WO2019023825A1 - 隐私保护的方法及设备 - Google Patents
隐私保护的方法及设备 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2019023825A1 WO2019023825A1 PCT/CN2017/095088 CN2017095088W WO2019023825A1 WO 2019023825 A1 WO2019023825 A1 WO 2019023825A1 CN 2017095088 W CN2017095088 W CN 2017095088W WO 2019023825 A1 WO2019023825 A1 WO 2019023825A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- remote terminal
- information
- identifier
- imsi
- request message
- Prior art date
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
- H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
- H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/108—Source integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
- H04W12/33—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications using wearable devices, e.g. using a smartwatch or smart-glasses
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/72—Subscriber identity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/26—Network addressing or numbering for mobility support
Definitions
- the embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a method and device for privacy protection.
- a wearable device such as a smart watch that can be installed with a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM card) has been introduced on the market, so that the smart watch can be directly connected to the network. Direct connection of wearable devices to the network is a future trend.
- SIM card Subscriber Identification Module
- the mobile phone and the wearable device each perform network communication. It is hoped that the wearable device is connected to the network through the mobile phone, thereby saving the power of the wearable device and increasing the transmission efficiency of the wearable device.
- the mobile phone can be called a relay terminal, and the wearable device is called a remote terminal.
- the remote terminal Before the remote terminal connects to the network through the relay terminal, the remote terminal needs to discover the relay terminal, and then attaches to the network through the relay terminal to communicate with the core network.
- the non-access stratum (NAS) message between the remote terminal and the core network includes the international mobile subscriber identification (IMSI) of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identification
- the NAS message containing the IMSI is not encrypted; therefore, the IMSI of the remote terminal is easily obtained by the relay terminal. If the relay terminal is attacked or misused, the relay terminal can adsorb the terminal and scam the remote terminal. Fraudulent behavior can have negative consequences for users.
- the present invention provides a method and a device for protecting privacy, so as to solve the problem that the IMSI in the prior art is easily obtained by the relay terminal, and the IMSI is leaked, causing adverse consequences to the user.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a method for privacy protection, including:
- the first identification information obtains an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal; wherein the first identity information is a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the remote terminal sends a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal,
- the first request message includes second identifier information of the remote terminal, the second identifier information is used by a network device to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal, and the remote terminal obtains the network device by using the relay terminal.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, the a boot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the remote terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the booting process initiated by the network device, an identifier for discovery discovered by the network device, or a public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device.
- the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection method, including: receiving, by a network device, a second request message sent by a relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information or a second identifier of the remote terminal.
- the second request message is sent by the relay terminal after receiving the first request message of the remote terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the network device transmitting the first identity information and the remote terminal to a user data server IMSI, so that the user data server saves the correspondence between the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal; or the network device sends the first identification information and the remote terminal to the mobility management entity The IMSI, so that the mobility management entity saves the correspondence between the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the IMSI is replaced by the first identifier information or the second identifier information, and the correspondence between the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal is saved in the user data server and the mobility management entity, and then the IMSI is determined by the identifier information, thereby avoiding the IMSI being relayed.
- the terminal intercepts, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the network device determines an IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identifier information, thereby obtaining the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal; or, the network device is configured according to The second identification information determines an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal, the network device generates the first identity information, and the network device obtains the first identity information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the first identification information is used to determine the IMSI of the remote device, and the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the network device sends a third request message to the user data server, where the third request message includes the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the third request message may enable the user data server to update the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal, thereby preventing the relay terminal from obtaining the IMSI.
- the network device sends a fourth request message to the user data server, so that the user data server sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity;
- the fourth request message includes Determining first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal, the fifth request message including the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the fourth management message may enable the mobility management entity to update the first identity information and the IMSI of the remote terminal, thereby preventing the relay terminal from obtaining the IMSI.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery
- the public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device By using one of the above multiple identifiers instead of the IMSI, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection method, including: a mobility management entity receives a first message sent by a remote terminal by using a relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal.
- the mobility management entity obtains an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal. By replacing the IMSI with the first identification information, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the mobility management entity sends a first request message to the user data server, where the first request message includes the first identifier information, and receives the first returned by the user data server.
- a response message of the request message the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal; or the mobility management entity obtains the remote according to the stored correspondence between the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal The IMSI of the terminal; or the mobility management entity determines the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and sends a second request message to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, where the second request message includes Receiving, by the first identifier information, a response message of the second request message returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, where the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the mobility management entity determines, according to the length of the first identifier information, the identifier information of the remote terminal as the first identifier information; or the mobility management entity mobility management.
- the entity indicates that the identifier information of the remote terminal is the first identifier information according to the indication information in the first identifier information.
- the identifier information may be determined to be the first identifier information by using the identifier information, or the identifier information may be the first identifier information, and the identifier information is the first identifier information.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI and realizing the protection of the user privacy.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection method, including: establishing, by a remote terminal, a communication connection with a relay terminal; the remote terminal obtaining a root key of the remote terminal, and a root key of the remote terminal And for protecting communication between the remote terminal and the relay terminal; the remote terminal generates a first key according to a root key of the remote terminal, and encrypts the first information by using the first key
- the first information includes an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal; the remote terminal sends a second message to the mobility management entity, where the second message includes the encrypted first message and the remote terminal The identity of the root key.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the relay terminal By using the IMSI as the first message and encrypting the first key generated by the root message by using the root key, the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the pair is implemented. Protection of user privacy.
- the remote terminal generates a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and performs at least integrity protection on the first information by using the second key to generate MAC information.
- the second message The MAC information is also included in the medium. At least the first information is integrity-protected by using the second key, thereby ensuring that the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI and realizing the protection of the user privacy.
- the second message further includes at least one of the following: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the first message encryption and/or integrity protection algorithm identification information is added in the second message to facilitate decryption and verification of the second information by the mobility management entity.
- the remote terminal sends a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, where the first request message includes The first identification information of the remote terminal.
- the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the first identifier information is any one of the following identifiers: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery
- the public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device By using one of the above multiple identifiers instead of the IMSI, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection method, including: receiving, by a network device, a second request message sent by a relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the second a request message for requesting acquisition of a root key for communicating with the remote terminal; the network device obtaining a root key of the remote terminal and identification information of the root key; the network device The root key and the identification information of the root key are sent to the user data server, or the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key to the relay terminal.
- Mobility management entity including: receiving, by a network device, a second request message sent by a relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the second a request message for requesting acquisition of a root key for communicating with the remote terminal; the network device obtaining a root key of the remote terminal and identification information of the root key; the network device The root key and the identification information of the root key are sent to the user data server, or the
- the network device sends, by using a user data server, the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the application implementation provides a privacy protection method, including: a mobility management entity receiving a first message sent by a remote terminal, where the first message includes the encrypted first information and a root key of the remote terminal And the first information includes an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal; the mobility management entity obtains a root key of the remote terminal according to an identifier of a root key of the remote terminal; Sexual management entity according to the remote The root key of the terminal generates a first key, and decrypts the first information by using the first key to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the relay terminal By using the IMSI as the first message and encrypting the first key generated by the root message by using the root key, the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the pair is implemented. Protection of user privacy.
- the first message further includes MAC information, where the MAC information is generated after the remote terminal performs integrity protection on the first information, and the mobility management entity is configured according to the The root key of the remote terminal generates a second key, and uses the second key to verify the MAC information to verify the integrity of the first information.
- the second key is used to perform at least integrity protection on the first information to verify the integrity of the first information, thereby implementing protection of user privacy.
- the first message further includes at least one of: encryption or integrity protection algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal; and when the first message includes the encryption algorithm identifier In the information, the mobility management entity decrypts the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identifier information; or when the first message includes the integrity protection algorithm When the information is identified, the mobility management entity verifies the MAC information by using the second key according to an integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identifier information; or, when the first message includes the When the encryption algorithm identifies the information and the integrity protection algorithm identification information, the mobility management entity decrypts the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information; The mobility management entity adopts the second key verification system according to the integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identification information. MAC information.
- the first message encryption and/or integrity protection algorithm identification information is added in the second message to facilitate decryption and verification of the second information by the mobility management entity.
- the mobility management entity sends a second request message to the user data server, where the second request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives user data.
- a response message of the second request message returned by the server the response message including a root key of the remote terminal; or the mobility management entity according to the saved root key of the remote terminal and the remote Determining a root key of the remote terminal in a correspondence relationship between identifier information of a root key of the terminal; or determining, by the mobility management entity, a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, moving to the relay terminal
- the sex management entity sends a third request message, the third request message including an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receiving the return of the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs
- the third request message is a response message, and the response message includes a root key of the remote terminal.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, including: a sending unit, configured to send, by using a relay terminal, a first message to a mobility management entity, where the first message includes a first end of the remote terminal Identification information, the first message is used by the mobility management entity to obtain an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal, where the first identity information is in a proximity service Following the user key identification PRUK ID.
- the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal. In turn, the privacy of the user is protected.
- the sending unit is further configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish establishment between the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the first request message includes the second identification information of the remote terminal, the second identification information is used by the network device to obtain the IMSI of the remote terminal, and the device further includes: an acquiring unit, configured to: Obtaining, by the relay terminal, the first identifier information sent by the network device.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery
- the public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device By using one of the above multiple identifiers instead of the IMSI, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection method, including: a receiving unit, configured to receive a second request message sent by a relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of a remote terminal or a second identifier information, where the second request message is sent by the relay terminal after receiving the first request message of the remote terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish the remote terminal and the a communication connection between the relay terminals; an obtaining unit, configured to obtain the first identification information and an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal; and a sending unit, configured to send the first identifier information to the user data server The IMSI of the remote terminal, so that the user data server saves the correspondence between the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal; or the network device sends the first identifier information to the mobility management entity And an IMSI of the remote terminal, so that the mobility management entity saves a correspondence between the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- a receiving unit configured to receive
- the IMSI is replaced by the first identifier information or the second identifier information, and the correspondence between the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal is saved in the user data server and the mobility management entity, and then the IMSI is determined by the identifier information, thereby avoiding the IMSI being relayed.
- the terminal intercepts, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the acquiring unit is configured to determine an IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identifier information, thereby obtaining the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal; or, according to the first
- the second identification information determines an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal
- the network device generates the first identity information
- the network device obtains the first identity information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first identification information is used to determine the IMSI of the remote device, and the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the sending unit is configured to send a third request message to the user data server, where the third request message includes the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the third request message may enable the user data server to update the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal, thereby preventing the relay terminal from obtaining the IMSI.
- the sending unit is configured to send a fourth request message to the user data server, so that the user data server sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity; the fourth request Message
- the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal are included, and the fifth request message includes the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the fourth management message may enable the mobility management entity to update the first identity information and the IMSI of the remote terminal, thereby preventing the relay terminal from obtaining the IMSI.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery
- the public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device By using one of the above multiple identifiers instead of the IMSI, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, including: a receiving unit, configured to receive a first message sent by a remote terminal by using a relay terminal, where the first message includes a first identifier of the remote terminal And an acquiring unit, configured to obtain an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the sending unit is configured to send a first request message to the user data server, where the first request message includes the first identifier information
- the receiving unit is further configured to receive the user a response message of the first request message returned by the data server, the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal
- the acquiring unit configured to use the first identifier of the remote terminal and the remote
- the IMSI of the terminal obtains the IMSI of the remote terminal; or the sending unit is further configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and send the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs a second request message, the second request message includes the first identifier information, and the receiving unit is further configured to receive the second request message returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs
- the response message includes the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the determining unit is configured to determine, according to the length of the first identifier information, identifier information of the remote terminal as the first identifier information, or an indication unit, where the mobility management entity is configured according to The indication information in the first identifier information indicates that the identifier information of the remote terminal is the first identifier information.
- the identifier information may be determined to be the first identifier information by using the identifier information, or the identifier information may be the first identifier information, and the identifier information is the first identifier information.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- PRUK ID instead of IMSI avoids the interception of IMSI by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the protection of the user privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection apparatus, including: a communication connection unit, configured to establish a communication connection with a relay terminal; and an obtaining unit, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal, the remote The root key of the terminal is used to protect communication between the remote terminal and the relay terminal; and an encryption unit is generated, configured to generate a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and adopt the first
- the first information is encrypted by the key, the first information includes an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal, and the sending unit is configured to send a second message to the mobility management entity, where the second message includes an encrypted A message and an identification of the root key of the remote terminal.
- the relay terminal By using the IMSI as the first message and encrypting the first key generated by the root message by using the root key, the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the pair is implemented. Protection of user privacy.
- the generating an encryption unit is further configured to generate a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and perform integrity protection on the first information by using the second key.
- Generating MAC information; the second message further includes the MAC information.
- At least the first information is integrity-protected by using the second key, thereby ensuring that the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI and realizing the protection of the user privacy.
- the second message further includes at least one of the following: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the first message encryption and/or integrity protection algorithm identification information is added in the second message to facilitate decryption and verification of the second information by the mobility management entity.
- the communication connection unit is configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, where the A request message includes first identification information of the remote terminal.
