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WO2022135392A1 - 身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序 - Google Patents

身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022135392A1
WO2022135392A1 PCT/CN2021/140078 CN2021140078W WO2022135392A1 WO 2022135392 A1 WO2022135392 A1 WO 2022135392A1 CN 2021140078 W CN2021140078 W CN 2021140078W WO 2022135392 A1 WO2022135392 A1 WO 2022135392A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
requesting device
access controller
identity
ciphertext
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2021/140078
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
铁满霞
曹军
赖晓龙
赵晓荣
李琴
张变玲
黄振海
Original Assignee
西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 filed Critical 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority to US18/259,307 priority Critical patent/US20240064011A1/en
Priority to EP21909388.7A priority patent/EP4270858A4/en
Publication of WO2022135392A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022135392A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0414—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0847—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving identity based encryption [IBE] schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of network communication security, and in particular, to an identity authentication method, apparatus, device, chip, storage medium and program.
  • a requesting device can access the network through an authenticated access controller.
  • the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the identity of the requesting device, and the requesting device also needs to authenticate the identity of the authentication access controller to ensure that the requesting device accessing the network belong to a legitimate user, and the network requesting access to the device belongs to a legitimate network.
  • the point-to-point transmission in the blockchain technology also needs to establish a trust relationship between different nodes, so it is also very important for the identification of nodes.
  • identity information In the process of two-way identity authentication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, both parties need to provide their own identity information for identity authentication.
  • this type of identity information generally carries private and sensitive information, such as ID number, home address, bank card information, geographic location information, and affiliation information.
  • identity information is usually included in the entity's digital certificate, and the digital certificate is used as the entity's identity credential.
  • the identity information is intercepted and used for illegal purposes by the attacker during the two-way identity authentication process between the requesting device and the authentication access controller, it will cause great security risks to the authentication access controller, the requesting device and the network.
  • the present application provides an identity authentication method, device, device, chip, storage medium and program.
  • an authentication server By introducing an authentication server, while ensuring the confidentiality of entity identity-related information, two-way communication between a requesting device and an authentication access controller can be realized. Real-time authentication of identity.
  • an identity authentication method including:
  • the authentication access controller obtains the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device is obtained by using a message encryption key pair including The encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device is encrypted and generated;
  • the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to the first authentication server it trusts, and the first authentication request message includes the identity information cipher text of the authentication access controller and the number of the requesting device.
  • certificate, the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encrypted certificate, and the digital certificate of the requesting device is Obtained by the authentication access controller decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the message encryption key;
  • the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information and the a second digital signature; wherein, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information includes information about the authentication access controller.
  • the first verification result of the digital certificate, the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and the first The second authentication result information includes the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the second digital signature is calculated and generated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information digital signature;
  • the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result information.
  • the second verification result determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; when the authentication access controller determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is legal, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or,
  • the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device And determine the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
  • the authentication access controller uses the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature; if the verification of the second digital signature passes, the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature according to the second The second verification result in the authentication result information determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
  • the third authentication response message includes authentication result information ciphertext
  • the authentication result information ciphertext is composed of the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature using the message encryption key pair. Encrypted data including encrypted data generated;
  • the requesting device After receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature, The requesting device verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is passed, the requesting device obtains the first authentication result according to the ciphertext of the first authentication result information. The first verification result in the information determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller.
  • an authentication access controller including:
  • the obtaining part is configured to obtain the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device, and the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device is obtained by using a message encryption key pair. Generated by encryption of encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • a first sending part configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller and the digital certificate of the requesting device, the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encryption certificate, so The digital certificate of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the message encryption key;
  • the first receiving part is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and the second digital signature; wherein, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information includes the authentication access controller
  • the first verification result of the digital certificate of The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the second digital signature is calculated and generated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information 's digital signature;
  • the first verification part is configured to use the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature, and if the verification is passed, the first determination part is based on the second verification in the second authentication result information.
  • the result determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; when the first determining part determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is legal, the second sending part sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or,
  • the second verification result in the second verification result information determines the identity verification result of the requesting device
  • the verification result determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; the second sending part sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
  • the third authentication response message includes authentication result information ciphertext
  • the authentication result information ciphertext is composed of the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature using the message encryption key pair.
  • the encrypted data inside is encrypted and generated.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a request device, including:
  • the sending part is configured to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device is encrypted using message encryption.
  • the key is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • the first receiving part is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, the third authentication response message includes an authentication result information ciphertext, and the authentication result information ciphertext is encrypted by using a message
  • the key pair is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature; the first authentication result information ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information,
  • the first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
  • a first decryption part configured to use the message encryption key to decrypt the authentication result information ciphertext to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature;
  • a first verification part configured to verify the first digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server
  • a first determination part configured to determine the authentication access control according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information when the first digital signature is verified The authentication result of the device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a first authentication server, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • a first receiving part configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the authentication access controller and the digital certificate of the requesting device,
  • the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encryption certificate;
  • the first sending part is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and the second digital signature; wherein, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information includes the authentication access controller
  • the first verification result of the digital certificate of The second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the second digital signature is calculated and generated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information digital signature.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a second authentication server, where the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the second authentication server is two different authentication servers; then the second authentication server includes:
  • the receiving part is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the digital certificate of the requesting device and the first authentication server
  • the third digital signature is the digital signature generated by the first authentication server to the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • a first verification part configured to verify the third digital signature
  • a second verification part configured to perform legality verification on the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result when the third digital signature verification is passed;
  • a generating part configured to generate second authentication result information according to the information including the second verification result
  • the sending part is configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and a fourth digital signature, the first digital signature is the digital signature generated by the second authentication server on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and the fourth digital signature is the The second authentication server calculates and generates a digital signature on the signature data including the second authentication result information.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an authentication access controller, where the authentication access controller includes: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used for storing a computer program, and the processor is used for calling and running all The computer program stored in the memory is used to execute the steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a requesting device, where the requesting device includes: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run a computer stored in the memory A program to execute the steps performed by the requesting device in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a first authentication server, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by an authentication access controller, and includes: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used to store a computer program, The processor is configured to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a second authentication server, where the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the second authentication server is two different authentication servers, then the second authentication server includes: a processor and a memory, the memory is used for storing a computer program, and the processor is used for calling and running the computer stored in the memory A program to execute the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a chip, where the chip includes: a processor configured to call and run a computer program from a memory, so that an authentication access controller installed with the chip executes the first aspect The steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity authentication method, or,
  • the second authentication server installed with the chip is caused to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity authentication method according to the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium is used to store a computer program, and the computer program enables the authentication access controller to execute the identity authentication method described in the first aspect. the steps performed by the authentication access controller, or,
  • the computer program causes the requesting device to perform the steps performed by the requesting device in the identity authentication method described in the first aspect, or,
  • the computer program causes the first authentication server to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity authentication method described in the first aspect, or,
  • the computer program causes the second authentication server to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity authentication method of the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer program, the computer program causes the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity authentication method described in the first aspect, or,
  • the computer program causes the requesting device to perform the steps performed by the requesting device in the identity authentication method described in the first aspect, or,
  • the computer program causes the first authentication server to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity authentication method described in the first aspect, or,
  • the computer program causes the second authentication server to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity authentication method of the first aspect.
  • the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller is confidentially processed, which can prevent the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller from being exposed during the transmission process, and ensures that the attacker cannot obtain the privacy, sensitive information.
  • the real-time authentication of the bidirectional identity between the requesting device and the authentication access controller is realized while ensuring the confidentiality of the information related to the entity identity, which lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with the legitimate network.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for requesting a device REQ and an authentication access controller AAC to negotiate a message encryption key according to an embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another identity authentication method under a roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of yet another identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of yet another identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of yet another identity authentication method under roaming provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or optional operation;
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of yet another identity authentication method under the roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein “*” represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 11 is a structural block diagram of an authentication access controller AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 12 is a structural block diagram of a requesting device REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a structural block diagram of a first authentication server AS-AAC provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 14 is a structural block diagram of a second authentication server AS-REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the requesting device can access the network through the authentication access controller.
  • the authentication access controller needs to authenticate the requesting device, and the requesting device also needs to authenticate the authentication access controller. identify.
  • the requesting device can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, etc.
  • the terminal device, the authentication access controller can be a network side device such as a wireless access point and a wireless router.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a desktop computer or a notebook computer, and the authentication access controller may be a network-side device such as a switch or a router.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer.
  • the authentication access controller may be a network side device such as a base station.
  • the present application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios such as other wired networks and short-range communication networks.
  • both the requesting device and the authenticating access controller need to provide their own identity information.
  • the identity information of the requesting device may be contained in the digital certificate of the requesting device
  • the identity information for authenticating the access controller may be contained in the digital certificate for authenticating the access controller. If an attacker intercepts this kind of digital certificate in the process of identity authentication, he can obtain the private and sensitive information and use it for illegal purposes, which will cause great harm to the authentication of the access controller, the requesting device and even the network. Security risks.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an identity authentication method, which authenticates an access controller to obtain an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the The identity information ciphertext is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device using the message encryption key; the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to the first authentication server it trusts, and the first authentication request The message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller and the digital certificate of the requesting device.
  • the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller that uses the public key of the encrypted certificate to identify the access controller.
  • the encrypted data including the digital certificate is encrypted and generated, and the digital certificate of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the message encryption key; the authentication access controller receives the transmission from the first authentication server.
  • the first authentication response message includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information and the second digital signature; wherein, the first authentication result information ciphertext is to include
  • the information including the first authentication result information is encrypted, and the first authentication result information includes the first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and the first digital signature is the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the digital signature generated by calculating the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the second authentication result information including the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, the second digital signature is the first authentication server to include: The digital signature generated by the calculation of the signature data including the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server.
  • the second authentication result determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; when the authentication access controller determines that the requesting device is legal, it sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device.
  • the third authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the authentication result information and the authentication result information.
  • the ciphertext is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the first digital signature by using the message encryption key; the requesting device uses the message encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the first authentication result.
  • information ciphertext and the first digital signature, and use the public key of the second authentication server to verify the first digital signature, after the verification is passed, according to the first verification result obtained by decrypting the first authentication result information ciphertext in the first verification result information Determine the identity authentication result that authenticates the access controller.
  • the first authentication result information mentioned in the embodiment of the present application is obtained by verifying the validity of the digital certificate authenticating the access controller by the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, and the second authentication result information. It is obtained by verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the requesting device by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the above-mentioned first authentication server and second authentication server can be two independent servers used to authenticate identities, or can be used to authenticate identities. the same server.
  • the above are only some examples of the requesting device, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server, and should not be construed as a limitation on the requesting device, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server.
  • the device, the authentication access controller and the authentication server can also be other devices.
  • the identity authentication method provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to realize the mutual identity authentication (Mutual Identity Authentication, MIA for short) between the requesting device and the authentication access controller.
  • MIA Mutual Identity Authentication
  • REQ request device
  • AAC authentication Access Controller
  • AS authentication server
  • the AS trusted by AAC is called the first authentication server AS-AAC, and the AS trusted by REQ is called the second authentication server AS-REQ.
  • AS-AAC has the ability to verify the legitimacy of AAC digital certificates.
  • AS-AAC holds digital certificates and private keys corresponding to digital certificates that comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems.
  • AS-REQ has the ability to verify the legitimacy of REQ digital certificates.
  • AS-REQ also holds digital certificates and private keys corresponding to digital certificates that comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems. .
  • AS-AAC and AS-REQ have the ability to pass the digital certificate to other AS for verification, and also have the ability to pass the digital certificate verification result information to other AS.
  • AS-AAC and AS-REQ trust each other and know each other's digital certificate or the public key in the digital certificate.
  • the certificate decryption server (Certificate Sever-Decrypt, CS-DEC for short) holds the encryption certificate and the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate in accordance with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems; CS-DEC Can be a standalone server or reside in AS-AAC.
  • REQ can be an endpoint participating in the authentication process, establish a connection with AAC, access services provided by AAC, and access AS through AAC, REQ holds ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems
  • the specified digital certificate and the private key corresponding to the digital certificate and know the digital certificate of the AS-REQ or the public key in the digital certificate.
  • the AAC may be another endpoint that participates in the authentication process, establishes a connection with the REQ, provides services, communicates with the REQ, and has direct access to the AS-AAC.
  • AAC holds digital certificates and private keys corresponding to digital certificates that comply with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and knows AS-AAC's digital certificates or public keys in digital certificates, And know the encryption certificate of CS-DEC or the public key in the encryption certificate.
  • the AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncData REQ of the identity information of REQ .
  • the EncData REQ is generated by the REQ encrypting the encrypted data including the REQ's digital certificate Cert REQ by using a message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm.
  • the identity information of the REQ is treated confidentially to prevent the identity information of the REQ from being exposed during the transmission process.
  • the message encryption key may be obtained through negotiation between REQ and AAC, or may be pre-shared by REQ and AAC. The implementation of the negotiated message encryption key between REQ and AAC will be introduced later.
  • the encrypted object is called encrypted data.
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.
  • the AACVeri includes AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS and Cert REQ .
  • EncPub AS is generated by AAC using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the encrypted data including AAC's digital certificate Cert AAC . Therefore, in the process of transmitting identity information between AAC and AS-AAC, AAC's identity The information is treated confidentially to prevent AAC's identity information from being exposed during transmission.
  • the Cert REQ is obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ using a message encryption key and a symmetric encryption algorithm after the AAC receives the EncData REQ sent by the REQ.
  • the decryption of the EncPub AS can be decrypted by the AS-AAC using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate, or the AS-AAC can send the EncPub AS to the CS-DEC that has an interaction and trust relationship with the AS-AAC.
  • CS-DEC can be an independent server dedicated to certificate decryption, or it can be integrated in the authentication server to perform decryption functions.
  • CS-DEC can be integrated in AS-AAC.
  • the AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the AS-AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information and the second digital signature.
  • the first authentication result information ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information Pub AAC
  • Pub AAC includes the first authentication result Res AAC to Cert AAC
  • the first digital signature is that REQ trusts AS-REQ calculates the digital signature generated to the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext
  • the second authentication result information Pub REQ includes the second authentication result Res REQ to Cert REQ
  • the second digital signature is AS-AAC calculates the digital signature generated by the signature data including Pub REQ .
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are the same authentication server, that is, REQ and AAC jointly trust the same authentication server (non-roaming)
  • the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC can use AS-AAC ( Of course, it can also be represented by AS-REQ).
  • AS-AAC the validity of the Cert AAC obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS
  • AS-AAC which can also be expressed as AS-REQ
  • the validity of the Cert REQ can be verified to obtain the second verification result.
  • Res REQ generate the first authentication result information Pub AAC according to the information including the Res AAC , then encrypt the Pub AAC to generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generate the second authentication result information Pub REQ according to the information including the Res REQ , calculate and generate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 (also can be expressed as Sig AS_REQ1 ) to the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext, calculate and generate the second signature data including the second authentication result information Pub REQ
  • the digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 can also be expressed as Sig AS_REQ2 ), according to the ciphertext including the first authentication result information, Sig AS_AAC1 (also expressed as Sig AS_REQ1 ), the second authentication result information Pub REQ , Sig AS_AAC2 (also expressed as Sig AS_AAC2 )
  • the information including AS_REQ2 generates the first authentication response message ASVeri, and sends the ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the encryption/decryption mode of the ciphertext of the first authentication result information may be preset.
  • AAC can pre-generate a key for encrypting Pub AAC , and then send the key to AS-AAC through EncPub AS , then AS-AAC can use this key to encrypt and generate information including Pub AAC The ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the key generated by the AAC for encrypting the Pub AAC may be the second protection random number Nonce AACPub , and the AS-AAC uses the Nonce AACPub to encrypt information including the Pub AAC .
  • the Nonce AACPub and the Pub AAC can be encrypted AAC performs XOR operation to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information
  • the AS-REQ trusted by REQ and the AS-AAC trusted by AAC are two different authentication servers (roaming)
  • the AS-AAC decrypts the EncPub AS .
  • the obtained Cert AAC is subjected to legality verification to obtain the first verification result Res AAC
  • the first authentication result information Pub AAC is generated according to the information including the Res AAC
  • the first authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting the Pub AAC , and then sent to the AS.
  • AS-REQ sends the second authentication request message AS-AACVeri, and the AS-AACVeri includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, Cert REQ and the third digital signature Sig AS_AAC3 ; wherein, Sig AS_AAC3 is AS-AAC to AS-AACVeri in The digital signature generated by the calculation of the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the Cert REQ .
  • AS-REQ uses the public key of AS-AAC to verify the Sig AS_AAC3 , if the verification is passed, the validity verification is performed on the Cert REQ to obtain the second verification result Res REQ , and the second verification result information is generated according to the information including the Res REQ .
  • the AS-REQVeri includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 , the Pub REQ and the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 ;
  • Sig AS_REQ4 is a digital signature generated by AS-REQ on the signature data including Pub REQ
  • Sig AS_REQ1 is a digital signature generated by AS-REQ on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the AS-AAC calculates the signature data including the Pub REQ to generate the second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 , Generate a first authentication response message ASVeri according to the information including the first authentication result information ciphertext, the Sig AS_REQ1 , the second authentication result information Pub REQ and the Sig AS_AAC2 , and send the ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the AAC verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the AS-AAC.
  • the AAC determines the identity authentication result of REQ according to the second verification result Res REQ in the second authentication result information.
  • the AAC can confirm whether the REQ is legal according to the Res REQ in the second authentication result information, thereby laying a foundation for ensuring that only legal REQs can access the network.
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes the authentication result information ciphertext EncData AAC .
  • the EncData AAC is generated by AAC encrypting the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature by using a message encryption key.
  • the execution sequence of S104 to S106 does not affect the implementation of the present application.
  • the execution sequence of S104 to S106 may be set according to requirements.
  • the AAC selects whether to execute S106 according to the local policy. Considering the efficiency, the preferred solution is not to execute and end the current authentication process.
  • REQ decrypts the ciphertext of the authentication result information EncData AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the first digital signature.
  • the message encryption key can be obtained through negotiation between REQ and AAC, or shared in advance by REQ and AAC. Therefore, after REQ receives the AACAuth, it can decrypt the EncData AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the first digital signature.
  • REQ verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of AS-REQ.
  • the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by AS-REQ on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and REQ knows the public key of AS-REQ it trusts, REQ can use AS-REQ's public key.
  • the public key verifies the first digital signature, and if the verification passes, execute S109, and if the verification fails, discard the AACAuth.
  • S109 REQ determines the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the first verification result Res AAC in the first authentication result information obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the REQ can decrypt the ciphertext of the first authentication result information according to a preset encryption and decryption method.
