication interface 1412, and/or any other component, or any combination thereof.
  • Certain UEs may utilize all or a subset of the components shown in Figure 14. The level of integration between the components may vary from one UE to another UE. Further, certain UEs may contain multiple instances of a component, such as multiple processors, memories, transceivers, transmitters, receivers, etc.
  • the processing circuitry 1402 is configured to process instructions and data and may be configured to implement any sequential state machine operative to execute instructions stored as machine-readable computer programs in the memory 1410.
  • the processing circuitry 1402 may be implemented as one or more hardware-implemented state machines (e.g., in discrete logic, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), etc.); programmable logic together with appropriate firmware; one or more stored computer programs, general-purpose processors, such as a microprocessor or digital signal processor (DSP), together with appropriate software; or any combination of the above.
  • the processing circuitry 1402 may include multiple central processing units (CPUs).
  • the processing circuitry 1402 may be operable to provide, either alone or in conjunction with other UE 1400 components, such as the memory 1410, UE 1400 functionality.
  • the processing circuitry 1402 may be configured to cause the UE 1402 to perform the methods as described with reference to Figure 6.
  • the input/output interface 1406 may be configured to provide an interface or interfaces to an input device, output device, or one or more input and/or output devices.
  • Examples of an output device include a speaker, a sound card, a video card, a display, a monitor, a printer, an actuator, an emitter, a smartcard, another output device, or any combination thereof.
  • An input device may allow a user to capture information into the UE 1400.
  • Examples of an input device include a touch-sensitive or presence-sensitive display, a camera (e.g., a digital camera, a digital video camera, a web camera, etc.), a microphone, a sensor, a mouse, a trackball, a directional pad, a trackpad, a scroll wheel, a smartcard, and the like.
  • the presencesensitive display may include a capacitive or resistive touch sensor to sense input from a user.
  • a sensor may be, for instance, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, a tilt sensor, a force sensor, a magnetometer, an optical sensor, a proximity sensor, a biometric sensor, etc., or any combination thereof.
  • An output device may use the same type of interface port as an input device. For example, a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port may be used to provide an input device and an output device.
  • USB Universal Serial Bus
  • the power source 1408 is structured as a battery or battery pack. Other types of power sources, such as an external power source (e.g., an electricity outlet), photovoltaic device, or power cell, may be used.
  • the power source 1408 may further include power circuitry for delivering power from the power source 1408 itself, and/or an external power source, to the various parts of the UE 1400 via input circuitry or an interface such as an electrical power cable. Delivering power may be, for example, for charging of the power source 1408.
  • Power circuitry may perform any formatting, converting, or other modification to the power from the power source 1408 to make the power suitable for the respective components of the UE 1400 to which power is supplied.
  • the memory 1410 may be or be configured to include memory such as random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), magnetic disks, optical disks, hard disks, removable cartridges, flash drives, and so forth.
  • the memory 1410 includes one or more application programs 1414, such as an operating system, web browser application, a widget, gadget engine, or other application, and corresponding data 1416.
  • the memory 1410 may store, for use by the UE 1400, any of a variety of various operating systems or combinations of operating systems.
  • the memory 1410 may be configured to include a number of physical drive units, such as redundant array of independent disks (RAID), flash memory, USB flash drive, external hard disk drive, thumb drive, pen drive, key drive, high-density digital versatile disc (HD-DVD) optical disc drive, internal hard disk drive, Blu-Ray optical disc drive, holographic digital data storage (HDDS) optical disc drive, external mini-dual in-line memory module (DIMM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), external micro-DIMM SDRAM, smartcard memory such as tamper resistant module in the form of a universal integrated circuit card (UICC) including one or more subscriber identity modules (SIMs), such as a USIM and/or ISIM, other memory, or any combination thereof.
  • RAID redundant array of independent disks
  • HD-DVD high-density digital versatile disc
  • HDDS holographic digital data storage
  • DIMM external mini-dual in-line memory module
  • SDRAM synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • SDRAM synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • the UICC may for example be an embedded UICC (eUICC), integrated UICC (iUICC) or a removable UICC commonly known as ‘SIM card.’
  • the memory 1410 may allow the UE 1400 to access instructions, application programs and the like, stored on transitory or non-transitory memory media, to off-load data, or to upload data.
  • An article of manufacture, such as one utilizing a communication system may be tangibly embodied as or in the memory 1410, which may be or comprise a device-readable storage medium.
  • the processing circuitry 1402 may be configured to communicate with an access network or other network using the communication interface 1412.
  • the communication interface 1412 may comprise one or more communication subsystems and may include or be communicatively coupled to an antenna 1422.
  • the communication interface 1412 may include one or more transceivers used to communicate, such as by communicating with one or more remote transceivers of another device capable of wireless communication (e.g., another UE or a network node in an access network).
  • Each transceiver may include a transmitter 1418 and/or a receiver 1420 appropriate to provide network communications (e.g., optical, electrical, frequency allocations, and so forth).
  • the transmitter 1418 and receiver 1420 may be coupled to one or more antennas (e.g., antenna 1422) and may share circuit components, software or firmware, or alternatively be implemented separately.
  • communication functions of the communication interface 1412 may include cellular communication, Wi-Fi communication, LPWAN communication, data communication, voice communication, multimedia communication, short-range communications such as Bluetooth, near-field communication, location-based communication such as the use of the global positioning system (GPS) to determine a location, another like communication function, or any combination thereof.