- the first identifier information is any one of the following identifiers: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery
- the public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device By using one of the above multiple identifiers instead of the IMSI, the IMSI is prevented from being intercepted by the relay terminal, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, including: a receiving unit, configured to receive a second request message sent by a relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, The second request message is used to request to acquire a root key for communicating with the remote terminal; the obtaining unit is configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal and identification information of the root key; and a sending unit, configured to: Sending the root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key to the user data server, or the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key to the A mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the convenient mobility management entity Obtaining a root key and a root key identifier of the remote terminal communication by using the second request message, and then identifying the root key and the root key of the mobility management entity,
- the convenient mobility management entity generates the first key and the second key according to the identifier of the root key before decrypting the second message, thereby decrypting and verifying the second information.
- the sending unit is configured to send, by the user data server, the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the relay terminal by using a user data server. Mobility management entity.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, including: a receiving unit, configured to receive a first message sent by a remote terminal, where the first message includes the encrypted first information and the remote terminal An identifier of the root key, the first information includes an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal, and an obtaining unit, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal; And a decryption unit, configured to generate a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and decrypt the first information by using the first key to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the relay terminal By using the IMSI as the first message and encrypting the first key generated by the root message by using the root key, the relay terminal does not obtain the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and the pair is implemented. Protection of user privacy.
- the first message further includes MAC information, where the MAC information is generated after the remote terminal performs integrity protection on the first information, and the generating decryption unit is further used. Generating a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and verifying the MAC information by using the second key to verify the integrity of the first information. The second key is used to perform at least integrity protection on the first information to verify the integrity of the first information, thereby implementing protection of user privacy.
- the first message further includes at least one of: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information; when the first message includes the encryption When the algorithm identifies the information, the generating and decrypting unit is further configured to decrypt the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information; or, when the first message includes When the integrity protection algorithm identifies the information, the generating and decrypting unit is further configured to: use the second key to verify the MAC information according to the integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identifier information; or, when When the first message includes the encryption algorithm identification information and the integrity protection algorithm identification information, the generating and decrypting unit is further configured to use the first encryption according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information.
- the mobility management entity performs integrity protection corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identification information Method, using the second authentication key information to the MAC.
- the first message encryption or integrity protection algorithm identification information is added in the second message to facilitate decryption and verification of the second information by the mobility management entity.
- the acquiring unit is configured to send a second request message to the user data server, where the second request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and the receiving user a response message of the second request message returned by the data server, the response message including a root key of the remote terminal; or, according to the saved root key of the remote terminal and the root key of the remote terminal Determining a root key of the remote terminal in a correspondence relationship of the identification information; or determining a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, returning to the relay terminal
- the mobility management entity of the genus sends a third request message, where the third request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and the mobility management entity that receives the relay terminal belongs to return
- the third request message response message includes a root key of the remote terminal.
- the privacy protection method when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification.
- the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI is avoided, and the protection of the user's privacy is realized.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the transceiver sends a first message to the mobility management entity by using the relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the first message is used by the mobility management entity according to the The first identification information of the remote terminal obtains an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal; wherein the first identity information is a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the transceiver is further configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish establishment between the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the first request message includes second identification information of the remote terminal, the second identification information is used by the network device to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal, and the processor is configured to pass the medium And obtaining, by the terminal, the first identifier information sent by the network device.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery The public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the transceiver is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information or second identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is the relay After receiving the first request message of the remote terminal, the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal;
- the processor is configured to obtain the first identification information and an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the transceiver is further configured to send the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal to a user data server, so that the user data server saves the correspondence between the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal a relationship; or, the network device sends the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal to a mobility management entity, so that the mobility management entity saves the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal Correspondence.
- the processor is configured to determine an IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identifier information, thereby obtaining the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal; or, according to the first Two identification information Determining an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal, the network device generating the first identity information, and the network device obtaining the first identity information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the sending unit is configured to send a third request message to the user data server, where the third request message includes the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the transceiver is configured to send a fourth request message to a user data server, so that the user data server sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity; the fourth request The message includes the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal, and the fifth request message includes the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first identifier information of the remote terminal is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery The public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the transceiver is configured to receive a first message sent by the remote terminal by using the relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal;
- the processor is configured to obtain an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the transceiver is further configured to send a first request message to the user data server, where the first request message includes the first identifier information, and the location returned by the user data server is received. a response message of the first request message, the response message including an IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the processor is configured to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal according to the stored correspondence between the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the transceiver is further configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and send a second request message to a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, where the second request message includes the first
- the identifier information includes a response message of the second request message returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the processor is further configured to determine, according to the length of the first identifier information, identifier information of the remote terminal as the first identifier information; or, according to the first identifier information The indication information in the indication that the identification information of the remote terminal is the first identification information.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the processor is configured to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, obtain a root key of the remote terminal, and use a root key of the remote terminal to protect communication between the remote terminal and the relay terminal Generating a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and encrypting the first information by using the first key, the first information including an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the transceiver is configured to send a second message to the mobility management entity, where the second message includes an encrypted first message and an identifier of a root key of the remote terminal.
- the processor is further configured to generate a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and perform integrity protection on the first information by using the second key, Generating MAC information; the second message further includes the MAC information.
- the second message further includes at least one of the following: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the transceiver is further configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, where the A request message includes first identification information of the remote terminal.
- the first identifier information is any one of the following identifiers: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote a pilot interaction identifier B-TID generated by the terminal through the boot process, a push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and a identifier or a location for the discovery The public identity of the remote terminal allocated by the network device.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the transceiver is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is used to request to obtain communication with the remote terminal. Root key
- the processor is configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal and identifier information of the root key
- the transceiver is further configured to send the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to a user data server, or the network device uses a root key of the remote terminal and the root
- the identification information of the key is sent to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the transceiver is further configured to send, by the user equipment, the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the relay by using the user data server.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a privacy protection device, where the device includes: a processor, a memory, and a transceiver;
- the transceiver is configured to receive a first message sent by a remote terminal, where the first message includes an encrypted first information and an identifier of a root key of the remote terminal, where the first information includes the remote terminal International mobile subscriber identity IMSI;
- the processor is configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal; generate a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and decrypt the first key
- the first information obtains an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first message further includes MAC information, where the MAC information is generated after the remote terminal performs integrity protection on the first information.
- the processor is further configured to generate a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and verify the MAC information by using the second key to verify the integrity of the first information.
- the first message further includes at least one of the following: an encryption algorithm identifier information used by the remote terminal, or an integrity protection algorithm identifier information,
- the processor is further configured to: decrypt the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information; or The processor is further configured to use the second key verification according to the integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identifier information, when the first message includes the integrity protection algorithm identifier information.
- the transceiver is configured to send a second request message to the user data server, where the second request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and the receiving user a response message of the second request message returned by the data server, the response message including a root key of the remote terminal; or the processor, configured to save the root key and the remote terminal according to the Determining a root key of the remote terminal in a correspondence relationship between the identification information of the root key of the remote terminal; or the processor, configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, the transceiver The mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs sends a third request message, where the third request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives the mobile of the relay terminal The third request message response message returned by the sex management entity, where the response message includes a root key of the remote terminal.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions, wherein when the instruction is run on a computer, the computer is caused to perform the first aspect, the second aspect, and the third aspect.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium, wherein the computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, where the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the first aspect, The method of the second aspect, the third aspect, the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect or the sixth aspect.
- the privacy protection method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI and realizing the protection of the user privacy; Or the encryption and integrity protection is performed on the message sent by the remote terminal, and the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification, thereby avoiding the situation that the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI of the remote terminal and realizing the protection of the user's privacy.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system for a remote terminal to access a network through a relay terminal according to an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 2 is a signaling interaction diagram of a method for privacy protection according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG. 3 is a signaling interaction diagram of another method for privacy protection according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a first privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a second privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a third privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a fourth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a fifth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a sixth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a first privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a second privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a third privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a fourth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a fifth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of hardware of a sixth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- a remote terminal establishes a short-range communication connection with a relay terminal, and the remote terminal can be attached to the network through a relay terminal, and further, the remote terminal It is also possible to interact with the network device and the core network device through the relay terminal, and then attach to the network through the relay network.
- the short-range communication connection may be a connection mode such as a Bluetooth or a WiFi, and may also be another short-distance communication connection mode, which is not limited in this application.
- the remote terminal can be a wearable device such as a smart watch, a smart bracelet or smart glasses.
- the first terminal may include a terminal in LTE and a 5G scenario.
- the relay terminal may include terminals in LTE and 5G scenarios, such as a mobile phone or a mobile phone, a Tablet Personal Computer (TPC), a laptop computer, a digital camera, a digital camera, a projection device, and a wearable device.
- Wearable Device Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), e-Book Reader, Virtual Reality Intelligent Device, Digital Broadcast Terminal, Messaging Device, Game Console, Medical Equipment, Fitness A terminal such as a device or a scanner.
- PDA Personal Digital Assistant
- e-Book Reader Virtual Reality Intelligent Device
- Digital Broadcast Terminal such as a device or a scanner.
- the network device may be a device that provides Proximity Service (Prose) for remote terminals and relay terminals, such as a Proximity Key Management Function (PKMF) entity, or a Prosity Function device. Or a functional entity that is combined; the network device can also be other types of application servers.
- Proximity Service Prose
- PKMF Proximity Key Management Function
- the network device can also be other types of application servers.
- the core network device device may be a mobility management entity or a user data server
- the mobility management entity may be a mobility management entity (MME) in a 4G network, or may be a device responsible for mobility management in a 5G network.
- MME mobility management entity
- AMF access and mobility management function
- the user data server may be a home subscriber server (HSS) of the 4G network, or a device responsible for storing user data in the 5G network, for example, unified data management (UDM).
- HSS home subscriber server
- UDM unified data management
- the mobility management entity MME in the 4G network and the home subscription user server HSS in the 4G network are taken as an example for description.
- the “first request message”, the “second request message”, the “third request message”, the “fourth request message”, the “fifth request message”, “the first” “identification information”, “second identification information”, and “first”, “second”, and “third” in “first message” and “second message” are used to distinguish request messages, identifiers or messages, and The request message, the identity or the message itself is not restricted.
- the remote terminal may be referred to as a remote device or an eRemote UE
- the relay terminal may be referred to as a relay UE or an eRelay UE.
- the embodiment of the present application can complete privacy protection through two schemes.
- Solution 1 In the process of establishing communication between the remote terminal and the relay terminal, the ProSe User Key Identity (PRUK ID) is used instead of the IMSI;
- Option 2 the proximity service relay user using the remote terminal
- PRUK generates a key for the encryption and integrity protection IMSI (Key_int_IMSI, Key_enc_IMSI) to encrypt and integrity protect the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- FIG. 2 is a signaling interaction diagram of a method for privacy protection according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 2, the method can include the following steps:
- the remote terminal sends a first request message to the relay terminal.
- the eRemote UE After the eRemote UE finds the eRelay UE, it sends a first request message to the eRelay UE, where the first request message may be: a direct communication request message, to request to establish a communication connection between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE.
- the first request message includes first identifier information or second identifier information of the eRemote UE.
- the first identifier information may be, but not limited to, a pro-relay user key identity (PRUK ID) of the eRemote UE, and the proximity of the remote terminal.
- PRUK ID pro-relay user key identity
- the service relay user key is a root key of the remote terminal and is allocated by the network device for generating a root key for communicating with the relay terminal, and protecting the security of communication between the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the second identifier information may be, but not limited to, a mobile subscriber international ISDN/PSTN number (MSISDN) of the eRemote UE, and an eRemote UE generated by the boot process.
- MSISDN mobile subscriber international ISDN/PSTN number
- the temporary private identity, the pilot interaction identifier generated by the eRemote UE through the boot process, the B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the eRemote UE through the network device, and the identifier or network device allocated by the network device for discovery The public identity of the assigned eRemote UE, where the second identity information may be any one of the above identifiers.
- the eRelay UE After the eRelay UE receives the first request message sent by the eRemote UE, the eRelay UE sends the network message to the network device. And sending the second request message, where the second request message includes the first identifier information or the second identifier information of the eRemote UE, where the first identifier information or the second identifier information of the eRemote UE is obtained from the first request message.
- the second request message may be a key request message.
- the network device obtains the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the network device saves according to the The correspondence between the first identification information and the eRemote UE determines the IMSI of the eRemote UE, thereby obtaining the first identification information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- PRUK ID first identifier information
- the network device saves according to the The correspondence between the first identification information and the eRemote UE determines the IMSI of the eRemote UE, thereby obtaining the first identification information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the network device determines the IMSI of the eRemote UE according to the second identifier information. For example, the network device may request the bootstrap server function (BSF) to obtain the IMSI of the eRemote UE, and the BSF returns the IMSI of the eRemote UE to the network device according to the correspondence between the second identifier information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE; or the network device The IMSI of the eRemote UE may also be obtained according to the correspondence between the second identifier and the IMSI saved by itself.