  • the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by the AS-AAC using the second protection random number to encrypt the first authentication result information.
  • the EncData AAC sent by AAC to REQ in S106 The encrypted data also includes a second protection random number, then REQ uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData AAC to obtain a second protection random number, and uses the second protection random number to decrypt the first authentication result information encryption.
  • the text obtains the first identification result information.
  • the REQ can determine whether the AAC is legal according to the Res AAC in the first authentication result information obtained by decryption, thereby laying a foundation for ensuring that the REQ can access the legal network.
  • the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller is confidentially processed, which can prevent the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller from being exposed in the process of accessing the network, and ensure that attackers cannot.
  • the real-time authentication of the bidirectional identity between the requesting device and the authentication access controller is realized while ensuring the confidentiality of the entity identity-related information, which lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with the legitimate network.
  • REQInit of S101 may also include the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ, and the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit, then before S105, AAC also needs to determine whether Sig REQ is verified or not, S105 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are the same authentication server, the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-AAC (which can also be expressed as AS-REQ) or by AAC; -REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, then the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-REQ or by AAC.
  • AS-AAC which can also be expressed as AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are two different authentication servers, then the Sig REQ can be verified by AS-REQ or by AAC.
  • AAC determines whether the Sig REQ is verified through the following methods:
  • the Sig REQ can be carried in the AACVeri of S102 and passed to AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ), and AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ) utilizes the Cert in AACVeri REQ verifies the Sig REQ , if the verification is passed, the steps such as generating and sending the first authentication response message ASVeri are continued; if the verification fails, the steps such as generating and sending the first authentication response message ASVeri will not be performed. Therefore, the AAC can determine whether the verification of the Sig REQ is passed according to whether the first authentication response message ASVeri can be received. If the AAC can receive the ASVeri, the AAC determines that the verification of the Sig REQ is passed
  • the AS-REQ can use the Cert REQ in the AS-AACVeri to verify the Describe Sig REQ , if verification passes, then continue to execute the steps such as generating and sending the second identification response message AS-REQVeri and generating the follow-up first identification response message ASVeri; Steps such as the response message AS-REQVeri and the subsequent first authentication response message ASVeri will not be generated. Therefore, the AAC can determine whether the verification of the Sig REQ is passed according to whether the first authentication response message ASVeri can be received. If the AAC can receive the ASVeri, the AAC determines that the verification of the Sig REQ
  • the AAC can verify the Sig REQ by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in REQInit of S101, so as to determine whether the Sig REQ is verified .
  • the second authentication result information Pub REQ generated by the authentication server may also include the Cert REQ .
  • the Cert REQ verifies the Sig REQ to determine whether the Sig REQ is verified.
  • the second authentication result information Pub REQ generated by the authentication server may further include the Cert REQ , then the AAC first verifies the Pub REQ after receiving the ASVeri of S103
  • the Cert REQ in is consistent with the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ . If they are consistent, then use the Cert REQ to verify the Sig REQ to determine whether the Sig REQ is verified.
  • the AACVeri of S102 may also include the digital signature Sig AAC of AAC, and the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACVeri, then before S109, the REQ also needs to determine whether the Sig AAC has passed the verification, S109 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • REQ determines whether Sig AAC is verified by including the following methods: AS-AAC trusted by AAC uses Cert AAC obtained by decrypting the identity information ciphertext of AAC in AACVeri EncPub AS to verify Sig AAC , and the subsequent process will be executed after the verification is passed. , so if the REQ can receive the AACAuth of S106, the REQ determines that the Sig AAC has passed the verification.
  • the AACAuth of S106 may also include the digital signature Sig AAC of AAC, and the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACAuth, then the first authentication result information Pub AAC generated by AS-AAC also includes Cert AAC ;
  • the REQ also needs to determine whether the Sig AAC has passed the verification, and S109 can be executed only after the verification is passed.
  • the REQ determines whether the Sig AAC is verified by the following methods: REQ uses the Cert AAC in the Pub AAC obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to verify the Sig AAC , and determines whether the Sig AAC is verified according to the verification result.
  • the message transmitted between REQ, AAC and the authentication server may also include parameter information such as random numbers and identity identifiers generated by AAC and/or REQ.
  • parameter information such as random numbers and identity identifiers generated by AAC and/or REQ.
  • these random numbers And/or the identity identifier should be unchanged during the transmission process of each message, but if it encounters network jitter or attack, it may cause the loss of random number and/or identity identifier and other parameter information in the message or tamper. Therefore, during identity authentication, the consistency of the identity identifier and/or random number in the message can also be verified to ensure the reliability and freshness of the authentication result.
  • the encrypted data of the identity information ciphertext EncData REQ of REQ in REQInit of S101 also includes the identity ID REQ of REQ
  • the AACVeri of S102 also includes ID REQ
  • the ASVeri of S103 also includes ID REQ
  • the ASVeri of S106 also includes ID REQ.
  • the authentication result information ciphertext EncData in AACAuth also includes ID REQ . Therefore, the REQ decrypts the EncData AAC and obtains the ID REQ . Before the REQ executes S109 , it also performs consistency verification between the decrypted ID REQ and the ID REQ of the REQ itself, and executes S109 after the verification is passed.
  • the encrypted data of AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS in AACVeri of S102 further includes AAC's identity ID AAC and first protected random number Nonce AACID
  • Nonce AACID is used to encrypt ID AAC
  • the ASVeri of S103 also includes the identity ciphertext of AAC, and the identity ciphertext of AAC is obtained by AS-AAC encrypting ID AAC by using Nonce AACID , for example, AAC can be obtained by performing XOR operation on Nonce AACID and ID AAC .
  • the AAC needs to verify the identity ciphertext of the AAC according to its own identity ID AAC and the Nonce AACID .
  • the verification includes: the AAC uses the Nonce AACID to verify the identity ID AAC including the AAC itself in the The encrypted information in the AAC generates the identity ciphertext of AAC, and the identity ciphertext of the generated AAC and the identity ciphertext of the AAC received in the ASVeri of S103 are verified for consistency; Or, AAC can utilize the Nonce AACID Decrypt the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the AAC, and perform consistency verification between the decrypted ID AAC and the identity identifier ID AAC of the AAC itself, and perform S105 after the verification is passed.
  • the AACVeri of S102 may also include Nonce REQ and the first random number Nonce AAC generated by AAC , correspondingly, in the ASVeri of S103 It can also include Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC , and the encrypted data of EncData AAC in AACAuth of S106 can also include Nonce REQ .
  • AAC Before S105, AAC also needs to verify the consistency of the Nonce AAC in ASVeri and the Nonce AAC generated by AAC ; before S109, REQ also needs to verify the consistency of the Nonce REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData AAC and the Nonce REQ generated by REQ . .
  • the AACAuth of S106 may also include the message integrity check code MacTag AAC .
  • MacTag AAC is calculated by AAC using the message integrity check key to include other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC . generated; then after REQ receives AACAuth, it also needs to verify the MacTag AAC , and execute S109 after the verification is passed.
  • REQ verifies MacTag AAC
  • the generation method of the message integrity check key will be described in the next embodiment.
  • the message encryption key in the above-mentioned embodiment may be obtained through negotiation between REQ and AAC. Therefore, this embodiment also provides a method for negotiating a message encryption key between REQ and AAC. Referring to FIG. 2 , the method includes:
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes the key exchange parameter KeyInfo AAC of the AAC, and the KeyInfo AAC includes the temporary public key of the AAC.
  • the key exchange refers to a key exchange algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman (DH for short).
  • the AACInit may further include the first random number Nonce AAC generated by the AAC .
  • the AACInit may also include Security capabilities AAC ,
  • Security capabilities AAC represents the security capability parameter information supported by AAC, including the identity authentication suite supported by AAC (the identity authentication suite includes one or more identity authentication methods), symmetric encryption algorithm, Integrity verification algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc., for REQ to select and use a specific security policy, REQ can select the specific security policy Security capabilities REQ used by REQ according to Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities REQ means that REQ determines the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity check algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm to be used accordingly.
  • REQ performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter KeyInfo REQ including REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate a first key, and according to the information including the first key
  • the message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm.
  • the REQ can perform the key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, and combine K1 to include Information including Nonce AAC and the second random number Nonce REQ generated by REQ, use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key.
  • the negotiated key derivation algorithm may be the key derivation algorithm selected by the REQ according to the Security capabilities AAC sent by the AAC.
  • KeyInfo REQ is the key exchange parameter generated by REQ, including the temporary public key of REQ.
  • the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ is a temporary private key generated by REQ and corresponding to the temporary public key of REQ, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and private keys.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes KeyInfo REQ , so that AAC calculates and obtains the message encryption key according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo REQ .
  • the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC is a temporary private key generated by the AAC and corresponding to the temporary public key of the AAC, that is, the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and private keys.
  • the REQInit may also include Security capabilities REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce REQ , so that the AAC can be calculated according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC , the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ , the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ .
  • the message encryption key may also include Security capabilities REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce REQ , so that the AAC can be calculated according to the information including the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC , the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ , the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ .
  • the message encryption key may also include Security capabilities REQ .
  • the REQInit may also include the Nonce AAC , then the AAC may perform consistency verification on the Nonce AAC in the REQInit and the Nonce AAC generated by the AAC before calculating the message encryption key, to ensure that the REQInit received by the AAC is for AACInit. response message.
  • AAC performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ to generate the first key, and uses the encrypted key according to the information including the first key.
  • the key derivation algorithm computes the message encryption key.
  • the AAC may perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo REQ to generate the first key K1 , and K1 is combined with the information including the Nonce AAC and the Nonce REQ , and the message encryption key is calculated through a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm.
  • the negotiated key derivation algorithm may be the key derivation algorithm selected and used by the AAC according to the Security capabilities REQ sent by the REQ.
  • REQ and AAC can also generate a message integrity check key.
  • the implementation manner in which the REQ and the AAC each generate the message integrity check key is the same as the implementation manner in which the REQ and the AAC each generate the message encryption key exemplified in the embodiment of FIG. 2 .
  • AAC can use the key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data in the manner of the embodiment in FIG. 2, and the key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity check key, or, the key data can be used as a message encryption key and a message integrity check key.
  • a part of the key data in the key data is used as the message encryption key, and the other part of the key data is used as the message integrity check key;
  • AAC can also use the key derivation algorithm to derive two strings of the same value in stages by using the key derivation algorithm in the embodiment of FIG. 2 Or different key data, one string is used as the message encryption key, and the other string is used as the message integrity check key.
  • REQ can use the key derivation algorithm to derive a string of key data in the manner of the embodiment of FIG.
  • the key data can be used as both a message encryption key and a message integrity check key, or the key data can be used as A part of the key data is used as the message encryption key, and the other part of the key data is used as the message integrity check key;
  • the key data, one string is used as the message encryption key, and the other string is used as the message integrity check key.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a method for determining the first authentication server and/or the second authentication server used in this authentication process by utilizing the information exchange between the AAC and the REQ:
  • AAC adds ID AS_AAC of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC in AACInit of S201, and REQ determines ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by itself according to the ID AS_AAC .
  • REQ selects at least one authentication server from ID AS_AAC and is the identity of the authentication server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ , if the selection fails, then REQ uses the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ (wherein , select the success corresponding to the non-roaming situation, and select the failure corresponding to the roaming situation), add the ID AS_REQ to the REQInit of S203 and send it to the AAC.
  • the AAC may determine the first authentication server according to the ID AS_AAC and the ID AS_REQ . For example, the AAC may determine whether there is at least one identical authentication server identifier in the ID AS_REQ and the ID AS_AAC . If it exists, it is a non-roaming situation. AAC determines the first authentication server participating in identity authentication from the identity identifiers of the at least one authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC. The AS_AAC determines the first authentication server AS-AAC participating in the identity authentication, and sends the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ .
  • the AAC may not need to send the ID AS_AAC to the REQ, but the REQ adds the identity ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by itself in REQInit of S203 .
  • the implementation of determining the first authentication server and/or the second authentication server participating in the identity authentication process according to the ID AS_REQ and the identity ID AS_AAC of the authentication server trusted by the AAC itself is as in the previous embodiment.
  • the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC can be the same or different, when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are the same, it is a non-roaming situation; when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are different, it is a roaming situation.
  • Fig. 3 it is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in a non-roaming situation, in which AS-AAC (also AS-REQ) can be used to represent the authentication server jointly trusted by REQ and AAC; before the implementation of this embodiment, REQ and AAC
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • the AAC already has the message encryption key.
  • the message encryption key can be pre-shared by both parties or negotiated through the method shown in Figure 2.
  • the identity authentication method includes:
  • the AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncData REQ of the identity information of REQ and the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ .
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS and Cert REQ .
  • the Cert REQ is obtained by the AAC decrypting the EncData REQ using a message encryption key.
  • AS-AAC decrypts the EncPub AS by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain Cert AAC and the second protected random number Nonce AACPub , and respectively performs legality verification on Cert AAC and Cert REQ to obtain the first verification result Res AAC and the second verification result Res REQ , generate the first identification result information according to the information including Cert AAC and Res AAC , generate the second identification result information according to the information including Cert REQ and Res REQ ; use Nonce AACPub to include the first identification result information in the The information inside is encrypted to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext is calculated to generate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1 , and the signature data including the second authentication result information is calculated and generated The second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • the AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the AS-AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig AS_AAC1 , the second authentication result information and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • AAC utilizes the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig AS_AAC2 , utilizes the Cert REQ in the second identification result information to verify the Sig REQ , if all the verifications pass, then determine the identity identification result of REQ according to the Res REQ in the second identification result information .
  • AAC encrypts the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext, the Sig AS_AAC1 , and the Nonce AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate the authentication result information ciphertext EncData AAC , and encrypts the encrypted data including the EncData AAC
  • the signature data is calculated to generate AAC's digital signature Sig AAC .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes the EncData AAC and the Sig AAC .
  • REQ decrypts the EncData AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_AAC1 and Nonce AACPub .
  • the REQ decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the Nonce AACPub to obtain the first authentication result information.
  • the REQ determines the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the Res AAC in the first authentication result information.
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S305 can also be changed to be performed first in S301, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Sig REQ is verified by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit, and after the verification is passed Go to S302.
  • the second authentication result information may not include Cert REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S305 can also be changed to be performed first in S303, in this case, the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-AAC through the AACVeri of S302, and the Sig REQ is verified by AS-AAC using Cert REQ , Perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • REQ REQ
  • Both the AAC and the AAC already have a message encryption key, and the message encryption key can be shared in advance by both parties or obtained through negotiation through the method shown in FIG. 2 .
  • the identification method includes:
  • the AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncData REQ of the identity information of REQ and the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ .
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS , Cert REQ and AAC's digital signature Sig AAC .
  • the Cert REQ is obtained by the AAC decrypting the EncData REQ using a message encryption key.
  • AS-AAC decrypts the ciphertext EncPub AS of the identity information of AAC to obtain Cert AAC and the second protection random number Nonce AACPub , and uses Cert AAC to verify the Sig AAC .
  • AS-AAC respectively performs legality verification on Cert AAC and Cert REQ to obtain a first verification result Res AAC and a second verification result Res REQ , and generates first identification result information according to the information including Res AAC , and according to the information including Cert REQ Generate second authentication result information with information including Res REQ ; use Nonce AACPub to encrypt the information including the first authentication result information to generate the first authentication result information ciphertext, and encrypt the information including the first authentication result information ciphertext.
  • the signature data is calculated to generate the first digital signature Sig AS_AAC1
  • the signature data including the second authentication result information is calculated to generate the second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • the AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the AS-AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig AS_AAC1 , the second authentication result information and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • AAC utilizes the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig AS_AAC2 , utilizes the Cert REQ in the second identification result information to verify the Sig REQ , if all the verifications pass, then determine the identity identification result of REQ according to the Res REQ in the second identification result information .
  • AAC encrypts the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_AAC1 and Nonce AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate the authentication result information ciphertext EncData AAC .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes the EncData AAC .
  • REQ decrypts the EncData AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_AAC1 and Nonce AACPub .
  • the REQ decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the Nonce AACPub to obtain the first authentication result information, and determines the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the Res AAC in the first authentication result information.
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S406 can also be changed to be performed first in S401, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Sig REQ is verified by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit, and after the verification is passed Step S402 is executed.
  • the second authentication result information may not include Cert REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S406 can also be changed to be performed first in S403, in this case, the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-AAC through the AACVeri of S402, and the Sig REQ is verified by AS-AAC using Cert REQ , Perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • FIG. 5 it is an embodiment of an identity authentication method in the case of roaming.
  • AS-AAC and AS-REQ trust each other and know each other's digital certificate or the public key in the digital certificate.
  • both REQ and AAC already possess a message encryption key, and the message encryption key may be pre-shared by both parties or obtained through negotiation through the method shown in FIG. 2 .
  • the identification method includes:
  • the AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncData REQ of the identity information of REQ, the identity ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ, and the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ .
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS , Cert REQ and ID AS_REQ .
  • the AS-AAC can determine the second authentication server AS-REQ used in the authentication process according to the ID AS_REQ , and send the Cert REQ to the AS-REQ for verification.
  • the Cert REQ is obtained by the AAC decrypting the EncData REQ using a message encryption key.
  • the AS-AAC decrypts the EncPub AS to obtain the Cert AAC and the second protection random number Nonce AACPub , performs the legality verification on the Cert AAC to obtain the first verification result Res AAC , and generates the first authentication result according to the information including the Cert AAC and the Res AAC
  • For the result information use Nonce AACPub to encrypt the information including the first authentication result information to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, and calculate the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext to generate the third digital signature Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, Cert REQ and Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • AS-REQ verifies Sig AS_AAC3 by using the public key of AS-AAC.
  • AS-REQ performs legality verification on Cert REQ to obtain a second verification result Res REQ , generates second authentication result information according to the information including Cert REQ and Res REQ , and performs second authentication result information including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the signature data is calculated to generate the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1
  • the signature data including the second authentication result information is calculated to generate the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • the AS-REQ sends the second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 , the second authentication result information and the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • AS-AAC verifies Sig AS_REQ4 by using the public key of AS-REQ.
  • AS-AAC calculates and generates a second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 on the signature data including the second authentication result information, according to the ciphertext including the first authentication result information, Sig AS_REQ1 , the second authentication result information and Sig AS_AAC2 The information generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • AAC uses the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig AS_AAC2 , and uses the Cert REQ in the second authentication result information to verify the Sig REQ , if the verification is passed, then determine the identity of the REQ according to the Res REQ in the second authentication result information Identification results.
  • AAC encrypts the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub using the message encryption key to generate the authentication result information ciphertext EncData AAC , and calculates and generates AAC for the signature data including EncData AAC The digital signature of Sig AAC .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes EncData AAC and Sig AAC .