  • GPS global positioning system
  • Communications may be implemented in according to one or more communication protocols and/or standards, such as IEEE 802.11, Code Division Multiplexing Access (CDMA), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), GSM, LTE, New Radio (NR), UMTS, WiMax, Ethernet, transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP), synchronous optical networking (SONET), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), QUIC, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and so forth.
  • CDMA Code Division Multiplexing Access
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • NR New Radio
  • UMTS Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
  • WiMax Ethernet
  • TCP/IP transmission control protocol/internet protocol
  • SONET synchronous optical networking
  • ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
  • QUIC Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  • HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  • a UE may provide an output of data captured by its sensors, through its communication interface 1412, via a wireless connection to a network node.
  • Data captured by sensors of a UE can be communicated through a wireless connection to a network node via another UE.
  • the output may be periodic (e.g., once every 15 minutes if it reports the sensed temperature), random (e.g., to even out the load from reporting from several sensors), in response to a triggering event (e.g., when moisture is detected an alert is sent), in response to a request (e.g., a user initiated request), or a continuous stream (e.g., a live video feed of a patient).
  • a UE comprises an actuator, a motor, or a switch, related to a communication interface configured to receive wireless input from a network node via a wireless connection.
  • the states of the actuator, the motor, or the switch may change.
  • the UE may comprise a motor that adjusts the control surfaces or rotors of a drone in flight according to the received input or controls a robotic arm performing a medical procedure according to the received input.
  • a UE when in the form of an Internet of Things (loT) device, may be a device for use in one or more application domains, these domains comprising, but not limited to, city wearable technology, extended industrial application and healthcare.
  • loT device are devices which are or which are embedded in: a connected refrigerator or freezer, a TV, a connected lighting device, an electricity meter, a robot vacuum cleaner, a voice controlled smart speaker, a home security camera, a motion detector, a thermostat, a smoke detector, a door/window sensor, a flood/moisture sensor, an electrical door lock, a connected doorbell, an air conditioning system like a heat pump, an autonomous vehicle, a surveillance system, a weather monitoring device, a vehicle parking monitoring device, an electric vehicle charging station, a smaOrt watch, a fitness tracker, a head-mounted display for Augmented Reality (AR) or Virtual Reality (VR), a wearable for tactile augmentation or sensory enhancement, a water sprinkler, an animal- or
  • AR Augmented
  • a UE may represent a machine or other device that performs monitoring and/or measurements, and transmits the results of such monitoring and/or measurements to another UE and/or a network node.
  • the UE may in this case be an M2M device, which may in a 3GPP context be referred to as an MTC device.
  • the UE may implement the 3GPP NB-IoT standard.
  • a UE may represent a vehicle, such as a car, a bus, a truck, a ship and an airplane, or other equipment that is capable of monitoring and/or reporting on its operational status or other functions associated with its operation.
  • any number of UEs may be used together with respect to a single use case.
  • a first UE might be or be integrated in a drone and provide the drone’s speed information (obtained through a speed sensor) to a second UE that is a remote controller operating the drone.
  • the first UE may adjust the throttle on the drone (e.g. by controlling an actuator) to increase or decrease the drone’s speed.
  • the first and/or the second UE can also include more than one of the functionalities described above.
  • a UE might comprise the sensor and the actuator, and handle communication of data for both the speed sensor and the actuators.
  • FIG. 15 shows a network node 1500 in accordance with some embodiments.
  • network node refers to equipment capable, configured, arranged and/or operable to communicate directly or indirectly with a UE and/or with other network nodes or equipment, in a telecommunication network.
  • network nodes include, but are not limited to, access points (APs) (e.g., radio access points), base stations (BSs) (e.g., radio base stations, Node Bs, evolved Node Bs (eNBs) and NR NodeBs (gNBs)).
  • APs access points
  • BSs base stations
  • Node Bs Node Bs
  • eNBs evolved Node Bs
  • gNBs NR NodeBs
  • Base stations may be categorized based on the amount of coverage they provide (or, stated differently, their transmit power level) and so, depending on the provided amount of coverage, may be referred to as femto base stations, pico base stations, micro base stations, or macro base stations.
  • a base station may be a relay node or a relay donor node controlling a relay.
  • a network node may also include one or more (or all) parts of a distributed radio base station such as centralized digital units and/or remote radio units (RRUs), sometimes referred to as Remote Radio Heads (RRHs). Such remote radio units may or may not be integrated with an antenna as an antenna integrated radio.
  • RRUs remote radio units
  • RRHs Remote Radio Heads
  • Such remote radio units may or may not be integrated with an antenna as an antenna integrated radio.
  • Parts of a distributed radio base station may also be referred to as nodes in a distributed antenna system (DAS).
  • DAS distributed antenna system
  • network nodes include multiple transmission point (multi-TRP) 5G access nodes, multistandard radio (MSR) equipment such as MSR BSs, network controllers such as radio network controllers (RNCs) or base station controllers (BSCs), base transceiver stations (BTSs), transmission points, transmission nodes, multi-cell/multicast coordination entities (MCEs), Operation and Maintenance (O&M) nodes, Operations Support System (OSS) nodes, Self-Organizing Network (SON) nodes, positioning nodes (e.g., Evolved Serving Mobile Location Centers (E-SMLCs)), and/or Minimization of Drive Tests (MDTs).