- BSF bootstrap server function
- the network device performs a booting process of the push mode according to the IMSI of the eRemote UE, the network device generates the push process temporary identifier P-TID, acquires the GPI and Ks(_int/ext)_NAF of the eRemote UE from the BSF; or the network device from the HSS GPI and Ks(_int/ext)_NAF are generated locally after obtaining the authentication vector, where Ks(_int/ext)_NAF is a key generated by the universal boot process based on the push mode for communicating with the network device, and the Ks obtained by the network device (_int/ext)_NAF is the PRUK of the remote terminal, and the P-TID is used as the PRUK ID, that is, the first identification information, so the network device obtains the first identification information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- P-TID is used as the PRUK ID, that is, the first identification information
- the network device determines, according to the second identifier information, an IMSI of the eRemote UE, for example, the network device may perform a boot server function ( The Bootstrapping server function (BSF) requests to obtain the IMSI of the eRemote UE, and the BSF returns the IMSI of the eRemote UE to the network device according to the correspondence between the second identifier information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE; or the network device may also save the second identifier and the IMSI according to itself.
- the Bootstrapping server function BSF
- the network device uses the Ks(_int/ext)_NAF corresponding to the B-TID or the P-TID as the PRUK, the B-TID or the P-TID as the first identification information, and the first identification information is the PRUK ID, so the network device obtains the first Identification information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the network device performs a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the network device generates a root key for eRemote UE and eRelay UE communication based on the obtained PRUK of the eRemote UE, and transmits the root key to the eRelay UE to assist in establishing a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal. This process is prior art and will not be described here.
- the network device sends the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal to the HSS.
- the network device sends a third request message to the home subscriber server HSS, where the third request message includes the first identity information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the network device sends the first identity information and the IMSI of the remote terminal to the mobility management entity.
- the network device sends a fourth request message to the HSS, so that the HSS sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity;
- the fourth request message includes the first identifier information and the IMSI of the eRemote UE, and the fifth request message includes the first identifier.
- Information and IMRe of the eRemote UE are examples of the network device.
- S205 and S206 are two optional steps, that is, any one of S205 and S206 may be selected as the steps implemented in the present application, and the following steps are performed.
- the mobility management entity receives the first message sent by the remote terminal through the relay terminal.
- the first message includes first identification information of the eRemote UE.
- the first message may be an attach message sent by the eRemote UE, or an identity response message returned by the eRemote UE in response to the mobility management entity identity request.
- the eRemote UE needs to use the IMSI as the identity of the eRemote UE, in order to hide the IMSI, the eRemote UE should The first identification information is used as the identifier of the eRemote UE.
- the identifier of the eRemote UE includes the indication information indicating that the identifier is the first identifier information, such as 2 bits before the first identifier information, where 01 indicates the identifier of the eRemote UE. Is the first identification information.
- the mobility management entity obtains an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the mobility management entity sends a sixth request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the sixth request message includes the first identifier information, and receives the response message of the sixth request message returned by the HSS.
- the response message includes the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the sixth request message may be an authentication data request message, and the response message is an authentication data response message.
- the mobility management entity obtains the IMSI of the eRemote UE according to the correspondence between the first identifier of the saved eRemote UE and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the mobility management entity may save the correspondence between the first identifier of the eRemote UE and the IMSI of the eRemote UE by using the step S106.
- the eRemote UE When the first message is an attach message, the eRemote UE first attaches to the network through the eRelay UE, eRelay UE The eNB routes the attach message message to the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, so the mobility management entity obtains the IMSI of the eRemote UE according to the correspondence between the first identifier of the saved eRemote UE and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the mobility management entity determines the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, and sends a seventh request message to the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, where the seventh request message includes the first identifier information. And receiving a response message of the seventh request message returned by the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, where the response message includes an IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the attach message of the eRemote UE is not routed to the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, and the other mobility management entity is selected as the mobility management entity of the eRemote UE, the mobility management entity shall attach Obtaining the identifier of the eRelay UE in the message or the S1-AP protocol message, determining the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, obtaining the IMSI of the eRemote UE from the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, and how the specific mobility management entity obtains the eRelay UE identity.
- the application does not limit the implementation scheme in which the HSS and the mobility management entity maintain the correspondence between the first identifier information of the eRemote UE and the IMSI of the eRemote UE.
- the HSS may be stored in the data of the eRemote UE, and the mobility management entity may be saved in the eRemote UE.
- the eRelay UE or in the context of receiving the eRelay UE identity.
- the mobility management entity or the HSS may determine that the identifier of the eRmote UE is the first identifier according to the indication information.
- the identifier of the eRmote UE is obtained as the first identifier by using the first identifier length, for example, the length of the PRUK ID is 64 bits, and the length of the IMSI is different.
- the method for privacy protection provided by the embodiment of the present application is adopted when a remote terminal is attached to a network through a relay terminal.
- the PRUK ID replaces the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation where the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI and realizes the protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 3 is a signaling interaction diagram of another method for privacy protection according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 3, the method may include the following steps:
- the remote terminal sends a first request message to the relay terminal.
- the eRemote UE After the eRemote UE finds the eRelay UE, it sends a first request message to the eRelay UE, where the first request message may be: a direct communication request message, to request to establish a communication connection between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE, where the first request message includes the eRemote UE Identification information.
- the first request message may be: a direct communication request message, to request to establish a communication connection between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE, where the first request message includes the eRemote UE Identification information.
- the identifier information may be, but is not limited to, the PRUK ID of the eRemote UE, the MSISDN of the eRemote UE, the temporary private identity generated by the eRemote UE through the boot process, the boot interaction identifier generated by the eRemote UE through the boot process, the B-TID, and the eRemote UE through the network device.
- the public identification identifier of the eRemote UE that is generated by the initiating the push-pushing process, the P-TID generated by the network device, the identifier for the discovery, or the eRemote UE allocated by the network device, where the first identifier information may be any one of the above identifiers.
- the first identifier information may be any one of the above identifiers.
- the eRelay UE After the eRelay UE receives the first request message sent by the eRemote UE, the eRelay UE sends a second request message to the network device, where the second request message may be a key request key request message, and the second request message is used to request to obtain the eRemote The root key of the UE communication.
- the second request message includes identification information of the eRemote UE obtained from the first request message.
- the network device obtains a root key of the remote terminal and identifier information of the root key.
- the root key of the remote terminal is PRUK
- the identification information of the root key is PRUK ID.
- the network device obtains the PRUK according to the PRUK ID because the correspondence between the PRUK ID and the PRUK is stored on the network device.
- the network device obtains the IMSI of the eRemote UE according to the identifier information of the eRemote UE, and the manner of obtaining the IMSI is the same as the method in step 203 in FIG. 2 . Therefore, the network device obtains the GPI information of the eRemote UE according to the IMSI.
- the GPI information is obtained by the network device based on the general boot process of the push mode. According to the implementation of the network architecture, the PKMF can obtain the GPI information or the PKMF directly.
- the authentication vector of the eRemote UE and locally generates GPI information according to the authentication vector.
- the PKMF obtains the GPI and also obtains the key Ks(_int/ext)_NAF, and the Ks(_int/ext)_NAF is generated based on the general boot process of the push mode.
- the PRUK ID may specifically be a UL NAF SA Identifier.
- the PRUK ID may also be a random number RAND in the GPI information.
- the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the home subscription subscriber server HSS.
- the identifier of the eRemote UE or the identifier of the eRelay UE may be sent to the HSS together with the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key, such as the IMSI of the eRelay UE and the eRemote UE.
- the method of saving the root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key is not limited herein.
- the HSS may store the root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key in the data of the eRemote UE or the data of the eRelay UE.
- the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the network device sends the root key of the eRemote UE and the identifier information of the root key to the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs by using the HSS.
- This process can be achieved by the following substeps:
- the network device sends an update proximity service policy data request message to the HSS, where the PRUK and the PRUK ID of the eRemote UE are included, and the step further includes an identifier of the eRelay UE, such as an IMSI of the eRelay UE.
- the HSS updates the data on the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs by inserting the subscription data message, and the PRUK and PRUK ID may be saved on the mobility management entity of the eRelay UE, or the context of the eRelay UE stored on the mobility management entity. in.
- the MME returns a response response message for inserting the subscription data message.
- S304 and S305 are two optional steps, and any one of S304 and S305 can be selected as the step implemented in the present application.
- the network device returns a response message of the second request message to the relay terminal.
- the network device performs other procedures of establishing a communication connection between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE, generates a root key Kd for communication between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE, and generates a fresh parameter of the root key.
- the response message includes the identifier of the Remote UE, the Kd generated by the network device, and the fresh parameter for generating the root key. If the network device obtains GPI, it should also contain GPI information.
- the relay terminal sends a direct security mode command to the remote terminal.
- the eRelay UE After receiving the key response message, the eRelay UE sends a direct security mode command to the eRemote UE to perform security negotiation with the eRemote UE, where the Kd, Kd freshness parameters and GPI information received in the key response message are included.
- the remote terminal returns a direct security mode complete message.
- the eRemote UE generates Kd according to the root key PRUK of the eRemote UE, and further protects communication between the eRemote UE and the eRelay UE based on the Kd generation session key. In this step:
- the PRUK is the root key of the eRemote UE.
- the eRemote UE If the eRemote UE does not configure the PRUK and the PRUK ID, the eRemote UE generates Ks(_int/ext)_NAF according to the GPI information received in step S207, uses Ks(_int/ext)_NAF as the PRUK, and uses the P-TID in the GPI information as PRUK ID.
- the relay terminal returns a direct communication acceptance message.
- the remote terminal sends a first message to the core network mobile new management entity.
- the first message may be an attach message sent by the eRemote UE, or an identity response message returned by the eRemote UE in response to the mobility management entity identity request.
- the eRemote UE needs to use the IMSI as the identity of the eRemote UE, in order to hide the IMSI, the eRemote UE should The first identification information is used as the identifier of the eRemote UE.
- the first message includes first information, wherein the first information includes an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the remote terminal generates a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and encrypts the first information by using the first key.
- the eRemote UE generates Key_enc_IMSI according to PRUK, and Key_enc_IMSI is an encryption key. among them,
- the encryption algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE may also be an input information for generating Key_enc_IMSI.
- the eRemote UE encrypts the first information based on the selected encryption algorithm with Key_enc_IMSI.
- the first information may further include other parameters in the first message, such as non-security related parameters of the eRemote UE, and may not include an encryption algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE, an integrity protection algorithm identifier of step S209, and a PRUK ID.
- other parameters in the first message such as non-security related parameters of the eRemote UE, and may not include an encryption algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE, an integrity protection algorithm identifier of step S209, and a PRUK ID.
- the remote terminal generates a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and performs integrity protection on the first information by using the second key to generate MAC information.
- the eRemote UE generates Key_int_IMSI according to PRUK, and Key_int_IMSI is an integrity protection key.
- the integrity protection algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE may also be an input information for generating Key_int_IMSI.
- the eRemote UE uses the Key_int_IMSI to perform integrity protection on the first information based on the selected integrity protection algorithm to generate MAC information.
- the first information may include other parameters in the first message, and the eRemote UE may perform integrity protection on the first information and other information, and may perform integrity protection on the first message to generate MAC information.
- the integrity protection input information also includes fresh information, which may be time information, or NAS count, or an SQN value obtained by the eRemote UE through the AUTN in the GPI information.
- the order in which the eRemote UE performs encryption and integrity is not limited, that is, the MAC information generated by the eRemote UE may be obtained by performing integrity protection on the encrypted or unencrypted first information.
- the remote terminal sends a first message to the mobility management entity.
- the first message includes the encrypted first information, the MAC information, the encryption algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE, the integrity protection algorithm identifier selected by the eRemote UE, the PRUK ID, and other parameters of the first message.
- the mobility management entity receives the first message sent by the remote terminal.
- the mobility management entity obtains a root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal.
- the mobility management entity can obtain the root key of the remote terminal in the following manner:
- the mobility management entity sends a fourth request message to the home subscriber server HSS, where the fourth request message includes an identifier of the root key of the eRemote UE received from the first message, and a response message of the fourth request message returned by the HSS, and the response
- the message includes the root key of the eRemote UE; or,
- the mobility management entity If the mobility management entity has saved the correspondence between the root key of the eRemote UE and the identity information of the root key of the eRemote UE, the mobility management entity according to the root key of the saved eRemote UE and the root key of the eRemote UE Determining the root key of the eRemote UE in the correspondence relationship of the identification information; or
- the mobility management entity may also determine the mobility of the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs and to the eRelay UE.
- the management entity sends a fifth request message, where the fifth request message includes an identifier of the root key of the eRemote UE received from the first message, and receives a fifth request message response message returned by the mobility management entity to which the eRelay UE belongs, in the response message Contains the root key of the eRemote UE.
- the mobility management entity generates a symmetric key of the first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and decrypts the first information by using a symmetric key of the first key to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the mobility management entity generates a symmetric key of Key_enc_IMSI in the same manner as step S208, according to the The encryption algorithm in a message decrypts the first information by using the symmetric key of Key_enc_IMSI, thereby obtaining the IMSI in the first information.
- the following steps may be performed:
- the mobility management entity generates a symmetric key of the second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and uses the symmetric key of the second key to verify the MAC information to verify the integrity of the information including at least the first information.
- the mobility management entity generates a symmetric key of Key_int_IMSI in the same manner as step S209, and verifies the MAC by using the symmetric key of Key_int_IMSI according to the integrity protection algorithm in the first message, thereby verifying the integrity.
- the mobility management entity should also verify the legitimacy of the fresh information, specifically:
- the fresh information is time information
- the fresh information is SQN
- the MME sends the SQN to the HSS/Auc, requesting the HSS/Auc to verify the validity of the SQN.
