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WO2023070560A1 - 信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质 - Google Patents

信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023070560A1
WO2023070560A1 PCT/CN2021/127588 CN2021127588W WO2023070560A1 WO 2023070560 A1 WO2023070560 A1 WO 2023070560A1 CN 2021127588 W CN2021127588 W CN 2021127588W WO 2023070560 A1 WO2023070560 A1 WO 2023070560A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security policy
communication
relay
security
prose
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2021/127588
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
洪伟
Original Assignee
北京小米移动软件有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 北京小米移动软件有限公司 filed Critical 北京小米移动软件有限公司
Priority to EP21961915.2A priority Critical patent/EP4425983A1/en
Priority to CN202180003641.0A priority patent/CN116368835A/zh
Priority to PCT/CN2021/127588 priority patent/WO2023070560A1/zh
Publication of WO2023070560A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023070560A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/37—Managing security policies for mobile devices or for controlling mobile applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
    • H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of wireless communication but is not limited to the technical field of wireless communication, and in particular relates to an information transmission method, device, communication device and storage medium.
  • the proximity communication service (ProSe, Proximity Service) for the fifth generation (5G, 5th Generation) cellular mobile communication includes: ProSe direct communication and ProSe indirect communication.
  • a remote user equipment (UE, User Equipment) relays the UE through a UE to a network (U2N, UE-to-Network) to communicate with the network.
  • U2N UE-to-Network
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure provide an information transmission method, device, communication device, and storage medium.
  • an information transmission method which is applied to a user equipment UE, and the method includes:
  • PC5 security policy Acquire a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the method also includes:
  • the PC5 communication is established.
  • the method in response to the UE being a relay UE, the method further includes:
  • the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service is protected.
  • the acquiring PC5 security policy includes:
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • an information transmission method which is applied to a core network, and the method includes:
  • PC5 security policy Configure a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the method also includes:
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • an information transmission apparatus wherein, applied to a user equipment UE, the apparatus includes:
  • the obtaining module is configured to obtain a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the device also includes:
  • An establishment module configured to establish the PC5 communication based on the PC5 security policy.
  • the apparatus in response to the UE being a relay UE, the apparatus further includes:
  • the protection module is configured to protect the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service based on the UP security policy provided by the network side.
  • the acquisition module is specifically configured as:
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • an information transmission device which is applied to a core network, and the device includes:
  • a setting module configured to configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the device also includes:
  • the sending module is configured to send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • a communication device including a processor, a memory, and an executable program stored on the memory and capable of being run by the processor, wherein the processor runs the executable program
  • the steps of the information transmission method described in the first aspect or the second aspect are executed when the program is executed.
  • a storage medium on which an executable program is stored, wherein, when the executable program is executed by a processor, the information transmission method as described in the first aspect or the second aspect is implemented. A step of.
  • the UE obtains a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, and meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication. Improve communication security.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication system according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic flowchart of an information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic flowchart of another information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of information interaction of an information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 5 is a block diagram of an information transmission device according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 6 is a block diagram of another information transmission device according to an exemplary embodiment
  • Fig. 7 is a block diagram showing an apparatus for information transmission according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • first, second, third, etc. may use the terms first, second, third, etc. to describe various information, the information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, without departing from the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure, first information may also be called second information, and similarly, second information may also be called first information. Depending on the context, the word “if” as used herein may be interpreted as “at” or "when” or "in response to a determination.”
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication system provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the wireless communication system is a communication system based on cellular mobile communication technology, and the wireless communication system may include: several terminals 11 and several base stations 12 .
  • the terminal 11 may be a device that provides voice and/or data connectivity to the user.
  • the terminal 11 can communicate with one or more core networks via a radio access network (Radio Access Network, RAN), and the terminal 11 can be an Internet of Things terminal, such as a sensor device, a mobile phone (or called a "cellular" phone) and a
  • the computer of the IoT terminal for example, may be a fixed, portable, pocket, hand-held, built-in computer or vehicle-mounted device.
  • Station For example, Station (Station, STA), subscriber unit (subscriber unit), subscriber station (subscriber station), mobile station (mobile station), mobile station (mobile), remote station (remote station), access point, remote terminal ( remote terminal), an access terminal (access terminal), a user device (user terminal), a user agent (user agent), a user device (user device), or a user terminal (user equipment, UE).
  • the terminal 11 may also be a device of an unmanned aerial vehicle.
  • the terminal 11 may also be a vehicle-mounted device, for example, a trip computer with a wireless communication function, or a wireless communication device connected externally to the trip computer.
  • the terminal 11 may also be a roadside device, for example, it may be a street lamp, a signal lamp, or other roadside devices with a wireless communication function.
  • the base station 12 may be a network side device in a wireless communication system.
  • the wireless communication system may be a fourth generation mobile communication technology (the 4th generation mobile communication, 4G) system, also known as a Long Term Evolution (LTE) system; or, the wireless communication system may also be a 5G system, Also known as new radio (NR) system or 5G NR system.
  • the wireless communication system may also be a next-generation system of the 5G system.
  • the access network in the 5G system can be called NG-RAN (New Generation-Radio Access Network, New Generation Radio Access Network).
  • the MTC system the MTC system.
  • the base station 12 may be an evolved base station (eNB) adopted in a 4G system.
  • the base station 12 may also be a base station (gNB) adopting a centralized and distributed architecture in the 5G system.
  • eNB evolved base station
  • gNB base station
  • the base station 12 adopts a centralized distributed architecture it generally includes a centralized unit (central unit, CU) and at least two distributed units (distributed unit, DU).
  • the centralized unit is provided with a packet data convergence protocol (Packet Data Convergence Protocol, PDCP) layer, radio link layer control protocol (Radio Link Control, RLC) layer, media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) layer protocol stack;
  • PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • RLC Radio Link Control
  • MAC media access control
  • a physical (Physical, PHY) layer protocol stack is set in the unit, and the embodiment of the present disclosure does not limit the specific implementation manner of the base station 12 .
  • a wireless connection can be established between the base station 12 and the terminal 11 through a wireless air interface.
  • the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fourth-generation mobile communication network technology (4G) standard; or, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fifth-generation mobile communication network technology (5G) standard, such as
  • the wireless air interface is a new air interface; alternatively, the wireless air interface may also be a wireless air interface based on a technical standard of a next-generation mobile communication network based on 5G.
  • an E2E (End to End, end-to-end) connection can also be established between the terminals 11.
  • V2V vehicle to vehicle, vehicle-to-vehicle
  • V2I vehicle to Infrastructure, vehicle-to-roadside equipment
  • V2P vehicle to pedestrian, vehicle-to-person communication in vehicle to everything (V2X) communication Wait for the scene.
  • the above wireless communication system may further include a network management device 13 .
  • the network management device 13 may be a core network device in the wireless communication system, for example, the network management device 13 may be a mobility management entity (Mobility Management Entity, MME).
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • the network management device can also be other core network devices, such as Serving GateWay (SGW), Public Data Network Gateway (Public Data Network GateWay, PGW), policy and charging rule functional unit (Policy and Charging Rules Function, PCRF) or Home Subscriber Server (Home Subscriber Server, HSS), etc.