  • MSR multistandard radio
  • RNCs radio network controllers
  • BSCs base station controllers
  • BTSs base transceiver stations
  • OFDM Operation and Maintenance
  • OSS Operations Support System
  • SON Self-Organizing Network
  • positioning nodes e.g., Evolved Serving Mobile Location Centers (E-SMLCs)
  • the network node 1500 includes processing circuitry 1502, a memory 1504, a communication interface 1506, and a power source 1508, and/or any other component, or any combination thereof.
  • the network node 1500 may be composed of multiple physically separate components (e.g., a NodeB component and a RNC component, or a BTS component and a BSC component, etc.), which may each have their own respective components.
  • the network node 1500 comprises multiple separate components (e.g., BTS and BSC components)
  • one or more of the separate components may be shared among several network nodes.
  • a single RNC may control multiple NodeBs.
  • each unique NodeB and RNC pair may in some instances be considered a single separate network node.
  • the network node 1500 may be configured to support multiple radio access technologies (RATs).
  • RATs radio access technologies
  • some components may be duplicated (e.g., separate memory 1504 for different RATs) and some components may be reused (e.g., a same antenna 1510 may be shared by different RATs).
  • the network node 1500 may also include multiple sets of the various illustrated components for different wireless technologies integrated into network node 1500, for example GSM, WCDMA, LTE, NR, WiFi, Zigbee, Z-wave, LoRaWAN, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or Bluetooth wireless technologies. These wireless technologies may be integrated into the same or different chip or set of chips and other components within network node 1500.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • the processing circuitry 1502 may comprise a combination of one or more of a microprocessor, controller, microcontroller, central processing unit, digital signal processor, application-specific integrated circuit, field programmable gate array, or any other suitable computing device, resource, or combination of hardware, software and/or encoded logic operable to provide, either alone or in conjunction with other network node 1500 components, such as the memory 1504, network node 1500 functionality.
  • the processing circuitry 1502 may be configured to cause the network node to perform the methods as described with reference to Figure 7 or Figure 8.
  • the processing circuitry 1502 includes a system on a chip (SOC). In some embodiments, the processing circuitry 1502 includes one or more of radio frequency (RF) transceiver circuitry 1512 and baseband processing circuitry 1514. In some embodiments, the radio frequency (RF) transceiver circuitry 1512 and the baseband processing circuitry 1514 may be on separate chips (or sets of chips), boards, or units, such as radio units and digital units. In alternative embodiments, part or all of RF transceiver circuitry 1512 and baseband processing circuitry 1514 may be on the same chip or set of chips, boards, or units.
  • SOC system on a chip
  • the processing circuitry 1502 includes one or more of radio frequency (RF) transceiver circuitry 1512 and baseband processing circuitry 1514.
  • the radio frequency (RF) transceiver circuitry 1512 and the baseband processing circuitry 1514 may be on separate chips (or sets of chips), boards, or units, such as radio units and digital units. In alternative embodiments, part or all of
  • the memory 1504 may comprise any form of volatile or non-volatile computer-readable memory including, without limitation, persistent storage, solid-state memory, remotely mounted memory, magnetic media, optical media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), mass storage media (for example, a hard disk), removable storage media (for example, a flash drive, a Compact Disk (CD) or a Digital Video Disk (DVD)), and/or any other volatile or non-volatile, non-transitory device-readable and/or computer-executable memory devices that store information, data, and/or instructions that may be used by the processing circuitry 1502.
  • volatile or non-volatile computer-readable memory including, without limitation, persistent storage, solid-state memory, remotely mounted memory, magnetic media, optical media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), mass storage media (for example, a hard disk), removable storage media (for example, a flash drive, a Compact Disk (CD) or a Digital Video Disk (DVD)), and/or any other volatile or non-
  • the memory 1504 may store any suitable instructions, data, or information, including a computer program, software, an application including one or more of logic, rules, code, tables, and/or other instructions capable of being executed by the processing circuitry 1502 and utilized by the network node 1500.
  • the memory 1504 may be used to store any calculations made by the processing circuitry 1502 and/or any data received via the communication interface 1506.
  • the processing circuitry 1502 and memory 1504 is integrated.
  • the communication interface 1506 is used in wired or wireless communication of signaling and/or data between a network node, access network, and/or UE. As illustrated, the communication interface 1506 comprises port(s)/terminal(s) 1516 to send and receive data, for example to and from a network over a wired connection.
  • the communication interface 1506 also includes radio front-end circuitry 1518 that may be coupled to, or in certain embodiments a part of, the antenna 1510.
  • Radio front-end circuitry 1518 comprises filters 1520 and amplifiers 1522.
  • the radio front-end circuitry 1518 may be connected to an antenna 1510 and processing circuitry 1502.
  • the radio front-end circuitry may be configured to condition signals communicated between antenna 1510 and processing circuitry 1502.
  • the radio front-end circuitry 1518 may receive digital data that is to be sent out to other network nodes or UEs via a wireless connection.
  • the radio front-end circuitry 1518 may convert the digital data into a radio signal having the appropriate channel and bandwidth parameters using a combination of filters 1520 and/or amplifiers 1522.
  • the radio signal may then be transmitted via the antenna 1510.
  • the antenna 1510 may collect radio signals which are then converted into digital data by the radio front-end circuitry 1518.