- the order in which the mobility management entity decrypts and verifies the integrity depends on the order in which the eRemote UE performs encryption and integrity protection, which is not limited herein.
- the mobility management entity continues to perform other processes of the first message.
- the mobility management entity may obtain an authentication vector of the eRemote UE, initiate authentication for the eRemote UE, and create a context for the eRemote UE after the authentication is passed.
- the mobility management entity may save the obtained root key and root key identifier of the eRemote UE in the context of the eRemote UE, and the root key and the root key identifier of the saved eRemote UE are valid for a certain period of time. Or valid for a certain number of uses.
- the remote terminal when the remote terminal is attached to the network through the relay terminal, the remote terminal encrypts the first information by using the root key and at least performs integrity protection on the first information;
- the sex management entity obtains the root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal, and then decrypts the encrypted first information to obtain the IMSI and verifies the integrity of the information including at least the first information, thereby realizing the privacy of the user. protection of.
- the solution of the embodiment of the present application is mainly introduced from the perspective of interaction between a remote terminal, a relay terminal, a network device, and a mobility management entity.
- the remote terminal, the relay terminal, the network device, the mobility management entity, and the like in order to implement the above functions, include hardware structures and/or software modules corresponding to each function.
- the present application can be implemented in a combination of hardware or hardware and computer software in combination with the elements and algorithm steps of the various examples described in the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is implemented in hardware or computer software to drive hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the solution. A person skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each particular application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present application.
- the embodiments of the present application may perform functional unit division on an access network device, a terminal device, and the like according to the foregoing method.
- each functional unit may be divided according to each function, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing.
- the above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit. It should be noted that the division of the unit in the embodiment of the present application is schematic, and is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be another division manner.
- FIG. 4 shows a first possible schematic diagram of a privacy-protected device involved in the above embodiment, which may be a remote terminal (eRemote UE).
- the device includes:
- the sending unit 401 sends a first message to the mobility management entity by using the relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the first message is used by the mobility management entity according to the The first identification information of the remote terminal obtains the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal; wherein the first identity information is a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the sending unit 401 is further configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal, where the A request message includes second identification information of the remote terminal, the second identification information is used by the network device to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal, and the device further includes: an obtaining unit 402, configured to pass the relay terminal Obtaining the first identifier information sent by the network device.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile user international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as a remote terminal in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the remote terminal in FIG. 2, and uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI. Protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 5 shows a second possible schematic diagram of the privacy-protected device involved in the above embodiment, and the privacy-protected device may be a network device. As shown in Figure 5, the device includes:
- the receiving unit 501 is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information or second identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is the relay terminal
- the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal
- the obtaining unit 502 is configured to obtain the The first identification information and the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal
- the sending unit 503 configured to send the first identity information and the IMSI of the remote terminal to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, so that the HSS is saved a correspondence between the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal
- the network device sends the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal to a mobility management entity to enable the mobility management The entity saves the correspondence between the first identification information and the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the obtaining unit 502 is configured to determine, according to the first identifier information, an IMSI of the remote terminal, to obtain the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal; or, according to the second identifier information Determining an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal, the network device generating the first identity information, and the network device obtaining the first identity information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the sending unit 503 is configured to send a third request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS.
- the third request message includes the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the sending unit 503 is configured to send a fourth request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, so that the HSS sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity, where the fourth request message includes Determining first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal, the fifth request message including the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile user international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as the network device in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the network device in FIG. 2, and uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI. Protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 6 shows a third possible structural diagram of the privacy-protected device involved in the above embodiment, and the privacy-protected device may be a core network device. As shown in Figure 6, the device includes:
- the receiving unit 601 is configured to receive a first message sent by the remote terminal by using the relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the acquiring unit 602 is configured to use, according to the first identifier of the remote terminal The information obtains the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the device further includes: a sending unit 603, configured to send a first request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the first request message includes the first identifier information, and the receiving unit 601 further a response message for receiving the first request message returned by the HSS, where the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal; or the obtaining unit 602 is configured to use, according to the saved first identifier information, The corresponding relationship of the IMSI of the remote terminal obtains the IMSI of the remote terminal; or the sending unit 603 is further configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and move to the relay terminal The second management message is sent by the mobility management entity, where the second request message includes the first identifier information, and the receiving unit 601 is further configured to receive the location returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs. And a response message of the second request message, where the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- a sending unit 603 configured to send a first request message to the home subscription subscriber server H
- the device further includes: a determining unit 604, configured to determine, according to the length of the first identifier information, identifier information of the remote terminal as the first identifier information; or, an indication unit 605, configured to The indication information in the first identifier information indicates that the identifier information of the remote terminal is the first identifier information.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the above privacy-protected device can be used as a mobility management entity in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the mobility management entity in FIG. 2, and replaces the remote terminal IMSI with the PRUK ID, thereby avoiding interception of the relay terminal.
- the remote terminal IMSI the protection of user privacy is achieved.
- FIG. 7 shows the first embodiment of the privacy-protected device involved in the above embodiment.
- the privacy protected device can be a remote terminal.
- the device includes:
- a communication connection unit 701 configured to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal; an obtaining unit 702, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal, where the root key of the remote terminal is used to protect the remote terminal and the middle a communication between the terminals; a generating encryption unit 703, configured to generate a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and encrypt the first information by using the first key, where the first information includes The international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal; the sending unit 704, configured to send the second message to the mobility management entity, where the second message includes the encrypted first message and the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal.
- the generating and encrypting unit 703 is further configured to generate a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and perform integrity protection on the first information by using the second key to generate a MAC.
- Information the second message further includes the MAC information.
- the second message further includes at least one of the following: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the communication connection unit 701 is configured to send a first request message to the relay terminal, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, where the first request message is The first identification information of the remote terminal is included.
- the first identifier information is any one of the following identifiers: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as a remote terminal in the privacy protection method of FIG. 3, and performs the steps performed by the remote terminal in FIG. 3, and encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message.
- the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the remote terminal IMSI, and the protection of user privacy is realized.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing a fifth possible structure of the privacy-protected device involved in the foregoing embodiment, where the privacy-protected device may be a network device, as shown in FIG. :
- the receiving unit 801 is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is used to request to acquire a root that communicates with the remote terminal.
- a key 802 configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal and identification information of the root key
- a sending unit 803, configured to: use a root key of the remote terminal and the root key
- the identification information is sent to the home subscriber server HSS, or the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identity information of the root key to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the sending unit 803 is configured to send, by the HSS, the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as the network device in the privacy protection method of FIG. 3, and performs the steps performed by the network device in FIG. 3, and encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message.
- the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the IMSI, and realizes the hiddenness to the user. Private protection.
- FIG. 9 shows a sixth possible schematic diagram of the privacy-protected device involved in the above embodiment, and the privacy-protected device may be a network device. As shown in Figure 9, the device includes:
- the receiving unit 901 is configured to receive a first message sent by the remote terminal, where the first message includes the encrypted first information and an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal, where the first information includes an international a mobile subscriber identity IMSI; an obtaining unit 902, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal; and generate a decryption unit 903, configured to generate a root key according to the remote terminal Decrypting the first information with a first key to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first message further includes at least one of: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information; when the first message includes the encryption algorithm identification information
- the generating and decrypting unit 903 is further configured to decrypt the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information; or when the first message includes the integrity
- the protection decryption unit 903 is further configured to: use the second key to verify the MAC information according to an integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identifier information; or
- the generating and decrypting unit 903 is further configured to adopt the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information. Decrypting the first information; and the mobility management entity according to the integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identification information The second verification key information to the MAC.
- the first message further includes the encryption and/or integrity protection algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal
- the generating and decrypting unit 903 is further configured to: according to the encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identification information, Decrypting the first information by using the first key; and/or verifying the MAC information by using the second key according to an integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the obtaining unit 902 is configured to send a second request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the second request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives the HSS return.
- the response message of the second request message, the response message includes a root key of the remote terminal; or, according to the saved root key of the remote terminal and the identification information of the root key of the remote terminal Determining a root key of the remote terminal; or determining a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and transmitting a third request message to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, the third request
- the message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives the third request message response message returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, where the response message includes The root key of the remote terminal.
- the above privacy-protected device can be used as a mobility management entity in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the mobility management entity in FIG. 2, by encrypting the first message and at least completing the first message.
- sexual protection the mobility management entity decrypts and verifies, and thus avoids the interception of the IMSI by the relay terminal, and realizes the protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 10 is a hardware structural diagram of a first privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 10, the device includes a processor 1010, a memory 1020, and a transceiver 1030. among them:
- the processor 1010 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or a combination of a CPU and a hardware chip.
- the hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof.
- the PLD may be a complex programmable logic device (CPLD), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a general array logic (GAL), or any combination thereof.
- the memory 1020 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data.
- the memory 1020 can transfer the stored data to the processor 1010.
- the memory 1020 can include volatile memory, such as nonvolatile random access memory (NVRAM), phase change RAM (PRAM), and magnetoresistive random access memory (magetoresistive).
- NVRAM nonvolatile random access memory
- PRAM phase change RAM
- MRAM magnetoresistive random access memory
- RAM, MRAM, etc. may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory device, such as anti-flash memory (NOR flash memory) or NAND flash memory, semiconductor devices, such as solid state disk (SSD).
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- flash memory device such as anti-flash memory (NOR flash memory) or NAND flash memory
- SSD solid state disk
- the memory 1020 may also include a combination of the above types of memories.
- the memory 1020 can be integrated in the processor 1010 or can exist independently.
- the transceiver 1030 is configured to send, by using a relay terminal, a first message to a mobility management entity, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the first message is used for the mobility management
- the entity obtains an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identity information of the remote terminal, where the first identity information is a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the transceiver 1030 is further configured to send, to the relay terminal, a first request message, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal.
- the first request message includes second identifier information of the remote terminal, the second identifier information is used by the network device to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal, and the processor 1010 is configured to pass the relay terminal. Obtaining the first identifier information sent by the network device.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile user international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as a remote terminal in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the remote terminal in FIG. 2, and uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the remote terminal IMSI. , to achieve the protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 11 is a hardware structural diagram of a second privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 11, the device includes: a processor 1110, a memory 1120, and a transceiver 1130. among them:
- the processor 1110 can be the same as the processor 1010.
- Memory 1120 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data.
- the memory 1120 can be coupled to the memory 1020 the same.
- the memory 1120 can be integrated in the processor 1110 or can exist independently.
- the transceiver 1130 is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information or second identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is the middle After the terminal sends the first request message of the remote terminal, the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection between the remote terminal and the relay terminal;
- the processor 1110 is configured to obtain the first identifier information and an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the transceiver 1130 is further configured to send the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, so that the HSS saves the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the network device sends the first identifier information and the IMSI of the remote terminal to the mobility management entity, so that the mobility management entity saves the first identifier information and the remote terminal.
- the processor 1110 is configured to determine an IMSI of the remote terminal according to the first identifier information, thereby obtaining the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal; or, according to the second identifier information Determining an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) of the remote terminal, the network device generating the first identity information, and the network device obtaining the first identity information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- the transceiver 1130 is configured to send a third request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the third request message includes the first identifier information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the transceiver 1130 is configured to send a fourth request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, so that the HSS sends a fifth request message to the mobility management entity, where the fourth request message includes Determining first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal, the fifth request message including the first identification information and an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first identifier information of the remote terminal is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the second identifier information of the remote terminal is any one of the following: the remote terminal mobile user international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as the network device in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the network device in FIG. 2, and uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI, thereby preventing the relay terminal from intercepting the remote terminal IMSI. , to achieve the protection of user privacy.
- FIG. 12 is a hardware structural diagram of a third privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 12, the device includes a processor 1210, a memory 1220, and a transceiver 1230. among them:
- the processor 1210 can be the same as the processor 1010.
- Memory 1220 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data. Memory 1220 can be the same as memory 1020.
- the memory 1220 can be integrated in the processor 1210 or can exist independently.
- the transceiver 1230 is configured to receive a first message that is sent by the remote terminal by using the relay terminal, where the first message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, and the processor 1210 is configured to use the remote terminal according to the remote terminal.
- the first identification information obtains the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the transceiver 1230 is further configured to send a first request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the first request message includes the first identifier information, and receive the first returned by the HSS. a response message of the request message, the response message including an IMSI of the remote terminal; or the processor 1210, configured to obtain, according to the saved correspondence between the first identifier of the remote terminal and the IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the IMSI of the remote terminal; or the transceiver 1230 is further configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, and send a second request message to a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs.
- the second request message includes the first identifier information, and receives a response message of the second request message returned by the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, where the response message includes an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the processor 1210 is further configured to determine, according to the length of the first identifier information, identifier information of the remote terminal as the first identifier information; or, according to the indication in the first identifier information The information indicates that the identification information of the remote terminal is the first identification information.
- the first identifier information is: a proximity service relay user key identifier PRUK ID.
- the above privacy-protected device can be used as a mobility management entity in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the mobility management entity in FIG. 2, and uses the PRUK ID instead of the IMSI, thereby preventing the relay terminal from intercepting the remote terminal.
- IMSI the protection of user privacy is realized.
- FIG. 13 is a hardware structural diagram of a fourth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 13, the device includes: a processor 1310, a memory 1320, and a transceiver 1330. among them:
- the processor 1310 can be the same as the processor 1010.
