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WO2011038620A1 - Procédé d'authentification d'accès, appareil et système dans un réseau de communications mobiles - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification d'accès, appareil et système dans un réseau de communications mobiles Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011038620A1
WO2011038620A1 PCT/CN2010/076174 CN2010076174W WO2011038620A1 WO 2011038620 A1 WO2011038620 A1 WO 2011038620A1 CN 2010076174 W CN2010076174 W CN 2010076174W WO 2011038620 A1 WO2011038620 A1 WO 2011038620A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
ilr
access server
authentication result
random number
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2010/076174
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
张世伟
符涛
吴强
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Publication of WO2011038620A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011038620A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications, and in particular, to a method, device and system for access authentication in a mobile communication network. Background technique
  • Access authentication is a basic requirement for the safe and normal operation of a communication network. With access authentication, the network can correctly identify the user's identity and give the legitimate user the contracted service capability, prevent other users from stealing the service, and ensure the correctness of the charging. .
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
  • WCDMA authentication uses a shared key.
  • a shared key K exists between the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card and the Home Location Register (HLR) of the user terminal, and the random number RAND is generated by the HLR, and then A proprietary algorithm that generates an authentication token (AUTN), an expected response value (XRES), an encryption key (CK), and an integrity protection key (IK).
  • AUTN authentication token
  • XRES expected response value
  • CK encryption key
  • IK integrity protection key
  • the HLR passes the XRES, AUTN, RAND to the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN), the SGSN saves the XRES, and passes the random numbers RAND and AUTN to the User Equipment (UE), and the UE utilizes RAND and shared key K calculate AUTN, and then compare the calculated AUTN with the transmitted AUTN, such as If they are consistent, it indicates that the terminal is accessing a legitimate network. If the inconsistency is a fake network.
  • SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
  • UE User Equipment
  • the authentication parameters are transmitted through the plaintext between the HLR and the SGSN. This method is established in the case where each SGSN node is trusted and the message path of the SGSN to the HLR is strictly reliable. However, if this authentication is used in an IP-based network, since there may be multiple paths between the two networks of the IP network, if one intermediate node of one path is not secure enough, such as an intermediate forwarding node in the path Passing the authentication parameters may form a man-in-the-middle attack, as shown in Figure 1.
  • the SGSN routing information in the UE registration message sent by the SGSN to the HLR is changed to the routing of the malicious node SGSN-mal, so that after the intermediate node MN is modified, although the user registration can still succeed, the user access location recorded by the HLR is SGSN-mal instead of SGSN, so if other users send data to this UE, the access server of other users needs to query the HLR for the current location of the UE, but the routing information of the UE access point returned by the HLR is the malicious node SGSN-mal.
  • the information, such that the packet that should have been sent to the SGSN for forwarding to the UE is sent to the SGSN-Mal, resulting in a typical man-in-the-middle attack.
  • the present invention provides a method for access authentication in a mobile communication network, the method comprising:
  • the user terminal uses the pre-shared key K1 to pass the second message integrity check algorithm to the second
  • the authentication parameter calculates the authentication result RES 2 IL R , and sends the authentication result RES 2 IL R to the access server;
  • the pre-shared key K1 is a pre-shared key of the user terminal and the ILR;
  • the second authentication parameter includes the random number RANDUE, the random number RANDIL R , and a user identity identifier (SID) And the RID.
  • the method further includes:
  • the method further includes:
  • the SID and the random number RA DUE are sent to the access server;
  • the access server sends the received SID and random number RA DUE to the ILR along with the public key K ASN of the access server and the RID;
  • the ILR uses the pre-shared key K1 to calculate the authentication result RES 2UE for the first authentication parameter by using the first message integrity check algorithm, and uses the above!
  • the encrypted data E1 is sent to the access server; wherein the first authentication parameter includes the random number RA DUE and the random number
  • the first encryption parameter includes the authentication result RES 2UE and a random number RA DILR;
  • the access server After the access server decrypts the encrypted data E1 by using the private key K A of the access server, the obtained authentication result RES 2UE and the random number RAKDJLR are sent to the user terminal;
  • the user terminal After receiving the authentication result RES 2UE and the random number RA DILR, the user terminal uses the pre-shared key K1 to calculate the authentication result XRES 2UE and the first authentication parameter by using the first message integrity check algorithm. The authentication result RES 2UE is compared. If the authentication is successful, the user terminal passes the authentication of the authentication server. If not, the user terminal fails to authenticate the authentication server.
  • the ILR uses the authentication key KM shared by the ILR and the access server, calculates an authentication result RES 2ASN for the third authentication parameter by using a third message integrity check algorithm, and uses the public key of the access server.
  • the K ASI ⁇ second encryption parameter is encrypted to obtain the encrypted data E3, and the encrypted data E3 is sent to the access server;
  • the third authentication parameter includes a network of RAND ASN , RANDUE, RA Dn ⁇ RID, ILR An identifier (IID) and a SID;
  • the second encryption parameter includes the authentication result RES 2ASN ;
  • the access server After receiving the encrypted data E3, the access server decrypts the encrypted data E3 with the private key K A of the access server, extracts the RES 2ASN , and passes the third message with the authentication key KAJ.
  • the integrity check algorithm calculates the authentication result RES 2ASN for the third authentication parameter;
  • the access server compares the XRES 2ASN and the RES 2ASN . If they are consistent, the access server passes the authentication of the ILR; if not, the access server fails to authenticate the ILR. .
  • the first encryption parameter further includes a public key KJLR and an IID of the ILR;
  • the access data encryption key is used by the authentication server to utilize the shared encrypted root key K2 between the user terminal and the authentication server, and the RA D UE , RANDILR, SID, and RID.