  • the digital data may be passed to the processing circuitry 1502.
  • the communication interface may comprise different components and/or different combinations of components.
  • the network node 1500 does not include separate radio front-end circuitry 1518, instead, the processing circuitry 1502 includes radio front-end circuitry and is connected to the antenna 1510.
  • the processing circuitry 1502 includes radio front-end circuitry and is connected to the antenna 1510.
  • all or some of the RF transceiver circuitry 1512 is part of the communication interface 1506.
  • the communication interface 1506 includes one or more ports or terminals 1516, the radio front-end circuitry 1518, and the RF transceiver circuitry 1512, as part of a radio unit (not shown), and the communication interface 1506 communicates with the baseband processing circuitry 1514, which is part of a digital unit (not shown).
  • the antenna 1510 may include one or more antennas, or antenna arrays, configured to send and/or receive wireless signals.
  • the antenna 1510 may be coupled to the radio front-end circuitry 1518 and may be any type of antenna capable of transmitting and receiving data and/or signals wirelessly.
  • the antenna 1510 is separate from the network node 1500 and connectable to the network node 1500 through an interface or port.
  • the antenna 1510, communication interface 1506, and/or the processing circuitry 1502 may be configured to perform any receiving operations and/or certain obtaining operations described herein as being performed by the network node. Any information, data and/or signals may be received from a UE, another network node and/or any other network equipment. Similarly, the antenna 1510, the communication interface 1506, and/or the processing circuitry 1502 may be configured to perform any transmitting operations described herein as being performed by the network node. Any information, data and/or signals may be transmitted to a UE, another network node and/or any other network equipment.
  • the power source 1508 provides power to the various components of network node 1500 in a form suitable for the respective components (e.g., at a voltage and current level needed for each respective component).
  • the power source 1508 may further comprise, or be coupled to, power management circuitry to supply the components of the network node 1500 with power for performing the functionality described herein.
  • the network node 1500 may be connectable to an external power source (e.g., the power grid, an electricity outlet) via an input circuitry or interface such as an electrical cable, whereby the external power source supplies power to power circuitry of the power source 1508.
  • the power source 1508 may comprise a source of power in the form of a battery or battery pack which is connected to, or integrated in, power circuitry. The battery may provide backup power should the external power source fail.
  • Embodiments of the network node 1500 may include additional components beyond those shown in Figure 15 for providing certain aspects of the network node’s functionality, including any of the functionality described herein and/or any functionality necessary to support the subject matter described herein.
  • the network node 1500 may include user interface equipment to allow input of information into the network node 1500 and to allow output of information from the network node 1500. This may allow a user to perform diagnostic, maintenance, repair, and other administrative functions for the network node 1500.
  • FIG 16 is a block diagram of a host 1600, which may be an embodiment of the host 1316 of Figure 13, in accordance with various aspects described herein.
  • the host 1600 may be or comprise various combinations hardware and/or software, including a standalone server, a blade server, a cloud- implemented server, a distributed server, a virtual machine, container, or processing resources in a server farm.
  • the host 1600 may provide one or more services to one or more UEs.
  • the host 1600 includes processing circuitry 1602 that is operatively coupled via a bus 1604 to an input/output interface 1606, a network interface 1608, a power source 1610, and a memory 1612.
  • processing circuitry 1602 that is operatively coupled via a bus 1604 to an input/output interface 1606, a network interface 1608, a power source 1610, and a memory 1612.
  • Other components may be included in other embodiments. Features of these components may be substantially similar to those described with respect to the devices of previous figures, such as Figures 14 and 15, such that the descriptions thereof are generally applicable to the corresponding components of host 1600.
  • the memory 1612 may include one or more computer programs including one or more host application programs 1614 and data 1616, which may include user data, e.g., data generated by a UE for the host 1600 or data generated by the host 1600 for a UE.
  • Embodiments of the host 1600 may utilize only a subset or all of the components shown.
  • the host application programs 1614 may be implemented in a container-based architecture and may provide support for video codecs (e.g., Versatile Video Coding (VVC), High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC), Advanced Video Coding (AVC), MPEG, VP9) and audio codecs (e.g., FLAC, Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), MPEG, G.711), including transcoding for multiple different classes, types, or implementations of UEs (e.g., handsets, desktop computers, wearable display systems, heads-up display systems).
  • the host application programs 1614 may also provide for user authentication and licensing checks and may periodically report health, routes, and content availability to a central node, such as a device in or on the edge of a core network.
  • the host 1600 may select and/or indicate a different host for over-the-top services for a UE.
  • the host application programs 1614 may support various protocols, such as the HTTP Live Streaming (HLS) protocol, Real-Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP), Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP), Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (MPEG-DASH), etc.
  • HLS HTTP Live Streaming
  • RTMP Real-Time Messaging Protocol
  • RTSP Real-Time Streaming Protocol
  • MPEG-DASH Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP
  • FIG 17 is a block diagram illustrating a virtualization environment 1700 in which functions implemented by some embodiments may be virtualized.
  • virtualizing means creating virtual versions of apparatuses or devices which may include virtualizing hardware platforms, storage devices and networking resources.
  • virtualization can be applied to any device described herein, or components thereof, and relates to an implementation in which at least a portion of the functionality is implemented as one or more virtual components.