  • REQ decrypts the EncData AAC with the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub .
  • the REQ decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the Nonce AACPub to obtain the first authentication result information.
  • REQ verifies the Sig AAC using the Cert AAC in the first authentication result information, and verifies the Sig AS_REQ1 using the public key of the AS-REQ.
  • the REQ determines the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the Res AAC in the first authentication result information.
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S511 can also be changed to be performed first in S501, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Sig REQ is verified by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit, and after the verification is passed Go to S502, in this case, the second authentication result information may not include Cert REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S511 can also be changed to be performed first in S505. In this case, the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-REQ through AACVeri and AS-AACVeri, and AS-REQ uses Cert REQ to verify Sig REQ REQ , and then perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • the identity authentication method includes:
  • the AAC obtains the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by the REQ.
  • the REQInit includes the ciphertext EncData REQ of the identity information of REQ, the identity ID AS_REQ of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ, and the digital signature Sig REQ of REQ .
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes AAC's identity information ciphertext EncPub AS , Cert REQ , ID AS_REQ and AAC's digital signature Sig AAC .
  • the Cert REQ is obtained by the AAC decrypting the EncData REQ using a message encryption key.
  • the AS-AAC decrypts the EncPub AS to obtain the Cert AAC and the second protection random number Nonce AACPub , and uses the Cert AAC to verify the Sig AAC .
  • the AS-AAC performs legality verification on the Cert AAC to obtain the first verification result Res AAC , generates the first authentication result information according to the information including the Res AAC , and encrypts the information including the first authentication result information by using the Nonce AACPub
  • the first authentication result information ciphertext is generated, and the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext is calculated to generate the third digital signature Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes the first authentication result information ciphertext, Cert REQ and Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • AS-REQ uses the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • AS-REQ verifies the legitimacy of the Cert REQ and obtains the second verification result Res REQ , generates the second authentication result information according to the information including the Cert REQ and the Res REQ , and signs the signature including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information
  • the data is calculated to generate the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1
  • the signature data including the second authentication result information is calculated to generate the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • the AS-REQ sends the second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature Sig AS_REQ1 , the second authentication result information and the fourth digital signature Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • AS-AAC uses the public key of AS-REQ to verify Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • AS-AAC calculates and generates a second digital signature Sig AS_AAC2 on the signature data including the second authentication result information, according to the ciphertext including the first authentication result information, Sig AS_REQ1 , the second authentication result information and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • the information generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • AAC uses the public key of AS-AAC to verify Sig AS_AAC2 , and uses the Cert REQ in the second authentication result information to verify the Sig REQ , if all the verifications pass, then determine the identity of the REQ according to the Res REQ in the second authentication result information Identification results.
  • the AAC encrypts the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate the authentication result information ciphertext EncData AAC .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes the EncData AAC .
  • REQ decrypts the EncData AAC with the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext, Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub .
  • REQ verifies Sig AS_REQ1 by using the public key of AS-REQ.
  • the REQ decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the Nonce AACPub to obtain the first authentication result information, and determines the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the Res AAC in the first authentication result information.
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S612 can also be changed to be performed first in S601, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit is used to verify the Sig REQ , and after the verification is passed, Go to S602.
  • the second authentication result information may not include Cert REQ .
  • the verification of the Sig REQ in S612 can also be changed to be performed first in S606.
  • the Sig REQ can be sent to the AS-REQ through AACVeri and AS-AACVeri, and the Sig REQ can be verified by the AS-REQ using the Cert REQ . REQ , and then perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • the first authentication result information is represented by Pub AAC
  • the second authentication result information is represented by Pub REQ .
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ AS-REQ
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the digital signature of AAC Sig AAC is verified by REQ, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC and Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field, indicating the security capability parameter information supported by AAC, including the identity authentication suite, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity check algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm supported by AAC (the same below).
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ , generates Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate a first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as specific strings, etc.) use negotiated or preset key derivation algorithms to calculate message encryption keys and message integrity Check the key; use the message encryption key to calculate the EncData REQ using the symmetric encryption algorithm; calculate the Sig REQ .
  • Security capabilities REQ represents the selection of a specific security policy made by REQ according to Security capabilities AAC , that is, the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity verification algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc. determined by REQ (the same below). Whether the REQ generates the Security capabilities REQ depends on whether the AACInit sent by the AAC to the REQ carries the Security capabilities AAC .
  • the calculation of the message integrity check key by REQ is an optional operation, and this step can be performed when the message integrity check key needs to be used later.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncData REQ and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC is an optional field and should be equal to the corresponding field in AACInit;
  • Security capabilities REQ is an optional field.
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes Cert REQ and ID REQ .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncData REQ and Sig REQ ; when REQInit does not include the Nonce AAC field, the signature data of the Sig REQ also includes the Nonce AAC field in AACInit.
  • the object to be signed is called signature data.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations (if there is no special description or logical relationship, the actions numbered in (1), (2), . order. Same as the full text), including:
  • the AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes ID REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and EncPub AS .
  • ID REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce REQ should be equal to the corresponding fields in REQInit;
  • Nonce AAC should be equal to Nonce AAC generated by AAC ;
  • EncPub AS encrypted data includes ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACPub and Nonce AACID .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_AAC1 , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ , and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AACPub , ID AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively;
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC1 includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ and
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC2 includes Nonce AAC and Pub REQ .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData AAC , Sig AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • EncData AAC 's encrypted data includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_AAC1 and Nonce AACPub .
  • the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACAuth.
  • MacTag AAC is an optional field, and its calculation process is as follows: use the message integrity check key and use the integrity check algorithm to calculate and generate MacTag AAC for information including other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification process is: use the message integrity verification key to use the integrity verification algorithm to locally calculate and generate MacTag AAC for the information including other fields in AACAuth except MacTag AAC (this calculation method is the same as that of AAC calculating MacTag AAC ). same way) and compare the calculated MacTag AAC with the MacTag AAC in the received AACAuth.
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S709 can also be changed to be performed first in S705, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, it uses the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit to verify the Sig REQ , and after the verification is passed S706 is executed.
  • Pub REQ in the embodiment of FIG. 7 can be replaced with Res REQ .
  • the verification of the Sig REQ in S709 can also be changed to be performed first in S707. In this case, the Sig REQ can be sent to the AS-AAC through the AACVeri of S706, and the Sig REQ is verified by the AS-AAC using the Cert REQ , Perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • AS-AAC also AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ AS-REQ
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the digital signature Sig AAC of AAC is verified by AS-AAC, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC and Security capabilities AAC .
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field.
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ , generates Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as specific strings, etc.) use negotiated or preset key derivation algorithms to calculate message encryption keys and message integrity Check the key; use the message encryption key to calculate the identity information ciphertext EncData REQ of REQ by using the symmetric encryption algorithm; calculate the Sig REQ .
  • the calculation of the message integrity check key by REQ is an optional operation, and this step can be performed when the message integrity check key needs to be used later.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncData REQ and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields, and Nonce AAC should be equal to Nonce AAC in AACInit.
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes ID REQ and Cert REQ .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes ID REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncPub AS and Sig AAC .
  • ID REQ , Cert REQ , and Nonce REQ should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in REQInit.
  • EncPub AS 's encrypted data includes ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACPub , and Nonce AACID .
  • the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACVeri.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AAC and Nonce AACID are generated by XOR operation Generate XOR operation on Pub AAC and Nonce AACPub
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_AAC1 , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ , and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AACPub , ID AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively;
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC1 includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ ,
  • the signature numbers for Sig AS_AAC2 include Nonce AAC , Pub REQ .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, which should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • EncData AAC 's encrypted data includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_AAC1 and Nonce AACPub , and ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_AAC1 shall be equal to the corresponding field in ASVeri respectively.
  • MacTag AAC is an optional field, and its calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7 .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S809 can also be changed to be performed first in S805, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Sig REQ is verified by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit, and after the verification is passed S806 is executed.
  • Pub REQ in the embodiment of FIG. 8 may be replaced by Res REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S809 can also be changed to be performed first in S807, in this case, the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-AAC through the AACVeri of S806, and the Sig REQ is verified by AS-AAC using Cert REQ , Perform subsequent operations after the verification is passed.
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the digital signature of AAC Sig AAC is verified by REQ, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC , Security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC .
  • Security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC are optional fields;
  • ID AS_AAC represents the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC, which is used to make REQ determine whether there is a mutually trusted authentication server (the same below) according to ID AS_AAC .
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ , generates ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, Combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) and use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity check key; use the message encryption key to calculate the identity information ciphertext EncData REQ of REQ using a symmetric encryption algorithm; calculate Sig REQ .
  • ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields.
  • ID AS_REQ represents the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ.
  • REQ tries to select at least one identity of the same authentication server as ID AS_AAC from its trusted authentication servers as ID AS_REQ . If the selection fails, the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by itself is used as ID AS_REQ ; when ID AS_AAC does not exist in AACInit, REQ uses the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by itself as ID AS_REQ (the same as the full text).
  • the calculation of the message integrity check key by REQ is an optional operation, and this step can be performed when the message integrity check key needs to be used.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , ID AS_REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncData REQ and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC , ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields, and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACInit;
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes ID REQ and Cert REQ .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit. When the Nonce AAC field is not included in REQInit, the signature data of Sig REQ also includes the Nonce AAC field in AACInit.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • ID AS_REQ is carried in REQInit and the ID AS_AAC is carried in AACInit , then AAC judges whether ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC have at least one identical identification server identity. In the identity of an authentication server trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication according to ID AS_AAC , and send the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ; or,
  • the AAC determines whether the ID AS_REQ and the authentication server trusted by the AAC have at least one identical ID of the authentication server. If so, it is a non-roaming situation. In the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication participating in identity authentication according to the authentication server trusted by itself.
  • the server AS-AAC sends the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ;
  • the result determined in this embodiment is a roaming situation.
  • the AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes ID REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncPub AS and ID AS_REQ .
  • ID AS_REQ is an optional field
  • Nonce REQ , ID AS_REQ , ID REQ and Cert REQ should be equal to the corresponding fields in REQInit respectively
  • Nonce AAC should be equal to the Nonce AAC generated by AAC
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACPub , and Nonce AACID .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC sends a decryption request message AS-AACReq to the certificate decryption server CS-DEC.
  • the AS-AACReq includes EncPub AS in the AACVeri.
  • CS-DEC After receiving the AS-AACReq, CS-DEC decrypts the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AACPub .
  • CS-DEC sends a decryption response message CS-DECRep to AS-AAC.
  • the CS-DECRep includes the decrypted ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AACPub .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the CS-DECRep, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to ID AS_REQ , if not, then AS-AAC has confirmed AS-REQ;
  • AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , Cert REQ , and Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce AACPub , ID AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri, and the signature data of Sig AS_AAC3 includes other fields before Sig AS_AAC3 in AS-AACVeri.
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the AS-AACVeri, the AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-REQ sends the second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , ID AAC Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_REQ1 includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub ;
  • the signature data of Sig AS_REQ4 includes ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , and Pub REQ .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AS-REQVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , and Pub REQ should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC2 includes ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , and Pub REQ .
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData AAC , Sig AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • MacTag AAC is an optional field, and its calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7 .
  • EncData AAC 's encrypted data includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub , and ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 shall be equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri respectively.
  • the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACAuth.
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S916 can also be changed to be performed first in S905, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Sig REQ is verified by using the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in the REQInit, and after the verification is passed S906 is performed.
  • Pub REQ in the embodiment of FIG. 9 can be replaced with Res REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S916 can also be changed to be performed first in S912.
  • the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-REQ through AACVeri of S906 and AS-AACVeri of S911, and used by AS-REQ
  • the Cert REQ verifies the Sig REQ , and the subsequent operations are performed after the verification is passed.
  • the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is integrated into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation.
  • the digital signature Sig AAC of AAC is verified by AS-AAC, and the method includes:
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC and KeyInfo AAC , and generates Security capabilities AAC as required.
  • the AAC sends a key request message AACInit to the REQ.
  • the AACInit includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo AAC , Security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC . Among them, Security capabilities AAC and ID AS_AAC are optional fields.
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ and KeyInfo REQ , generates ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ as required, performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key included in KeyInfo AAC to generate the first key K1, Combine K1 with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) and use the negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm to calculate the message encryption key and message integrity check key; use the message encryption key to calculate the identity information ciphertext EncData REQ of REQ using a symmetric encryption algorithm; calculate Sig REQ .
  • ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields.
  • the calculation of the message integrity check key by REQ is an optional operation, and this step can be performed when the message integrity check key needs to be used later.
  • REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to the AAC.
  • the REQInit includes Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ , Security capabilities REQ , ID AS_REQ , KeyInfo REQ , EncData REQ and Sig REQ .
  • Nonce AAC , ID AS_REQ and Security capabilities REQ are optional fields, and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACInit.
  • the encrypted data of EncData REQ includes Cert REQ and ID REQ .
  • the signature data of Sig REQ includes other fields before Sig REQ in REQInit.
  • the AAC After receiving the REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • ID AS_REQ is carried in REQInit and the ID AS_AAC is carried in AACInit , then AAC judges whether ID AS_REQ and ID AS_AAC have at least one identical identification server identity. In the identity of an authentication server trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication according to ID AS_AAC , and send the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ; or,
  • the AAC determines whether the ID AS_REQ and the authentication server trusted by the AAC have at least one identical ID of the authentication server. If so, it is a non-roaming situation. In the identification of at least one authentication server mutually trusted by REQ and AAC, determine the first authentication server participating in identity authentication; if it does not exist, it is a roaming situation, and AAC needs to determine the first authentication participating in identity authentication according to the authentication server trusted by itself.
  • the server AS-AAC sends the ID AS_REQ to the AS-AAC, so that the AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to the ID AS_REQ ;
  • the result determined in this embodiment is a roaming situation.
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri may include ID REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , ID AS_REQ , EncPub AS and Sig AAC .
  • Nonce REQ , ID AS_REQ , ID REQ , and Cert REQ should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in REQInit
  • Nonce AAC should be equal to Nonce AAC generated by AAC
  • ID AS_REQ is an optional field.
  • the encrypted data of EncPub AS includes ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACPub and Nonce AACID ; the signature data of Sig AAC includes other fields before Sig AAC in AACVeri.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC sends a decryption request message AS-AACReq to the CS-DEC.
  • the AS-AACReq includes EncPub AS in the AACVeri.
  • CS-DEC After receiving the AS-AACReq, CS-DEC decrypts the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AACPub .
  • CS-DEC sends a decryption response message CS-DECRep to AS-AAC.
  • the CS-DECRep includes the decrypted ID AAC , Cert AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AACPub .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the CS-DECRep, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AS-AAC determines the second authentication server AS-REQ according to ID AS_REQ , if not, then AS-AAC has confirmed AS-REQ;
  • AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ.
  • the AS-AACVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Cert REQ and Sig AS_AAC3 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Cert REQ , Nonce AACPub , ID AAC , Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri.
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC3 includes other fields before Sig AS_AAC3 in AS-AACVeri.
  • the AS-REQ After receiving the AS-AACVeri, the AS-REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ and Sig AS_REQ4 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , ID AAC Nonce AACID , and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri respectively;
  • the signature data of Sig AS_REQ1 includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub ;
  • Sig AS_REQ4 The signature data includes ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ .
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AS-REQVeri, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ and Sig AS_AAC2 .
  • ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 , ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , and Pub REQ should be equal to the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri respectively;
  • the signature data of Sig AS_AAC2 includes ID AAC Nonce AACID , Nonce AAC , Pub REQ .
  • the AAC After receiving the ASVeri, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , EncData AAC and MacTag AAC .
  • Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC are optional fields, and should be equal to Nonce REQ in REQInit and Nonce AAC generated by AAC respectively.
  • MacTag AAC is an optional field, and its calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7 .
  • the encrypted data of EncData AAC includes ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , Sig AS_REQ1 and Nonce AACPub , wherein ID REQ , Nonce REQ , Pub AAC Nonce AACPub , and Sig AS_REQ1 should be equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri respectively.
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S1016 can also be changed to be performed first in S1005, that is, after AAC obtains the REQInit, the Cert REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData REQ in REQInit is used to verify the Sig REQ , and after the verification is passed S1006 is executed.
  • Pub REQ in the embodiment of FIG. 10 can be replaced with Res REQ .
  • the verification of Sig REQ in S1016 can also be changed to be performed first in S1012.
  • the Sig REQ can be sent to AS-REQ through AACVeri of S1006 and AS-AACVeri of S1011, and used by AS-REQ
  • the Cert REQ verifies the Sig REQ , and the subsequent operations are performed after the verification is passed.
  • each message may also carry a hash value HASH X_Y , and the hash value HASH X_Y is calculated by the sender entity X of the message using the hash algorithm on the latest pre-order message sent by the peer entity Y received. obtained, which is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether the entity X has received the complete latest pre-order message.
  • HASH REQ_AAC represents the hash value calculated by REQ on the latest pre-order message sent by AAC received
  • HASH AAC_REQ represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the latest pre-order message sent by REQ received
  • HASH AAC_AS-AAC represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the received Hash value calculated by the latest pre-order message sent by the received AS-AAC
  • HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ represents the AS-AAC Hash value calculated for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-REQ
  • HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC indicates the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-AAC.
  • HASH X_Y may not exist in the message or meaningless.
  • entity Y uses the hash algorithm to calculate the hash value locally for the latest pre-order message previously sent to entity X, and compares it with the hash value HASH X_Y carried in the received message. Then execute the following steps, otherwise discard or end the current authentication process.
  • the pre-order message sent by the peer entity Y to the entity X refers to the received message M sent by the peer entity Y to the entity X before the entity X sends the message M to the peer entity Y.
  • the latest pre-order message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y. If the message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there is no peer entity Y to the entity before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y The preorder message sent by X.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an authentication access controller AAC, including:
  • the obtaining part 1101 is configured to obtain the identity ciphertext message sent by the requesting device, the identity ciphertext message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, and the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device is obtained by using a message encryption key Generated by encrypting encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • the first sending part 1102 is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity information password of the authentication access controller.
  • the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encryption certificate,
  • the digital certificate of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the message encryption key;
  • the first receiving part 1103 is configured to receive the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and a second digital signature; wherein, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information includes the authentication access control
  • the first verification result of the digital certificate of the device, the first digital signature is the digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the second authentication result information includes the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the second digital signature is calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information.
  • the first verification part 1104 is configured to use the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature, and if the verification is passed, the first determination part 1105 according to the second authentication result information.