  • SGW Serving GateWay
  • PGW Public Data Network Gateway
  • PCRF Policy and Charging Rules Function
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • Executors involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure include, but are not limited to: UEs such as mobile phone terminals supporting cellular mobile communications, base stations, and core networks.
  • PC5 communication based on PC5 connection needs to be established between the remote UE and the U2N relay UE.
  • PC5 connection security of PC5 communication in ProSe indirect communication it is mainly realized by generating a key. How to configure the activation and deactivation of PC5 connection security to meet the communication security requirements of ProSe indirect communication is an urgent problem to be solved.
  • this exemplary embodiment provides an information transmission method, which can be applied to a UE in a cellular mobile communication system, including:
  • Step 201 Obtain a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the method disclosed in this embodiment may be executed by a UE in cellular mobile communication, and the UE may include: a terminal such as a mobile phone for wireless communication using cellular mobile communication technology.
  • PC5 communication is performed between the remote UE and the relay UE through the established PC5 connection; the relay UE and the network side of the cellular mobile communication can communicate through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
  • the PC5 security policy can be used to configure the PC5 connection security (PC5 Connection Security) of the PC5 communication through the PC5 connection in the ProSe indirect communication.
  • the PC5 connection security may be a security protection method adopted for the PC5 connection.
  • the PC5 security policy may indicate whether PC5 communication is protected by using PC5 connection security.
  • the PC5 security policy may indicate: PC5 connection security must be used, PC5 connection security is preferred, PC5 connection security does not need to be used, and the like.
  • the PC5 connection security may include multiple security protection methods.
  • the PC5 security policy may also indicate the specific protection mode of the PC5 connection security adopted.
  • the specific protection methods for PC5 connection security may include at least one of the following: encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data; integrity protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data, and the like.
  • the encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data can be the security protection that PC5 communication signaling and/or data adopt the modes such as key encryption and decryption to carry out.
  • Integrity protection may be to use keys for integrity protection and verification of PC5 communication signaling and/or data.
  • the UE When the UE performs the PC5 communication in the ProSe indirect communication, it can determine the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication according to the PC5 security policy, thereby improving the data communication security in the PC5 communication.
  • the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication, and improve communication security.
  • the PC5 security policy is configured by the core network.
  • the PC5 security policy can be configured by the PCF of the core network.
  • the acquiring PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 security policy may be configured by the PCF of the core network.
  • the PCF of the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
  • the core network can send the instruction information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
  • the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through NAS signaling during the service authorization and provisioning process for the UE.
  • service authorization and activation may include: authorization and activation of the ProSe relay service.
  • the core network may respectively send PC5 security policy indication information to the remote UE and the relay UE through NAS signaling during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE and the relay UE respectively.
  • the core network authorizes and activates services for the U2N relay UE; the PCF provides the relay UE with a PC5 security policy for ProSe indirect communication.
  • the core network authorizes and activates services for the remote UE; the PCF provides the remote UE with the PC5 security policy of ProSe indirect communication.
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the PC5 security policies of different ProSe relay services may be the same or different.
  • the PC5 security policies configured for the signaling plane and the data plane may be the same or different for the PC5 connection security.
  • the PC5 security policy can configure different security for PC5 UP and PC5 CP.
  • the ProSe relay service may be a service carried by the remote UE during data communication with the network side through the relay UE performing data relay.
  • the instruction information of the PC5 security policy is sent through the core network to realize the security configuration of the PC5 communication corresponding to one or more ProSe relay services, meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of each ProSe relay service, and improve the communication security.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • the Relay Service Code (RSC, Relay Service Code) can be provided by the PCF to the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • An RSC can uniquely identify a ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide to the remote UE.
  • the RSC can also identify authorized users that the relay UE can provide services, and can be used to select relevant security policies or information, etc. For example, RSC is required for authentication and authorization between remote UEs and relay UEs.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the security requirements of the CP and the UP during data transmission may be the same or different.
  • the PC5 CP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of the CP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 CP security.
  • the PC5 UP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of UP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 UP security.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • PC5 communication For the ProSe indirect communication implemented by the relay UE, PC5 communication needs to be established to carry the signaling and user data between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy needs to meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of the ProSe relay service running between the remote UE and the relay UE, and the PC5 CP security policy also needs to meet the network side NAS Signaling and AS signaling security requirements.
  • the PC5 CP security of ProSe indirect communication configured by the PC5 CP security policy needs to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling.
  • the PC5 CP security policy for ProSe indirect communication can be configured to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling defined in 3GPP TS 33.501, that is, PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication is required (REQUIRED) .
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the PC5 UP security policy needs to satisfy the ProSe service data exchanged between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the PC5 UP security policy also needs to meet the connection service provided by the relay UE requested by the remote UE; further, the connection service provided by the relay UE is used to support the relay service provided by the network side to the remote UE through the relay UE. Therefore, the PC5 UP security configured by the PC5 UP security policy needs to meet the UP security requirements of the relay service provided by the network.
  • the PC5 UP security policy can configure the PC5 UP security to be consistent with the network side UP security.
  • Encryption and integrity protection requirements in UP security on the network side can have "required (REQUIRED)” or “preferred (PREFERRED)” or “not required (NOT NEEDED)” options.
  • the method also includes:
  • the PC5 communication is established.
  • the remote UE can discover the relay UE and determine the ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide.
  • the remote UE selects the discovered relay UE and establishes a PC5 connection for ProSe indirect communication.
  • the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE is configured by the PC5 security policy.
  • the PC5 security policy may be sent by the PCF to the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the method in response to the UE being a relay UE, the method further includes:
  • the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service is protected.
  • the relay UE can establish a PDU session for ProSe indirect communication.
  • the UP security policy of the established PDU session can be provided by the network.
  • the PDU session may be established before the remote UE requests to establish PC5 communication for ProSe indirect communication.
  • Relay UE and 5G radio access network can activate UP security for PDU session based on UP security policy.
  • the remote UE can request different ProSe relay services from the relay UE.
  • the remote UE can request by sending the relay service code (RSC, Relay Service Code) of the ProSe relay service to the relay UE. If the relay UE does not currently establish a PDU session associated with the RSC, or the relay UE actively needs to establish a new If the PDU session is relayed, the relay UE can initiate a new PDU session establishment process before establishing the PC5 connection.
  • the UP security policy of the new PDU session can also be provided by the network side.
  • the network side may be a radio access network and/or a core network in a cellular mobile communication system.
  • the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE may be determined based on the configuration of the PC5 security policy.
  • the communication security between the relay UE and the network side can be determined based on the configuration of the security policy provided by the network side. In this way, the PC5 communication security in the ProSe indirect communication and the communication security between the relay UE and the network side are realized.
  • this exemplary embodiment provides an information transmission method, which can be applied to the core network of a cellular mobile communication system, including:
  • Step 301 Configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the method disclosed in this embodiment may be executed by the PCF in the core network or the like.
  • the PC5 security policy can be configured by the PCF.
  • PC5 communication is performed between the remote UE and the relay UE through the established PC5 connection; the relay UE and the network side of the cellular mobile communication can communicate through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
  • the PC5 security policy can be used to configure the PC5 connection security (PC5 Connection Security) of the PC5 communication through the PC5 connection in the ProSe indirect communication.
  • the PC5 connection security may be a security protection method adopted for the PC5 connection.