  • Some or all of the functions described herein may be implemented as virtual components executed by one or more virtual machines (VMs) implemented in one or more virtual environments 1700 hosted by one or more of hardware nodes, such as a hardware computing device that operates as a network node, UE, core network node, or host.
  • VMs virtual machines
  • the virtual node does not require radio connectivity (e.g., a core network node or host)
  • the node may be entirely virtualized.
  • Applications 1702 (which may alternatively be called software instances, virtual appliances, network functions, virtual nodes, virtual network functions, etc.) are run in the virtualization environment Q400 to implement some of the features, functions, and/or benefits of some of the embodiments disclosed herein.
  • Hardware 1704 includes processing circuitry, memory that stores software and/or instructions executable by hardware processing circuitry, and/or other hardware devices as described herein, such as a network interface, input/output interface, and so forth.
  • Software may be executed by the processing circuitry to instantiate one or more virtualization layers 1706 (also referred to as hypervisors or virtual machine monitors (VMMs)), provide VMs 1708a and 1708b (one or more of which may be generally referred to as VMs 1708), and/or perform any of the functions, features and/or benefits described in relation with some embodiments described herein.
  • the virtualization layer 1706 may present a virtual operating platform that appears like networking hardware to the VMs 1708.
  • the VMs 1708 comprise virtual processing, virtual memory, virtual networking or interface and virtual storage, and may be run by a corresponding virtualization layer 1706.
  • a virtualization layer 1706 Different embodiments of the instance of a virtual appliance 1702 may be implemented on one or more of VMs 1708, and the implementations may be made in different ways.
  • Virtualization of the hardware is in some contexts referred to as network function virtualization (NFV). NFV may be used to consolidate many network equipment types onto industry standard high volume server hardware, physical switches, and physical storage, which can be located in data centers, and customer premise equipment.
  • NFV network function virtualization
  • a VM 1708 may be a software implementation of a physical machine that runs programs as if they were executing on a physical, non-virtualized machine.
  • Each of the VMs 1708, and that part of hardware 1704 that executes that VM be it hardware dedicated to that VM and/or hardware shared by that VM with others of the VMs, forms separate virtual network elements.
  • a virtual network function is responsible for handling specific network functions that run in one or more VMs 1708 on top of the hardware 1704 and corresponds to the application 1702.
  • Hardware 1704 may be implemented in a standalone network node with generic or specific components. Hardware 1704 may implement some functions via virtualization. Alternatively, hardware 1704 may be part of a larger cluster of hardware (e.g. such as in a data center or CPE) where many hardware nodes work together and are managed via management and orchestration 1710, which, among others, oversees lifecycle management of applications 1702.
  • hardware 1704 is coupled to one or more radio units that each include one or more transmitters and one or more receivers that may be coupled to one or more antennas. Radio units may communicate directly with other hardware nodes via one or more appropriate network interfaces and may be used in combination with the virtual components to provide a virtual node with radio capabilities, such as a radio access node or a base station.
  • some signaling can be provided with the use of a control system 1712 which may alternatively be used for communication between hardware nodes and radio units.
  • Figure 18 shows a communication diagram of a host 1802 communicating via a network node 1804 with a UE 1806 over a partially wireless connection in accordance with some embodiments.
  • host 1802 Like host 1600, embodiments of host 1802 include hardware, such as a communication interface, processing circuitry, and memory.
  • the host 1802 also includes software, which is stored in or accessible by the host 1802 and executable by the processing circuitry.
  • the software includes a host application that may be operable to provide a service to a remote user, such as the UE 1806 connecting via an over-the-top (OTT) connection 1850 extending between the UE 1806 and host 1802.
  • OTT over-the-top
  • a host application may provide user data which is transmitted using the OTT connection 1850.
  • the network node 1804 includes hardware enabling it to communicate with the host 1802 and UE 1806.
  • the connection 1860 may be direct or pass through a core network (like core network 1306 of Figure 13) and/or one or more other intermediate networks, such as one or more public, private, or hosted networks.
  • a core network like core network 1306 of Figure 13
  • an intermediate network may be a backbone network or the Internet.
  • the UE 1806 includes hardware and software, which is stored in or accessible by UE 1806 and executable by the UE’s processing circuitry.
  • the software includes a client application, such as a web browser or operator-specific “app” that may be operable to provide a service to a human or non-human user via UE 1806 with the support of the host 1802.
  • a client application such as a web browser or operator-specific “app” that may be operable to provide a service to a human or non-human user via UE 1806 with the support of the host 1802.
  • an executing host application may communicate with the executing client application via the OTT connection 1850 terminating at the UE 1806 and host 1802.
  • the UE’s client application may receive request data from the host's host application and provide user data in response to the request data.
  • the OTT connection 1850 may transfer both the request data and the user data.
  • the UE’s client application may interact with the user to generate the user data that it provides to the host application through the OTT
  • the OTT connection 1850 may extend via a connection 1860 between the host 1802 and the network node 1804 and via a wireless connection 1870 between the network node 1804 and the UE 1806 to provide the connection between the host 1802 and the UE 1806.
  • the connection 1860 and wireless connection 1870, over which the OTT connection 1850 may be provided, have been drawn abstractly to illustrate the communication between the host 1802 and the UE 1806 via the network node 1804, without explicit reference to any intermediary devices and the precise routing of messages via these devices.
  • the host 1802 provides user data, which may be performed by executing a host application.
  • the user data is associated with a particular human user interacting with the UE 1806.