  • the second verification result determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; when the first determining part 1105 determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is valid, the second sending part 1106 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or ,
  • the first verification part 1104 is configured to use the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature, and if the verification is passed, the second sending part 1106 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device And the first determination part 1105 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
  • the first verification part 1104 is configured to use the public key of the first authentication server to verify the second digital signature; if the verification of the second digital signature is passed, the first determination part 1105 determines The second verification result in the authentication result information determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device; the second sending part 1106 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
  • the third authentication response message includes authentication result information ciphertext
  • the authentication result information ciphertext is composed of the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature using the message encryption key pair.
  • the encrypted data inside is encrypted and generated.
  • the authenticated access controller further comprises:
  • the third sending part is configured to send a key request message to the requesting device, where the key request message includes the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 contains Also includes key exchange parameters of the requesting device;
  • the calculation part is configured to perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the requesting device to generate the first key.
  • the message encryption key is calculated using a key derivation algorithm according to the information including the first key.
  • the key request message sent by the third sending part further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 further includes a request device generated the second random number;
  • the calculation part is further configured to calculate the message encryption key according to the information including the first key, the first random number and the second random number.
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 further includes the first random number; then the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the second verification part is configured to verify the consistency of the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.
  • the key request message sent by the third sending part further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 also includes specific security capabilities. policy, the specific security policy is determined by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller.
  • the key request message sent by the third sending part further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 further includes The identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
  • the authentication access controller also includes:
  • the second determination part is configured to be based on the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message and the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message
  • the identity identifier is determined to determine the first authentication server.
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the third determining part is configured to determine the first authentication server according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.
  • the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller further includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller and a first protection random number;
  • the first authentication response message further includes the identity ciphertext of the authentication access controller, and the identity ciphertext of the authentication access controller uses the first protection random number to pair the ciphertext including all It is generated by encrypting the information including the ID of the authentication access controller;
  • the authentication access controller further includes:
  • the third verification part is configured to verify the ciphertext of the identity of the authentication access controller according to the identity of the authentication access controller and the first protection random number.
  • the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller further includes a second protected random number; correspondingly, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information uses the second protected random number Obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information;
  • the encrypted data of the authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message sent by the second sending part 1106 further includes the second protection random number.
  • the identity ciphertext message obtained by the obtaining part 1101 further includes the digital signature of the requesting device
  • the first determining part 1105 is further configured to determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device passes the verification. If the verification of the digital signature of the requesting device is passed, then the identity authentication result of the requesting device is determined according to the second verification result.
  • the first determining portion 1105 is further configured to:
  • Verify the digital signature of the requesting device by using the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device, and determine whether the digital signature of the requesting device is verified according to the verification result; or,
  • the second authentication server verifies the digital signature of the requesting device using the digital certificate of the requesting device, if the first receiving part 1103 receives the first authentication response message, the first determining part 1105 determines the The digital signature of the requesting device has been verified; or,
  • the second authentication result information also includes the digital certificate of the requesting device
  • the first determining part 1105 uses the information described in the second authentication result information
  • the digital certificate of the requesting device verifies the digital signature of the requesting device, and determines whether the digital signature of the requesting device passes the verification according to the verification result; or,
  • the first determination part 1105 first determines the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information and decrypts the digital certificate of the requesting device in the second authentication result information. Consistency of the digital certificate of the requesting device obtained from the ciphertext of the identity information; if they are consistent, the first determining part 1105 then uses the digital certificate of the requesting device to verify the digital signature of the requesting device, and determines according to the verification result Whether the digital signature of the requesting device is verified.
  • the third authentication response message sent by the second sending part 1106 further includes a message integrity check code, where the message integrity check code is the message integrity check key pair used by the computing part It includes the calculation and generation of other fields in the third authentication response message except the message integrity check code; the message integrity check key is generated in the same manner as the message encryption key.
  • the message integrity check code is the message integrity check key pair used by the computing part It includes the calculation and generation of other fields in the third authentication response message except the message integrity check code; the message integrity check key is generated in the same manner as the message encryption key.
  • the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the requesting device; the The message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the first authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a requesting device REQ, including:
  • the sending part 1201 is configured to send an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device, and the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device is encrypted by the message
  • the key is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • the first receiving part 1202 is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, where the third authentication response message includes an authentication result information ciphertext, and the authentication result information ciphertext is a use message
  • the encryption key is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature;
  • the first authentication result information ciphertext is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information , the first authentication result information includes a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
  • the first decryption part 1203 is configured to use the message encryption key to decrypt the authentication result information ciphertext to obtain the first authentication result information ciphertext and the first digital signature;
  • the first verification part 1204 is configured to use the public key of the second authentication server to verify the first digital signature
  • the first determination part 1205 is configured to determine the authentication access according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information when the first digital signature is verified.
  • the authentication result of the controller is configured to determine the authentication access according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information when the first digital signature is verified.
  • the requesting device further includes:
  • a second receiving part configured to receive a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the key request message includes key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller;
  • the calculation part is configured to perform key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the requesting device and the temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller to generate the first key.
  • a key calculates the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to the information including the first key;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 also includes the key exchange parameter of the requesting device.
  • the key request message received by the second receiving part further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller
  • the calculating part is further configured to calculate the message encryption key according to the information including the first key, the first random number and the second random number generated by the requesting device;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 further includes the second random number.
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 further includes the first random number.
  • the key request message received by the second receiving part further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller, and the requesting device further includes:
  • the second determining part is configured to determine the specific security policy used by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; then the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 also includes the requesting device The specific security policy used.
  • the key request message received by the second receiving part further includes the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; then the requesting device further includes:
  • a third determining part configured to determine the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending part 1201 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
  • the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device sent by the sending part 1201 further includes the identity of the requesting device; correspondingly, in the third authentication response message received by the first receiving part 1202
  • the encrypted data of the authentication result information ciphertext also includes the identity of the requesting device; then the requesting device further includes:
  • the second verification part is configured to perform consistency verification on the identity of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication result information and the identity of the requesting device itself.
  • the encrypted data of the authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message received by the first receiving part 1202 further includes a second protection random number
  • the first decryption part 1203 uses the message encryption key to decrypt the authentication result information ciphertext to obtain the second protected random number, and uses the second protected random number to decrypt the first authentication result information.
  • the ciphertext obtains the first authentication result information.
  • the first determining part 1205 is further configured to determine whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, if it is determined that the authentication If the verification of the digital signature of the access controller is passed, the identity verification result of the access controller is determined according to the first verification result.
  • the first determining portion 1205 is further configured to:
  • the first authentication server decrypts the authentication access
  • the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained from the ciphertext of the identity information of the controller verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller, if the first receiving part 1202 receives the third authentication response message, Then the first determining part 1205 determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller has been verified; or,
  • the third authentication response message further includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller
  • the first authentication result information obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information also includes the authentication access controller.
  • the digital certificate of the authentication access controller then the first determination part 1205 verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and determines the authentication access controller according to the verification result. Whether the digital signature is verified.
  • the third authentication response message received by the first receiving part 1202 further includes a message integrity check code; the requesting device further includes:
  • the third verification part is configured to verify the message integrity check code using a message integrity check key; the message integrity check key is generated in the same manner as the message encryption key.
  • the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preamble message sent by the authentication access controller received.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a first authentication server AS-AAC, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • the first receiving part 1301 is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the authentication access controller and the digital certificate of the requesting device , the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting the encrypted data including the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encryption certificate;
  • the first sending part 1302 is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and a second digital signature; wherein, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is obtained by encrypting the information including the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information includes the authentication access control
  • the first verification result of the digital certificate of the device, the first digital signature is the digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.
  • the second authentication result information includes the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requesting device, and the second digital signature is calculated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information. Generated digital signature.
  • the first authentication server further includes:
  • the first verification part is configured to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller.
  • the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are the same authentication server, and the first authentication server further includes:
  • the first decryption part is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
  • the second verification part is configured to perform legality verification on the decrypted digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, and perform legality verification on the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result;
  • a first generating part configured to generate first authentication result information according to the information including the first verification result, regenerate the first authentication result information ciphertext, and according to the information including the second verification result generating second authentication result information, calculating the signature data including the first authentication result information ciphertext to generate a first digital signature, and calculating the signature data including the second authentication result information to generate a second digital signature , generating the first authentication response message according to the information including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information and the second digital signature.
  • the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers, and the first authentication server further includes:
  • the third verification part is configured to use the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the authentication access controller to obtain the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and to decrypt the authentication access controller.
  • the validity of the digital certificate is verified to obtain the first verification result;
  • a second generating part configured to generate first authentication result information according to the information including the first verification result, and then generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information
  • the second sending part is configured to send a second authentication request message to the second authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the cipher text of the first authentication result information, the digital certificate of the requesting device and the first authentication request message.
  • a third digital signature of the authentication server is the digital generated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device sign;
  • the second receiving part is configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information and the fourth digital signature;
  • the first digital signature is the digital signature generated by the second authentication server on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and the first authentication result information
  • the four-digital signature is a digital signature calculated and generated by the second authentication server on the signature data including the second authentication result information;
  • a fourth verification part configured to verify the fourth digital signature using the public key of the second authentication server
  • the third generating part is configured to calculate and generate a second digital signature for the signature data including the second authentication result information when the fourth digital signature is verified, and encrypt the signature data including the first authentication result information according to the first authentication result information.
  • the first authentication response message is generated using information including the text, the first digital signature, the second authentication result information, and the second digital signature.
  • the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller further includes a value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the authentication access controller. hash value; the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the latest pre-order message sent by the second authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a second authentication server AS-REQ.
  • the second authentication server is an authentication server that requests the device to trust. If the authentication access control If the first authentication server trusted by the device and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers, the second authentication server includes:
  • the receiving part 1401 is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the digital certificate of the requesting device and the first authentication
  • the third digital signature of the server is a digital signature calculated and generated by the first authentication server on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the digital certificate of the requesting device;
  • a first verification part 1402 configured to verify the third digital signature
  • the second verification part 1403 is configured to perform legality verification on the digital certificate of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result when the third digital signature verification is passed;
  • generating part 1404 configured to generate second authentication result information according to the information including the second verification result
  • the sending part 1405 is configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second authentication result information and a fourth digital signature, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server on the signature data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and the fourth digital signature is The second authentication server calculates and generates a digital signature on the signature data including the second authentication result information.
  • the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the first authentication server .
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • the electronic device 1500 may be the following authentication access controller, request device, first authentication server or second authentication server .
  • the electronic device 1500 includes: a processor 1501 and a memory 1502, the memory 1502 is used to store a computer program, the processor 1501 is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory 1502, to execute the following authentication access controller , the steps in any of the foregoing embodiments performed by the requesting device, the first authentication server, or the second authentication server.
  • the processor 1501 and the memory 1502 of the electronic device 1500 may be the processor 1501 and the memory 1502 of the following authentication access controller, requesting device, first authentication server or second authentication server, respectively.
  • the following is an exemplary description of the authentication access controller, the requesting device, the first authentication server or the second authentication server:
  • An embodiment of the present application further provides an authentication access controller AAC, including: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute The steps performed by the AAC in any of the above embodiments.
  • AAC authentication access controller
  • the authentication access controller may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AAC in the various methods in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • Embodiments of the present application further provide a requesting device REQ, including: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute any one of the above Steps performed by REQ in an embodiment.
  • a requesting device REQ including: a processor and a memory, where the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute any one of the above Steps performed by REQ in an embodiment.
  • the requesting device may implement the corresponding processes implemented by REQ in each method of the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a first authentication server AS-AAC, the AS-AAC is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller AAC, and includes: a processor and a memory, the memory is used for storing a computer program, and the The processor is configured to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the steps performed by the AS-AAC in any of the above embodiments.
  • the first authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-AAC in each method in the embodiments of the present application, and for brevity, details are not described herein again.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a second authentication server AS-REQ
  • the AS-REQ is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device REQ
  • the second authentication server includes: a processor and a memory
  • the memory is used for storing a computer program
  • the processor is used for calling and running the computer program stored in the memory, to execute any one of the above implementations The steps performed by AS-REQ in the example.
  • the second authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-REQ in each method in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • the authentication access controller, the requesting device, the processor in the first authentication server, or the processor in the second authentication server in this embodiment of the present application may also execute the methods in other embodiments, for example, in the above method embodiments Other methods are not limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip provided by an embodiment of the application.
  • the chip 1600 includes: a processor 1601 and a memory 1602.
  • the processor 1601 is configured to call and run a computer program from the memory 1602, so that the The authentication access controller installed with the chip 1600 performs the steps performed by the authentication access controller in any of the foregoing embodiments, or,
  • the second authentication server installed with the chip 1600 is caused to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in any of the above embodiments.
  • the memory 1602 may be included in the chip 1600 , or the memory 1602 may be provided outside the chip 1600 .
  • An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium is used to store a computer program, and the computer program enables the authentication access controller to execute the execution of the authentication access controller in any of the foregoing embodiments. steps, or,
  • the computer program causes the requesting device to perform the steps performed by the requesting device in any of the above embodiments, or,
  • the computer program causes the first authentication server to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in any of the above embodiments, or,
  • the computer program causes the second authentication server to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in any of the above embodiments.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program, the computer program causes the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in any of the foregoing embodiments, or,
  • the computer program causes the requesting device to perform the steps performed by the requesting device in any of the above embodiments, or,
  • the computer program causes the first authentication server to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in any of the above embodiments, or,
  • the computer program causes the second authentication server to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in any of the above embodiments.
  • the aforementioned program can be stored in a computer storage medium, and when the program is executed, the execution includes the above method embodiments.
  • the aforementioned computer storage medium can be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (English: Read-Only Memory, abbreviation: ROM), random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), magnetic disk or Various media that can store program codes, such as optical discs.
  • Each part, chip, or processor of the embodiments of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip, which has a signal processing capability.
  • each step of the above method embodiments may be completed by a hardware integrated logic circuit in a processor or an instruction in the form of software.
  • the above-mentioned respective parts, chips or processors may include the integration of any one or at least two of the following: general-purpose processors, application-specific integrated circuits (Application Specific Integrated Circuits, ASICs), digital signal processors (Digital Signal Processors, DSPs), Digital Signal Processing Device (DSPD), Programmable Logic Device (PLD), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Central Processing Unit (CPU), Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), embedded neural-network processing units (NPU), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor, programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, Discrete hardware components.
  • ASICs Application Specific Integrated Circuits
  • DSPs Digital Signal Processors
  • DSPD Digital Signal Processing Device
  • PLD Programmable Logic Device
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • CPU Central Processing Unit
  • GPU Graphics Processing Unit
  • NPU embedded neural-network processing units
  • controller microcontroller, microprocessor, programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, Discrete
  • each embodiment in this specification is described in a progressive manner, and the same and similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. place.
  • the description is relatively simple, and reference may be made to some descriptions of the method embodiments for related parts.
  • the device and system embodiments described above are only illustrative, and the parts described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as parts may or may not be physical parts, that is, they may be located in One place, or it can be distributed over multiple network segments. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without creative effort.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure disclose an identity authentication method, device, device, chip, storage medium, and program, wherein the identity information of the requesting device and the authentication access controller is confidentially processed, which can prevent the requesting device and the authentication access control from being processed.
  • the identity information of the device is exposed during the transmission process, ensuring that the attacker cannot obtain private and sensitive information.