  • the PC5 security policy may indicate whether PC5 communication is protected by using PC5 connection security.
  • the PC5 security policy may indicate: PC5 connection security must be used, PC5 connection security is preferred, PC5 connection security does not need to be used, and the like.
  • the PC5 connection security may include multiple security protection methods.
  • the PC5 security policy may also indicate the specific protection mode of the PC5 connection security adopted.
  • the specific protection methods for PC5 connection security may include at least one of the following: encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data; integrity protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data, and the like.
  • the encryption protection of the PC5 communication signaling and/or data may be the security protection of the PC5 communication signaling and/or data by means of key encryption and decryption. Integrity protection may be to use keys for integrity protection and verification of PC5 communication signaling and/or data.
  • the UE When the UE performs the PC5 communication in the ProSe indirect communication, it can determine the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication according to the PC5 security policy, thereby improving the data communication security in the PC5 communication.
  • the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, and meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication. Improve communication security.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the security requirements of the CP and the UP during data transmission may be the same or different.
  • the PC5 CP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of the CP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 CP security.
  • the PC5 UP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of UP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 UP security.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • PC5 communication For the ProSe indirect communication implemented by the relay UE, PC5 communication needs to be established to carry the signaling and user data between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy needs to meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of the ProSe relay service running between the remote UE and the relay UE, and the PC5 CP security policy also needs to meet the network side NAS Signaling and AS signaling security requirements.
  • the PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication configured by the PC5 CP security policy needs to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling.
  • the PC5 CP security policy for ProSe indirect communication can configure PC5 CP security to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling defined in 3GPP TS 33.501, that is, PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication is required (REQUIRED) .
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the PC5 UP security policy needs to satisfy the ProSe service data exchanged between the remote UE and the relay UE.
  • the PC5 UP security policy also needs to meet the connection service provided by the relay UE requested by the remote UE; further, the connection service provided by the relay UE is used to support the relay service provided by the network side to the remote UE through the relay UE. Therefore, the PC5 UP security configured by the PC5 UP security policy needs to meet the UP security requirements of the relay service provided by the network.
  • the PC5 UP security policy can configure the PC5 UP security to be consistent with the network side UP security.
  • Encryption and integrity protection requirements in UP security on the network side can have "required (REQUIRED)” or “preferred (PREFERRED)” or “not required (NOT NEEDED)” options.
  • the method also includes:
  • the PC5 security policy may be configured by the PCF of the core network.
  • the PCF of the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
  • the core network can send the instruction information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
  • the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through NAS signaling during the service authorization and provisioning process for the UE.
  • service authorization and activation may include: authorization and activation of the ProSe relay service.
  • the core network may respectively send PC5 security policy indication information to the remote UE and the relay UE through NAS signaling during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE and the relay UE respectively.
  • the core network authorizes and activates services for the U2N relay UE; the PCF provides the relay UE with a PC5 security policy for ProSe indirect communication.
  • the core network authorizes and activates services for the remote UE; the PCF provides the remote UE with the PC5 security policy of ProSe indirect communication.
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the PC5 security policies of different ProSe relay services may be the same or different.
  • the PC5 security policies configured for the signaling plane and the data plane may be the same or different for the PC5 connection security.
  • the PC5 security policy can configure different security for PC5 UP and PC5 CP.
  • the ProSe relay service may be a service carried by the remote UE during data communication with the network side through the relay UE performing data relay.
  • the instruction information of the PC5 security policy is sent through the core network to realize the security configuration of the PC5 communication corresponding to one or more ProSe relay services, meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of each ProSe relay service, and improve the communication security.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • the Relay Service Code (RSC, Relay Service Code) can be provided by the PCF to the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • An RSC can uniquely identify a ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide to the remote UE.
  • the RSC can also identify authorized users that the relay UE can provide services, and can be used to select relevant security policies or information, etc. For example, RSC is required for authentication and authorization between remote UEs and relay UEs.
  • the application steps of the PC5 security policy in the ProSe indirect communication process include:
  • Step 401a the core network may provide the relay UE with the PC5 security policy during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the relay UE.
  • Step 401b the core network may provide the remote UE with the PC5 security policy during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE.
  • Step 402 the relay UE may establish a PDU session for ProSe indirect communication relay.
  • the UP security policy of the established PDU session is provided by the network side.
  • Step 403 the remote UE initiates a discovery process, and the remote UE can discover the relay UE and determine the ProSe relay service provided by the relay UE.
  • Step 404a the remote UE selects the discovered relay UE and establishes a PC5 connection to perform ProSe indirect communication.
  • the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE is configured by the PC5 security policy.
  • Step 404b Optionally, if the relay UE does not currently establish a PDU session associated with the RSC, or the relay UE actively needs to establish a new PDU session for relay, the relay UE can initiate a new PDU before completing the establishment of the PC5 connection Session establishment process.
  • the UP security policy of the new PDU session can also be provided by the network side.
  • Step 405 the relay UE sends a remote UE report (remote user ID, remote UE information) to the SMF, and the remote UE report is sent for the PDU session.
  • a remote UE report remote user ID, remote UE information
  • Step 406a The ProSe relay service traffic is transmitted through the PC5 connection with security protection.
  • Step 406b The ProSe relay service flow relays the connection transmission between the UE and the network side, which has security protection.
  • the embodiment of the present invention also provides an information transmission device, which is applied to a UE of cellular mobile wireless communication, as shown in FIG. 5 , wherein the device 100 includes:
  • the obtaining module 110 is configured to obtain a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the device also includes:
  • the establishment module 120 is configured to establish the PC5 communication based on the PC5 security policy.
  • the apparatus in response to the UE being a relay UE, the apparatus further includes:
  • the protection module 130 is configured to protect the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service based on the UP security policy provided by the network side.
  • the acquiring module 110 is specifically configured as:
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • the embodiment of the present invention also provides an information transmission device, which is applied in the core network of cellular mobile wireless communication, as shown in FIG. 6, wherein the device 200 includes:
  • the setting module 210 is configured to configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 security policy includes:
  • the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
  • the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
  • the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
  • the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
  • the device also includes:
  • the sending module 220 is configured to send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
  • the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
  • the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
  • the acquisition module 110, the establishment module 120, the protection module 130, the setting module 210 and the sending module 220 etc. may be controlled by one or more central processing units (CPU, Central Processing Unit), graphics processing units (GPU, Graphics Processing Unit), Baseband Processor (BP, Baseband Processor), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC, Application Specific Integrated Circuit), DSP, Programmable Logic Device (PLD, Programmable Logic Device), Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD, Complex Programmable Logic Device), field-programmable gate array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array), general-purpose processor, controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation for executing the aforementioned method.
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • GPU Graphics Processing Unit
  • BP Baseband Processor
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • DSP Programmable Logic Device
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
  • FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
  • Fig. 7 is a block diagram of an apparatus 3000 for information transmission according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • the apparatus 3000 may be a mobile phone, a computer, a digital broadcast terminal, a messaging device, a game console, a tablet device, a medical device, a fitness device, a personal digital assistant, and the like.
  • device 3000 may include one or more of the following components: processing component 3002, memory 3004, power supply component 3006, multimedia component 3008, audio component 3010, input/output (I/O) interface 3012, sensor component 3014, and Communication component 3016.