  • the user data is associated with a UE 1806 that shares data with the host 1802 without explicit human interaction.
  • the host 1802 initiates a transmission carrying the user data towards the UE 1806.
  • the host 1802 may initiate the transmission responsive to a request transmitted by the UE 1806.
  • the request may be caused by human interaction with the UE 1806 or by operation of the client application executing on the UE 1806.
  • the transmission may pass via the network node 1804, in accordance with the teachings of the embodiments described throughout this disclosure. Accordingly, in step 1812, the network node 1804 transmits to the UE 1806 the user data that was carried in the transmission that the host 1802 initiated, in accordance with the teachings of the embodiments described throughout this disclosure.
  • the UE 1806 receives the user data carried in the transmission, which may be performed by a client application executed on the UE 1806 associated with the host application executed by the host 1802. In some examples, the UE 1806 executes a client application which provides user data to the host 1802. The user data may be provided in reaction or response to the data received from the host 1802.
  • the UE 1806 may provide user data, which may be performed by executing the client application.
  • the client application may further consider user input received from the user via an input/output interface of the UE 1806.
  • the UE 1806 initiates, in step 1818, transmission of the user data towards the host 1802 via the network node 1804.
  • the network node 1804 receives user data from the UE 1806 and initiates transmission of the received user data towards the host 1802.
  • the host 1802 receives the user data carried in the transmission initiated by the UE 1806.
  • One or more of the various embodiments improve the performance of OTT services provided to the UE 1806 using the OTT connection 1850, in which the wireless connection 1870 forms the last segment. More precisely, the teachings of these embodiments may improve the privacy of UEs.
  • factory status information may be collected and analyzed by the host 1802.
  • the host 1802 may process audio and video data which may have been retrieved from a UE for use in creating maps.
  • the host 1802 may collect and analyze real-time data to assist in controlling vehicle congestion (e.g., controlling traffic lights).
  • the host 1802 may store surveillance video uploaded by a UE.
  • the host 1802 may store or control access to media content such as video, audio, VR or AR which it can broadcast, multicast or unicast to UEs.
  • the host 1802 may be used for energy pricing, remote control of non-time critical electrical load to balance power generation needs, location services, presentation services (such as compiling diagrams etc. from data collected from remote devices), or any other function of collecting, retrieving, storing, analyzing and/or transmitting data.
  • a measurement procedure may be provided for the purpose of monitoring data rate, latency and other factors on which the one or more embodiments improve.
  • the measurement procedure and/or the network functionality for reconfiguring the OTT connection may be implemented in software and hardware of the host 1802 and/or UE 1806.
  • sensors (not shown) may be deployed in or in association with other devices through which the OTT connection 1850 passes; the sensors may participate in the measurement procedure by supplying values of the monitored quantities exemplified above, or supplying values of other physical quantities from which software may compute or estimate the monitored quantities.
  • the reconfiguring of the OTT connection 1850 may include message format, retransmission settings, preferred routing etc.; the reconfiguring need not directly alter the operation of the network node 1804. Such procedures and functionalities may be known and practiced in the art.
  • measurements may involve proprietary UE signaling that facilitates measurements of throughput, propagation times, latency and the like, by the host 1802.
  • the measurements may be implemented in that software causes messages to be transmitted, in particular empty or ‘dummy’ messages, using the OTT connection 1850 while monitoring propagation times, errors, etc.
  • computing devices described herein may include the illustrated combination of hardware components, other embodiments may comprise computing devices with different combinations of components. It is to be understood that these computing devices may comprise any suitable combination of hardware and/or software needed to perform the tasks, features, functions and methods disclosed herein. Determining, calculating, obtaining or similar operations described herein may be performed by processing circuitry, which may process information by, for example, converting the obtained information into other information, comparing the obtained information or converted information to information stored in the network node, and/or performing one or more operations based on the obtained information or converted information, and as a result of said processing making a determination.
  • processing circuitry may process information by, for example, converting the obtained information into other information, comparing the obtained information or converted information to information stored in the network node, and/or performing one or more operations based on the obtained information or converted information, and as a result of said processing making a determination.
  • computing devices may comprise multiple different physical components that make up a single illustrated component, and functionality may be partitioned between separate components.
  • a communication interface may be configured to include any of the components described herein, and/or the functionality of the components may be partitioned between the processing circuitry and the communication interface.
  • non-computationally intensive functions of any of such components may be implemented in software or firmware and computationally intensive functions may be implemented in hardware.
  • processing circuitry executing instructions stored on in memory, which in certain embodiments may be a computer program product in the form of a non-transitory computer -readable storage medium.
  • some or all of the functionality may be provided by the processing circuitry without executing instructions stored on a separate or discrete device-readable storage medium, such as in a hardwired manner.
  • the processing circuitry can be configured to perform the described functionality. The benefits provided by such functionality are not limited to the processing circuitry alone or to other components of the computing device, but are enjoyed by the computing device as a whole, and/or by end users and a wireless network generally.
  • a method performed by a user equipment comprising: transmitting a first radio resource control message to a target network node comprising an encrypted cause indication indicating why the user equipment is establishing, re-establishing or resuming a connection to the target network node.
  • step of transmitting is performed responsive to receiving an indication from a source network node that the UE can encrypt the cause indication.
  • step of transmitting is performed responsive to receiving an indication from the target network node that the UE can encrypt the cause indication.