- Memory 1320 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data.
- the memory 1320 can transfer the stored data to the processor 1310.
- the memory 1320 can be the same as the memory 1020.
- the memory 1320 can be integrated in the processor 1310 or can exist independently.
- the processor 1310 is configured to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, obtain a root key of the remote terminal, and use a root key of the remote terminal to protect the remote terminal from the relay terminal. Generating a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and encrypting the first information by using the first key, the first information including an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the remote terminal;
- the transceiver 1330 is configured to send a second message to the mobility management entity, where the second message includes an encrypted first message and an identifier of a root key of the remote terminal.
- the processor 1310 is further configured to generate a second key according to the root key of the remote terminal, and perform integrity protection on the first information by using the second key to generate MAC information.
- the second message further includes the MAC information.
- the second message further includes at least one of the following: encryption algorithm identification information used by the remote terminal, or integrity protection algorithm identification information.
- the transceiver 1330 is further configured to send, to the relay terminal, a first request message, where the first request message is used to request to establish a communication connection with the relay terminal, where the first request message is The first identification information of the remote terminal is included.
- the first identifier information is any one of the following identifiers: the remote terminal mobile subscriber international identifier MSISDN, the temporary private identity generated by the remote terminal by the boot process, and the remote terminal passing the boot process
- the generated boot interaction identifier B-TID, the push temporary identifier P-TID generated by the remote terminal through the network device, and the identifier for the discovery or the network device assignment allocated by the network device The public identity of the remote terminal.
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as a remote terminal in the privacy protection method of FIG. 3, and performs the steps performed by the remote terminal in FIG. 3, and encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message.
- the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the remote terminal IMSI, and the protection of user privacy is realized.
- FIG. 14 is a hardware structural diagram of a fifth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 14, the device includes a processor 1410, a memory 1420, and a transceiver 1430. among them:
- the processor 1410 can be the same as the processor 1010.
- Memory 1420 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data.
- the memory 1420 can be the same as the memory 1020.
- the memory 1420 can be integrated in the processor 1410 or can exist independently.
- the transceiver 1430 is configured to receive a second request message sent by the relay terminal, where the second request message includes first identifier information of the remote terminal, where the second request message is used to request to obtain communication with the remote terminal. a root key; the processor 1410, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal and identification information of the root key; the transceiver 1430 is further configured to use a root key of the remote terminal And the identifier information of the root key is sent to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, or the network device sends the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the mobile terminal to which the relay terminal belongs. Sexual management entity.
- the transceiver 1430 is further configured to send, by the HSS, the root key of the remote terminal and the identifier information of the root key to the mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs by using an HSS. .
- the above-mentioned privacy-protected device can be used as the network device in the privacy protection method of FIG. 3, and performs the steps performed by the network device in FIG. 3, and encrypts the first message and at least performs integrity protection on the first message.
- the mobility management entity performs decryption and verification, thereby avoiding the situation in which the relay terminal intercepts the remote terminal IMSI, and the protection of user privacy is realized.
- FIG. 15 is a hardware structural diagram of a sixth privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 15, the device includes: a processor 1510, a memory 1520, and a transceiver 1530. among them:
- the processor 1510 can be the same as the processor 1010.
- Memory 1520 is used to store various applications, operating systems and data.
- the memory 1520 can be the same as the memory 1020.
- the memory 1520 can be integrated in the processor 1510 or can exist independently.
- the transceiver 1530 is configured to receive a first message sent by a remote terminal, where the first message includes an encrypted first information and an identifier of a root key of the remote terminal, where the first information includes the remote terminal
- the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI the processor 1510, configured to obtain a root key of the remote terminal according to the identifier of the root key of the remote terminal; and generate a first key according to the root key of the remote terminal Decrypting the first information with a first key to obtain an IMSI of the remote terminal.
- the first message further includes MAC information, where the MAC information is generated after the remote terminal performs integrity protection on the first information, and the processor 1510 is further configured to: The root key of the remote terminal generates a second key, and uses the second key to verify the MAC information to verify the integrity of the first information.
- the first message further includes at least one of the following: an encryption algorithm identifier information used by the remote terminal, or an integrity protection algorithm identifier information, where the first message includes the encryption algorithm identifier information,
- the processor 1510 is further configured to: decrypt the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identifier information; or when the first message includes the integrity protection algorithm identifier information
- the processor 1510 is further configured to: use the second key to verify the MAC information according to an integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identifier information; or, when the first message includes
- the processor 1510 is further configured to decrypt the first information by using the first key according to an encryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm identifier information, where the encryption algorithm identifier information and the integrity protection algorithm identifier information are described.
- the mobility management entity verifies the M by using the second key according to an integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the integrity protection algorithm identification information. AC information.
- the transceiver 1530 is configured to send a second request message to the home subscription subscriber server HSS, where the second request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives the HSS return.
- the response message of the second request message, the response message includes a root key of the remote terminal; or the processor 1510 is configured to use the root key of the remote terminal and the remote Determining a root key of the remote terminal in a correspondence between the identification information of the root key of the terminal; or the processor 1510, configured to determine a mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs, the transceiver to the The mobility management entity to which the relay terminal belongs sends a third request message, where the third request message includes an identifier of the root key of the remote terminal received from the first message, and receives mobility of the relay terminal attribution And the third request message response message returned by the management entity, where the response message includes a root key of the remote terminal.
- the above privacy-protected device can be used as a mobility management entity in the privacy protection method of FIG. 2, and performs the steps performed by the mobility management entity in FIG. 2, by encrypting the first message and at least completing the first message.
- sexual protection the mobility management entity decrypts and verifies, and thus avoids the interception of the IMSI by the relay terminal, and realizes the protection of user privacy.
- the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product comprising instructions, when the instruction is run on a computer, causing the computer to perform the method of privacy protection as shown in FIG. 1 or FIG. 2, and implementing FIG. 1 or FIG. 2 The technical effect of the privacy protection method shown.
- the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer readable storage medium, where the computer readable storage medium stores a calculation
- the computer program is executed by the processor as a method of privacy protection as shown in FIG. 1 or FIG. 2, and implements the technical effect of the privacy protection method as shown in FIG. 1 or FIG. 2.
- the integrated unit if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
- the technical solution of the present invention contributes in essence or to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium.
- a number of instructions are included to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.
- the foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like. .
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Abstract
本申请实施例涉及一种隐私保护的方法及设备,所述方法包括:远程终端通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。采用第一标识信息替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
Description
本申请实施例涉及通信技术领域,尤其涉及一种隐私保护的方法及设备。
智能手机行业已经成熟,且市场即将走向饱和,接入和数据卡市场已经下滑,可穿戴设备是未来战略方向之一。目前市场上已推出了可安装用户身份识别卡(Subscriber Identification Module,SIM卡)的可穿戴设备例如智能手表,从而智能手表可以直接连接到网络。可穿戴设备直接连接到网络是未来发展趋势。
目前,通常可穿戴设备周围都会有高性能的手机存在,手机与可穿戴设备各自进行网络通信。希望可穿戴设备通过手机连接到网络,从而可以节省可穿戴设备的电量,增加可穿戴设备的传输效率。其中,可以将手机称之为中继终端,可穿戴设备称之为远程终端。
在远程终端通过中继终端连接到网络之前,需要远程终端发现中继终端,进而通过中继终端附着到网络,与核心网络相互通信。当核心网尚未给远程终端分配临时身份标识时,远程终端与核心网之间的非接入层(Non-access Stratum,NAS)消息中包含远程终端的国际移动用户标识(international mobile subscriber identification,IMSI),且包含IMSI的NAS消息未进行加密保护;因此,造成远程终端的IMSI容易被中继终端得到,若中继终端被攻击或错误使用,中继终端可以吸附终端,对远程终端进行诈骗等欺诈行为,会给用户造成不良后果。
发明内容
本申请提供一种隐私保护的方法及设备,以解决现有技术中IMSI容易被中继终端得到,IMSI的泄露,给用户造成不良后果的问题。
第一方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:
远程终端通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。通过第一标识信息或第二标识信息代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述远程终端通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述
远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第二方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:网络设备接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述网络设备向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。通过第一标识信息或第二标识信息代替IMSI,在用户数据服务器和移动性管理实体保存更新第一标识信息和远程终端的IMSI的对应关系,进而通过标识信息确定IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述网络设备根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述网络设备根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。采用第一标识信息确定远程设备的IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述网络设备向用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。通过第三请求消息可使用户数据服务器更新远程终端的第一标识信息和IMSI,进而避免中继终端获得IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述网络设备向用户数据服务器发送第四请求消息,以使所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。通过第四请求消息可使移动性管理实体更新远程终端的第一标识信息和IMSI,进而避免中继终端获得IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所
述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第三方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:移动性管理实体接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。通过第一标识信息代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述移动性管理实体向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述移动性管理实体根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述移动性管理实体确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述移动性管理实体根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或,所述移动性管理实体移动性管理实体根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。还可以通过标识信息的长度确定标识信息是否为第一标识信息,或通过指示信息指示标识信息为第一标识信息,保证标识信息为第一标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第四方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:远程终端与中继终端建立通信连接;所述远程终端获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;所述远程终端根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述远程终端向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。通过将IMSI作为第一消息,并对第一消息采用根密钥生成的第一密钥进行加密,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥至少对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息
中还包括所述MAC信息。采用第二密钥至少对第一信息进行完整性保护,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。在第二消息中添加对第一消息加密和/或完整性保护算法标识信息,方便移动性管理实体对第二信息的解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。通过在第一请求消息中第一标识信息代替IMSI,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第五方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:网络设备接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;所述网络设备获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。通过第二请求消息获取远程终端通信的根密钥及根密钥的标识,再将根密钥及根密钥的标识移动性管理实体,方便移动性管理实体在对第二消息进行解密前根据根密钥的标识生成第一密钥和第二密钥,进而对第二信息进行解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述网络设备通过用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第六方面,本申请实施提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:移动性管理实体接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程
终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。通过将IMSI作为第一消息,并对第一消息采用根密钥生成的第一密钥进行加密,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。采用第二密钥至少对第一信息进行完整性保护进行验证,确定第一信息的完整性,进而实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息中还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密或者完整性保护算法标识信息;,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。在第二消息中添加对第一消息加密和/或完整性保护算法标识信息,方便移动性管理实体对第二信息的解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述移动性管理实体向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述移动性管理实体根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述移动性管理实体确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第七方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,包括:发送单元,用于通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。通过第一标识信息或第二标识信息代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,