  • the real-time authentication of the bidirectional identity between the requesting device and the authentication access controller is realized while ensuring the confidentiality of the information related to the entity identity, which lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate users can communicate with the legitimate network.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序，对请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息进行保密处理，防止请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息在传输过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得这些私密、敏感的信息。并且通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份的实时鉴别。

Description

身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序
相关申请的交叉引用
本专利申请要求2020年12月26日提交的中国专利申请号为202011569237.3，申请名称为“一种身份鉴别方法和装置”的优先权，该公开的全文以引用的方式并入本公开中。
技术领域
本申请涉及网络通信安全技术领域，特别是涉及一种身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序。
背景技术
在通信网络中，请求设备可以通过鉴别接入控制器访问网络。在一些对安全性需求较高的情况下，鉴别接入控制器需要对请求设备的身份进行鉴别，并且，请求设备也需要对鉴别接入控制器的身份进行鉴别，以确保访问网络的请求设备属于合法用户，且请求设备访问的网络属于合法网络。此外，在区块链技术中的点对点传输，也需要在不同节点之间建立信任关系，因此对于节点的身份鉴别也是十分重要的。
在对请求设备和鉴别接入控制器进行双向身份鉴别的过程中，双方均需提供自身的身份信息用于身份鉴别。然而，这类身份信息一般携带了私密、敏感的信息，诸如身份证号、家庭住址、银行卡信息、地理位置信息、所属机构信息等。并且在实际应用过程中，这类身份信息通常会包含在实体的数字证书中，以数字证书作为实体的身份凭证。
若在请求设备与鉴别接入控制器的双向身份鉴别过程中，身份信息被攻击者截获用于非法用途，则会对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备及网络造成极大的安全隐患。
发明内容
本申请提供了一种身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份的实时鉴别。
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，包括：
鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，所述请求设备的数字证书是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果为合法时，向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别 响应消息；或者，
所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息以及根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；或者，
所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证；若所述第二数字签名验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；
其中，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；
所述请求设备接收到所述第三鉴别响应消息后，利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密得到所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名，所述请求设备利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第一数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述请求设备根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
获取部分，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，所述请求设备的数字证书是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第一验证部分，被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当所述第一确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果为合法时，第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；或者，
被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息以及第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；或者，
被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证；若所述第二数字签名验证通过，则第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；
其中，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供了一种请求设备，包括：
发送部分，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第三鉴别响应消息，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果；
第一解密部分，被配置为利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密得到所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名；
第一验证部分，被配置为利用第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第一数字签名进行验证；
第一确定部分，被配置为当所述第一数字签名验证通过时，根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
第一接收部分，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器；则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
接收部分，被配置为接收第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和所述第一鉴别服务器的第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第一验证部分，被配置为对所述第三数字签名进行验证；
第二验证部分，被配置为当所述第三数字签名验证通过时，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果；
生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息；
发送部分，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名，所述第一数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤。
第七方面，本申请实施例提供了一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤。
第八方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第九方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十方面，本申请实施例提供了一种芯片，所述芯片包括：处理器，用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有所述芯片的鉴别接入控制器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片的请求设备执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片的第一鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务 器所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片的第二鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质用于存储计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
第十二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行如第一方面所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
由上述技术方案可以看出，对请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息在传输过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得私密、敏感的信息。并且，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现了请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能与合法网络通信奠定基础。
为使本公开的上述目的、特征和优点能更明显易懂，下文特举较佳实施例，并配合所附附图，作详细说明如下。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅是本申请的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本申请实施例提供的一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ和鉴别接入控制器AAC协商消息加密密钥的方法的示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下另一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下另一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下又一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图8为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下再一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图9为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下又一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图10为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下再一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图11为本申请实施例提供的一种鉴别接入控制器AAC的结构框图；
图12为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ的结构框图；
图13为本申请实施例提供的一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC的结构框图；
图14为本申请实施例提供的一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ的结构框图；
图15为本申请实施例提供的一种电子设备的结构示意图；
图16为本申请实施例提供的一种芯片的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行描述，显然，所描述的实施例是本申请一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本申请保护的范围。
本申请实施例所记载的技术方案之间，在不冲突的情况下，可以任意组合。
在通信网络中，请求设备可以通过鉴别接入控制器访问网络，为了确保合法用户访问合法网络，鉴别接入控制器需要对请求设备进行身份鉴别，请求设备也需要对鉴别接入控制器进行身份鉴别。
以目前的无线通信和移动通信场景为例，在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入无线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，简称PDA)、平板电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是无线接入点、无线路由器等网络侧设备。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入有线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为台式机、笔记本电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是交换机或路由器等网络侧设备。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入第四/五代移动通信技术(the 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology，简称4G/5G)网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机、平板电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以为基站等网络侧设备。当然，本申请同样适用于其他有线网络、近距离通信网络等各种数据通信场景。
然而，在请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的双向身份鉴别的过程中，请求设备和鉴别接入控制器均需要提供自身的身份信息。例如，请求设备的身份信息可以包含在请求设备的数字证书中，鉴别接入控制器的身份信息可以包含在鉴别接入控制器的数字证书中。若在身份鉴别过程中，攻击者截获了这类数字证书，便可获取其中的私密、敏感信息，从而将其用于非法用途，会对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备甚至网络造成极大的安全隐患。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，身份密文消息中包括请求设备的身份信息密文，请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，第一鉴别请求消息中包括鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和请求设备的数字证书，鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是鉴别接入控制器利用加密证书的公钥对包括鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，请求设备的数字证书是鉴别接入控制器利用消息加密密钥对请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；鉴别接入控制器接收第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，第一鉴别结果信息中包括对鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，第二鉴别结果信息中包括对请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，第二数字签名是第一鉴别服务器对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；鉴别接入控制器利用第一鉴别服务器的公钥对第二数字签名进行验证，验证通过后，根据第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当鉴别接入控制器确定请求设备为合法时，向请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息，第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，鉴别结果信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；请求设备利用消息加密密钥对鉴别结果信息密文解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名，并利用第二鉴别服务器的公钥验证第一数字签名，验证通过后，根据解密第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
可以理解的是，本申请实施例提到的第一鉴别结果信息是鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器对鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到的，第二鉴别结果信息是请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到的，上述第一鉴别服务器和第二鉴别服务器可以是用于鉴别身份的两个独立服务器，或者是用于鉴别身份的同一个服务器。以上仅为请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器的一些示例，不应理解为对请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器的限定，在本申请实施例其他可能的实现方式中，请求设备、鉴别接入控制器及鉴别服务器还可以是其他设备。
本申请实施例提供的身份鉴别方法用于实现请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份鉴别(Mutual Identity Authentication，简称MIA)。
为便于介绍，在本申请实施例中，将以请求设备(REQuester，简称REQ)、鉴别接入控制器(Authentication Access Controller，简称AAC)和鉴别服务器(Authentication Server，简称AS)为例对 本申请的身份鉴别方法进行介绍。
其中，AAC信任的AS称为第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，REQ信任的AS称为第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ。AS-AAC具有验证AAC数字证书的合法性的能力，AS-AAC持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥。AS-REQ具有验证REQ数字证书的合法性的能力，AS-REQ也持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥。AS-AAC和AS-REQ具有将数字证书传递给其它AS去验证的能力，也具有将数字证书验证结果信息传递给其它AS的能力。当AS-AAC和AS-REQ不相同时，AS-AAC和AS-REQ相互信任，并相互知晓对方的数字证书或者数字证书中的公钥。证书解密服务器(Certificate Sever-Decrypt，简称CS-DEC)持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的加密证书和加密证书对应的私钥；CS-DEC可以是独立的服务器，也可以驻留在AS-AAC中。
REQ可以是参与身份鉴别过程的一个端点，与AAC建立连接，访问AAC提供的服务，且通过AAC访问AS，REQ持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥，并知晓AS-REQ的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥。AAC可以是参与身份鉴别过程的另一个端点，与REQ建立连接，提供服务，并与REQ通信，且可直接访问AS-AAC。AAC持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的数字证书和数字证书对应的私钥，并知晓AS-AAC的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥，且知晓CS-DEC的加密证书或加密证书中的公钥。
下面结合图1，说明本申请实施例提供的一种身份鉴别方法，该方法包括：
S101、AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ。其中，EncData REQ为REQ利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对包括REQ的数字证书Cert REQ在内的加密数据加密生成的。在REQ和AAC之间传输身份信息的过程中，对REQ的身份信息进行保密处理，防止REQ的身份信息在传输过程中暴露。所述消息加密密钥可以是REQ和AAC协商得到的，也可以是REQ和AAC预先共享的。REQ和AAC协商消息加密密钥的实施方式将在后续介绍。本申请中，将被加密的对象称为加密数据。
S102、AAC向其信任的AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS和Cert REQ。其中，EncPub AS是AAC利用加密证书的公钥对包括AAC的数字证书Cert AAC在内的加密数据加密生成的，由此在AAC和AS-AAC之间传输身份信息的过程中，对AAC的身份信息进行保密处理，防止AAC的身份信息在传输过程中暴露。Cert REQ是在AAC接收到REQ发送的EncData REQ后，利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对EncData REQ解密得到的。
需要说明的是，对EncPub AS的解密可以由AS-AAC利用加密证书对应的私钥进行解密，或者可以由AS-AAC将EncPub AS发送给与AS-AAC有交互、信任关系的CS-DEC进行解密。CS-DEC可以是专用于证书解密的独立服务器，也可以集成在鉴别服务器中执行解密功能。例如在本实施例中，CS-DEC可以集成在AS-AAC中。
S103、AAC接收AS-AAC发送的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名。其中，第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息Pub AAC在内的信息加密得到的，Pub AAC中包括对Cert AAC的第一验证结果Res AAC；第一数字签名是REQ信任的AS-REQ对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中包括对Cert REQ的第二验证结果Res REQ；所述第二数字签名是AS-AAC对包括Pub REQ在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
需要说明的是，当AS-REQ和AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器时，即REQ和AAC共同信任同一个鉴别服务器(非漫游)，则REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器可以用AS-AAC(当然也可以用AS-REQ)来表示。此情形下，可以由AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)对解密EncPub AS得到的Cert AAC进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC，对Cert REQ进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息Pub AAC，再对Pub AAC加密生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名Sig AS_AAC1(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ1)，对包括第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ2)，根据包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ1)、第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ、Sig AS_AAC2(也可以表示为Sig AS_REQ2)在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri，并向AAC发送ASVeri。
其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文的加解密方式可以预先设定。例如，可以由AAC预先生成用于对Pub AAC加密的密钥，然后将该密钥通过EncPub AS发送给AS-AAC，则AS-AAC可以利用该密钥对包括Pub AAC在内的信息加密生成第一鉴别结果信息密文。作为一种实现方式，AAC生成的用于加密Pub AAC 的密钥可以为第二保护随机数Nonce AACPub，AS-AAC用Nonce AACPub对包括Pub AAC在内的信息加密，例如可以将Nonce AACPub与Pub AAC进行异或运算得到第一鉴别结果信息密文
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000001
在REQ信任的AS-REQ和AAC信任的AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器(漫游)的情形下，则AS-AAC接收到第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri后，由AS-AAC对解密EncPub AS得到的Cert AAC进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息Pub AAC，再对Pub AAC加密生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，然后向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri，所述AS-AACVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Cert REQ和第三数字签名Sig AS_AAC3；其中，Sig AS_AAC3是AS-AAC对AS-AACVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文和Cert REQ在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。AS-REQ利用AS-AAC的公钥验证所述Sig AS_AAC3，若验证通过，则对Cert REQ进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ，并向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri，所述AS-REQVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1、Pub REQ和第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4；Sig AS_REQ4是AS-REQ对包括Pub REQ在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，Sig AS_REQ1是AS-REQ对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。AS-AAC接收所述AS-REQVeri后，利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ4，若验证通过，则AS-AAC对包括所述Pub REQ在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述Sig AS_REQ1、所述第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ和所述Sig AS_AAC2在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri，并向AAC发送ASVeri。
S104、AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥对第二数字签名进行验证。
S105、AAC根据第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
由于Res REQ可以反映REQ是否合法，因此AAC可以根据第二鉴别结果信息中的Res REQ确认REQ是否合法，从而为保证只有合法的REQ才能访问网络奠定基础。
S106、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC。其中，EncData AAC是AAC利用消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的。
需要说明的是，S104至S106的执行顺序并不影响本申请的实现，在实际应用中，可根据需求设定S104至S106的执行顺序。优选建议，先执行S104，当AAC对所述第二数字签名验证不通过，则丢弃ASVeri，当AAC对所述第二数字签名验证通过后，再执行S105，当AAC确定REQ为合法时，再执行S106，当AAC确定REQ为不合法时，则AAC根据本地策略选择是否执行S106，考虑到效率，优选方案为不执行并结束本次鉴别过程。
S107、REQ利用消息加密密钥对鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名。
由于消息加密密钥可以是REQ和AAC协商得到的，也可以是REQ和AAC预先共享的。因此REQ接收到所述AACAuth后，可以利用消息加密密钥对EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名。
S108、REQ利用AS-REQ的公钥对第一数字签名进行验证。
由于第一数字签名是AS-REQ对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，而REQ知晓其信任的AS-REQ的公钥，因此REQ可以利用AS-REQ的公钥验证第一数字签名，若验证通过，则执行S109，若验证不通过，则丢弃所述AACAuth。
S109、REQ根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果。
其中，REQ可以根据预先设定的加解密方式对第一鉴别结果信息密文进行解密。当然，也可以如S103内容示例的，第一鉴别结果信息密文是AS-AAC利用第二保护随机数对第一鉴别结果信息加密生成的，此情形下，S106中AAC向REQ发送的EncData AAC的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数，则REQ利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData AAC解密还得到第二保护随机数，并利用所述第二保护随机数解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到第一鉴别结果信息。
由于Res AAC可以反映AAC是否合法，因此REQ可以根据解密得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的Res AAC确定AAC是否合法，从而为保证REQ能够访问合法网络奠定基础。
由上述技术方案可以看出，对请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息在接入网络的过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得请求设备和鉴别接入控制器私密、敏感的信息。并且，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能与合法网络通信奠定基础。
在一些实施例中，S101的REQInit中还可以包括REQ的数字签名Sig REQ，Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，则在S105之前，AAC还需要确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S105。需要说明的是，若AS-REQ和AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器，则所述Sig REQ可以由AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)进行验证，也可以由AAC进行验证；若AS-REQ和AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述Sig REQ可以由AS-REQ进行验证，也可以由AAC进行验证。其中，AAC确定Sig REQ是否验证通过包括以下方式：
作为一种由鉴别服务器来验证所述Sig REQ的实施例，在AS-REQ和AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器(即非漫游)的情形下，当AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)验证所述Sig REQ时，Sig REQ可以被携带在S102的AACVeri中传递至AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)，AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)利用AACVeri中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，若验证通过，则继续执行生成并发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri等步骤；若验证不通过，则不会执行生成并发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri等步骤。因此，AAC可以根据是否能接收到第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri来确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，若AAC能接收到ASVeri，则AAC确定Sig REQ验证通过。
作为一种由鉴别服务器来验证所述Sig REQ的另一实施例，在AS-REQ和AS-AAC为两个不同的鉴别服务器(即漫游)的情形下，当AS-REQ验证所述Sig REQ时，Sig REQ可以被携带在S102的AACVeri中以及AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送的第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri中传递至AS-REQ，AS-REQ利用AS-AACVeri中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，若验证通过，则继续执行生成并发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri以及生成后续的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri等步骤；若验证不通过，则不会执行生成并发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri以及不会生成后续的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri等步骤。因此，AAC可以根据是否能接收到第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri来确定Sig REQ是否验证通过，若AAC能接收到ASVeri，则AAC确定Sig REQ验证通过。
作为一种由AAC验证所述Sig REQ的实施例，AAC可以利用解密S101的REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ对Sig REQ进行验证，从而确定Sig REQ是否验证通过。
作为一种由AAC验证所述Sig REQ的另一实施例，鉴别服务器生成的第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中还可以包括Cert REQ，则AAC在接收到S103的ASVeri后，利用所述Pub REQ中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，从而确定Sig REQ是否验证通过。
作为一种由AAC验证所述Sig REQ的再一实施例，鉴别服务器生成的第二鉴别结果信息Pub REQ中还可以包括Cert REQ，则AAC在接收到S103的ASVeri后，先验证所述Pub REQ中的Cert REQ与解密EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ的一致性，若一致，则再利用Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，从而确定Sig REQ是否验证通过。
在一些实施例中，S102的AACVeri中还可以包括AAC的数字签名Sig AAC，Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACVeri中Sig AAC之前的其他字段，则在S109之前，REQ还需要确定Sig AAC是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S109。其中，REQ确定Sig AAC是否验证通过包括以下方式：由AAC信任的AS-AAC利用解密AACVeri中AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS得到的Cert AAC对Sig AAC进行验证，验证通过后才会执行后续流程，因此若REQ能够接收到S106的AACAuth，则REQ确定Sig AAC已验证通过。
类似的，S106的AACAuth中还可以包括AAC的数字签名Sig AAC，Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACAuth中Sig AAC之前的其他字段，则AS-AAC生成的第一鉴别结果信息Pub AAC中还包括Cert AAC；相应的，在S109之前，REQ还需要确定Sig AAC是否验证通过，验证通过才能执行S109。其中，REQ确定Sig AAC是否验证通过包括以下方式：REQ利用解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的Pub AAC中的Cert AAC验证所述Sig AAC，根据验证结果确定Sig AAC是否验证通过。
请参考图1，在REQ、AAC和鉴别服务器之间传递的消息中还可以包括AAC和/或REQ生成的随机数、身份标识等参数信息，正常情况下，在身份鉴别过程中，这些随机数和/或身份标识在通过各个消息进行传输的过程中应该是不变的，但是如果遇到网络抖动或攻击等情况时，可能造成消息中的随机数和/或身份标识等参数信息的丢失或篡改。因此，在身份鉴别时还可以对消息中的身份标识和/或随机数的一致性进行验证，以保障鉴别结果的可靠性和新鲜性。
例如，若S101的REQInit中REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ的加密数据还包括REQ的身份标识ID REQ，对应的，S102的AACVeri中还包括ID REQ，S103的ASVeri中还包括ID REQ，S106的AACAuth中的鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC的加密数据还包括ID REQ。因此，REQ解密EncData AAC还得到ID REQ，REQ在执行S109之前，还要将解密得到的ID REQ与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ进行一致性验证，验证通过后再执行S109。
同样的，若S102的AACVeri中AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS的加密数据还包括AAC的身份标识ID AAC和第一保护随机数Nonce AACID，Nonce AACID用于对ID AAC进行加密。对应的，S103的ASVeri中还包括AAC的身份标识密文，AAC的身份标识密文是AS-AAC利用Nonce AACID对ID AAC加密得到 的，例如可以利用Nonce AACID与ID AAC进行异或运算得到AAC的身份标识密文
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000002
因此，在S105之前，AAC要根据自身的身份标识ID AAC和所述Nonce AACID对AAC的身份标识密文进行验证，例如验证包括：AAC利用所述Nonce AACID对包括AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC在内的信息加密生成AAC的身份标识密文，并将生成的AAC的身份标识密文与接收到S103的ASVeri中的AAC的身份标识密文进行一致性验证；或者，AAC可以利用所述Nonce AACID解密AAC的身份标识密文，并将解密得到的ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC进行一致性验证，验证通过后再执行S105。
与身份标识类似，若S101的REQInit中还包括REQ生成的第二随机数Nonce REQ，则S102的AACVeri中还可以包括Nonce REQ和AAC生成的第一随机数Nonce AAC，对应的，S103的ASVeri中还可以包括Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC，S106的AACAuth中EncData AAC的加密数据还可以包括Nonce REQ。则在S105之前，AAC还需要对ASVeri中的Nonce AAC和AAC生成的Nonce AAC进行一致性验证；在S109之前，REQ还需要对解密EncData AAC得到的Nonce REQ和REQ生成的Nonce REQ进行一致性验证。
此外，为了保障鉴别结果的可靠性，S106的AACAuth中还可以包括消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC，MacTag AAC是AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成的；则REQ接收到AACAuth后，还要验证所述MacTag AAC，验证通过后再执行S109。REQ验证MacTag AAC时，应利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成MacTag AAC，并将计算出的MacTag AAC与接收到的AACAuth中的MacTag AAC进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，若不一致，则验证不通过。其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥的生成方式将在下一实施例中说明。
上述实施例中的消息加密密钥可以是REQ和AAC协商得到的，因此本实施例还提供一种REQ和AAC协商消息加密密钥的方法，参见图2，所述方法包括：
S201、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括AAC的密钥交换参数KeyInfo AAC，KeyInfo AAC包括AAC的临时公钥。其中，密钥交换是指如迪菲·赫尔曼(Diffie-Hellman，简称DH)等密钥交换算法。所述AACInit还可以包括AAC生成的第一随机数Nonce AAC。
所述AACInit中还可以包括Security capabilities AAC，Security capabilities AAC表示AAC支持的安全能力参数信息，包括AAC支持的身份鉴别套件(身份鉴别套件中包含一种或多种身份鉴别方法)、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等，以供REQ选择使用的特定安全策略，则REQ可以根据Security capabilities AAC选择REQ使用的特定安全策略Security capabilities REQ。Security capabilities REQ表示REQ相应确定使用的身份鉴别方法、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等。
S202、REQ根据包括REQ的密钥交换参数KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
若S201的AACInit中还包括AAC生成的Nonce AAC，则REQ可以根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合包括Nonce AAC和REQ生成的第二随机数Nonce REQ在内的信息，利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。协商的密钥导出算法可以是REQ根据AAC发送的Security capabilities AAC而选择使用的密钥导出算法。其中，KeyInfo REQ是REQ产生的密钥交换参数，包括REQ的临时公钥。KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥是REQ产生的对应于REQ的临时公钥的临时私钥，即所述临时公钥和临时私钥是一对临时公私钥对。
S203、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括KeyInfo REQ，以便AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥在内的信息计算得到消息加密密钥。其中，KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥是AAC产生的对应于AAC的临时公钥的临时私钥，即所述临时公钥和临时私钥是一对临时公私钥对。
所述REQInit中还可以包括Security capabilities REQ。所述REQInit中还可以包括Nonce REQ，以便AAC根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥、所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥、所述Nonce AAC和所述Nonce REQ在内的信息计算得到该消息加密密钥。
所述REQInit中还可以包括所述Nonce AAC，则AAC可以在计算消息加密密钥之前，对REQInit中的Nonce AAC和AAC生成的Nonce AAC进行一致性验证，以确保AAC接收的REQInit是对AACInit的响应消息。
S204、AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥。
若所述REQInit中还包括所述Nonce REQ，则AAC可以根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥 和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥K1，将K1结合包括所述Nonce AAC和所述Nonce REQ在内的信息，通过协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算该消息加密密钥。其中，协商的密钥导出算法可以是AAC根据REQ发送的Security capabilities REQ而选择使用的密钥导出算法。
需要说明的是，在图2实施例中，REQ和AAC也可以生成消息完整性校验密钥。REQ和AAC各自生成消息完整性校验密钥的实施方式与图2实施例中示例的REQ和AAC各自生成消息加密密钥的实施方式相同。例如，AAC可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法导出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据既可以作为消息加密密钥又可以作为消息完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为消息加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为消息完整性校验密钥；AAC也可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法分次导出两串相同或不同的密钥数据，一串作为消息加密密钥，一串作为消息完整性校验密钥。REQ可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法导出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据既可以作为消息加密密钥又可以作为消息完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为消息加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为消息完整性校验密钥；REQ也可以通过图2实施例的方式利用密钥导出算法分次导出两串相同或不同的密钥数据，一串作为消息加密密钥，一串作为消息完整性校验密钥。