  • the first key comprises one of: a first symmetric key derived from a key for encrypting radio resource control messages in the user equipments access stratum context, KRRCenc; a second symmetric key derived from a key from which all other keys in the user equipments access stratum security context are derived, K g NB; a first public key received from a source network node.
  • the method as claimed in claim 9 further comprising receiving an indication of the first key from a source network node.
  • Group B Embodiments A method performed by a source network node, the method comprising: transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • the method of embodiment 13 further comprising: receiving an encrypted cause indication from a target network node; decrypting the encrypted cause indication; and transmitting the decrypted cause indication to the target network node.
  • the method of embodiment 14 further comprising: receiving an indication that the encrypted cause indication is encrypted from the target network node.
  • the method of any one of embodiments 14 to 15 further comprising utilizing a first key to decrypt the encrypted cause indication.
  • the method of embodiment 13 further comprising transmitting a first key to a target network node to use in decrypting an encrypted cause indication.
  • the method of embodiment 17 further comprising transmitting, to the target network node, an indication of an algorithm to use to decrypt the encrypted cause indication.
  • the method of embodiment 16 to 18 wherein the first key comprises one of: a first symmetric key derived from a key for encrypting radio resource control messages in the user equipments access stratum context, KRRCenc; a second symmetric key derived from a key from which all other keys in the user equipments access stratum security context are derived, K g NB; a first private key.
  • the method of one of embodiments 13 to 19 further comprising transmitting, to the user equipment, an indication of a second key to use in encrypting the cause indication.
  • a method performed by a target network node comprising: transmitting, to a user equipment, an indication that encryption of a cause indication can be performed by the user equipment.
  • the method of embodiment 21 wherein the indication that encryption of the cause indication can be performed by the user equipment is transmitted in a broadcast message.
  • the method of embodiment 21 or 22 further comprising: receiving a first cause indication from the user equipment; and transmitting the first cause indication to a source network node.
  • the method of embodiment 23 further comprising: responsive to the source network node enabling encryption of cause indications, receiving a decrypted cause indication from the source network node.
  • the method of embodiment 23 further comprising: responsive to encryption of cause indications not being enabled at the source network node, assuming that the first cause value is unencrypted.
  • the method of embodiment 22 further comprising: receiving an encrypted cause indication from the user equipment; obtaining a first key from a source network node; and decrypting the encrypted cause indication.
  • the first key comprises one of: a first symmetric key derived from a key for encrypting radio resource control messages in the user equipments access stratum context, KRRCenc; a second symmetric key derived from a key from which all other keys in the user equipments access stratum security context are derived, K g NB; a first private key received from the source network node.
  • a user equipment comprising: processing circuitry configured to cause the user equipment to perform any of the steps of any of the Group A embodiments; and power supply circuitry configured to supply power to the processing circuitry.
  • a network node comprising: processing circuitry configured to cause the network node to perform any of the steps of any of the Group B embodiments; power supply circuitry configured to supply power to the processing circuitry.
  • a user equipment comprising: an antenna configured to send and receive wireless signals; radio front-end circuitry connected to the antenna and to processing circuitry, and configured to condition signals communicated between the antenna and the processing circuitry; the processing circuitry being configured to perform any of the steps of any of the Group A embodiments; an input interface connected to the processing circuitry and configured to allow input of information into the UE to be processed by the processing circuitry; an output interface connected to the processing circuitry and configured to output information from the UE that has been processed by the processing circuitry; and a battery connected to the processing circuitry and configured to supply power to the UE.
  • UE user equipment
  • a host configured to operate in a communication system to provide an over-the-top (OTT) service, the host comprising: processing circuitry configured to provide user data; and a network interface configured to initiate transmission of the user data to a cellular network for transmission to a user equipment (UE), wherein the UE comprises a communication interface and processing circuitry, the communication interface and processing circuitry of the UE being configured to perform any of the steps of any of the Group A embodiments to receive the user data from the host.
  • OTT over-the-top
  • the cellular network further includes a network node configured to communicate with the UE to transmit the user data to the UE from the host.
  • the processing circuitry of the host is configured to execute a host application, thereby providing the user data; and the host application is configured to interact with a client application executing on the UE, the client application being associated with the host application.
  • UE user equipment
  • a host configured to operate in a communication system to provide an over-the-top (OTT) service, the host comprising: processing circuitry configured to provide user data; and a network interface configured to initiate transmission of the user data to a cellular network for transmission to a user equipment (UE), wherein the UE comprises a communication interface and processing circuitry, the communication interface and processing circuitry of the UE being configured to perform any of the steps of any of the Group A embodiments to transmit the user data to the host.
  • OTT over-the-top
  • the cellular network further includes a network node configured to communicate with the UE to transmit the user data from the UE to the host.
  • the processing circuitry of the host is configured to execute a host application, thereby providing the user data; and the host application is configured to interact with a client application executing on the UE, the client application being associated with the host application.
  • UE user equipment
  • the method of the previous embodiment further comprising: at the host, transmitting input data to the client application executing on the UE, the input data being provided by executing the host application, wherein the user data is provided by the client application in response to the input data from the host application.
  • a host configured to operate in a communication system to provide an over-the-top (OTT) service, the host comprising: processing circuitry configured to provide user data; and a network interface configured to initiate transmission of the user data to a network node in a cellular network for transmission to a user equipment (UE), the network node having a communication interface and processing circuitry, the processing circuitry of the network node configured to perform any of the operations of any of the Group B embodiments to transmit the user data from the host to the UE.