  • the processing component 3002 generally controls the overall operations of the device 3000, such as those associated with display, telephone calls, data communications, camera operations, and recording operations.
  • the processing component 3002 may include one or more processors 3020 to execute instructions to complete all or part of the steps of the above method. Additionally, processing component 3002 may include one or more modules that facilitate interaction between processing component 3002 and other components. For example, processing component 3002 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between multimedia component 3008 and processing component 3002 .
  • the memory 3004 is configured to store various types of data to support operations at the device 3000 . Examples of such data include instructions for any application or method operating on device 3000, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, videos, and the like.
  • the memory 3004 can be realized by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or their combination, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM), Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), Read Only Memory (ROM), Magnetic Memory, Flash Memory, Magnetic or Optical Disk.
  • SRAM static random access memory
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
  • EPROM erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
  • PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
  • ROM Read Only Memory
  • Magnetic Memory Flash Memory
  • Magnetic or Optical Disk Magnetic Disk
  • Power component 3006 provides power to various components of device 3000 .
  • Power components 3006 may include a power management system, one or more power supplies, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power for device 3000 .
  • the multimedia component 3008 includes a screen that provides an output interface between the device 3000 and the user.
  • the screen may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) and a touch panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touch screen to receive input signals from a user.
  • the touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensor can sense not only the boundary of a touch or swipe action, but also detect the duration and pressure associated with the touch or swipe operation.
  • the multimedia component 3008 includes a front camera and/or a rear camera. When the device 3000 is in an operation mode, such as a shooting mode or a video mode, the front camera and/or the rear camera can receive external multimedia data. Each front camera and rear camera can be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capability.
  • the audio component 3010 is configured to output and/or input audio signals.
  • the audio component 3010 includes a microphone (MIC), which is configured to receive external audio signals when the device 3000 is in operation modes, such as call mode, recording mode and voice recognition mode. Received audio signals may be further stored in memory 3004 or sent via communication component 3016 .
  • the audio component 3010 also includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.
  • the I/O interface 3012 provides an interface between the processing component 3002 and a peripheral interface module, which may be a keyboard, a click wheel, a button, and the like. These buttons may include, but are not limited to: a home button, volume buttons, start button, and lock button.
  • Sensor assembly 3014 includes one or more sensors for providing status assessments of various aspects of device 3000 .
  • the sensor component 3014 can detect the open/closed state of the device 3000, the relative positioning of components such as the display and the keypad of the device 3000, the sensor component 3014 can also detect a change in the position of the device 3000 or a component of the device 3000, a user Presence or absence of contact with device 3000 , device 3000 orientation or acceleration/deceleration and temperature change of device 3000 .
  • Sensor assembly 3014 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects in the absence of any physical contact.
  • the sensor assembly 3014 may also include an optical sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications.
  • the sensor component 3014 may also include an acceleration sensor, a gyroscope sensor, a magnetic sensor, a pressure sensor or a temperature sensor.
  • the communication component 3016 is configured to facilitate wired or wireless communication between the apparatus 3000 and other devices.
  • the device 3000 can access wireless networks based on communication standards, such as Wi-Fi, 2G or 3G, or a combination thereof.
  • the communication component 3016 receives broadcast signals or broadcast related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel.
  • the communication component 3016 also includes a near field communication (NFC) module to facilitate short-range communication.
  • NFC near field communication
  • the NFC module may be implemented based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, Infrared Data Association (IrDA) technology, Ultra Wide Band (UWB) technology, Bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • IrDA Infrared Data Association