本申请实施例还提供了利用AAC和REQ之间信息交互来确定本次鉴别过程所使用的第一鉴别服务器和/或第二鉴别服务器的方法：
请参考图2，AAC在S201的AACInit中添加AAC信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_AAC，则REQ根据所述ID AS_AAC确定自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ。在实现时，REQ从ID AS_AAC中选取至少一个鉴别服务器且是自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ，若选取失败，则REQ将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ(其中，选取成功对应非漫游情况，选取失败对应漫游情况)，将该ID AS_REQ添加至S203的REQInit中发送给AAC。进而，AAC可以根据ID AS_AAC和ID AS_REQ确定第一鉴别服务器，例如AAC可以判断ID AS_REQ和ID AS_AAC中是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识。若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ。
作为另一种实施方式，AAC可以不必向REQ发送ID AS_AAC，而由REQ在S203的REQInit中添加自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ。根据ID AS_REQ和AAC自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别过程的第一鉴别服务器和/或第二鉴别服务器的实现如前一种实施方式。
由于REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器可以相同也可以不同，当REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器相同时，即为非漫游情况；当REQ和AAC信任的鉴别服务器不同时，即为漫游的情况。
参见图3，是非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的一个实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器；在该实施例执行前，REQ和AAC已经都拥有了消息加密密钥，消息加密密钥可以是双方预先共享的也可以是通过图2所示的方法协商得到的，该身份鉴别方法包括：
S301、AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ和REQ的数字签名Sig REQ。
S302、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS和Cert REQ。所述Cert REQ是AAC利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData REQ解密得到的。
S303、AS-AAC利用加密证书对应的私钥解密EncPub AS得到Cert AAC和第二保护随机数Nonce AACPub，分别对Cert AAC及Cert REQ进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC和第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Cert AAC和Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息；利用Nonce AACPub对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名Sig AS_AAC1，对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S304、AAC接收AS-AAC发送的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1、第二鉴别结果信息和Sig AS_AAC2。
S305、AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2，利用第二鉴别结果信息中的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，若验证均通过，则根据第二鉴别结果信息中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为合法时，执行S306；当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为不 合法时，结束本次鉴别过程。
S306、AAC利用消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述Sig AS_AAC1和所述Nonce AACPub在内的加密数据加密生成鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC，对包括EncData AAC在内的签名数据计算生成AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。
S307、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括所述EncData AAC和所述Sig AAC。
S308、REQ利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1和Nonce AACPub。
S309、REQ利用Nonce AACPub解密第一鉴别结果信息密文得到第一鉴别结果信息。
S310、REQ利用第一鉴别结果信息中的Cert AAC验证所述Sig AAC，以及，利用AS-AAC的公钥验证所述Sig AS_AAC1。
若验证均通过，则执行S311；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACAuth。
S311、REQ根据第一鉴别结果信息中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果。
需要说明的是，在S305中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S301中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S302，此情形下，第二鉴别结果信息中可以不包括Cert REQ。或者，在S305中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S303中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S302的AACVeri发送给AS-AAC，由AS-AAC利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图4，是非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的另一个实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器；在该实施例执行前，REQ和AAC已经都拥有了消息加密密钥，消息加密密钥可以是双方预先共享的也可以是通过图2所示的方法协商得到的。该身份鉴别方法包括：
S401、AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ和REQ的数字签名Sig REQ。
S402、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS、Cert REQ及AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。所述Cert REQ是AAC利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData REQ解密得到的。
S403、AS-AAC对AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS解密得到Cert AAC和第二保护随机数Nonce AACPub，并利用Cert AAC验证所述Sig AAC。
若验证通过，则执行S404；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACVeri。
S404、AS-AAC分别对Cert AAC及Cert REQ进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC和第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息；利用Nonce AACPub对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名Sig AS_AAC1，对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S405、AAC接收AS-AAC发送的第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1、第二鉴别结果信息和Sig AS_AAC2。
S406、AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2，利用第二鉴别结果信息中的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，若验证均通过，则根据第二鉴别结果信息中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为合法时，执行S407；当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为不合法时，结束本次鉴别过程。
S407、AAC利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1和Nonce AACPub在内的加密数据加密生成鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC。
S408、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括所述EncData AAC。
S409、REQ利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_AAC1和Nonce AACPub。
S410、REQ利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC1。
若验证通过，则执行S411；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACAuth。
S411、REQ利用Nonce AACPub解密第一鉴别结果信息密文得到第一鉴别结果信息，根据第一鉴别结果信息中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果。
需要说明的是，在S406中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S401中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit 后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S402，此情形下，第二鉴别结果信息中可以不包括Cert REQ。或者，在S406中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S403中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S402的AACVeri发送给AS-AAC，由AS-AAC利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图5，是漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的一个实施例，此时AS-AAC和AS-REQ相互信任，且知晓对方的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥。在该实施例执行前，REQ和AAC已经都拥有了消息加密密钥，消息加密密钥可以是双方预先共享的也可以是通过图2所示的方法协商得到的。该身份鉴别方法包括：
S501、AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ、REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ和REQ的数字签名Sig REQ。
S502、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS、Cert REQ及ID AS_REQ。AS-AAC可以根据ID AS_REQ确定出此次鉴别过程中使用的第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，并将Cert REQ发送给AS-REQ进行验证。所述Cert REQ是AAC利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData REQ解密得到的。
S503、AS-AAC解密EncPub AS得到Cert AAC和第二保护随机数Nonce AACPub，对Cert AAC进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC，根据包括Cert AAC和Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，利用Nonce AACPub对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第三数字签名Sig AS_AAC3。
S504、AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Cert REQ和Sig AS_AAC3。
S505、AS-REQ利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC3。
若验证通过，则执行S506；若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-AACVeri。
S506、AS-REQ对Cert REQ进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1，对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S507、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1、第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S508、AS-AAC利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ4。
若验证通过，则执行509；若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri。
S509、AS-AAC对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2，根据包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1、第二鉴别结果信息和Sig AS_AAC2在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
S510、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
S511、AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2，利用第二鉴别结果信息中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，若验证均通过，则根据第二鉴别结果信息中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为合法时，执行S512；当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为不合法时，结束本次鉴别过程。
S512、AAC利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub在内的加密数据加密生成鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC，对包括EncData AAC在内的签名数据计算生成AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。
S513、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括EncData AAC和Sig AAC。
S514、REQ利用消息加密密钥对EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub。
S515、REQ利用Nonce AACPub解密第一鉴别结果信息密文得到第一鉴别结果信息。
S516、REQ利用第一鉴别结果信息中的Cert AAC验证所述Sig AAC，以及，利用AS-REQ的公钥验证所述Sig AS_REQ1。
若验证均通过，则执行S517；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACAuth。
S517、REQ根据第一鉴别结果信息中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果。
需要说明的是，在S511中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S501中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S502，此情形下， 第二鉴别结果信息中可以不包括Cert REQ。或者，在S511中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S505中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过AACVeri、AS-AACVeri发送给AS-REQ，由AS-REQ利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图6，是漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的另个实施例，此时AS-AAC和AS-REQ相互信任，且知晓对方的数字证书或数字证书中的公钥。在该实施例执行前，REQ和AAC已经都拥有了消息加密密钥，消息加密密钥可以是双方预先共享的也可以是通过图2所示的方法协商得到的，该身份鉴别方法包括：
S601、AAC获取REQ发送的身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ、REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识ID AS_REQ和REQ的数字签名Sig REQ。
S602、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS、Cert REQ、ID AS_REQ及AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。所述Cert REQ是AAC利用消息加密密钥对所述EncData REQ解密得到的。
S603、AS-AAC解密EncPub AS得到Cert AAC和第二保护随机数Nonce AACPub，并利用Cert AAC验证Sig AAC。
若验证通过，则执行S604；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACVeri。
S604、AS-AAC对Cert AAC进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果Res AAC，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，利用Nonce AACPub对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第三数字签名Sig AS_AAC3。
S605、AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Cert REQ和Sig AS_AAC3。
S606、AS-REQ利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC3。
若验证通过，则执行S607；若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-AACVeri。
S607、AS-REQ验证Cert REQ的合法性得到第二验证结果Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息，对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1，对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S608、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1、第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S609、AS-AAC利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ4。
若验证通过，则执行610；若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri。
S610、AS-AAC对包括第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2，根据包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1、第二鉴别结果信息和Sig AS_AAC2在内的信息生成第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
S611、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
S612、AAC利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2，利用第二鉴别结果信息中的Cert REQ验证所述Sig REQ，若验证均通过，则根据第二鉴别结果信息中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果。
当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为合法时，执行S613；当AAC确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为不合法时，结束本次鉴别过程。
S613、AAC利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub在内的加密数据加密生成鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC。
S614、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括所述EncData AAC。
S615、REQ利用消息加密密钥对EncData AAC解密得到第一鉴别结果信息密文、Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub。
S616、REQ利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ1。
若验证通过，则执行S617；若验证不通过，则丢弃AACAuth。
S617、REQ利用Nonce AACPub解密第一鉴别结果信息密文得到第一鉴别结果信息，根据第一鉴别结果信息中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果。
需要说明的是，在S612中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S601中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S602，此情形下，第二鉴别结果信息中可以不包括Cert REQ。或者，在S612中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S606中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过AACVeri、AS-AACVeri发送给AS-REQ，由AS-REQ利用Cert REQ 验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
为表述简便，在图7-图10实施例中，第一鉴别结果信息用Pub AAC表示，第二鉴别结果信息用Pub REQ表示。
参见图7，是在非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的又一个实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，AAC的数字签名Sig AAC由REQ验证，该方法包括：
S701、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S702、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC和Security capabilities AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC为可选字段，表示AAC支持的安全能力参数信息，包括AAC支持的身份鉴别套件、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)。
S703、REQ生成Nonce REQ和KeyInfo REQ，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算EncData REQ；计算Sig REQ。
其中，Security capabilities REQ表示REQ根据Security capabilities AAC作出的特定安全策略的选择，即REQ确定使用的身份鉴别方法、对称加密算法、完整性校验算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)。REQ是否生成Security capabilities REQ取决于AAC向REQ发送的AACInit中是否携带Security capabilities AAC。REQ计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行。
S704、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncData REQ及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应等于AACInit中的相应字段；Security capabilities REQ为可选字段。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Cert REQ和ID REQ。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，例如，当REQInit中依次包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncData REQ及Sig REQ时，Sig REQ的签名数据包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ及EncData REQ；当REQInit中不包括Nonce AAC字段时，Sig REQ的签名数据还包括AACInit中的Nonce AAC字段。本申请中，将被签名的对象称为签名数据。
S705、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作(若无特别说明或逻辑上的关系，本文中以(1)、(2)、……编号的动作并不因为有编号而存在必然的先后顺序。全文同)，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查该Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；其中，AAC计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述EncData REQ解密得到Cert REQ和ID REQ；
(4)、生成Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(5)、利用加密证书的公钥计算AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS。
S706、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC和EncPub AS。其中，ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ应等于REQInit中的相应字段；Nonce AAC应等于AAC生成的Nonce AAC；EncPub AS的加密数据包括ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACPub和Nonce AACID。
S707、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用加密证书对应的私钥解密所述EncPub AS得到ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(2)、分别验证Cert AAC和Cert REQ的合法性得到Res AAC和Res REQ，根据包括Cert AAC和Res AAC在内的信息生成Pub AAC，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；对ID AAC和Nonce AACID进行异或运算生成
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000003
对Pub AAC和Nonce AACPub进行异或运算生成
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000004
(3)、计算第一数字签名Sig AS_AAC1和第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S708、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000005
Sig AS_AAC1、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000006
Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_AAC2。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AACPub、ID AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段；Sig AS_AAC1的签名数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ和
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000007
Sig AS_AAC2的签名数据包括
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000008
Nonce AAC和Pub REQ。
S709、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce AACID与ID AAC Nonce AACID进行异或运算恢复ID AAC，检查该ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC是否相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(3)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2；
(4)、检查Pub REQ中的Cert REQ与解密EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ是否相同；
(5)、利用Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri；若上述检查与验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果；若确定REQ为不合法，则结束本次鉴别过程；
(7)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC；
(8)、计算AAC的数字签名Sig AAC；
(9)、根据需要计算MacTag AAC。
S710、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData AAC、Sig AAC和MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。EncData AAC的加密数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000009
Sig AS_AAC1和Nonce AACPub。Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACAuth中Sig AAC之前的其他字段。MacTag AAC为可选字段，其计算过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息计算生成MacTag AAC。
S711、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ，则检查Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同；若AACAuth中存在Nonce AAC，则检查Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、若AACAuth中存在MacTag AAC，则校验MacTag AAC；
校验过程为：利用消息完整性校验密钥采用完整性校验算法对包括AACAuth中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算生成MacTag AAC(该计算方式与AAC计算MacTag AAC的方式相同)，并将计算出的MacTag AAC与接收到的AACAuth中的MacTag AAC进行比较。
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData AAC得到ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000010
Sig AS_AAC1、Nonce AACPub；
(4)、检查解密得到的ID REQ、Nonce REQ是否分别与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ、REQ生成的Nonce REQ相同；
(5)、将解密得到的Nonce AACPub与
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000011
进行异或运算恢复Pub AAC；
(6)、利用Pub AAC中的Cert AAC验证Sig AAC，以及，利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC1；
(7)、上述检查与验证均通过，则根据Pub AAC中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth。
需要说明的是，在S709中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S705中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S706，此情形下，图7实施例中的Pub REQ可以替换为Res REQ。或者，在S709中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S707中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S706的AACVeri发送给AS-AAC，由AS-AAC利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图8，是在非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的再一实施例，其中可以用AS-AAC(也可以用AS-REQ)来表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，AAC的数字签名Sig AAC由AS-AAC验证，该方法包括：
S801、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S802、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC和Security capabilities AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC为可选字段。
S803、REQ生成Nonce REQ和KeyInfo REQ，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ；计算Sig REQ。
其中，REQ计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行。
S804、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncData REQ及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，且Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的Nonce AAC。EncData REQ的加密数据包括ID REQ和Cert REQ。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。
S805、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；其中，AAC计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述EncData REQ解密得到Cert REQ和ID REQ；
(4)、生成Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(5)、利用加密证书的公钥计算AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS；
(6)、计算AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。
S806、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncPub AS和Sig AAC。其中，ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ应分别等于REQInit中的相应字段。EncPub AS的加密数据包括ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACPub和Nonce AACID。Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACVeri中Sig AAC之前的其他字段。
S807、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、解密所述EncPub AS得到ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(2)、利用Cert AAC验证所述Sig AAC；
(3)、分别验证Cert AAC和Cert REQ的合法性得到Res AAC和Res REQ，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成Pub AAC，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；对ID AAC和Nonce AACID进行异或运算生成
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000012
对Pub AAC和Nonce AACPub进行异或运算生成
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000013
(4)、计算第一数字签名Sig AS_AAC1和第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S808、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000014
Sig AS_AAC1、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000015
Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_AAC2。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AACPub、ID AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段；Sig AS_AAC1的签名数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000016
Sig AS_AAC2的签名数字包括
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000017
Nonce AAC、Pub REQ。
S809、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce AACID与ID AAC Nonce AACID进行异或运算恢复ID AAC，检查该ID AAC是否与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(3)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2；
(4)、检查Pub REQ中的Cert REQ与解密EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ是否相同；
(5)、利用Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri；若上述检查与验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果，若确定REQ为不合法，则结束本次鉴别过程；
(7)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算EncData AAC；
(8)、根据需要计算MacTag AAC。
S810、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData AAC和MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。EncData AAC的加密数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000018
Sig AS_AAC1和Nonce AACPub，且ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000019
Sig AS_AAC1应分别等于ASVeri中的相应字段。MacTag AAC为可选字段，其计算过程如图7实施例所述。
S811、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同；若AACAuth中存在Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、若AACAuth中存在MacTag AAC，则校验MacTag AAC；校验过程如图7实施例所述；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData AAC得到ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000020
Sig AS_AAC1、Nonce AACPub；
(4)、检查解密得到的ID REQ、Nonce REQ是否分别与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ、REQ生成的Nonce REQ相同；
(5)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC1；
(6)、将解密得到的Nonce AACPub与
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000021
进行异或运算恢复Pub AAC；
(7)、上述检查与验证均通过，则根据Pub AAC中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果；若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth。
需要说明的是，在S809中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S805中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S806，此情形下，图8实施例中的Pub REQ可以替换为Res REQ。或者，在S809中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S807中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S806的AACVeri发送给AS-AAC，由AS-AAC利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图9，是漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的又一个实施例。在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，AAC的数字签名Sig AAC由REQ验证，该方法包括：
S901、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S902、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC、Security capabilities AAC和ID AS_AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC和ID AS_AAC为可选字段；ID AS_AAC表示AAC信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，用于使得REQ根据ID AS_AAC确定是否存在共同信任的鉴别服务器(下文同)。
S903、REQ生成Nonce REQ和KeyInfo REQ，根据需要生成ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ；计算Sig REQ。
其中，ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段。ID AS_REQ表示REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，当AACInit中存在ID AS_AAC时，REQ尽量从其信任的鉴别服务器中选择至少一个与ID AS_AAC中相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ，若选择失败，则将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ；当AACInit中不存在ID AS_AAC时，REQ将自身信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识作为ID AS_REQ(全文同)。REQ计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行。
S904、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、ID AS_REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncData REQ及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC、ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，且Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段；EncData REQ的加密数据包括ID REQ和Cert REQ。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段，当REQInit中不包括Nonce AAC字段时，Sig REQ的签名数据还包括AACInit中的Nonce AAC字段。
