WO2008140442A1 - Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2008140442A1 WO2008140442A1 PCT/US2007/011125 US2007011125W WO2008140442A1 WO 2008140442 A1 WO2008140442 A1 WO 2008140442A1 US 2007011125 W US2007011125 W US 2007011125W WO 2008140442 A1 WO2008140442 A1 WO 2008140442A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- secure
- time
- clock
- time value
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
Definitions
- This invention relates to keys used to decrypt content, such as a digital cinema presentation.
- a typical digital cinema system in an exhibition venue (e.g., a motion picture theater) comprises a Media Block for decrypting digital motion picture content for subsequent display.
- the Media Block performs the decryption using decryption keys associated with the content.
- SMPTE Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers
- KDM Digital Cinema Operations Key Distribution Message
- the KDM message has a validity interval defined by entries in the NotValidBefore and NotValidAfter fields whose entries are repeated for non-authoritative human readability in the ContentKeysNotValidBefore and ContentKeysNot ValidAfter elements.
- the Media Block includes a Secure Clock set at the time of manufacture.
- the Secure Clock should not drift by more than 5 minutes per year, the presently allowed threshold.
- the Secure Clock of the Media Block serves as the mechanism for evaluating the usability of keys with respect to their validity interval. If the current time and date, as determined by the Secure Clock within the Media Block, lies outside the validity interval of the key, then the Media Block will refuse to use that key to decrypt content. (The Media Block can use another key to decrypt the same content, even if the key has a different validity interval, as long as the that validity interval remains current, that is, the interval overlaps the present time.) At times near the beginning and end of a key's validity interval, the accuracy of the
- the Media Block becomes critically important. If the Secure Clock has drifted by fifteen or twenty minutes several years after manufacture, the Media Block could lack the ability to successfully deliver a performance of a newly released movie at a given time. For example, assume that a theater has a scheduled screening of a particular digital cinema presentation at midnight and possesses a key whose validity expires just after that time. Thus, a show scheduled to start at 12:01 AM, even with ten or fifteen minutes of trailers, probably would not undergo playout at 12:15 AM, disrupting the scheduled performance.
- a method for accommodating for the drift in the Secure Clock of a Media Block in a Digital Cinema System comprises the step of adjusting a validity interval of a key for decrypting content in accordance with the time difference between a secure time value and a present time value.
- FIGURE 1 depicts a block schematic diagram of a digital cinema system for practicing the key adjustment technique of the present principles
- FIGURE 2 depicts a method for adjusting the validity interval of a key in accordance with an illustrative embodiment of the present principles.
- FIGURE 1 depicts an illustrative embodiment of a Digital Cinema System 100 of type typically found in a movie theater or similar exhibition facility for presenting content (e.g., movies) originally received in digital form.
- the Digital Cinema System 100 comprises Screen Server 110 which receives and decrypts encrypted content for delivery through a link 122 for receipt by a Projector 120 which serves to display the decrypted content on a screen (not shown).
- the Screen Server 110 comprises a Media Block 112 and a Secure Clock 114.
- the Media Block 112 performs content decryption in a well known manner using a key described hereinafter. For that reason, the Media Block 112 is secure and tamper-proof.
- the Secure Clock 114 provides time and date information to the Media Block 112 for use connection with content decryption.
- the Screen Server 110 has a control panel 124 to facilitate manual operation. Control of the Screen Server 110 can occur remotely through a Theatre Management System (TMS) or through a Network Operations Center (NOC) (not shown).
- TMS Theatre Management System
- NOC Network Operations Center
- Screen Server 110 accesses encrypted content from a Database 116, which can exist internally within the screen server or external thereto as shown in FIG 1. If the Projector 120 and Media Block 112 do not reside together within a secure enclosure (not shown), the link 122 typically will make use of an independent encryption technique negotiated between the Projector and the Media Block to reduce the risk of the digital content being digitally copied.