进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述发送单元,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述设备还包括:获取单元,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第八方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的方法,包括:接收单元,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;获取单元,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。通过第一标识信息或第二标识信息代替IMSI,在用户数据服务器和移动性管理实体保存更新第一标识信息和远程终端的IMSI的对应关系,进而通过标识信息确定IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述获取单元,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。采用第一标识信息确定远程设备的IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。通过第三请求消息可使用户数据服务器更新远程终端的第一标识信息和IMSI,进而避免中继终端获得IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第四请求消息,以使得所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息
包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。通过第四请求消息可使移动性管理实体更新远程终端的第一标识信息和IMSI,进而避免中继终端获得IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第九方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,包括:接收单元,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;获取单元,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。通过第一标识信息代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
在一可能的实施方式中,发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元,还用于接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述获取单元,用于根据保存的所述远程终端的第一标识与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述发送单元,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元,还用于,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,确定单元,用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,指示单元,用于移动性管理实体根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。还可以通过标识信息的长度确定标识信息是否为第一标识信息,或通过指示信息指示标识信息为第一标识信息,保证标识信息为第一标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。采用PRUK ID代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第十方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的装置,包括:通信连接单元,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得单元,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;生成加密单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。通过将IMSI作为第一消息,并对第一消息采用根密钥生成的第一密钥进行加密,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述生成加密单元,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。采用第二密钥至少对第一信息进行完整性保护,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。在第二消息中添加对第一消息加密和/或完整性保护算法标识信息,方便移动性管理实体对第二信息的解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述通信连接单元,用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。通过在第一请求消息中第一标识信息代替IMSI,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。采用上述多个标识中的一个来代替IMSI,避免了IMSI被中继终端截获,进而保护了用户的隐私。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第十一方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,包括:接收单元,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;获取单元,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;发送单元,用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。通过第二请求消息获取远程终端通信的根密钥及根密钥的标识,再将根密钥及根密钥的标识移动性管理实体,
方便移动性管理实体在对第二消息进行解密前根据根密钥的标识生成第一密钥和第二密钥,进而对第二信息进行解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述发送单元,用于所述网络设备通过用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第十二方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,包括:接收单元,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;获取单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;生成解密单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。通过将IMSI作为第一消息,并对第一消息采用根密钥生成的第一密钥进行加密,进而保证中继终端不会得到IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。采用第二密钥至少对第一信息进行完整性保护进行验证,确定第一信息的完整性,进而实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息;当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。在第二消息中添加对第一消息加密或者完整性保护算法标识信息,方便移动性管理实体对第二信息的解密和验证。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述获取单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归
属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
第十三方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述收发器,通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述处理器,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
第十四方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述收发器,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;
所述处理器,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;
所述收发器,还用于向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述处理器,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息
确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,用于向用户数据服务器发送第四请求消息,以使得所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
第十五方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述收发器,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;
所述处理器,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,还用于向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;
或者,
所述处理器,用于根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;
或者,
所述收发器,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述处理器,还用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
第十六方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述处理器,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;
所述收发器,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述处理器,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
第十七方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述收发器,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;
所述处理器,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;
所述收发器,还用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,还用于所述网络设备通过所述用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
第十八方面,本申请实施例提供一种隐私保护的设备,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,
所述收发器,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识
IMSI;
所述处理器,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;
所述处理器,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述第一消息中还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息,
当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
在一可能的实施方式中,所述收发器,用于向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器,用于根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器,用于确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,所述收发器向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
第十九方面,本申请实施例提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品,其特征在于,当所述指令在计算机上运行时,使得所述计算机执行上述第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面或第六方面所述的方法。
第二十方面,本申请实施例提供一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现上述第一方面、第二方面、第三方面、第四方面、第五方面或第六方面所述的方法。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护;
或采用对远程终端发送的消息进行加密和完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端的IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图1为本申请实施例提供的远程终端通过中继终端接入网络的系统示意图;
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种隐私保护的方法的信令交互图;
图3为本申请实施例提供的另一种隐私保护的方法的信令交互图;
图4为本申请实施例提供的第一种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图5为本申请实施例提供的第二种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图6为本申请实施例提供的第三种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图7为本申请实施例提供的第四种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图8为本申请实施例提供的第五种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图9为本申请实施例提供的第六种隐私保护的设备的结构示意图;
图10为本申请实施例提供的第一种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图;
图11为本申请实施例提供的第二种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图;
图12为本申请实施例提供的第三种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图;
图13为本申请实施例提供的第四种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图;
图14为本申请实施例提供的第五种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图;
图15为本申请实施例提供的第六种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构示意图。
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图,对本发明实施例进行描述。
图1为本申请实施例提供的远程终端通过中继终端接入网络的系统示意图,远程终端和中继终端建立近距离通信连接,远程终端可通过中继终端附着到网络上,进而,远程终端还可以通过中继终端与网络设备以及核心网设备等进行交互,进而通过中继网络附着到网络上。近距离通信连接可以是蓝牙、WiFi等连接方式,还可以是其它近距离通信连接方式,本申请对此不作限制。
远程终端可以是可穿戴设备,例如智能手表、智能手环或者智能眼镜等。第一终端可以包括LTE以及5G场景下的终端。
中继终端可以包括LTE以及5G场景下的终端,例如是手机或移动电话、平板电脑(Tablet Personal Computer,TPC)、膝上型电脑(Laptop Computer)、数码相机、数字摄影机、投影设备、可穿戴式设备(Wearable Device)、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant,PDA)、电子书阅读器(e-Book Reader)、虚拟现实智能设备、数字广播终端,消息收发设备,游戏控制台,医疗设备,健身设备或扫描仪等终端。
网络设备可以是为远程终端和中继终端提供接近服务(Proximity Service,Prose)的设备,如接近服务密钥管理功能(Prose key management function,PKMF)实体,或接近服务功能(Prose function)设备,或二者合设的功能实体;网络设备还可以其它类型的应用服务器。
核心网设备设备可以是移动性管理实体、用户数据服务器,移动性管理实体可以是4G网络中的移动性管理实体(mobile management entity,MME),也可以是5G网络中负责移动性管理的设备,例如是接入与移动管理实体(access and mobility management function,AMF)。用户数据服务器可以是4G网络的归属签约用户服务器(home subscriber server,HSS),也可是5G网络中负责存储用户数据的设备,例如是统一数据管理(unified data management,UDM)。
本申请在实施例中以4G网络中的移动性管理实体MME、及4G网络中的归属签约用户服务器HSS为例进行介绍。
需要说明的是,在下文的实施例描述中,“第一请求消息”、“第二请求消息”、“第三请求消息”、“第四请求消息”、“第五请求消息”,“第一标识信息”、“第二标识信息”以及“第一消息”、“第二消息”中的“第一”、“第二”和“第三”是为了区分请求消息,标识或者消息,并不对请求消息,标识或者消息本身进行限制。
在本申请实施例中,远程终端可以称之为远程用户设备(user equipment),简称为remote UE或eRemote UE,中继终端可以称之为中继用户设备,简称为relay UE或eRelay UE。
本申请实施例可以通过两种方案完成隐私保护。方案一:在远程终端和中继终端建立通信的过程中,采用接近业务中继用户密钥标识(ProSe Relay User Key identity,PRUK ID)替代IMSI;方案二:利用远程终端的接近业务中继用户密钥PRUK生成加密和完整性保护IMSI的密钥(Key_int_IMSI,Key_enc_IMSI),对远程终端的IMSI进行加密和完整性保护。
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种隐私保护的方法的信令交互图。如图2,该方法可以包括以下步骤:
S201、远程终端向中继终端发送第一请求消息。
eRemote UE发现eRelay UE后,向eRelay UE发送第一请求消息,第一请求消息可以是:直接通信请求消息,以请求建立eRemote UE与eRelay UE之间的通信连接。第一请求消息包括eRemote UE的第一标识信息或第二标识信息。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,第一标识信息可以是,但不限于:eRemote UE的接近业务中继用户密钥的标识(prose relay user key identity,PRUK ID),远程终端的接近业务中继用户密钥是远程终端的根秘钥,由网络设备分配,用于生成与中继终端通信的根密钥,保护远程终端和中继终端之间通信的安全。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,第二标识信息可以是,但不限于:eRemote UE的移动用户国际识别码(mobile subscriber international ISDN/PSTN number,MSISDN)、eRemote UE通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、eRemote UE通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、eRemote UE通过网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或网络设备分配的eRemote UE的公有身份标识,其中,第二标识信息可以是以上标识中的任意一种。
S202、中继终端向网络设备发送的第二请求消息。
在eRelay UE接收到由eRemote UE发送的第一请求消息后,eRelay UE向网络设备发
送第二请求消息,其中,第二请求消息中包括eRemote UE的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,eRemote UE的第一标识信息或第二标识信息从第一请求消息中获得。
在本实施例中,第二请求消息可以是密钥请求(key request)消息。
S203、网络设备获得第一标识信息和远程终端的IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,如果eRemote UE的标识信息为第一标识信息(PRUK ID),网络设备保存的eRemote UE的信息中包含第一标识信息与IMSI,则网络设备根据保存的第一标识信息与eRemote UE的对应关系确定eRemote UE的IMSI,从而获得第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,如果eRemote UE的标识信息为第二标识信息,则网络设备根据第二标识信息确定eRemote UE的IMSI。例如,网络设备可以向引导服务器功能(Bootstrapping server function,BSF)请求获得eRemote UE的IMSI,BSF根据第二标识信息及eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系,向网络设备返回eRemote UE的IMSI;或者网络设备也可以根据自身保存的第二标识和IMSI的对应关系,获得eRemote UE的IMSI。进一步的,网络设备根据eRemote UE的IMSI执行推送方式的引导过程,网络设备生成该推送过程临时标识P-TID,从BSF获取eRemote UE的GPI和Ks(_int/ext)_NAF;或网络设备从HSS获得认证向量后本地生成GPI和Ks(_int/ext)_NAF,其中Ks(_int/ext)_NAF是基于推送方式的通用引导过程生成的用于与网络设备通信的密钥,网络设备将获得的Ks(_int/ext)_NAF作为远程终端的PRUK,将P-TID作为PRUK ID,即第一标识信息,因此网络设备获得第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,在第二标识信息是B-TID或P-TID时,网络设备根据第二标识信息确定eRemote UE的IMSI,例如,网络设备可以向引导服务器功能(Bootstrapping server function BSF)请求获得eRemote UE的IMSI,BSF根据第二标识信息及eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系,向网络设备返回eRemote UE的IMSI;或者网络设备也可以根据自身保存的第二标识和IMSI的对应关系,获得eRemote UE的IMSI。网络设备将B-TID或P-TID对应的Ks(_int/ext)_NAF作为PRUK,将B-TID或P-TID作为第一标识信息,第一标识信息为PRUK ID,因此网络设备获得第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI。
S204、网络设备执行建立远程终端和中继终端之间的通信连接。
其中,网络设备基于获得的eRemote UE的PRUK生成用于eRemote UE和eRelay UE通信的根密钥,并传给eRelay UE,辅助建立远程终端和中继终端之间的通信连接。本过程为现有技术,此处不再赘述。
S205、网络设备向HSS发送第一标识信息和远程终端的IMSI。
网络设备向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第三请求消息,第三请求消息包括第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI。
S206、网络设备向移动性管理实体发送第一标识信息和远程终端的IMSI。
具体地,网络设备向HSS发送第四请求消息,以使得HSS向移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;第四请求消息包括第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI,第五请求消息包括第一标识信息和eRemote UE的IMSI。
需要说明的是,S205和S206为两个可选的步骤,即可选择S205和S206中的任意一个作为本申请实施了的步骤,并执行以下步骤。
S207、移动性管理实体接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息。
第一消息包括eRemote UE的第一标识信息。
第一消息可以为eRemote UE发送的附着消息,或eRemote UE响应移动性管理实体身份请求所返回的身份响应消息,当eRemote UE需要以IMSI作为eRemote UE的身份标识时,为了隐藏IMSI,eRemote UE应该使用第一标识信息作为eRemote UE的标识。
可选的,为了指示eRemote UE的标识为第一标识信息,eRemote UE的标识中包含指示标识为第一标识信息的指示信息,如在第一标识信息之前的2比特,01表示eRemote UE的标识为第一标识信息。
S208、移动性管理实体根据远程终端的第一标识信息获得远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,移动性管理实体向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第六请求消息,第六请求消息中包括第一标识信息,接收HSS返回的第六请求消息的响应消息,响应消息包括eRemote UE的IMSI。具体的,第六请求消息可以是认证数据请求消息,响应消息为认证数据响应消息。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,移动性管理实体根据保存的eRemote UE的第一标识与eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系获得eRemote UE的IMSI。移动性管理实体可以通过S106步骤上保存了eRemote UE的第一标识与eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系,当第一消息是附着消息时,由于eRemote UE通过eRelay UE第一次附着到网络,eRelay UE的eNB将附着消息消息路由到eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体,因此移动性管理实体根据保存的eRemote UE的第一标识与eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系获得eRemote UE的IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,移动性管理实体确定eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体,向eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体发送第七请求消息,第七请求消息包括第一标识信息,接收eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体返回的第七请求消息的响应消息,响应消息包括eRemote UE的IMSI。当第一消息是附着消息时,eRemote UE的附着消息未路由到eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体,而选择其它移动性管理实体作为eRemote UE的移动性管理实体,则移动性管理实体应通过附着消息或S1-AP协议消息中获得eRelay UE的标识,确定eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体,从eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体获得eRemote UE的IMSI,具体移动性管理实体如何获得eRelay UE标识不在本idea范围内。
本申请不限定HSS及移动性管理实体保存eRemote UE的第一标识信息与eRemote UE的IMSI的对应关系的实现方案,如HSS可以保存在eRemote UE的数据中,移动性管理实体可以保存在eRemote UE的上下文(context)中,或在收到eRelay UE标识时,可以保存在eRelay UE的上下文中。
移动性管理实体或HSS可以根据指示信息确定eRmoteUE的标识为第一标识,可选的,还可以通过第一标识长度获知eRmoteUE的标识为第一标识,如PRUK ID长度为64比特,与IMSI长度不同。
本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,采用
PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图3为本申请实施例提供的另一种隐私保护的方法的信令交互图。如图3所示,该方法可以包括以下步骤:
S301、远程终端向中继终端发送第一请求消息。
eRemote UE发现eRelay UE后,向eRelay UE发送第一请求消息,第一请求消息可以是:直接通信请求消息,以请求建立eRemote UE与eRelay UE之间的通信连接,第一请求消息包括eRemote UE的标识信息。
标识信息可以是,但不限于:eRemote UE的PRUK ID,eRemote UE的MSISDN、eRemote UE通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、eRemote UE通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、eRemote UE通过网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或网络设备分配的eRemote UE的公有身份标识,其中,第一标识信息可以是以上标识中的任意一种。
S302、中继终端向网络设备发送的第二请求消息。
在eRelay UE接收到由eRemote UE发送的第一请求消息后,eRelay UE向网络设备发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息可以是密钥请求key request消息,第二请求消息用于请求获取与eRemote UE通信的根密钥。第二请求消息中包含从第一请求消息中获得的eRemote UE的标识信息。
S303、网络设备获得远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息。
远程终端的根密钥为PRUK,根密钥的标识信息为PRUK ID。
若第二请求消息中eRemote UE的标识为为PRUK ID,由于网络设备上存储有PRUK ID和PRUK的对应关系,则网络设备根据PRUK ID获得PRUK。