  • the access data integrity verification key KJNT is an integrity key K3 shared by the authentication server between the user terminal and the authentication server, In the stated
  • RID is a parameter, which is calculated by using an integrity check key generation algorithm.
  • the step of the ILR transmitting the encrypted data E3 to the access server includes: the ILR generating a digital signature SIGNIL R of the encrypted data E3 with a private key of the ILR, and the digital signature 81& 11
  • the encrypted data E3 is sent to the access server together; before the access server decrypts the encrypted data E3, the method further includes: the access server first verifying the correctness of the digital signature SIGNILR by using the KIL R If yes, the step of decrypting the encrypted data E3 by the access server using the private key of the access server is continued.
  • the access server is a serving GPRS support node, a gateway GPRS support node, a packet data support node, a service gateway packet data gateway, or an external proxy.
  • the access server is configured to: after receiving the authentication result RES 2ILR , generate a random number RA D ASN , and send the authentication result RES 2 IL R and the random number RA D ASN to the ILR;
  • the ILR is configured to: after receiving the authentication result RES 2ILR sent by the access server and the random number RAND ASN , using the pre-shared key K1, by using a second message integrity check algorithm
  • the second authentication parameter calculates an authentication result XRES 2 IL R and compares the authentication result XRES 2 IL R with the received authentication result RES 2 IL R if the authentication result XRES 2 IL R and the authentication result RES 2 IL R is the same as the access authentication; if not, the access authentication fails;
  • the above method and system interpolate the process of distributing the ASN and ILR public keys K ASN and 3 ⁇ 4L R to each other to the UE for ILR authentication and ILR to UE authentication, ensuring that the public keys K ASN and IQLR are correct.
  • the ASN only needs to add the public key K ASN of the ASN ;
  • the terminal UE authenticates the authentication server ILR to prevent counterfeit network attacks.
  • the authentication of the terminal UE by the ILR prevents the fake terminal from accessing.
  • the RID and K ASN are correctly passed from the ASN to the ILR.
  • the IID and KILR ⁇ 'J ASN are correctly transmitted from the ILR, and a secure channel is established between the ASN and the ILR to facilitate the shared key for the UE generated by other ILRs. Transfer to the ASN through this secure channel.
  • this embodiment also provides a system for implementing the foregoing method, including a user terminal, an access server, and an authentication server, where:
  • An access server configured to send the received SID and the random number RANDUE, together with the public key of the access server (K ASN ) and the routing identifier (RID ) of the access server in the network to the authentication server; and use the private After the key K A decrypts the encrypted data E1 sent by the authentication server, The obtained RES 2UE and RA DM are sent to the user terminal
  • the fl algorithm is an authentication algorithm used for authentication of the authentication server by the user terminal, and exists in the user terminal and the authentication server.
  • Fl user terminal uses the algorithm XRES 2UE 2UE after comparing the RES, a user terminal, the access server and the authentication server is further configured to:
  • the access server is configured to: after receiving the authentication terminal request message, generate a random number RA D ASN , and encrypt the RES 2 ILR and the RA D ASN to send the encrypted data E2 to the authentication server; and the authentication server is configured to use the authentication
  • the private key of the server decrypts the encrypted data E2 sent by the access server to obtain RESIR and RA D ASN , and then uses K1, takes RANDue RA Due SID and RID as parameters, calculates XRES R by the £2 algorithm, and calculates the ⁇ 8 2 1 ⁇ is compared with the decrypted RES 2 IL R. If they are consistent, the authentication server passes the authentication of the user terminal; if not, the authentication server fails the authentication of the user terminal.
  • the ⁇ is an authentication algorithm that exists in both the user terminal and the authentication server.
  • the beta algorithm is an authentication algorithm that exists between the access server and the authentication server.
  • the present invention adds the route identifier RID to the access server when both the UE and the ILR calculate the authentication result, and the route identifier of the ASN seen by the UE and the route identifier of the ASN seen by the ILR are obtained from the mechanism. Consistently, the RID of the user registered in the ILR is consistent with the actual access, which avoids the man-in-the-middle attack caused by the intermediary modifying the RID of the access server. Second, the solution calculates the authentication result in the authentication server ILR or the terminal UE.
  • the random numbers RA Dn ⁇ RA D ASN and RA DUE generated by the respective nodes are used, which can prevent the middleman from changing the random number to a non-random number, such as an all-zero string, allowing the UE or ILR to generate an authentication result to guess. Shared key.
  • the middleman can modify the random number to a non-random value, such as 00000000, and then submit the result to the UE, thus having the parameter 00000000 and The authentication response RESUE - a comparison result. Then the middleman changes the random number to 00000001, and then the UE calculates the comparison result. After repeated multiple times, the middle person may have broken the shared key of the UE.
  • a message integrity check algorithm for ILR authentication of the UE calculating RES 2:LR and XRES 2 IL R in the UE and ILR, and present in both the UE and the ILR.
  • a message integrity check algorithm for ASN authentication of ILR RES 2ASN and XRES 2ASN are calculated in ILR and ASN, and exist in UE and ILR. ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ . ( ) Take the data in parentheses ( ) as the parameter, use the ⁇ algorithm, and use the key ⁇ to calculate the result. This algorithm is used for ASN to authenticate the ILR.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé d'authentification d'accès dans un réseau de communications mobiles. Le procédé comprend un processus d'authentification d'accès pour un terminal utilisateur effectué par un registre de localisation d'identifications dans le réseau de communications mobiles. La présente invention concerne également un système correspondant. Le système comporte un terminal utilisateur, un serveur d'accès et un registre de localisation d'identifications. La présente invention concerne en outre un appareil correspondant. La présente invention permet d'éviter efficacement une attaque par l'homme du milieu (HDM) entraînée par le passage via des réseaux non fiables, garantit l'authenticité du point d'accès de l'utilisateur en reliant l'information de route du point d'accès au résultat de l'authentification.
PCT/CN2010/076174 2009-09-29 2010-08-20 Procédé d'authentification d'accès, appareil et système dans un réseau de communications mobiles WO2011038620A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN200910176393.0A CN102036242B (zh) 2009-09-29 2009-09-29 一种移动通讯网络中的接入认证方法和系统
CN200910176393.0 2009-09-29