  • UWB Ultra Wide Band
  • Bluetooth Bluetooth
  • apparatus 3000 may be programmed by one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable A gate array (FPGA), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor or other electronic component implementation for performing the methods described above.
  • ASICs application specific integrated circuits
  • DSPs digital signal processors
  • DSPDs digital signal processing devices
  • PLDs programmable logic devices
  • FPGA field programmable A gate array
  • controller microcontroller, microprocessor or other electronic component implementation for performing the methods described above.
  • non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions, such as the memory 3004 including instructions, which can be executed by the processor 3020 of the device 3000 to implement the above method.
  • the non-transitory computer readable storage medium may be ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, optical data storage device, and the like.

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Abstract

本公开实施例是关于信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质，用户设备(UE)获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。

Description

信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质 技术领域
本申请涉及无线通信技术领域但不限于无线通信技术领域，尤其涉及信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质。
背景技术
对于第五代(5G，5 th Generation)蜂窝移动通信的邻近通信服务(ProSe，Proximity Service)包括：ProSe直接通信和ProSe非直接通信。ProSe非直接通信场景中，远程用户设备(UE，User Equipment)通过UE到网络(U2N，UE-to-Network)中继UE实现与网络的通信。
发明内容
有鉴于此，本公开实施例提供了一种信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质。
根据本公开实施例的第一方面，提供一种信息传输方法，其中，应用于用户设备UE，所述方法包括：
获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述方法还包括：
基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述方法还包括：
基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
在一个实施例中，所述获取PC5安全策略，包括：
接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
根据本公开实施例的第二方面，提供一种信息传输方法，其中，应用于核心网，所述方法包括：
配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述方法还包括：
向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
根据本公开实施例的第三方面，提供一种信息传输装置，其中，应用于用户设备UE，所述装置包括：
获取模块，配置为获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述装置还包括：
建立模块，配置为基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述装置还包括：
保护模块，配置为基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
在一个实施例中，所述获取模块，具体配置为：
接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
根据本公开实施例的第四方面，提供一种信息传输装置，其中，应用于核心网，所述装置包括：
设置模块，配置为配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述装置还包括：
发送模块，配置为向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
根据本公开实施例的第五方面，提供一种通信设备装置，包括处理器、存储器及存储在存储器上并能够由所述处理器运行的可执行程序，其中，所述处理器运行所述可执行程序时执行如第一方面或第二方面所述信息传输方法的步骤。
根据本公开实施例的第六方面，提供一种存储介质，其上存储有可执行程序，其中，所述可执行程序被处理器执行时实现如第一方面或第二方面所述信息传输方法的步骤。
根据本公开实施例提供的信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质，UE获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。如此，通过PC5安全策略，远程UE和中继UE，基于安全策略保护ProSe非直接通信中的PC5连接安全，实现对ProSe中继业务中PC5通信的安全保护，满足ProSe非直接通信的安全需求，提高通信安全性。
应当理解的是，以上的一般描述和后文的细节描述仅是示例性和解释性的，并不能限制本公开实施例。
附图说明
此处的附图被并入说明书中并构成本说明书的一部分，示出了符合本发明实施例，并与说明书一起用于解释本发明实施例的原理。
图1是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种无线通信系统的结构示意图；
图2是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种信息传输方法的流程示意图；
图3是根据一示例性实施例示出的另一种信息传输方法的流程示意图；
图4是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种信息传输方法的信息交互示意图；
图5是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种信息传输装置的框图；
图6是根据一示例性实施例示出的另一种信息传输装置的框图；
图7是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种用于信息传输的装置的框图。
具体实施方式
这里将详细地对示例性实施例进行说明，其示例表示在附图中。下面的描述涉及附图时，除非另有表示，不同附图中的相同数字表示相同或相似的要素。以下示例性实施例中所描述的实施方式并不代表与本发明实施例相一致的所有实施方式。相反，它们仅是与如所附权利要求书中所详述的、本发明实施例的一些方面相一致的装置和方法的例子。
在本公开实施例使用的术语是仅仅出于描述特定实施例的目的，而非旨在限制本公开实施例。在本公开实施例和所附权利要求书中所使用的单数形式的“一种”、“所述”和“该”也旨在包括多数形式，除非上下文清楚地表示其他含义。还应当理解，本文中使用的术语“和/或”是指并包含一个或多个相关联的列出项目的任何或所有可能组合。
应当理解，尽管在本公开实施例可能采用术语第一、第二、第三等来描述各种信息，但这些信息不应限于这些术语。这些术语仅用来将同一类型的信息彼此区分开。例如，在不脱离本公开实施例范围的情况下，第一信息也可以被称为第二信息，类似地，第二信息也可以被称为第一信息。取决于语境，如在此所使用的词语“如果”可以被解释成为“在……时”或“当……时”或“响应于确定”。
请参考图1，其示出了本公开实施例提供的一种无线通信系统的结构示意图。如图1所示，无线通信系统是基于蜂窝移动通信技术的通信系统， 该无线通信系统可以包括：若干个终端11以及若干个基站12。
其中，终端11可以是指向用户提供语音和/或数据连通性的设备。终端11可以经无线接入网(Radio Access Network，RAN)与一个或多个核心网进行通信，终端11可以是物联网终端，如传感器设备、移动电话(或称为“蜂窝”电话)和具有物联网终端的计算机，例如，可以是固定式、便携式、袖珍式、手持式、计算机内置的或者车载的装置。例如，站(Station，STA)、订户单元(subscriber unit)、订户站(subscriber station)、移动站(mobile station)、移动台(mobile)、远程站(remote station)、接入点、远程终端(remote terminal)、接入终端(access terminal)、用户装置(user terminal)、用户代理(user agent)、用户设备(user device)、或用户终端(user equipment，UE)。或者，终端11也可以是无人飞行器的设备。或者，终端11也可以是车载设备，比如，可以是具有无线通信功能的行车电脑，或者是外接行车电脑的无线通信设备。或者，终端11也可以是路边设备，比如，可以是具有无线通信功能的路灯、信号灯或者其它路边设备等。
基站12可以是无线通信系统中的网络侧设备。其中，该无线通信系统可以是第四代移动通信技术(the 4th generation mobile communication，4G)系统，又称长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)系统；或者，该无线通信系统也可以是5G系统，又称新空口(new radio，NR)系统或5G NR系统。或者，该无线通信系统也可以是5G系统的再下一代系统。其中，5G系统中的接入网可以称为NG-RAN(New Generation-Radio Access Network，新一代无线接入网)。或者，MTC系统。