若第二请求消息中eRemote UE的标识为除PRUK ID外的其它标识信息,则网络设备根据eRemote UE的标识信息获得eRemote UE的IMSI,获得IMSI的方式与图2中的步骤203中的方法一致,此处不再赘述,网络设备根据IMSI获得eRemote UE的GPI信息,GPI信息是网络设备基于推动方式的通用引导过程获得的,其中根据网络架构的实现不同,PKMF可直接获得GPI信息或PKMF获得eRemote UE的认证向量,并根据认证向量在本地生成GPI信息,PKMF获得GPI的同时还获得密钥Ks(_int/ext)_NAF,Ks(_int/ext)_NAF是基于推送方式的通用引导过程生成的用于与网络设备通信的密钥。在此过程中网络设备生成推送过程临时标识P-TID,将Ks(_int/ext)_NAF作为远程终端的根密钥,将Ks(_int/ext)_NAF的标识作为PRUK,将P-TID作为PRUK ID。其中,PRUK ID具体可以为UL NAF SA Identifier。可选的,PRUK ID还可以是GPI信息中的随机数RAND。
S304、网络设备将远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息发送给归属签约用户服务器HSS。
可选的,eRemote UE的标识或eRelay UE的标识可以与远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息一同发送至HSS,如eRelay UE和eRemote UE的IMSI。本文不限定保存远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息的方式,HSS可以将远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息保存在eRemote UE的数据中或eRelay UE的数据中。
S305、网络设备将远程终端的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息发送给中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
具体地,网络设备通过HSS将eRemote UE的根密钥以及根密钥的标识信息发送给eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体。该过程可以通过以下子步骤实现:
S3051.网络设备向HSS发送更新接近业务策略数据请求消息,其中包含eRemote UE的PRUK及PRUK ID,该步骤中还包含eRelay UE的标识,如eRelay UE的IMSI。
S3052.HSS通过插入签约数据消息在eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体上更新数据,PRUK及PRUK ID可以保存在eRelay UE的移动性管理实体上,或保存在移动性管理实体上的eRelay UE的上下文中。
S3053.MME返回插入签约数据消息的响应响应消息。
在本实施例中S304和S305为两个可选步骤,即可选择S304和S305中的任意一个作为本申请实施了的步骤。
S306、网络设备向中继终端返回第二请求消息的响应消息。
在该过程中,网络设备执行建立eRemote UE和eRelay UE之间通信连接的其它过程,生成用于eRemote UE和eRelay UE之间通信的根密钥Kd,及生成根密钥的新鲜参数。
在响应消息中包含Remote UE的标识,网络设备生成的Kd及生成根密钥的新鲜参数。若网络设备获得GPI,还应包含GPI信息。
S307、中继终端向远程终端发送直接安全模式命令。
eRelay UE收到密钥响应消息后,向eRemote UE发送直接安全模式命令,以与eRemote UE进行安全协商,其中包含在密钥响应消息中收到的Kd,Kd freshness parameters及GPI信息。
S308、远程终端返回直接安全模式完成消息。
eRemote UE根据eRemote UE的根密钥PRUK生成Kd,进而基于Kd生成会话密钥保护eRemote UE和eRelay UE之间的通信。在本步骤中:
若eRemote UE配置了PRUK及PRUK ID,则PRUK为eRemote UE的根密钥。
若eRemote UE没有配置PRUK及PRUK ID,则eRemote UE根据步骤S207接收的GPI信息生成Ks(_int/ext)_NAF,将Ks(_int/ext)_NAF作为PRUK,同时将GPI信息中的P-TID作为PRUK ID。
S309、中继终端返回直接通信接受消息。
S310、远程终端向核心网移动新管理实体发送第一消息。
第一消息可以为eRemote UE发送的附着消息,或eRemote UE响应移动性管理实体身份请求所返回的身份响应消息,当eRemote UE需要以IMSI作为eRemote UE的身份标识时,为了隐藏IMSI,eRemote UE应该使用第一标识信息作为eRemote UE的标识。第一消息中包含第一信息,其中,第一信息包括远程终端的IMSI。
在eRemote UE发送第一消息前,按如下步骤执行:
S3101、远程终端根据远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥对第一信息加密。
eRemote UE根据PRUK生成Key_enc_IMSI,Key_enc_IMSI是加密密钥。其中,
eRemote UE所选择的加密算法标识还可以是生成Key_enc_IMSI的一个输入信息。eRemoteUE用Key_enc_IMSI基于所选择的加密算法对第一信息进行加密。
可选的,第一信息中还可以包括第一消息中的其它参数,如eRemote UE的非安全相关参数,不应包含eRemote UE所选择的加密算法标识、步骤S209的完整性保护算法标识及PRUK ID。
S3102、远程终端根据远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用第二密钥对第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息。
eRemote UE根据PRUK生成Key_int_IMSI,Key_int_IMSI是完整性保护密钥。其中,eRemote UE所选择的完整性保护算法标识还可以是生成Key_int_IMSI的一个输入信息。eRemote UE用Key_int_IMSI基于所选择的完整性保护算法对第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息。
可选的,第一信息中可以包括第一消息中的其它参数,eRemote UE可以第一信息及其它信息进行完整性保护,也可以对第一消息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息。
完整性保护的输入信息还包括新鲜信息fresh information,fresh information可以是时间信息,或NAS count,或eRemote UE通过GPI信息中的AUTN得到的SQN值。
需要说明的是,在本申请实施例中不限制eRemote UE执行加密和完整性的顺序,即eRemote UE所生成的MAC信息可以对已加密或未加密的第一信息进行完整性保护后得到。
S3103、远程终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息。
第一消息中包含加密的第一信息、MAC信息、eRemote UE所选择的加密算法标识、eRemote UE所选择的完整性保护算法标识、PRUK ID及其它第一消息的参数。
S311、移动性管理实体接收远程终端发送的第一消息。
S312、移动性管理实体根据远程终端的根密钥的标识获得远程终端的根密钥。
移动性管理实体可以按照以下方式获得远程终端的根密钥:
移动性管理实体向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第四请求消息,第四请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的eRemote UE的根密钥的标识,接收HSS返回的第四请求消息的响应消息,响应消息包括eRemote UE的根密钥;或,
若移动性管理实体已保存了eRemote UE的根密钥与eRemote UE的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系,则移动性管理实体根据保存的eRemote UE的根密钥与eRemote UE的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定eRemote UE的根密钥;或,
若移动性管理实体未保存eRemote UE的根密钥与eRemote UE的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系,移动性管理实体还可以确定eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体,向eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息,第五请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的eRemote UE的根密钥的标识,接收eRelay UE归属的移动性管理实体返回的第五请求消息响应消息,响应消息中包含eRemote UE的根密钥。
S313、移动性管理实体根据远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥的对称密钥,并采用第一密钥的对称密钥解密第一信息,获得远程终端的IMSI。
移动性管理实体按照与步骤S208相同的方式生成Key_enc_IMSI的对称密钥,根据第
一消息中的加密算法,采用Key_enc_IMSI的对称密钥解密第一信息,从而获得第一信息中的IMSI。
在本申请实施例的一可选方案中,当第一消息还包括MAC信息时,可执行以下步骤:
S314、移动性管理实体根据远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥的对称密钥,并采用第二密钥的对称密钥验证MAC信息,以验证至少包含第一信息的信息的完整性。
移动性管理实体按照与步骤S209相同的方式生成Key_int_IMSI的对称密钥,根据第一消息中的完整性保护算法,采用Key_int_IMSI的对称密钥验证MAC,从而验证完整性。移动性管理实体还应验证新鲜信息的合理性,具体的:
当新鲜信息是时间信息,则需要验证接收的时间信息与移动性管理实体自身的时间信息差值在允许的时间范围内;当新鲜信息是NAS count,则验证接收的NAS count是未使用的;当新鲜信息是SQN,则MME将SQN发送至HSS/Auc,请求HSS/Auc验证SQN的合法性。
移动性管理实体解密及验证完整性的顺序取决于eRemote UE执行加密及完整性保护的顺序,本文不做限定。
S315、移动性管理实体继续执行第一消息的其它过程。
例如,移动性管理实体可以获取eRemote UE的认证向量,对eRemote UE发起认证,在认证通过后为eRemote UE创建上下文。
需要说明的是,移动性管理实体可以将获得的eRemote UE的根密钥及根密钥标识保存在eRemote UE的上下文中,所保存eRemote UE的根密钥及根密钥标识在一定时间内有效或一定使用次数内有效。
采用本申请实施例提供的隐私保护的方法,实现了在远程终端通过中继终端附着到网络时,远程终端对第一信息采用根密钥进行加密以及至少对第一信息进行完整性保护;动性管理实体根据远程终端的根密钥的标识获得远程终端的根密钥,进而对加密的第一信息解密获得IMSI以及以验证至少包含第一信息的信息的完整性,进而实现了对用户隐私的保护。
上述主要从远程终端、中继终端、网络设备和移动性管理实体等交互的角度对本申请实施例的方案进行了介绍。可以理解的是,远程终端、中继终端、网络设备和移动性管理实体等为了实现上述功能,其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到,结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤,本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行,取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能,但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对接入网设备和终端设备等进行功能单元的划分,例如,可以对应各个功能划分各个功能单元,也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理单元中。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现,也可以采用软件功能单元的形式实现。需要说明的是,本申请实施例中对单元的划分是示意性的,仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分,实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图4示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第一种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是远程终端(eRemote UE)。如图4所示,该设备包括:
发送单元401,通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
可选地,
所述发送单元401,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述设备还包括:获取单元402,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
可选地,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的远程终端,并执行图2中远程终端所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图5示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第二种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是网络设备。如图5所示,该设备包括:
接收单元501,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;获取单元502,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元503,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述HSS保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
可选地,所述获取单元502,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述发送单元503,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第三请求消息,所
述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述发送单元503,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第四请求消息,以使所述HSS向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
可选地,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的网络设备,并执行图2中网络设备所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图6示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第三种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是核心网设备。如图6所示,该设备包括:
接收单元601,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;获取单元602,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
可选地,该设备,还包括:发送单元603,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元601,还用于接收所述HSS返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述获取单元602,用于根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述发送单元603,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元601,还用于,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,该设备还包括:确定单元604,用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,指示单元605,用于根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
可选地,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的移动性管理实体,并执行图2中移动性管理实体所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代远程终端IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图7示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第
四种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是远程终端。如图7所示,该设备包括:
通信连接单元701,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得单元702,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;生成加密单元703,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元704,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
可选地,所述生成加密单元703,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
可选地,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
可选地,所述通信连接单元701,用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
可选地,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图3的隐私保护的方法中的远程终端,并执行图3中远程终端所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图8示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第五种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是网络设备如图8,该设备包括:
接收单元801,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;获取单元802,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;发送单元803,用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给归属签约用户服务器HSS,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
可选地,发送单元803,用于所述网络设备通过HSS将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图3的隐私保护的方法中的网络设备,并执行图3中网络设备所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐
私的保护。
在采用集成的单元的情况下,图9示出了上述实施例中所涉及的隐私保护的设备的第六种可能的结构示意图,该隐私保护的设备可以是网络设备。如图9所示,该设备包括:
接收单元901,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;获取单元902,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;生成解密单元903,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述第一消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息;当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元903,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元903,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元903,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
可选地,第一消息中还包括所述远程终端所使用的加密和/或完整性保护算法标识信息,所述生成解密单元903,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;和/或,根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
可选地,所述获取单元902,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收HSS返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的移动性管理实体,并执行图2中移动性管理实体所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图10为本申请实施例提供的第一种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图。如图10所示,该设备包括:处理器1010、存储器1020和收发器1030。其中:
处理器1010可以是中央处理器(central processing unit,CPU),或者CPU和硬件芯片的组合。上述硬件芯片可以是专用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit,ASIC),可编程逻辑器件(programmable logic device,PLD)或其组合。上述PLD可以是复杂可编程逻辑器件(complex programmable logic device,CPLD),现场可编程逻辑门阵列(field-programmable gate array,FPGA),通用阵列逻辑(generic array logic,GAL)或其任意组合。
存储器1020用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1020可以将存储的数据传输给处理器1010。存储器1020可以包括易失性存储器,例如非挥发性动态随机存取内存(nonvolatile random access memory,NVRAM)、相变化随机存取内存(phase change RAM,PRAM)、磁阻式随机存取内存(magetoresistive RAM,MRAM)等,还可以包括非易失性存储器,例如至少一个磁盘存储器件、电子可擦除可编程只读存储器(electrically erasable programmable read-only memory,EEPROM)、闪存器件,例如反或闪存(NOR flash memory)或是反及闪存(NAND flash memory)、半导体器件,例如固态硬盘(solid state disk,SSD)等。存储器1020还可以包括上述种类的存储器的组合。
可以理解的是,存储器1020可以集成在处理器1010中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述收发器1030,用于通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
可选地,所述收发器1030,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述处理器1010,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
可选地,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的远程终端,并执行图2中远程终端所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图11为本申请实施例提供的第二种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图,如图11,该设备包括:处理器1110、存储器1120和收发器1130。其中:
处理器1110可以与处理器1010相同。
存储器1120用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1120可以与存储器1020
相同。
可以理解的是,存储器1120可以集成在处理器1110中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述收发器1130,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;
所述处理器1110,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;
所述收发器1130,还用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述HSS保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
可选地,所述处理器1110,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述收发器1130,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述收发器1130,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第四请求消息,以使所述HSS向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述远程终端的第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
可选地,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的网络设备,并执行图2中网络设备所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图12为本申请实施例提供的第三种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图。如图12所示,该设备包括:处理器1210、存储器1220和收发器1230。其中:
处理器1210可以与处理器1010相同。
存储器1220用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1220可以与存储器1020相同。
可以理解的是,存储器1220可以集成在处理器1210中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述收发器1230,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;所述处理器1210,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
可选地,所述收发器1230,还用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述HSS返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述处理器1210,用于根据保存的所述远程终端的第一标识与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述收发器1230,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述处理器1210,还用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
可选地,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的移动性管理实体,并执行图2中移动性管理实体所执行的步骤,采用PRUK ID替代IMSI,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图13为本申请实施例提供的第四种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图,如图13,该设备包括:处理器1310、存储器1320和收发器1330。其中:
处理器1310可以与处理器1010相同。
存储器1320用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1320可以将存储的数据传输给处理器1310。存储器1320可以与存储器1020相同。
可以理解的是,存储器1320可以集成在处理器1310中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述处理器1310,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述收发器1330,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
可选地,所述处理器1310,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
可选地,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
可选地,所述收发器1330,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
可选地,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图3的隐私保护的方法中的远程终端,并执行图3中远程终端所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图14为本申请实施例提供的第五种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图。如图14所示,该设备包括:处理器1410、存储器1420和收发器1430。其中:
处理器1410可以与处理器1010相同。
存储器1420用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1420可以与存储器1020相同。
可以理解的是,存储器1420可以集成在处理器1410中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述收发器1430,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;所述处理器1410,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;所述收发器1430,还用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给归属签约用户服务器HSS,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
可选地,所述收发器1430,还用于所述网络设备通过HSS将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图3的隐私保护的方法中的网络设备,并执行图3中网络设备所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获远程终端IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