S905、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查该Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是 相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；AAC计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述EncData REQ解密得到Cert REQ和ID REQ；
(4)、生成Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(5)、若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ且AACInit中携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和ID AS_AAC是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；或者，
若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ但AACInit中不携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和AAC所信任的鉴别服务器是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据自身信任的鉴别服务器确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；
需要说明的是，此实施例判断出的结果为漫游情况。
(6)、利用加密证书的公钥计算AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS。
S906、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中包括ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncPub AS和ID AS_REQ。其中，ID AS_REQ为可选字段，且Nonce REQ、ID AS_REQ、ID REQ和Cert REQ应分别等于REQInit中的相应字段；Nonce AAC应等于AAC生成的Nonce AAC；EncPub AS的加密数据包括ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACPub和Nonce AACID。
S907、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，向证书解密服务器CS-DEC发送解密请求消息AS-AACReq。
所述AS-AACReq中包括所述AACVeri中的EncPub AS。
S908、CS-DEC接收所述AS-AACReq后，利用加密证书对应的私钥解密所述EncPub AS得到ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AACPub。
S909、CS-DEC向AS-AAC发送解密响应消息CS-DECRep。
所述CS-DECRep中包括解密得到的ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AACPub。
S910、AS-AAC接收所述CS-DECRep后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、验证Cert AAC的合法性得到Res AAC，根据包括Cert AAC和Res AAC在内的信息生成Pub AAC；
(2)、对ID AAC和Nonce AACID进行异或运算生成ID AAC Nonce AACID，对Pub AAC和Nonce AACPub进行异或运算生成Pub AAC Nonce AACPub；
(3)、若AACVeri中存在ID AS_REQ，则AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，若不存在，则说明AS-AAC已确知AS-REQ；
(4)、计算第三数字签名Sig AS_AAC3。
S911、AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000022
Nonce AAC、Cert REQ和Sig AS_AAC3。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce AACPub、ID AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段，Sig AS_AAC3的签名数据包括AS-AACVeri中Sig AS_AAC3之前的其他字段。
S912、AS-REQ接收所述AS-AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证所述Sig AS_AAC3；若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-AACVeri；
(2)、验证Cert REQ的合法性得到Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；
(3)、计算第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1和第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S913、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_REQ4。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC应分别等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_REQ1的签名数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub；Sig AS_REQ4的签名数据包括ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ。
S914、AS-AAC接收所述AS-REQVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-REQ的公钥验证所述Sig AS_REQ4，若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri；
(2)、计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S915、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_AAC2。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ应分别等于AS-REQVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC2的签名数据包括ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ。
S916、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce AACID对ID AAC Nonce AACID进行异或运算恢复ID AAC，检查该ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC是否相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(3)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2；
(4)、检查Pub REQ中的Cert REQ与解密EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ是否相同；
(5)、利用Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、若上述检查和验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri，若上述检查和验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果；若确定REQ为不合法，则结束本次鉴别过程；
(7)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算鉴别结果信息密文EncData AAC；
(8)、计算Sig AAC；
(9)、根据需要计算MacTag AAC。
S917、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData AAC、Sig AAC和MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC为可选字段，其计算过程如图7实施例中所述。EncData AAC的加密数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000023
Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub，且ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1应分别等于ASVeri中的相应字段。Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACAuth中Sig AAC之前的其他字段。
S918、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同；若AACAuth中存在Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、若AACAuth中存在MacTag AAC，则校验MacTag AAC；校验过程如图7实施例中所述；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData AAC得到ID REQ、Nonce REQ、
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000024
Sig AS_REQ1、Nonce AACPub；
(4)、检查解密得到的ID REQ、Nonce REQ是否分别与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ、REQ生成的Nonce REQ相同；
(5)、将解密得到的Nonce AACPub与
Figure PCTCN2021140078-appb-000025
进行异或运算恢复Pub AAC；
(6)、利用Pub AAC中的Cert AAC验证Sig AAC，利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ1；
(7)、上述检查与验证均通过，则根据Pub AAC中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth。
需要说明的是，在S916中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S905中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S906，此情形下，图9实施例中的Pub REQ可以替换为Res REQ。或者，在S916中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S912中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S906的AACVeri、S911的AS-AACVeri发送给AS-REQ，由AS-REQ利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
参见图10，是漫游情况下的身份鉴别方法的再一实施例，在该实施例中，REQ和AAC之间的消息加密密钥协商过程被并行地融合到了身份鉴别过程中，更便于工程实施。其中，AAC的数字签名Sig AAC由AS-AAC验证，该方法包括：
S1001、AAC生成Nonce AAC和KeyInfo AAC，根据需要生成Security capabilities AAC。
S1002、AAC向REQ发送密钥请求消息AACInit。
所述AACInit中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo AAC、Security capabilities AAC和ID AS_AAC。其中，Security capabilities AAC和ID AS_AAC为可选字段。
S1003、REQ生成Nonce REQ和KeyInfo REQ，根据需要生成ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ，根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和KeyInfo AAC所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算REQ的身份信息密文EncData REQ；计算Sig REQ。
其中，ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段。REQ计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操 作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行。
S1004、REQ向AAC发送身份密文消息REQInit。
所述REQInit中包括Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ、Security capabilities REQ、ID AS_REQ、KeyInfo REQ、EncData REQ及Sig REQ。其中，Nonce AAC、ID AS_REQ和Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，且Nonce AAC应等于AACInit中的相应字段。EncData REQ的加密数据包括Cert REQ和ID REQ。Sig REQ的签名数据包括REQInit中Sig REQ之前的其他字段。
S1005、AAC接收所述REQInit后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若REQInit中存在Nonce AAC，则检查Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同，若不同，则丢弃REQInit；
(2)、根据包括所述KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和所述KeyInfo REQ所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)利用协商的或预置的密钥导出算法计算消息加密密钥和消息完整性校验密钥；AAC计算消息完整性校验密钥为可选操作，这一步可以在后续需要使用消息完整性校验密钥时再执行；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法对所述EncData REQ解密得到Cert REQ和ID REQ；
(4)、生成Nonce AACID和Nonce AACPub；
(5)、利用加密证书的公钥计算AAC的身份信息密文EncPub AS；
(6)、若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ且AACInit中携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和ID AS_AAC是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据ID AS_AAC确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；或者，
若REQInit中携带ID AS_REQ但AACInit中不携带ID AS_AAC，则AAC判断ID AS_REQ和AAC所信任的鉴别服务器是否存在至少一个相同的鉴别服务器的身份标识，若存在，即为非漫游情况，AAC从上述至少一个REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识中，确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器；若不存在，则为漫游情况，AAC需要根据自身信任的鉴别服务器确定参与身份鉴别的第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，并将ID AS_REQ发送给AS-AAC，以便AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ；
需要说明的是，此实施例判断出的结果为漫游情况。
(7)、计算AAC的数字签名Sig AAC。
S1006、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴别请求消息AACVeri。
所述AACVeri中可以包括ID REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、ID AS_REQ、EncPub AS和Sig AAC。其中，Nonce REQ、ID AS_REQ、ID REQ、Cert REQ应分别等于REQInit中的相应字段，Nonce AAC应等于AAC生成的Nonce AAC，ID AS_REQ为可选字段。EncPub AS的加密数据包括ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACPub和Nonce AACID；Sig AAC的签名数据包括AACVeri中Sig AAC之前的其他字段。
S1007、AS-AAC接收所述AACVeri后，向CS-DEC发送解密请求消息AS-AACReq。
所述AS-AACReq中包括所述AACVeri中的EncPub AS。
S1008、CS-DEC接收所述AS-AACReq后，利用加密证书对应的私钥解密所述EncPub AS得到ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AACPub。
S1009、CS-DEC向AS-AAC发送解密响应消息CS-DECRep。
所述CS-DECRep中包括解密得到的ID AAC、Cert AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AACPub。
S1010、AS-AAC接收所述CS-DECRep后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用所述Cert AAC对Sig AAC进行验证；
(2)、若Sig AAC验证通过，则验证Cert AAC的合法性得到Res AAC，根据包括Res AAC在内的信息生成Pub AAC；
(3)、对ID AAC和Nonce AACID进行异或运算生成ID AAC Nonce AACID，对Pub AAC和Nonce AACPub进行异或运算生成Pub AAC Nonce AACPub；
(4)、若AACVeri中存在ID AS_REQ，则AS-AAC根据ID AS_REQ确定第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，若不存在，则说明AS-AAC已确知AS-REQ；
(5)、计算第三数字签名Sig AS_AAC3。
S1011、AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送第二鉴别请求消息AS-AACVeri。
所述AS-AACVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Cert REQ和Sig AS_AAC3。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Cert REQ、Nonce AACPub、ID AAC、Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC 应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段。Sig AS_AAC3的签名数据包括AS-AACVeri中Sig AS_AAC3之前的其他字段。
S1012、AS-REQ接收所述AS-AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证所述Sig AS_AAC3，若验证不通过，则丢弃消息AS-AACVeri；
(2)、验证AS-AACVeri中的Cert REQ的合法性生成Res REQ，根据包括Cert REQ和Res REQ在内的信息生成Pub REQ；
(3)、计算第一数字签名Sig AS_REQ1和第四数字签名Sig AS_REQ4。
S1013、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴别响应消息AS-REQVeri。
所述AS-REQVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_REQ4。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC应分别等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段；Sig AS_REQ1的签名数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub；Sig AS_REQ4的签名数据包括ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ。
S1014、AS-AAC接收所述AS-REQVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用AS-REQ的公钥验证所述Sig AS_REQ4，若验证不通过，则丢弃AS-REQVeri；
(2)、计算生成第二数字签名Sig AS_AAC2。
S1015、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴别响应消息ASVeri。
所述ASVeri中包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ和Sig AS_AAC2。其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ应分别等于AS-REQVeri中的相应字段；Sig AS_AAC2的签名数据包括ID AAC Nonce AACID、Nonce AAC、Pub REQ。
S1016、AAC接收所述ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce AACID对ID AAC Nonce AACID进行异或运算恢复ID AAC，检查该ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC是否相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(3)、利用AS-AAC的公钥验证Sig AS_AAC2；
(4)、检查Pub REQ中的Cert REQ与解密EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ是否相同；
(5)、利用Cert REQ验证REQInit中的Sig REQ；
(6)、若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASVeri，若上述检查和验证均通过后，根据Pub REQ中的Res REQ确定REQ的身份鉴别结果；若为确定REQ的身份鉴别结果为不合法，则结束本次鉴别过程；
(7)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法计算EncData AAC；
(8)、根据需要计算MacTag AAC。
S1017、AAC向REQ发送第三鉴别响应消息AACAuth。
所述AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、EncData AAC和MacTag AAC。其中，Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC为可选字段，且应分别等于REQInit中的Nonce REQ、AAC生成的Nonce AAC。MacTag AAC为可选字段，其计算过程如图7实施例中所述。EncData AAC的加密数据包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1和Nonce AACPub，其中，ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1应分别等于ASVeri中的相应字段。
S1018、REQ接收所述AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACAuth中存在Nonce REQ，则检查所述Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否相同；若AACAuth中存在Nonce AAC，则检查所述Nonce AAC与接收到的AACInit中的Nonce AAC是否相同；
(2)、若AACAuth中存在MacTag AAC，则校验MacTag AAC；校验过程如图7实施例中所述；
(3)、利用消息加密密钥采用对称加密算法解密所述EncData AAC得到ID REQ、Nonce REQ、Pub AAC Nonce AACPub、Sig AS_REQ1、Nonce AACPub；
(4)、检查解密得到的ID REQ、Nonce REQ是否分别与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ、REQ生成的Nonce REQ相同；
(5)、利用AS-REQ的公钥验证Sig AS_REQ1；
(6)、将解密得到的Nonce AACPub与Pub AAC Nonce AACPub进行异或运算恢复Pub AAC；
(7)、上述检查与验证均通过，则根据Pub AAC中的Res AAC确定AAC的身份鉴别结果，若上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AACAuth。
需要说明的是，在S1016中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S1005中先行执行，即AAC获取所述REQInit后，利用解密REQInit中的EncData REQ得到的Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行S1006， 此情形下，图10实施例中的Pub REQ可以替换为Res REQ。或者，在S1016中对Sig REQ的验证也可以改为在S1012中先行执行，此情形下，所述Sig REQ可以通过S1006的AACVeri、S1011的AS-AACVeri发送给AS-REQ，由AS-REQ利用Cert REQ验证Sig REQ，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
在上述各实施例中，每条消息还可以携带一个杂凑值HASH X_Y，该杂凑值HASH X_Y是该消息的发送方实体X利用杂凑算法对接收到的对端实体Y发送的最新前序消息计算得到的，用于对端实体Y来验证实体X是否接收到完整的最新前序消息。其中，HASH REQ_AAC表示REQ对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_REQ表示AAC对接收到的REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_AS-AAC表示AAC对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AAC表示AS-AAC对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ表示AS-AAC对接收到的AS-REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC表示AS-REQ对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。若发送方实体X当前发送的消息为实体X和实体Y之间交互的首条消息，意味着实体X未曾收到对端实体Y发送的前序消息，则该条消息中HASH X_Y可以不存在或者无意义。
对应的，对端实体Y接收到实体X发送的消息后，若该条消息中包含HASH X_Y，则当实体Y未曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y忽略HASH X_Y；当实体Y曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y利用杂凑算法对之前向实体X发送的最新前序消息在本地计算杂凑值，并与接收到的消息中携带的杂凑值HASH X_Y比较，若一致，则执行后续步骤，否则丢弃或者结束本次鉴别过程。
本发明中，对实体X而言，对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收过的对端实体Y向实体X发送的消息；对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收的对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新一条消息。若实体X向其对端实体Y发送的消息M是实体X和实体Y之间交互的第一条消息，则实体X向其对端实体Y发送消息M之前，不存在对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息。
需要说明的是，上述图7、图8、图9和图10对应实施例中的可选字段和可选操作，在说明书附图的图7、图8、图9和图10中用“*”表示。以上所有实施例涉及的消息中所包括的各个内容不限定顺序，并且在没有特别说明的情况下，不限定消息接收方收到该消息后对相关消息的操作顺序以及对消息中所包括的内容进行处理的顺序。
基于图1至图10对应的实施例，参见图11，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器AAC，包括：
获取部分1101，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一发送部分1102，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，所述请求设备的数字证书是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
第一接收部分1103，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第一验证部分1104，被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第一确定部分1105根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当第一确定部分1105确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果为合法时，第二发送部分1106向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；或者，
第一验证部分1104，被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第二发送部分1106向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息以及第一确定部分1105根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；或者，
第一验证部分1104，被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证；若所述第二数字签名验证通过，则第一确定部分1105根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定 所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；第二发送部分1106向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；
其中，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第三发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥。
在一些实施例中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括请求设备生成的第二随机数；
则所述计算部分还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
在一些实施例中，获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第二验证部分，被配置为对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数的一致性进行验证。
在一些实施例中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，则获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括特定安全策略，所述特定安全策略是所述请求设备根据所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息确定的。
在一些实施例中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述身份密文消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
在一些实施例中，获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第三确定部分，被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和第一保护随机数；
对应的，所述第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文是利用所述第一保护随机数对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息加密生成的；
则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
第三验证部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识所述第一保护随机数对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文进行验证。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数；对应的，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述第二保护随机数对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的；
第二发送部分1106发送的第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述第二保护随机数。
在一些实施例中，获取部分1101获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则第一确定部分1105还被配置为确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
在一些实施例中，第一确定部分1105还被配置为：
利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
当所述第二鉴别服务器利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若第一接收部分1103接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则第一确定部分1105确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验 证通过；或者，
当所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，第一接收部分1103接收所述第一鉴别响应消息后，第一确定部分1105利用所述第二鉴别结果信息中所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
若所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则第一确定部分1105首先确定所述第二鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书和解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的一致性；若一致，则第一确定部分1105再利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过。
在一些实施例中，第二发送部分1106发送的第三鉴别响应消息中还包括消息完整性校验码，所述消息完整性校验码是所述计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第三鉴别响应消息中除所述消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；所述消息完整性校验密钥与所述消息加密密钥的生成方式相同。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
基于图1至图10对应的实施例，参见图12，本申请实施例提供了一种请求设备REQ，包括：
发送部分1201，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一接收部分1202，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第三鉴别响应消息，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果；
第一解密部分1203，被配置为利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密得到所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名；
第一验证部分1204，被配置为利用第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第一数字签名进行验证；
第一确定部分1205，被配置为当所述第一数字签名验证通过时，根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
在一些实施例中，所述请求设备还包括：
第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥；
发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数。
在一些实施例中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
则所述计算部分还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
对应的，发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数。
在一些实施例中，发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数。
在一些实施例中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述请求设备还包括：
第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；则发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略。
在一些实施例中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；则所述请求设备还包括：
第三确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
则发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标 识。
在一些实施例中，发送部分1201发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
在一些实施例中，发送部分1201发送的所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；对应的，第一接收部分1202接收的第三鉴别响应消息中的鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；则所述请求设备还包括：
第二验证部分，被配置为对解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的所述请求设备的身份标识和所述请求设备自身的身份标识进行一致性验证。
在一些实施例中，第一接收部分1202接收的第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数；
则第一解密部分1203利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密还得到所述第二保护随机数，并利用所述第二保护随机数解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到所述第一鉴别结果信息。
在一些实施例中，第一确定部分1205在确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果之前，还被配置为确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
在一些实施例中，第一确定部分1205还被配置为：
当所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名时，所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，若第一接收部分1202接收到所述第三鉴别响应消息，则第一确定部分1205确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名已验证通过；或者，
当所述第三鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名时，相应的，解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书；则第一确定部分1205利用所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过。
在一些实施例中，第一接收部分1202接收的第三鉴别响应消息中还包括消息完整性校验码；所述请求设备还包括：
第三验证部分，被配置为利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述消息完整性校验码；所述消息完整性校验密钥与所述消息加密密钥的生成方式相同。
在一些实施例中，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
基于图1至图10对应的实施例，参见图13，本申请实施例提供了一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
第一接收部分1301，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
第一发送部分1302，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
在一些实施例中，若第一接收部分1301接收的第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名，则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
第一验证部分，被配置为利用解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是同一个鉴别服务器，则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
第一解密部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文进行解密得到所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书；
第二验证部分，被配置为对解密得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果；
第一生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第一验证结果在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，再生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，以及根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息，对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名，对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
在一些实施例中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
第三验证部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文进行解密得到所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果；
第二生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第一验证结果在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，再生成所述第一鉴别结果信息密文；
第二发送部分，被配置为向第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和所述第一鉴别服务器的第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名；所述第一数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第四验证部分，被配置为利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥验证所述第四数字签名；
第三生成部分，被配置为当所述第四数字签名验证通过时，对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
在一些实施例中，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
基于图1至图10对应的实施例，参见图14，本申请实施例提供了一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
接收部分1401，被配置为接收第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和所述第一鉴别服务器的第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
第一验证部分1402，被配置为对所述第三数字签名进行验证；
第二验证部分1403，被配置为当所述第三数字签名验证通过时，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果；
生成部分1404，被配置为根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息；
发送部分1405，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名，所述第一数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
在一些实施例中，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
图15为本申请实施例提供的一种电子设备的结构示意图，如图15所示，该电子设备1500可以为下述的鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器或者第二鉴别服务器。电子设备1500包括：处理器1501和存储器1502，所述存储器1502用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器1501用于调用并运行所述存储器1502中存储的计算机程序，以执行以下鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器或者第二鉴别服务器所执行的上述任一实施例中的步骤。其中，电子设备1500的处理器1501和存储器1502， 可以分别为下述鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器或者第二鉴别服务器的处理器1501和存储器1502。
结合图15，以下分别对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器或者第二鉴别服务器进行示例性的说明：