其中，基站12可以是4G系统中采用的演进型基站(eNB)。或者，基站12也可以是5G系统中采用集中分布式架构的基站(gNB)。当基站12采用集中分布式架构时，通常包括集中单元(central unit，CU)和至少两个分布单元(distributed unit，DU)。集中单元中设置有分组数据汇聚协议 (Packet Data Convergence Protocol，PDCP)层、无线链路层控制协议(Radio Link Control，RLC)层、媒体访问控制(Media Access Control，MAC)层的协议栈；分布单元中设置有物理(Physical，PHY)层协议栈，本公开实施例对基站12的具体实现方式不加以限定。
基站12和终端11之间可以通过无线空口建立无线连接。在不同的实施方式中，该无线空口是基于第四代移动通信网络技术(4G)标准的无线空口；或者，该无线空口是基于第五代移动通信网络技术(5G)标准的无线空口，比如该无线空口是新空口；或者，该无线空口也可以是基于5G的更下一代移动通信网络技术标准的无线空口。
在一些实施例中，终端11之间还可以建立E2E(End to End，端到端)连接。比如车联网通信(vehicle to everything，V2X)中的V2V(vehicle to vehicle，车对车)通信、V2I(vehicle to Infrastructure，车对路边设备)通信和V2P(vehicle to pedestrian，车对人)通信等场景。
在一些实施例中，上述无线通信系统还可以包含网络管理设备13。
若干个基站12分别与网络管理设备13相连。其中，网络管理设备13可以是无线通信系统中的核心网设备，比如，该网络管理设备13可以是演进的数据分组核心网(Evolved Packet Core，EPC)中的移动性管理实体(Mobility Management Entity，MME)。或者，该网络管理设备也可以是其它的核心网设备，比如服务网关(Serving GateWay，SGW)、公用数据网网关(Public Data Network GateWay，PGW)、策略与计费规则功能单元(Policy and Charging Rules Function，PCRF)或者归属签约用户服务器(Home Subscriber Server，HSS)等。对于网络管理设备13的实现形态，本公开实施例不做限定。
本公开实施例涉及的执行主体包括但不限于：支持蜂窝移动通信的手机终端等UE、基站以及核心网等。
在ProSe非直接通信场景中，远程UE与U2N中继UE之间需要建立基于PC5连接的PC5通信。针对ProSe非直接通信中PC5通信的PC5连接安全，主要通过生成密钥来实现。如何配置PC5连接安全的激活和停用以满足ProSe非直接通信的通信安全需求，是亟待解决的问题。
如图2所示，本示例性实施例提供一种信息传输方法，信息传输方法可以应用于蜂窝移动通信系统的UE中，包括：
步骤201：获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
本实施例公开的方法可以由蜂窝移动通信中的UE执行，UE可以包括：采用蜂窝移动通信技术进行无线通信的手机等终端。
ProSe非直接通信中，远程UE与中继UE之间通过建立的PC5连接进行PC5通信；中继UE与蜂窝移动通信的网络侧可以通过蜂窝移动通信的空口进行通信。
PC5安全策略可以用于对ProSe非直接通信中通过PC5连接进行的PC5通信的PC5连接安全(PC5 Connection Security)进行配置。这里，PC5连接安全可以是对PC5连接采用的安全保护方式。
PC5安全策略可以指示是否采用PC5连接安全进行PC5通信的保护。
示例性地，PC5安全策略可以指示：必需采用PC5连接安全、首选PC5连接安全、不需使用PC5连接安全等。
PC5连接安全可以包括多种安全保护的方式，在PC5安全策略指示采用PC5连接安全进行PC5通信的保护时，PC5安全策略还可以指示采用的PC5连接安全的具体保护方式等。
PC5连接安全的具体保护方式，可以包括至少以下之一：PC5通信信令和/或数据的加密保护；PC5通信信令和/或数据的完整性保护等。PC5通信信令和/或数据的加密保护，可以是对PC5通信信令和/或数据采用密钥加 解密等方式进行的安全保护。完整性保护可以是对PC5通信信令和/或数据采用密钥进行完整性保护和验证。
UE在进行ProSe非直接通信中的PC5通信时，可以根据PC5安全策略，确定PC5通信的PC5连接安全等，从而提高PC5通信中的数据通信安全。
如此，通过PC5安全策略，远程UE和中继UE，基于安全策略保护ProSe非直接通信中PC5连接安全，实现对ProSe中继业务中PC5通信的安全保护，满足ProSe非直接通信的安全需求，提高通信安全性。
在一个实施例中，PC5安全策略是由核心网配置的。可以由核心网的PCF配置PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述获取PC5安全策略，包括：
接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
这里，PC5安全策略可以是由核心网的PCF配置的。可以由核心网的PCF向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。核心网可以通过蜂窝移动通信的空口向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，核心网可以在对UE进行业务授权和开通过程中，通过NAS信令，向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。这里，业务授权和开通可以包括：ProSe中继业务的授权和开通。核心网可以在对远程UE和中继UE分别进行业务授权和开通的过程中，分别通过NAS信令向远程UE和中继UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。
示例性地，核心网对U2N中继UE进行业务授权和开通；PCF向中继UE提供ProSe非直接通信的PC5安全策略。核心网对远程UE进行业务授权和开通；PCF为远程UE提供ProSe非直接通信的PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
ProSe非直接通信中，不同ProSe中继业务的PC5安全策略可以相同也可以不同。同一ProSe中继业务中，PC5安全策略针对信令面和数据面配置的PC5连接安全可以相同，也可以不同。例如，同一ProSe中继业务中，PC5安全策略针对PC5 UP和PC5 CP所配置的安全可以不同。这里，ProSe中继业务可以是远程UE通过中继UE进行数据中继，与网络侧进行的数据通信时所承载的业务。
如此，通过核心网发送PC5安全策略的指示信息，实现对一个或多个ProSe中继业务对应的PC5通信进行安全配置，满足各ProSe中继业务的PC5通信的安全需求，提高了通信安全性。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
中继业务代码(RSC，Relay Service Code)可以由PCF向中继UE和远程UE提供。一个RSC可以唯一标识中继UE可以提供给远程UE的一项ProSe中继业务。此外，RSC还可以标识中继UE可以提供服务的授权用户，并可用于选择相关的安全策略或信息等。例如，RSC是远程UE和中继UE之间的认证和授权所必需的。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
CP和UP的在数据传输时对安全需求可以相同，也可以不同。PC5 CP安全策略，可以用于配置中继UE和远程UE之间CP的PC5通信安全，即PC5 CP安全。PC5 UP安全策略，可以用于配置中继UE和远程UE之间 UP的PC5通信安全，即PC5 UP安全。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
对于通过中继UE实现的ProSe非直接通信，需要建立PC5通信来承载远程UE和中继UE之间的信令和用户数据。当远程UE向网络侧请求ProSe非直接通信时，PC5 CP安全策略需要满足远程UE与中继UE之间运行的ProSe中继业务的PC5通信的安全需求，PC5 CP安全策略还需要满足网络侧NAS信令和AS信令安全需求。
因此，PC5 CP安全策略配置的ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全需要与NAS信令和AS信令的安全需求保持一致。
例如，ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全策略可以配置PC5 CP安全与3GPP TS 33.501中定义NAS信令和AS信令的安全需求保持一致，即ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全是必需(REQUIRED)的。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
当远程UE向网络侧请求ProSe非直接通信时，PC5 UP安全策略需要满足远程UE和中继UE之间的交换的ProSe业务数据。PC5 UP安全策略还需要满足远程UE请求的中继UE提供的连接服务；进一步地，中继UE提供的连接服务，用于支持通过中继UE实现的网络侧向远程UE提供的中继服务。因此，PC5 UP安全策略配置的PC5 UP安全需要满足网络提供的中继服务的UP安全需求。
示例性地，PC5 UP安全策略可以配置PC5 UP安全与网络侧UP安全保持一致。网络侧UP安全中的加密和完整性保护要求，可以有“必需(REQUIRED)”或“首选(PREFERRED)”或“不需要(NOT NEEDED)”选项。
在一个实施例中，所述方法还包括：
基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
建立ProSe非直接通信时，远程UE可以进行对中继UE的发现，并确定中继UE可以提供的ProSe中继业务。
远程UE选择发现的中继UE并建立PC5连接进行ProSe非直接通信。远程UE和中继UE之间的PC5通信的PC5连接安全，是由PC5安全策略配置的。在一个实施例中，PC5安全策略可以是由PCF发送给远程UE和中继UE的。
在一个实施例中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述方法还包括：
基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
中继UE可以建立用于ProSe非直接通信的PDU会话。建立的PDU会话的UP安全策略可以网络提供。这里，PDU会话可以是在远程UE请求建立ProSe非直接通信的PC5通信之前建立的。
中继UE和5G无线接入网(NG-RAN)可以基于UP安全策略激活PDU会话的UP安全。
远程UE可以向中继UE请求不同的ProSe中继业务。远程UE可以通过向中继UE发送ProSe中继业务的中继业务代码(RSC，Relay Service Code)进行请求，如果中继UE当前未建立与RSC关联的PDU会话，或者中继UE主动需要建立新的PDU会话进行中继，则中继UE可以完成在建立PC5连接之前发起新的PDU会话建立流程。新的PDU会话的UP安全策略同样可以由网络侧提供。这里，网络侧可以是蜂窝移动通信系统中的无线接入网和/或核心网等。
在一个实施例中，ProSe非直接通信建立后，远程UE和中继UE之间PC5通信的PC5连接安全可以基于PC5安全策略的配置确定。中继UE与 网络侧之间的通信安全可以基于网络侧提供的安全策略的配置确定。从而实现ProSe非直接通信中PC5通信安全和中继UE与网络侧之间的通信安全。
如图3所示，本示例性实施例提供一种信息传输方法，该信息传输方法可以应用于蜂窝移动通信系统的核心网中，包括：
步骤301：配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
本实施例公开的方法可以由核心网中的PCF等执行。可以由PCF配置PC5安全策略。
ProSe非直接通信中，远程UE与中继UE之间通过建立的PC5连接进行PC5通信；中继UE与蜂窝移动通信的网络侧可以通过蜂窝移动通信的空口进行通信。