- a Key Generator 150 produces the key(s) employed by the Media Block 112 necessary for the presentation of encrypted content 116 in response to a order entry generated by an Order Entry Device 156, which can take the form of a human-operated terminal or an automated order collection and generation system. In practice, the Key generator 150 does not reside at the exhibition venue. The order entry received by the Key Generator 150 typically has a validity interval specified in the local time of the exhibition theatre, which defines when the key becomes effective and when the key expires. Normally, the Key
- GMT Greenwich Mean Time
- the Delivery Channel 154 can take one of several different forms.
- the Delivery Channel 154 can comprise a wired link (including, but not limited to, metallic and/or fiber conductors) and/or a wireless link.
- the delivery channel 154 could also comprise a common carrier for delivery of one or more key-containing memories physically shipped to the exhibition theatre.
- a Theatre Management System (not shown) can comprise part of key delivery channel 154.
- the Key Delivery Channel 154 comprises a network connection that traverses the Internet 140 or an alternate communication channel (not shown).
- such a network connection takes the form of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) between the Key Generator 150 and the exhibition theatre.
- VPN Virtual Private Network
- the Theater Management System can serve as an intermediary between the delivery of keys, regardless of delivery method, and the Screen Server 110.
- a Secure Clock Monitor 130 monitors the Secure Clock 114 via a Clock Monitor Channel 134.
- the Clock Monitor Channel 134 preferably comprises a network connection, which can pass through the Theater Management System to relay information about the Secure Clock 114 to the Secure Clock monitor 130.
- the Secure Clock Monitor 130 compares the time value of the Secure Clock 114 against the time value provided by a Reference Clock 142. In place of, or in addition to the Secure Clock Monitor 130 monitoring the Reference clock 142, the Secure Clock 114, the Screen Server 110, and/or the Theater Management System (not shown), could perform such monitoring.
- the Reference Clock 142 could comprise a plurality of synchronized clocks. Access to the Reference Clock 142 can occur using the Network Time Protocol (NAP) to provide good quality synchrony of local clocks (not shown) when used as a proxy for the Reference Clock 142. Access to the Reference clock 142 typically exists through the Internet 140 via a connection 144. Those skilled in the art will recognize that a local clock maintaining synchronism with a Reference Clock (e.g., through NTP) can serve as the basis for comparison of the Secure Clock 114 to the Reference Clock 142. The Secure Clock Monitor 130 transmits the result of such a comparison over a link 136 to the Screen Server Database 132 for storage.
- NAP Network Time Protocol
- the Secure clock Monitor 130 preferably restricts the values entered into Screen Server database 132 by reading stored information concerning prior monitored values of
- the Secure Clock Monitor 130 also preferably tracks an identifier unique to the Media
- Block 112 or the Secure Clock 114 for instance, a cryptographic certificate.
- the Secure Clock Monitor 130 can detect the presence of a different Secure Clock 114 and that a different rule might apply with regard to changing the offset of that clock in the digital cinema system 100.
- monitoring of the Secure Clock 114 by the Secure Clock Monitor 130 occurs over a network connection using the secure Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3).
- SNMPv3 secure Simple Network Management Protocol version 3
- SNMPv3 secure Simple Network Management Protocol version 3
- the Clock Monitor Channel 134 could comprise a human operator interrogating the Secure Clock 114 and reporting its value to Secure Clock Monitor 130 or a remote operator having an interface (not shown) and access to the Secure Clock Monitor.
- a manually provided report could serve to update the Screen Saver Database, provided the report does not violate any rules or policies for update.
- the Secure Clock 114 can provide a terse, human readable report, for example to control panel 124, that includes a checksum that incorporates information regarding both the current reading and the Media Block 112 or Secure Clock 114 identity, to provide detectability of a mis-entered or mis-attributed entry through the Control Panel 124.
- control panel 124 that includes a checksum that incorporates information regarding both the current reading and the Media Block 112 or Secure Clock 114 identity, to provide detectability of a mis-entered or mis-attributed entry through the Control Panel 124.