本申请实施例还提供一种鉴别接入控制器AAC，包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行上述任一实施例中的AAC所执行的步骤。
应理解，该鉴别接入控制器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供一种请求设备REQ，包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行上述任一实施例中的REQ所执行的步骤。
应理解，该请求设备可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供一种第一鉴别服务器AS-AAC，所述AS-AAC为鉴别接入控制器AAC信任的鉴别服务器，包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行上述任一实施例中的AS-AAC所执行的步骤。
应理解，该第一鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供一种第二鉴别服务器AS-REQ，所述AS-REQ为请求设备REQ信任的鉴别服务器，若AAC信任的第一鉴别服务器和REQ信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器，则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行上述任一实施例中的AS-REQ所执行的步骤。
应理解，该第二鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中的鉴别接入控制器、请求设备、第一鉴别服务器或者第二鉴别服务器中的处理器还可以执行其它实施例中的方法，例如上述方法实施例中的其它方法，本申请实施例对此不作限制。
图16为本申请实施例提供的一种芯片的结构示意图，如图16所示，芯片1600包括：处理器1601和存储器1602，处理器1601，用于从存储器1602中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有所述芯片1600的鉴别接入控制器执行上述任一实施例中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片1600的请求设备执行上述任一实施例中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片1600的第一鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
使得安装有所述芯片1600的第二鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
存储器1602可以包括在芯片1600中，或者，存储器1602可以在芯片1600外设置。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质用于存储计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行上述任一实施例中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行上述任一实施例中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行上述任一实施例中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行上述任一实施例中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行上述任一实施例中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成，前述程序可以存储于计算机存储介质中，该程序在执行时，执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤；而前述的计算机存储介质可以是下述介质中的至少一种：只读存储器(英文：Read-Only Memory，缩 写：ROM)、随机访问存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
本申请实施例的各个部分、芯片或者处理器可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法实施例的各步骤可以通过处理器中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的各个部分、芯片或者处理器可以包括以下任一个或至少两个的集成：通用处理器、特定用途集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit，ASIC)、数字信号处理器(Digital Signal Processor，DSP)、数字信号处理装置(Digital Signal Processing Device，DSPD)、可编程逻辑装置(Programmable Logic Device，PLD)、现场可编程门阵列(Field Programmable Gate Array，FPGA)、中央处理器(Central Processing Unit，CPU)、图形处理器(Graphics Processing Unit，GPU)、嵌入式神经网络处理器(neural-network processing units，NPU)、控制器、微控制器、微处理器、可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件。
需要说明的是，本说明书中的各个实施例均采用递进的方式描述，各个实施例之间相同相似的部分互相参见即可，每个实施例重点说明的都是与其他实施例的不同之处。尤其，对于设备及系统实施例而言，由于其与方法实施例相一致和对应，所以描述得比较简单，相关之处参见方法实施例的部分说明即可。以上所描述的设备及系统实施例仅是示意性的，其中作为分离部件说明的部分可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为部分显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理部分，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络部分上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部模块来实现本实施例方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性劳动的情况下，即可以理解并实施。
以上所述，仅为本申请的一种示例性实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应该以权利要求的保护范围为准。
工业实用性
本公开实施例公开了一种身份鉴别方法、装置、设备、芯片、存储介质及程序，其中，对请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息进行保密处理，可以防止请求设备和鉴别接入控制器的身份信息在传输过程中暴露，保证攻击者无法获得私密、敏感的信息。并且，通过引入鉴别服务器，在保障实体身份相关信息机密性的同时，实现了请求设备与鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份的实时鉴别，为确保只有合法用户才能与合法网络通信奠定基础。

Claims (57)

  1. 一种身份鉴别方法，所述方法包括：
    鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，所述请求设备的数字证书是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果为合法时，向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；或者，
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息以及根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；或者，
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证；若所述第二数字签名验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；
    其中，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；
    所述请求设备接收到所述第三鉴别响应消息后，利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密得到所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名，所述请求设备利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第一数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则所述请求设备根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，在所述鉴别接入控制器获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
    所述请求设备根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥；
    对应的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
    则所述请求设备计算所述消息加密密钥还包括：
    所述请求设备根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
    对应的，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述消息加密密钥还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；
    则在所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述消息加密密钥之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数的一致性进行验证；
    若验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器再计算所述消息加密密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求2至4任一项所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；则所述身份密文消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
  6. 根据权利要求2至5任一项所述的方法，其中，所述密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份密文消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6任一项所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  8. 根据权利要求1至7任一项所述的方法，其中，所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；
    所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和第一保护随机数；
    所述第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识，其中，所述请求设备的身份标识是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
    对应的，所述第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文是利用所述第一保护随机数对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息加密生成的；
    则在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据自身的身份标识和所述第一保护随机数对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文进行验证，验证通过后，所述鉴别接入控制器再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；
    对应的，所述第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；则在所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备解密所述鉴别结果信息密文还得到所述请求设备的身份标识，并将其和所述请求设备自身的身份标识进行一致性验证，验证通过后，所述请求设备再确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
  9. 根据权利要求1至8任一项所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数，对应的，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述第二保护随机数对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的；
    所述第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述第二保护随机数；
    则所述请求设备利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密还得到所述第二保护随机数，并利用所述第二保护随机数解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到所述第一鉴别结果信息。
  10. 根据权利要求1至9任一项所述的方法，其中，在所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名验证通过，则所述请求设备再确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过，包括：
    若所述第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名，则所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，若所述请求设备接收到所述第三鉴别响应消息，则所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名已验证通过；或者，
    若所述第三鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名，则所述请求设备解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，所述请求设备利用解密得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过。
  12. 根据权利要求1至11任一项所述的方法，其中，所述身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则所述鉴别接入控制器再确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    所述第二鉴别服务器利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若所述鉴别接入控制器接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验证通过；或者，
    若所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一鉴别响应消息后，利用所述第二鉴别结果信息中所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    若所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则所述鉴别接入控制器验证所述第二鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书和解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的一致性；若一致，则所述鉴别接入控制器再利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过。
  14. 根据权利要求2至6任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三鉴别响应消息中还包括消息完整性校验码，所述消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第三鉴别响应消息中除所述消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；所述鉴别接入控制器的消息完整性校验密钥与所述鉴别接入控制器的消息加密密钥的生成方式相同；
    所述请求设备利用所述消息完整性校验密钥验证所述消息完整性校验码；若验证通过，则所述请求设备再执行确定所述鉴别接入控制器身份鉴别结果的步骤；所述请求设备的消息完整性校验密钥与所述请求设备的消息加密密钥的生成方式相同。
  15. 根据权利要求1至14任一项所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是同一个鉴别服务器，则在所述第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别响应消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一鉴别服务器对利用所述加密证书对应的私钥解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果，根据包括第一验证结果在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别结果信息，再生成所述第一鉴别结果信息密文，以及根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成所述第二鉴别结果信息，对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名，对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  16. 根据权利要求1至14任一项所述的方法，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器；则在所述第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别响应消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一鉴别服务器对利用所述加密证书对应的私钥解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果，根据包括所述第一验证结果在 内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，再生成所述第一鉴别结果信息密文；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    所述第二鉴别服务器对所述第三数字签名进行验证，验证通过后，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果，根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息，向所述第一鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    所述第一鉴别服务器接收所述第二鉴别响应消息，利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥验证所述第四数字签名，若验证通过，则所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  17. 根据权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法，其中，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述请求设备发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述请求设备收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第一鉴别服务器收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述第一鉴别服务器器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第二鉴别服务器收到所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作；
    所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；
    则所述第一鉴别服务器收到所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息时，先对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，验证通过后再执行后续操作。
  18. 一种鉴别接入控制器，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：
    获取部分，被配置为获取请求设备发送的身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
    第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的，所述请求设备的数字证书是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份信息密文解密得到的；
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息 中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    第一验证部分，被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；当所述第一确定部分确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果为合法时，第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；或者，
    被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证，若验证通过，则第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息以及第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；或者，
    被配置为利用所述第一鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第二数字签名进行验证；若所述第二数字签名验证通过，则第一确定部分根据所述第二鉴别结果信息中的第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果；第二发送部分向所述请求设备发送第三鉴别响应消息；
    其中，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述消息加密密钥对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的。
  19. 根据权利要求18所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第三发送部分，被配置为向所述请求设备发送密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数；
    计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述请求设备的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括请求设备生成的第二随机数；
    则所述计算部分还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数；则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第二验证部分，被配置为对所述身份密文消息中的第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数的一致性进行验证。
  22. 根据权利要求19至21任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，则所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括特定安全策略，所述特定安全策略是所述请求设备根据所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息确定的。
  23. 根据权利要求19至22任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第三发送部分发送的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述身份密文消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述密钥请求消息中所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  24. 根据权利要求18至23任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第三确定部分，被配置为根据所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第一鉴别服务器。
  25. 根据权利要求18至24任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和第一保护随机数；
    对应的，所述第一鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文是利用所述第一保护随机数对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息加密生成的；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器还包括：
    第三验证部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识和所述第一保护随机数对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识密文进行验证。
  26. 根据权利要求18至25任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信 息密文的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数；对应的，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是利用所述第二保护随机数对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的；
    所述第二发送部分发送的第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述第二保护随机数。
  27. 根据权利要求18至26任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述获取部分获取的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的数字签名，则所述第一确定部分还被配置为确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述请求设备的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述第二验证结果确定所述请求设备的身份鉴别结果。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第一确定部分还被配置为：
    利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    当所述第二鉴别服务器利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，若所述第一接收部分接收到所述第一鉴别响应消息，则所述第一确定部分确定所述请求设备的数字签名已验证通过；或者，
    当所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，所述第一接收部分接收所述第一鉴别响应消息后，所述第一确定部分利用所述第二鉴别结果信息中所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过；或者，
    若所述第二鉴别结果信息中还包括所述请求设备的数字证书，则所述第一确定部分首先确定所述第二鉴别结果信息中的所述请求设备的数字证书和解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文得到的所述请求设备的数字证书的一致性；若一致，则所述第一确定部分再利用所述请求设备的数字证书对所述请求设备的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述请求设备的数字签名是否验证通过。
  29. 根据权利要求19至23任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述第二发送部分发送的第三鉴别响应消息中还包括消息完整性校验码，所述消息完整性校验码是所述计算部分利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第三鉴别响应消息中除所述消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；所述消息完整性校验密钥与所述消息加密密钥的生成方式相同。
  30. 根据权利要求18至29任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  31. 一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：
    发送部分，被配置为向鉴别接入控制器发送身份密文消息，所述身份密文消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文，所述请求设备的身份信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括所述请求设备的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第三鉴别响应消息，所述第三鉴别响应消息中包括鉴别结果信息密文，所述鉴别结果信息密文是利用消息加密密钥对包括第一鉴别结果信息密文和第一数字签名在内的加密数据加密生成的；所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果；
    第一解密部分，被配置为利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密得到所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述第一数字签名；
    第一验证部分，被配置为利用第二鉴别服务器的公钥对所述第一数字签名进行验证；
    第一确定部分，被配置为当所述第一数字签名验证通过时，根据解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中的第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备还包括：
    第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的密钥请求消息，所述密钥请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数；
    计算部分，被配置为根据包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述鉴别接入控制器的密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息加密密钥；
    所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备的密钥交换参数。
  33. 根据权利要求32所述的请求设备，其中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第一随机数；
    则所述计算部分还被配置为根据包括所述第一密钥、所述第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第二随机数在内的信息计算所述消息加密密钥；
    对应的，所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第二随机数。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的请求设备，其中，所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述第一随机数。
  35. 根据权利要求32至34任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息，所述请求设备还包括：
    第二确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器支持的安全能力参数信息确定所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略；则所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备使用的特定安全策略。
  36. 根据权利要求32至35任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述第二接收部分接收的密钥请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；则所述请求设备还包括：
    第三确定部分，被配置为根据所述鉴别接入控制器信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识；
    则所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
  37. 根据权利要求32至36任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述发送部分发送的身份密文消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识。
  38. 根据权利要求31至37任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述发送部分发送的所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；对应的，所述第一接收部分接收的第三鉴别响应消息中的鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备的身份标识；则所述请求设备还包括：
    第二验证部分，被配置为对解密所述鉴别结果信息密文得到的所述请求设备的身份标识和所述请求设备自身的身份标识进行一致性验证。
  39. 根据权利要求31至38任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一接收部分接收的第三鉴别响应消息中的所述鉴别结果信息密文的加密数据还包括第二保护随机数；
    则所述第一解密部分利用所述消息加密密钥对所述鉴别结果信息密文进行解密还得到所述第二保护随机数，并利用所述第二保护随机数解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到所述第一鉴别结果信息。
  40. 根据权利要求31至39任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一确定部分在确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果之前，还被配置为确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过，若确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名验证通过，则再根据所述第一验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份鉴别结果。
  41. 根据权利要求40所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一确定部分还被配置为：
    当所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第一鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名时，所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，若所述第一接收部分接收到所述第三鉴别响应消息，则所述第一确定部分确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名已验证通过；或者，
    当所述第三鉴别响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名时，相应的，解密所述第一鉴别结果信息密文得到的第一鉴别结果信息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书；则所述第一确定部分利用所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证，根据验证结果确定所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名是否验证通过。
  42. 根据权利要求32至37任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述第一接收部分接收的第三鉴别响应消息中还包括消息完整性校验码；所述请求设备还包括：
    第三验证部分，被配置为利用消息完整性校验密钥验证所述消息完整性校验码；所述消息完整性校验密钥与所述消息加密密钥的生成方式相同。
  43. 根据权利要求31至42任一项所述的请求设备，其中，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  44. 一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
    第一接收部分，被配置为接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴别请求消息，所述第一鉴别请求消息中包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文和请求设备的数字证书，所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文是利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书在内的加密数据加密生成的；
    第一发送部分，被配置为向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴别响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、第二鉴别结果信息和第二数字签名；其中，所述第一鉴别结果信息密文是对包括第一鉴别结果信息在内的信息加密得到的，所述第一鉴别结果信息中包括对所 述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书的第一验证结果，所述第一数字签名是所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第二鉴别结果信息中包括对所述请求设备的数字证书的第二验证结果，所述第二数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
  45. 根据权利要求44所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，若所述第一接收部分接收的第一鉴别请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名，则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    第一验证部分，被配置为利用解密所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字签名进行验证。
  46. 根据权利要求44或45所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是同一个鉴别服务器；则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    第一解密部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文进行解密得到所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书；
    第二验证部分，被配置为对解密得到的所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果；
    第一生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第一验证结果在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，再生成第一鉴别结果信息密文，以及根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息，对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成第一数字签名，对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  47. 根据权利要求44至46任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器；则所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    第三验证部分，被配置为利用加密证书对应的私钥对所述鉴别接入控制器的身份信息密文进行解密得到所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书，对所述鉴别接入控制器的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第一验证结果；
    第二生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第一验证结果在内的信息生成第一鉴别结果信息，再生成所述第一鉴别结果信息密文；
    第二发送部分，被配置为向第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和所述第一鉴别服务器的第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    第二接收部分，被配置为接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名；所述第一数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    第四验证部分，被配置为利用所述第二鉴别服务器的公钥验证所述第四数字签名；
    第三生成部分，被配置为当所述第四数字签名验证通过时，对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成第二数字签名，根据包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和所述第二数字签名在内的信息生成所述第一鉴别响应消息。
  48. 根据权利要求44至47任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器，其中，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  49. 一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的所述第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器；则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
    接收部分，被配置为接收第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴别请求消息，所述第二鉴别请求消息中包括第一鉴别结果信息密文、所述请求设备的数字证书和所述第一鉴别服务器的第三数字签名；所述第三数字签名是所述第一鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文和所述请求设备的数字证书在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名；
    第一验证部分，被配置为对所述第三数字签名进行验证；
    第二验证部分，被配置为当所述第三数字签名验证通过时，对所述请求设备的数字证书进行合法性验证得到第二验证结果；
    生成部分，被配置为根据包括所述第二验证结果在内的信息生成第二鉴别结果信息；
    发送部分，被配置为向所述第一鉴别服务器发送第二鉴别响应消息，所述第二鉴别响应消息中包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文、第一数字签名、所述第二鉴别结果信息和第四数字签名，所述第一数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第一鉴别结果信息密文在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名，所述第四数字签名是所述第二鉴别服务器对包括所述第二鉴别结果信息在内的签名数据计算生成的数字签名。
  50. 根据权利要求49所述的第二鉴别服务器，其中，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  51. 一种鉴别接入控制器，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤。
  52. 一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤。
  53. 一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  54. 一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，若鉴别接入控制器信任的第一鉴别服务器和所述请求设备信任的所述第二鉴别服务器是两个不同的鉴别服务器；则所述第二鉴别服务器包括：处理器和存储器，所述存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  55. 一种芯片，所述芯片包括：处理器，用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有所述芯片的鉴别接入控制器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
    使得安装有所述芯片的请求设备执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
    使得安装有所述芯片的第一鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
    使得安装有所述芯片的第二鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  56. 一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质用于存储计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
  57. 一种计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得鉴别接入控制器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述鉴别接入控制器所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得请求设备执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述请求设备所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得第一鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第一鉴别服务器所执行的步骤，或者，
    所述计算机程序使得第二鉴别服务器执行如权利要求1至17任意一项所述的身份鉴别方法中所述第二鉴别服务器所执行的步骤。
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