PC5安全策略可以用于对ProSe非直接通信中通过PC5连接进行的PC5通信的PC5连接安全(PC5 Connection Security)进行配置。这里，PC5连接安全可以是对PC5连接采用的安全保护方式。
PC5安全策略可以指示是否采用PC5连接安全进行PC5通信的保护。
示例性地，PC5安全策略可以指示：必需采用PC5连接安全、首选PC5连接安全、不需使用PC5连接安全等。
PC5连接安全可以包括多种安全保护的方式，在PC5安全策略指示采用PC5连接安全进行PC5通信的保护时，PC5安全策略还可以指示采用的PC5连接安全的具体保护方式等。
PC5连接安全的具体保护方式，可以包括至少以下之一：PC5通信信令和/或数据的加密保护；PC5通信信令和/或数据的完整性保护等。PC5通信信令和/或数据的加密保护，可以是对PC5通信信令和/或数据采用密钥加解密等方式进行的安全保护。完整性保护可以是对PC5通信信令和/或数据 采用密钥进行完整性保护和验证。
UE在进行ProSe非直接通信中的PC5通信时，可以根据PC5安全策略，确定PC5通信的PC5连接安全等，从而提高PC5通信中的数据通信安全。
如此，通过PC5安全策略，远程UE和中继UE，基于安全策略保护ProSe非直接通信中的PC5连接安全，实现对ProSe中继业务中PC5通信的安全保护，满足ProSe非直接通信的安全需求，提高通信安全性。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
CP和UP的在数据传输时对安全需求可以相同，也可以不同。PC5 CP安全策略，可以用于配置中继UE和远程UE之间CP的PC5通信安全，即PC5 CP安全。PC5 UP安全策略，可以用于配置中继UE和远程UE之间UP的PC5通信安全，即PC5 UP安全。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
对于通过中继UE实现的ProSe非直接通信，需要建立PC5通信来承载远程UE和中继UE之间的信令和用户数据。当远程UE向网络侧请求ProSe非直接通信时，PC5 CP安全策略需要满足远程UE与中继UE之间运行的ProSe中继业务的PC5通信的安全需求，PC5 CP安全策略还需要满足网络侧NAS信令和AS信令安全需求。
因此，PC5 CP安全策略配置的ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全需要 与NAS信令和AS信令的安全需求保持一致。
例如，ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全策略可以配置PC5 CP安全与3GPP TS 33.501中定义NAS信令和AS信令的安全需求保持一致，即ProSe非直接通信的PC5 CP安全是必需的(REQUIRED)。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
当远程UE向网络侧请求ProSe非直接通信时，PC5 UP安全策略需要满足远程UE和中继UE之间的交换的ProSe业务数据。PC5 UP安全策略还需要满足远程UE请求的中继UE提供的连接服务；进一步地，中继UE提供的连接服务，用于支持通过中继UE实现的网络侧向远程UE提供的中继服务。因此，PC5 UP安全策略配置的PC5 UP安全需要满足网络提供的中继服务的UP安全需求。
示例性地，PC5 UP安全策略可以配置PC5 UP安全与网络侧UP安全保持一致。网络侧UP安全中的加密和完整性保护要求，可以有“必需(REQUIRED)”或“首选(PREFERRED)”或“不需要(NOT NEEDED)”选项。
在一个实施例中，所述方法还包括：
向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
这里，PC5安全策略可以是由核心网的PCF配置的。可以由核心网的PCF向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。核心网可以通过蜂窝移动通信的空口向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，核心网可以在对UE进行业务授权和开通过程中，通过NAS信令，向UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。这里，业务授权和开通可以包括：ProSe中继业务的授权和开通。核心网可以在对远程UE和中继UE分别进行业务授权和开通的过程中，分别通过NAS信令向远程UE 和中继UE发送PC5安全策略的指示信息。
示例性地，核心网对U2N中继UE进行业务授权和开通；PCF向中继UE提供ProSe非直接通信的PC5安全策略。核心网对远程UE进行业务授权和开通；PCF为远程UE提供ProSe非直接通信的PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
ProSe非直接通信中，不同ProSe中继业务的PC5安全策略可以相同也可以不同。同一ProSe中继业务中，PC5安全策略针对信令面和数据面配置的PC5连接安全可以相同，也可以不同。例如，同一ProSe中继业务中，PC5安全策略针对PC5 UP和PC5 CP所配置的安全可以不同。这里，ProSe中继业务可以是远程UE通过中继UE进行数据中继，与网络侧进行的数据通信时所承载的业务。
如此，通过核心网发送PC5安全策略的指示信息，实现对一个或多个ProSe中继业务对应的PC5通信进行安全配置，满足各ProSe中继业务的PC5通信的安全需求，提高了通信安全性。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
中继业务代码(RSC，Relay Service Code)可以由PCF向中继UE和远程UE提供。一个RSC可以唯一标识中继UE可以提供给远程UE的一项ProSe中继业务。此外，RSC还可以标识中继UE可以提供服务的授权用户，并可用于选择相关的安全策略或信息等。例如，RSC是远程UE和中继UE之间的认证和授权所必需的。
以下结合上述任意实施例提供一个具体示例：
如图4所示，PC5安全策略在ProSe非直接通信过程中的应用步骤包括：
步骤401a：核心网可以在对中继UE进行业务授权和开通的过程中， 向中继UE提供PC5安全策略。
步骤401b：核心网可以在对远程UE进行业务授权和开通的过程中，向远程UE提供PC5安全策略。
步骤402：可选地，中继UE可以建立用于ProSe非直接通信中继的PDU会话。建立的PDU会话的UP安全策略由网络侧提供。
步骤403：远程UE发起发现流程，远程UE可以进行对中继UE的发现，并确定中继UE提供的ProSe中继业务。
步骤404a：远程UE选择发现的中继UE并建立PC5连接进行ProSe非直接通信。远程UE和中继UE之间的PC5通信的PC5连接安全，是由PC5安全策略配置的。
步骤404b：可选地，如果中继UE当前未建立与RSC关联的PDU会话，或者中继UE主动需要建立新的PDU会话进行中继，则中继UE可以完成PC5连接建立之前发起新的PDU会话建立流程。新的PDU会话的UP安全策略同样可以由网络侧提供。
步骤405：中继UE向SMF发送远程UE报告(远程用户ID，远程UE信息)，远程UE报告是针对PDU会话发送的。
步骤406a：ProSe中继业务流量通过PC5连接传输，具有安全保护。
步骤406b：ProSe中继业务流量中继UE与网络侧的连接传输，具有安全保护。
本发明实施例还提供了一种信息传输装置，应用于蜂窝移动无线通信的UE中，如图5所示，其中，所述装置100包括：
获取模块110，配置为获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的 PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述装置还包括：
建立模块120，配置为基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述装置还包括：
保护模块130，配置为基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
在一个实施例中，所述获取模块110，具体配置为：
接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
本发明实施例还提供了一种信息传输装置，应用于蜂窝移动无线通信的核心网中，如图6所示，其中，所述装置200包括：
设置模块210，配置为配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的 PC5通信；
和/或，
PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
在一个实施例中，所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
在一个实施例中，所述装置还包括：
发送模块220，配置为向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
在一个实施例中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
在一个实施例中，所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
在示例性实施例中，获取模块110、建立模块120、保护模块130、设置模块210和发送模块220等可以被一个或多个中央处理器(CPU，Central Processing Unit)、图形处理器(GPU，Graphics Processing Unit)、基带处理器(BP，Baseband Processor)、应用专用集成电路(ASIC，Application Specific Integrated Circuit)、DSP、可编程逻辑器件(PLD，Programmable Logic Device)、复杂可编程逻辑器件(CPLD，Complex Programmable Logic Device)、现场可编程门阵列(FPGA，Field-Programmable Gate Array)、通用处理器、控制器、微控制器(MCU，Micro Controller Unit)、微处理器(Microprocessor)、或其他电子元件实现，用于执行前述方法。
图7是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种用于信息传输的装置3000的框图。例如，装置3000可以是移动电话、计算机、数字广播终端、消息收发 设备、游戏控制台、平板设备、医疗设备、健身设备、个人数字助理等。
参照图7，装置3000可以包括以下一个或多个组件：处理组件3002、存储器3004、电源组件3006、多媒体组件3008、音频组件3010、输入/输出(I/O)接口3012、传感器组件3014、以及通信组件3016。
处理组件3002通常控制装置3000的整体操作，诸如与显示、电话呼叫、数据通信、相机操作和记录操作相关联的操作。处理组件3002可以包括一个或多个处理器3020来执行指令，以完成上述的方法的全部或部分步骤。此外，处理组件3002可以包括一个或多个模块，便于处理组件3002和其他组件之间的交互。例如，处理组件3002可以包括多媒体模块，以方便多媒体组件3008和处理组件3002之间的交互。
存储器3004被配置为存储各种类型的数据以支持在装置3000的操作。这些数据的示例包括用于在装置3000上操作的任何应用程序或方法的指令、联系人数据、电话簿数据、消息、图片、视频等。存储器3004可以由任何类型的易失性或非易失性存储设备或者它们的组合实现，如静态随机存取存储器(SRAM)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(EPROM)、可编程只读存储器(PROM)、只读存储器(ROM)、磁存储器、快闪存储器、磁盘或光盘。