图15为本申请实施例提供的第六种隐私保护的设备的硬件结构图,如图15所示,该设备包括:处理器1510、存储器1520和收发器1530。其中:
处理器1510可以与处理器1010相同。
存储器1520用于存储各种应用,操作系统和数据。存储器1520可以与存储器1020相同。
可以理解的是,存储器1520可以集成在处理器1510中,也可以独立存在。
所述各器件的工作过程如下:
所述收发器1530,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述处理器1510,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
可选地,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述处理器1510,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。
可选地,
所述第一消息中还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述处理器1510,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器1510,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器1510,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
可选地,所述收发器1530,用于向归属签约用户服务器HSS发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收HSS返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器1510,用于根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器1510,用于确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,所述收发器向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
上述隐私保护的设备可作为如图2的隐私保护的方法中的移动性管理实体,并执行图2中移动性管理实体所执行的步骤,采用对第一消息进行加密和至少对第一消息进行完整性保护,移动性管理实体再进行解密和验证,进而避免了中继终端截获IMSI的情况,实现了对用户隐私的保护。
本申请实施例还提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品,当该指令在计算机上运行时,使得该计算机执行如图1或图2所示的隐私保护的方法,并实现如图1或图2所示的隐私保护方法的技术效果。
本申请实施例还提供一种计算机可读存储介质,该计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算
机程序,该计算机程序被处理器执行如图1或图2所示的隐私保护的方法,并实现如图1或图2所示的隐私保护方法的技术效果。
专业人员应该还可以进一步意识到,结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤,能够以电子硬件、计算机软件或者二者的结合来实现,为了清楚地说明硬件和软件的可互换性,在上述说明中已经按照功能一般性地描述了各示例的组成及步骤。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行,取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能,但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所述集成的单元如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时,可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解,本发明的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分,或者该技术方案的全部或部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来,该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中,包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机,服务器,或者网络设备等)执行本发明各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括:U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM,Read-Only Memory)、随机存取存储器(RAM,Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述,仅为本申请较佳的具体实施方式,但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此,任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内,可轻易想到的变化或替换,都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此,本申请的保护范围应该以权利要求的保护范围为准。
Claims (74)
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:远程终端通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,其特征在于,在所述远程终端通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息之前,所述方法还包括:所述远程终端向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述远程终端通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:网络设备接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述网络设备向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
- 根据权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI包括:所述网络设备根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述网络设备根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述网络设备向所述用户数据服务器 发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI包括:所述网络设备向所述用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI包括:所述网络设备向所述用户数据服务器发送第四请求消息,以使所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求4-7任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求4-7任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:移动性管理实体接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
- 根据权利要求10所述的方法,其特征在于,所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的IMSI,包括:所述移动性管理实体向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息;所述移动性管理实体接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述移动性管理实体根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述移动性管理实体确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求10所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述移动性管理实体根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,所述移动性管理实体移动性管理实体根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求10-12任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:远程终端与中继终端建立通信连接;所述远程终端获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;所述远程终端根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述远程终端向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
- 根据权利要求14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述远程终端根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求14或15所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
- 根据权利要求14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述远程终端与中继终端建立通信连接,包括:所述远程终端向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求17所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:网络设备接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;所述网络设备获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 根据权利要求19所述的方法,其特征在于所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密 钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体包括:所述网络设备通过所述用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 一种隐私保护的方法,其特征在于,包括:移动性管理实体接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求21所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。
- 根据权利要求21或22所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息、或者完整性保护算法标识信息;当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述移动性管理实体根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求21所述的方法,其特征在于,所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥,包括:所述移动性管理实体向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述移动性管理实体根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述移动性管理实体确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终 端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:发送单元,用于通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求25所述的设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述设备还包括:获取单元,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求25所述的设备,其特征在于,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:接收单元,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;获取单元,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
- 根据权利要求28所述的设备,其特征在于,所述获取单元,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求28所述的设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求28所述的设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元,用于向用户数据服 务器发送第四请求消息,以使所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求28-31任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求28-31任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:接收单元,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;获取单元,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
- 根据权利要求34所述的设备,其特征在于,所述设备,还包括:发送单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元,还用于接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述获取单元,用于根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述发送单元,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,所述接收单元,还用于,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求34所述的设备,其特征在于,所述设备还包括:确定单元,用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,指示单元,用于根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求34-36任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:通信连接单元,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得单元,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;生成加密单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;发送单元,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
- 根据权利要求38所述的设备,其特征在于,所述生成加密单元,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求38或39所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
- 根据权利要求38所述的设备,其特征在于,所述通信连接单元,用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求41所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:接收单元,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;获取单元,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;发送单元,用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 根据权利要求43所述的设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元,用于所述网络设备通过所述用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,包括:接收单元,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;获取单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;生成解密单元,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求45所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。
- 根据权利要求45或46所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息;当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述生成解密单元,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求45所述的设备,其特征在于,所述获取单元,用于向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述收发器,用于通过中继终端向移动性管理实体发送第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第一消息用于所述移动性管理实体根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;其中,所述第一标识信息为接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求19所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第二标识信息,所述第二标识信息用于网络设备获得所述远程终端的IMSI;所述处理器,用于通过所述中继终端获得所述网络设备发送的所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求50所述的设备,其特征在于,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述收发器,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息中包括远程终端的第一标识信息或第二标识信息,所述第二请求消息为所述中继终端在接收到所述远程终端的第一请求消息后发送的,所述第一请求消息用于请求建立所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信连接;所述处理器,用于获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述收发器,还用于向用户数据服务器发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述用户数据服务器保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系;或者,所述网络设备向移动性管理实体发送所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,以使所述移动性管理实体保存所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系。
- 根据权利要求52所述的设备,其特征在于,所述处理器,用于根据所述第一标识信息确定所述远程终端的IMSI,从而获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,根据第二标识信息确定所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI,所述网络设备生成所述所述第一标识信息,所述网络设备获得所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求52所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,用于向用户数据服务器发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求52所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,用于向用户数据服务器发送第四请求消息,以使所述用户数据服务器向所述移动性管理实体发送第五请求消息;所述第四请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI,所述第五请求消息包括所述第一标识信息和所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求52-55任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 根据权利要求52-55任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述远程终端的第二标识信息为以下任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述收发器,用于接收远程终端通过中继终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息;所述处理器,用于根据所述远程终端的第一标识信息获得所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI。
- 根据权利要求58所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,还用于向用户数据服务器发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息中包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第一请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述处理器,用于根据保存的所述第一标识信息与所述远程终端的IMSI的对应关系获得所述远程终端的IMSI;或者,所述收发器,还用于确定所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括所述第一标识信息,接收所述所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求58所述的设备,其特征在于,所述处理器,还用于根据所述第一标识信息的长度确定所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息;或者,根据所述第一标识信息中的指示信息指示所述远程终端的标识信息为所述第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求58-60任一项所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为:接近业务中继用户密钥标识PRUK ID。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述处理器,用于与中继终端建立通信连接;获得所述远程终端的根密钥,所述远程终端的根密钥用于保护所述远程终端与所述中继终端之间的通信;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用所述第一密钥对第一信息加密,所述第一信息包括所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述收发器,用于向移动性管理实体发送第二消息,所述第二消息中包括加密的第一消息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识。
- 根据权利要求62所述的设备,其特征在于,所述处理器,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥对所述第一信息进行完整性保护,生成MAC信息;所述第二消息中还包括所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求62或63所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第二消息还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端的所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息。
- 根据权利要求62所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,还用于向所述中继终端发送第一请求消息,所述第一请求消息用于请求与所述中继终端建立通信连接,所述第一请求消息包括所述远程终端的第一标识信息。
- 根据权利要求65所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一标识信息为以下标识中的 任意一种:所述远程终端移动用户国际识别码MSISDN、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的临时私有身份、所述远程终端通过引导过程生成的引导交互标识B-TID、所述远程终端通过所述网络设备发起的引导推送过程中生成的推送临时标识P-TID、所述网络设备分配的用于发现的标识或所述网络设备分配的所述远程终端的公有身份标识。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述收发器,用于接收中继终端发送的第二请求消息,所述第二请求消息包括远程终端的第一标识信息,所述第二请求消息用于请求获取与所述远程终端通信的根密钥;所述处理器,用于获得所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息;所述收发器,还用于将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给用户数据服务器,或所述网络设备将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 根据权利要求67所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,还用于所述网络设备通过所述用户数据服务器将所述远程终端的根密钥以及所述根密钥的标识信息发送给所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体。
- 一种隐私保护的设备,其特征在于,所述设备包括:处理器、存储器和收发器;其中,所述收发器,用于接收远程终端发送的第一消息,所述第一消息包括加密的第一信息及所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,所述第一信息包含所述远程终端的国际移动用户标识IMSI;所述处理器,用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥的标识获得所述远程终端的根密钥;根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第一密钥,并采用第一密钥解密所述第一信息,获得所述远程终端的IMSI。
- 根据权利要求69所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一消息中还包括MAC信息,所述MAC信息为所述远程终端对所述第一信息进行完整性保护后生成的;所述处理器,还用于根据所述远程终端的根密钥生成第二密钥,并采用所述第二密钥验证MAC信息,以验证所述第一信息的完整性。
- 根据权利要求69或70所述的设备,其特征在于,所述第一消息中还包括以下至少一项:所述远程终端所使用的加密算法标识信息,或者完整性保护算法标识信息,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息;或者,当所述第一消息包括所述加密算法标识信息和所述完整性保护算法标识信息时,所述处理器,还用于根据所述加密算法标识信息对应的加密算法,采用所述第一密钥解密所述第一信息;并且,所述移动性管理实体根据所述完整性保护算法标识信息对应的完整性保护算法,采用 所述第二密钥验证所述MAC信息。
- 根据权利要求45所述的设备,其特征在于,所述收发器,用于向用户数据服务器发送第二请求消息,第二请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述用户数据服务器返回的所述第二请求消息的响应消息,所述响应消息包括所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器,用于根据保存的所述远程终端的根密钥与所述远程终端的根密钥的标识信息的对应关系中确定所述远程终端的根密钥;或,所述处理器,用于确定中继终端归属的移动性管理实体,所述收发器向所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体发送第三请求消息,所述第三请求消息包括从第一消息中接收的所述远程终端的根密钥的标识,接收所述中继终端归属的移动性管理实体返回的所述第三请求消息响应消息,所述响应消息中包含所述远程终端的根密钥。
- 一种包含指令的计算机程序产品,其特征在于,当所述指令在计算机上运行时,使得所述计算机执行如权利要求1-3任一项所述的方法、如权利要求4-9任一项所述的方法、如权利要求10-13任一项所述的方法、如权利要求14-18任一项所述的方法、如权利要求19-20任一项所述的方法或如权利要求21-24任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-3任一项所述的方法、如权利要求4-9任一项所述的方法、如权利要求10-13任一项所述的方法、如权利要求14-18任一项所述的方法、如权利要求19-20任一项所述的方法或如权利要求21-24任一项所述的方法。
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CN114339753A (zh) * | 2021-12-31 | 2022-04-12 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | 通信数据处理方法、系统、电子设备和可读存储介质 |
CN116055032A (zh) * | 2022-05-11 | 2023-05-02 | 荣耀终端有限公司 | 一种密钥生成方法及电子设备 |
CN116055032B (zh) * | 2022-05-11 | 2023-09-22 | 荣耀终端有限公司 | 一种密钥生成方法及电子设备 |
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EP3661241B1 (en) | 2022-10-26 |
CN110169102B (zh) | 2021-05-18 |
US11395148B2 (en) | 2022-07-19 |
CN110169102A (zh) | 2019-08-23 |
EP3661241A4 (en) | 2020-07-29 |
US20200213858A1 (en) | 2020-07-02 |
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