- Note that manual updates provided to the Secure Clock Monitor 130 through the control panel 124 likely will have poorer accuracy than automatically gathered readings. Different rules can exist for such lower accuracy readings as compared to those for automatic readings.
- a Theater Management System could have responsibility for managing multiple digital cinema systems, for example all digital cinema systems at a single exhibition theatre. Under such circumstances, the Theater Management System would have access to each Secure Clock 114 for which it is responsible.
- the Theater Management System would interact with the Secure Clock Monitor 130 of each digital cinema system and transfer information concerning the accuracy and drift of each Secure Clock 114. Further, the Theater Management System MS could have direct or indirect access to the Reference Clock 142, for example using NTP, and could report to the Secure Clock Monitor 103 the current offset of each Secure Clock 114 relative to the Reference Clock 142.
- FIGURE 2 depicts in flow chart form the steps of a process 200 for monitoring (and adjusting when necessary) the Secure Clock 112 and a process 250 for adjusting (e.g., offsetting) a key to account for an offset in the Secure Clock.
- the Secure Clock Monitoring Process 200 provides the data stored in the Screen Server Database 132 of FIG. 1 used during the Key Adjustment Process 250.
- the Secure Clock Monitoring Process 200 commences upon initiation (e.g., start-up) of the Secure Clock Monitor 130 of FIG. 1 during step 202 of FIG. 2. Such initiation can occur manually or upon the occurrence of an event (e.g., the receipt in an exhibition theatre of new content). Preferably, initiation of the Secure Clock Monitor 130 occurs on a scheduled, periodic basis (e.g., weekly).
- reading of the Reference Clock 142 of FIG. 1 occurs, typically via NTP. Alternatively, reading of a clock having strong synchronization to Reference Clock 142 can occur during step 204.
- the Secure Clock 114 of FIG, 1 is read.
- the interval between steps 204 and 206 is sufficiently small as to be negligible. Alternatively, the interval could have a finite known value, or be measured, in which case the interval would be added to the reading of the Reference Clock 142 obtained during step 204.
- Reference Clock 142 is determined and the value is stored in Screen Server database 132 in conjunction with the reading of the Reference Clock 142 obtained during step 204.
- the reading of the Secure Clock 114 obtained during step 206 can undergo storage instead of the offset value since the offset value can be calculated at a later time.
- the rate of drift of the Secure Clock 114 of FIG. 1 can be computed using the current readings established during steps 206 and 208, of FIG. 2 and from prior readings obtained from the same Secure Clock 114 and previously recorded in Screen Server Database 132 of FIG. 1.
- the rate at which a clock drifts can be computed by dividing the difference between a later offset and an earlier offset by the amount of time elapsed between the two offsets in accordance with the following relationship: where S n and r n are the current values of the Secure Clock 114 and the Reference Clock 142, respectively, at corresponding readings n, respectively. If the values of s and r are in seconds, then the drift is measured in seconds of drift per second elapsed, which should not exceed ⁇ 0.158 ⁇ S per second (i.e., 5 seconds per year). During step 212 of FIG. 2, the observed rate of drift undergoes an evaluation to determine acceptability.
- step 214 the process execution branches to step 214 during which generation of a warning occurs to indicate violation of the rule or policy associated with clock drift.
- step 216 the operator has an opportunity to enter an override of the rule or policy violation.
- the process concludes during step 220.
- an update is made to the authoritative offset for the Secure Clock 114 and that value is stored in the Screen Server Database 132.
- this update includes an annotation with pertinent forensic information, for example the identity of who authorized the override and why the override was made.
- the Secure Clock Monitoring method 200 concludes at step 220.
- step 252 commences upon execution of step 252 which occurs upon receipt of outstanding orders exist for key generation from the Order Entry device 156 of FIG. 1.
- step 254 acceptance of a key order occurs.
- the order typically includes sufficient information to identifying the Media Block 112 associated with the particular exhibition theater, the identity of the encrypted content 116, and details associated with the duration of the content presentation, often referred to as a "contract run.”