电源组件3006为装置3000的各种组件提供电力。电源组件3006可以包括电源管理系统、一个或多个电源、及其他与为装置3000生成、管理和分配电力相关联的组件。
多媒体组件3008包括在装置3000和用户之间的提供一个输出接口的屏幕。在一些实施例中，屏幕可以包括液晶显示器(LCD)和触摸面板(TP)。如果屏幕包括触摸面板，屏幕可以被实现为触摸屏，以接收来自用户的输入信号。触摸面板包括一个或多个触摸传感器以感测触摸、滑动和触摸面板上的手势。触摸传感器可以不仅感测触摸或滑动动作的边界，而且还检 测与触摸或滑动操作相关的持续时间和压力。在一些实施例中，多媒体组件3008包括一个前置摄像头和/或后置摄像头。当装置3000处于操作模式，如拍摄模式或视频模式时，前置摄像头和/或后置摄像头可以接收外部的多媒体数据。每个前置摄像头和后置摄像头可以是一个固定的光学透镜系统或具有焦距和光学变焦能力。
音频组件3010被配置为输出和/或输入音频信号。例如，音频组件3010包括一个麦克风(MIC)，当装置3000处于操作模式，如呼叫模式、记录模式和语音识别模式时，麦克风被配置为接收外部音频信号。所接收的音频信号可以被进一步存储在存储器3004或经由通信组件3016发送。在一些实施例中，音频组件3010还包括一个扬声器，用于输出音频信号。
I/O接口3012为处理组件3002和外围接口模块之间提供接口，上述外围接口模块可以是键盘、点击轮、按钮等。这些按钮可包括但不限于：主页按钮、音量按钮、启动按钮和锁定按钮。
传感器组件3014包括一个或多个传感器，用于为装置3000提供各个方面的状态评估。例如，传感器组件3014可以检测到装置3000的打开/关闭状态、组件的相对定位，例如组件为装置3000的显示器和小键盘，传感器组件3014还可以检测装置3000或装置3000一个组件的位置改变、用户与装置3000接触的存在或不存在、装置3000方位或加速/减速和装置3000的温度变化。传感器组件3014可以包括接近传感器，被配置用来在没有任何的物理接触时检测附近物体的存在。传感器组件3014还可以包括光传感器，如CMOS或CCD图像传感器，用于在成像应用中使用。在一些实施例中，该传感器组件3014还可以包括加速度传感器、陀螺仪传感器、磁传感器、压力传感器或温度传感器。
通信组件3016被配置为便于装置3000和其他设备之间有线或无线方式的通信。装置3000可以接入基于通信标准的无线网络，如Wi-Fi、2G或 3G，或它们的组合。在一个示例性实施例中，通信组件3016经由广播信道接收来自外部广播管理系统的广播信号或广播相关信息。在一个示例性实施例中，通信组件3016还包括近场通信(NFC)模块，以促进短程通信。例如，在NFC模块可基于射频识别(RFID)技术、红外数据协会(IrDA)技术、超宽带(UWB)技术、蓝牙(BT)技术和其他技术来实现。
在示例性实施例中，装置3000可以被一个或多个应用专用集成电路(ASIC)、数字信号处理器(DSP)、数字信号处理设备(DSPD)、可编程逻辑器件(PLD)、现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)、控制器、微控制器、微处理器或其他电子元件实现，用于执行上述方法。
在示例性实施例中，还提供了一种包括指令的非临时性计算机可读存储介质，例如包括指令的存储器3004，上述指令可由装置3000的处理器3020执行以完成上述方法。例如，非临时性计算机可读存储介质可以是ROM、随机存取存储器(RAM)、CD-ROM、磁带、软盘和光数据存储设备等。
本领域技术人员在考虑说明书及实践这里公开的发明后，将容易想到本发明实施例的其它实施方案。本申请旨在涵盖本发明实施例的任何变型、用途或者适应性变化，这些变型、用途或者适应性变化遵循本发明实施例的一般性原理并包括本公开实施例未公开的本技术领域中的公知常识或惯用技术手段。说明书和实施例仅被视为示例性的，本发明实施例的真正范围和精神由下面的权利要求指出。
应当理解的是，本发明实施例并不局限于上面已经描述并在附图中示出的精确结构，并且可以在不脱离其范围进行各种修改和改变。本发明实施例的范围仅由所附的权利要求来限制。

Claims (34)

  1. 一种信息传输信息传输方法，其中，应用于用户设备UE，所述方法包括：
    获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
    PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
    和/或，
    PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，
    所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
  4. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，
    所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述方法还包括：
    基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6任一项所述的方法，其中，所述获取PC5安全策略，包括：
    接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其中，
    所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
  10. 一种信息传输方法，其中，应用于核心网，所述方法包括：
    配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
    PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
    和/或，
    PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，
    所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
  13. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，
    所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
  14. 根据权利要求10至13任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的方法，其中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用 于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的方法，其中，
    所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
  17. 一种信息传输装置，其中，应用于用户设备UE，所述装置包括：
    获取模块，配置为获取PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
  18. 根据权利要求17所述的装置，其中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
    PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
    和/或，
    PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
  19. 根据权利要求18所述的装置，其中，
    所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
  20. 根据权利要求18所述的装置，其中，
    所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
  21. 根据权利要求17所述的装置，其中，所述装置还包括：
    建立模块，配置为基于所述PC5安全策略，建立所述PC5通信。
  22. 根据权利要求17所述的装置，其中，响应于所述UE为中继UE，所述装置还包括：
    保护模块，配置为基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略，保护ProSe中继业 务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
  23. 根据权利要求17至22任一项所述的装置，其中，所述获取模块，具体配置为：
    接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
  24. 根据权利要求23所述的装置，其中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
  25. 根据权利要求24所述的装置，其中，
    所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
  26. 一种信息传输装置，其中，应用于核心网，所述装置包括：
    设置模块，配置为配置PC5安全策略，其中，所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的装置，其中，所述PC5安全策略，包括：
    PC5控制面CP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信；
    和/或，
    PC5用户面UP安全策略，用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其中，
    所述PC5 CP安全策略，满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
  29. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其中，
    所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
  30. 根据权利要求26至29任一项所述的装置，其中，所述装置还包括：
    发送模块，配置为向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的装置，其中，所述安全策略的指示信息，用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务，和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的装置，其中，
    所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的，其中，不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
  33. 一种通信设备装置，包括处理器、存储器及存储在存储器上并能够由所述处理器运行的可执行程序，其中，所述处理器运行所述可执行程序时执行如权利要求1至9任或10至16任一项所述信息传输方法的步骤。
  34. 一种存储介质，其上存储有可执行程序，其中，所述可执行程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1至9或10至16任一项所述信息传输方法的步骤。
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