  • OTT over-the-top
  • the processing circuitry of the host is configured to execute a host application that provides the user data; and the UE comprises processing circuitry configured to execute a client application associated with the host application to receive the transmission of user data from the host.
  • UE user equipment
  • a communication system configured to provide an over-the-top service, the communication system comprising: a host comprising: processing circuitry configured to provide user data for a user equipment (UE), the user data being associated with the over-the-top service; and a network interface configured to initiate transmission of the user data toward a cellular network node for transmission to the UE, the network node having a communication interface and processing circuitry, the processing circuitry of the network node configured to perform any of the operations of any of the Group B embodiments to transmit the user data from the host to the UE.
  • a host comprising: processing circuitry configured to provide user data for a user equipment (UE), the user data being associated with the over-the-top service; and a network interface configured to initiate transmission of the user data toward a cellular network node for transmission to the UE, the network node having a communication interface and processing circuitry, the processing circuitry of the network node configured to perform any of the operations of any of the Group B embodiments to transmit the user data from the host to the UE.
  • the communication system of the previous embodiment further comprising: the network node; and/or the user equipment.
  • a host configured to operate in a communication system to provide an over-the-top (OTT) service, the host comprising: processing circuitry configured to initiate receipt of user data; and a network interface configured to receive the user data from a network node in a cellular network, the network node having a communication interface and processing circuitry, the processing circuitry of the network node configured to perform any of the operations of any of the Group B embodiments to receive the user data from a user equipment (UE) for the host.
  • OTT over-the-top
  • the processing circuitry of the host is configured to execute a host application, thereby providing the user data; and the host application is configured to interact with a client application executing on the UE, the client application being associated with the host application.
  • the method of the previous embodiment further comprising at the network node, transmitting the received user data to the host.
  • NAS Non-Access-Stratum
  • GAA Generic Authentication Architecture
  • GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
  • UEs using priority access can be distinguished from other non-priority access subscriber groups based on RRC establishment cause sent during connection establishment and based on RRC resume cause when UEs transition from RRC_INACTIVE state to RRC_CONNECTED state.
  • the options for the resume cause values are the same as for the establishment cause values. This solution scope is to address threat arising from the plain text RRC resume cause.
  • the RRC resume cause is in plain text in RRCResumeRequest, which is sent in SRB0 message that is neither confidentiality nor integrity protected.
  • Plain text RRC resume cause in unprotected RRCResumeRequest is an attack vector that could be exploited by an adversary to track a specific user of UEs using priority access and could be exploited to identify a group of UEs using priority access. Leaving the above attack vector untreated poses a privacy threat to the users of these UEs.
  • the solution proposes to provide confidentiality protection of RRC resume cause to mitigate privacy threat.
  • This solution proposes to introduce confidentiality protection of the clear text ‘resumeCause’ in RRCResumeRequest message using symmetric key.
  • the UE indicates to the network whether the UE supports encryption of the resume cause. It also indicates its own capabilities in relation to encryption algorithm and encryption key. This symmetric key is a part of the AS security context of the UE. UE is assumed to have established the AS security context while in RRC_CONNECTED state prior to transitioning into RRC_INACTIVE state.
  • the encryption is length-preserving, i.e., the length of the bit string representing the resumeCause in plaintext remains the same for the bit string of the encrypted resumeCasue.
  • the solution uses a RRCRelease message sent by the network to inform the UE which key and encryption algorithm to use to encrypt the resumeCause in the successive RRCResumeRequest messages when UE is transitioning from RRC_INACTIVE state to RRC_CONNECTED state by sending RRCResumeRequest.
  • the gNB/ng-eNB uses I-RNTI sent by UE in RRCResumeRequest to retrieve the UE context and cryptographic key needed to decrypt the resumeCause.
  • the decryption may be done by the source or the target gNB/ng-eNB.
  • the solution reuses the symmetric key already possessed by both the UE and the network from the established AS security context when UE was in RRC_CONNECTED state prior to its state transition to RRCJNACTIVE.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Des modes de réalisation décrits ici concernent des procédés et des appareils pour protéger la confidentialité d'indications de cause dans une messagerie de gestion des ressources radio, RRC. Un procédé dans un équipement utilisateur comprend la transmission d'un premier message de gestion des ressources radio à un nœud de réseau cible comprenant une indication de cause chiffrée indiquant pourquoi l'équipement utilisateur établit, rétablit ou reprend une connexion au nœud de réseau cible.
PCT/IB2024/051291 2023-02-10 2024-02-12 Procédés et appareils pour protéger la confidentialité d'indications de cause dans une messagerie de gestion des ressources radio WO2024166075A1 (fr)

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Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20180302944A1 (en) * 2015-12-22 2018-10-18 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Data Transmission Processing Method, User Equipment, and Base Station

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US20180302944A1 (en) * 2015-12-22 2018-10-18 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Data Transmission Processing Method, User Equipment, and Base Station

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"3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3; (Release 18)", vol. CT WG1, no. V18.1.0, 6 January 2023 (2023-01-06), pages 1 - 1031, XP052234923, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:https://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/archive/24_series/24.501/24501-i10.zip 24501-i10.docx> [retrieved on 20230106] *
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