- a typical contract run is has a start date and an end date or run duration, the later optionally being implied (i.e., a default of seven days). Additionally, the contract run information can include a start time, or other data for determining the validity interval.
- step 256 an access is made to the Screen Server database 132 to determine the correct time zone setting of the target Media Block (i.e., media block 112), since the validity interval information typically associated with the key is specified in GMT.
- the key order can specify a particular Media Block, typically, the key order only specifies the exhibition theatre.
- an authoritative offset for Secure Clock 114 of FIG. 1 is retrieved from the Screen Saver database 132. If no offset value exists in the database, an offset of zero is presumed.
- step 260 generation of a key for Media Block 112 to decrypt the encrypted content 116 occurs.
- the key will have a validity interval determined from the contract run or other interval described in the key order, but modified so that the key has a start time and an end time according to the time zone setting applicable to each, plus the authoritative offset. Additionally, if desired, an extrapolation of the authoritative offset can be made using the most recent or longer term drift. This becomes of significance if a long time has elapsed (e.g., a year or more) since Secure Clock monitor process 200 has been successful in monitoring a Secure Clock.
- the key is distributed to
- Offset key generation process 250 concludes during step 264.
- the foregoing describes a process for both updating a secure clock, and for updating a key for content decryption in accordance with the secure clock offset.
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (9)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CA002685877A CA2685877A1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
PL07872888T PL2147518T3 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
JP2010507366A JP2010526513A (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption key |
EP07872888.8A EP2147518B1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
PCT/US2007/011125 WO2008140442A1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
BRPI0721533-9A BRPI0721533A2 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption checks |
ES07872888.8T ES2528740T3 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for setting decryption keys |
CN2007800529066A CN101669322B (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
US12/450,533 US20100104100A1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US2007/011125 WO2008140442A1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2008140442A1 true WO2008140442A1 (en) | 2008-11-20 |
Family
ID=39683581
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US2007/011125 WO2008140442A1 (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Method and apparatus for adjusting decryption keys |
Country Status (9)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20100104100A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2147518B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2010526513A (en) |
CN (1) | CN101669322B (en) |
BR (1) | BRPI0721533A2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2685877A1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2528740T3 (en) |
PL (1) | PL2147518T3 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2008140442A1 (en) |
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- 2007-05-08 US US12/450,533 patent/US20100104100A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2007-05-08 PL PL07872888T patent/PL2147518T3/en unknown
- 2007-05-08 ES ES07872888.8T patent/ES2528740T3/en active Active
- 2007-05-08 EP EP07872888.8A patent/EP2147518B1/en not_active Not-in-force
- 2007-05-08 CA CA002685877A patent/CA2685877A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2007-05-08 BR BRPI0721533-9A patent/BRPI0721533A2/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2007-05-08 JP JP2010507366A patent/JP2010526513A/en active Pending
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Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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WO2010096391A1 (en) * | 2009-02-18 | 2010-08-26 | Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation | Method and system for synchronizing multiple secure clocks |
CN102326126A (en) * | 2009-02-18 | 2012-01-18 | 杜比实验室特许公司 | Method and system for synchronizing multiple secure clocks |
US8533515B2 (en) | 2009-02-18 | 2013-09-10 | Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation | Method and system for synchronizing multiple secure clocks using an average adjusted time of the secure clocks if the average adjusted time is within the limit intersection and using a substitute average adjusted time if the averaged adjusted time is outside the limit intersection |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2010526513A (en) | 2010-07-29 |
EP2147518B1 (en) | 2014-11-19 |
ES2528740T3 (en) | 2015-02-12 |
BRPI0721533A2 (en) | 2013-02-26 |
US20100104100A1 (en) | 2010-04-29 |
CN101669322B (en) | 2013-07-03 |
PL2147518T3 (en) | 2015-04-30 |
CA2685877A1 (en) | 2008-11-20 |
CN101669322A (en) | 2010-03-10 |
EP2147518A1 (en) | 2010-01-27 |
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