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2011038620A1 true WO2011038620A1 (fr) 2011-04-07

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CN (1) CN102036242B (fr)
WO (1) WO2011038620A1 (fr)

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CN107493570A (zh) * 2017-07-18 2017-12-19 东北大学 一种基于身份群签的pmipv6匿名接入认证系统及方法

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CN102625311B (zh) * 2012-03-14 2016-01-27 中国移动通信集团江苏有限公司 一种鉴权方法、鉴权系统及智能卡
KR20150021079A (ko) 2012-06-29 2015-02-27 닛본 덴끼 가부시끼가이샤 M2m의 그룹 기반 특징에 대한 보안 업데이트
CN104753687B (zh) * 2013-12-31 2019-01-01 中国移动通信集团公司 一种基于统一计费平台的计费方法及装置
CN103795542A (zh) * 2014-01-24 2014-05-14 中国工商银行股份有限公司 一种数字签名认证方法及装置
CN104954129B (zh) * 2014-03-31 2019-09-27 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 实体鉴别方法及装置
JP6348019B2 (ja) * 2014-08-28 2018-06-27 ルネサスエレクトロニクス株式会社 通信システム、通信装置、自動車および通信方法
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CN105577699B (zh) * 2016-03-03 2018-08-24 山东航天电子技术研究所 一种双向动态无中心鉴权的安全接入认证方法
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CN108174385B (zh) * 2018-02-12 2020-07-10 海信集团有限公司 一种通信链路的检测方法和装置
CN109335906B (zh) * 2018-08-01 2020-09-11 苏州汇川技术有限公司 校验方法、电梯控制设备以及电梯外围设备
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CN110493272B (zh) * 2019-09-25 2020-10-02 北京风信科技有限公司 使用多重密钥的通信方法和通信系统
CN114930769B (zh) * 2019-12-31 2024-04-12 华为技术有限公司 本地通信的方法、装置和系统
CN113206790B (zh) * 2021-04-30 2022-10-18 网络通信与安全紫金山实验室 基于时间周期的SRv6传输路径认证方法、系统及存储介质

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CN102036242A (zh) 2011-04-27

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