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WO1997022092A2 - Carte de donnees personnelles protegees et procede d'utilisation de cette carte - Google Patents

Carte de donnees personnelles protegees et procede d'utilisation de cette carte Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1997022092A2
WO1997022092A2 PCT/US1996/019418 US9619418W WO9722092A2 WO 1997022092 A2 WO1997022092 A2 WO 1997022092A2 US 9619418 W US9619418 W US 9619418W WO 9722092 A2 WO9722092 A2 WO 9722092A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
smart card
information
access
medical
card
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1996/019418
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO1997022092A3 (fr
Inventor
Roland Wolf
Original Assignee
Venda Security Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Venda Security Corporation filed Critical Venda Security Corporation
Publication of WO1997022092A2 publication Critical patent/WO1997022092A2/fr
Publication of WO1997022092A3 publication Critical patent/WO1997022092A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/22—Payment schemes or models
    • G06Q20/229—Hierarchy of users of accounts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G06Q20/3576—Multiple memory zones on card
    • G06Q20/35765—Access rights to memory zones

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the creation and use of a secure personal information card to store general information and to store medical information separately from the general information.
  • patient information is centralized in a computer database to which doctors can request access, usually by telephone.
  • This system is advantageous in its ability to allow doctors and emergency medical professionals to quickly access medical information concerning a patient with whom they are unfamiliar.
  • the confidential patient information can be compromised by computer intruders, often known as hackers. Due to the importance and confidentiality of medical information, reliable but decentralized control of the information is needed.
  • S art cards are currently being used in a series of applications throughout the United States and Europe. Smart cards are manufactured in various forms. For example, Bull of France manufactures the SCOT(xx) series of cards, including the SCOT 30, 60, 110 and 1000 cards. Ge plus also makes several series of microprocessor-based smart cards for GSM mobile communication systems (i.e., SIM2, SIM3 , Ge Xplore 3K, Ge Xplore 8K) , payment cards (i.e., PCO ⁇ , MPCOS16K, MPCOS24K, MPCOS64K) and multi-purpose cards (i.e., MCOS24K, MPC0S16K, MPCOS24K, MPC0S64K) .
  • GSM mobile communication systems i.e., SIM2, SIM3 , Ge Xplore 3K, Ge Xplore 8K
  • payment cards i.e., PCO ⁇ , MPCOS16K, MPCOS24K, MPCOS64K
  • multi-purpose cards i.e
  • Gemplus provides a software development kit to aid in the creation of applications using these microprocessor-based smart cards.
  • Some microprocessor cards also optionally provide cryptographic schemes based on the Data Encryption Standard algorithm, DES, card customization to enable additional functionality to be added to the smart cards and a multi-purpose chip operating system. Details on DES and other encryption/decryption algorithms can be found in APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS AND SOURCE CODE IN C, by Bruce Schneier, and published by John Wiley & Sons, 1994, which is incorporated herein by reference. Additionally, Gemplus makes a series of memory-based products, including GEMPLUS Free-Access Memory Cards (GFM) , GEMPLUS Protected Memory Cards (GPM) and GEMPLUS Authenticated Memory Cards
  • smart cards are used to provide a mechanism for purchasing telephone "units" consumed by telephone usage, as would be available through the GPM cards.
  • smart cards have been described, as in U.S. Patent 4,874,935 to Thomas L. Younger, wherein the smart card stores personalized information which can be read and written.
  • the connection, electrical, communication and other specifications for smart cards are set forth in International Standards Organizations' publications ISO 7816-1 through ISO 7816-5.
  • ISO 7816-1 International Standards Organizations' publications
  • ISO 7816-5 The disclosures of Younger and ISO 7816-1 to ISO 7816-5 are incorporated herein by reference.
  • Known systems such as Younger fail to provide a method for partitioning information on the smart card so that some information is available to all requestors while other information (e.g., medical history information) is available only to authorized users authenticated using a second smart card.
  • edical professional is not authenticated as requesting access to the medical information, while providing access to the medical information when a medical professional is authenticated.
  • the above and additional objects and advantages are achieved according to the present invention which includes storing general information on a first smart card, storing medical information onto the first smart card separately from the general information, inserting the first smart card into a first smart card reader, inserting a second smart card into a second smart card reader, authenticating the second smart card inserted into the smart card reader as a medical personnel's smart card, and detecting whether a medical personnel's smart card was authenticated.
  • Access to the medical information stored on the first smart card is blocked if a medical personnel's smart card is not authenticated as being inserted in the second smart card reader, while access is permitted to a portion of the medical data based on a type of inserted medical professional's smart card when a medical professional's smart card has been authenticated upon insertion into a second smart card reader.
  • Upon proper authentication at least one of reading medical information, updating medical information and erasing medical information from the first smart card are permitted using the provided access.
  • Figure IA is a schematic of one embodiment of a smart card utilized according to the present invention.
  • Figure IB is a schematic of a second embodiment of a smart card utilized according to the present invention.
  • Figure IC is a schematic showing the reverse side of a smart card according to the first and second embodiments of smart cards to be used according to the present invention
  • Figure 2 is a schematic of a computer system attached to a smart card reader, with the computer system performing a method of the present invention
  • Figure 3 is a schematic of a screen for inputting the personal information to be stored on a smart card according to the present invention.
  • Figure 4 is a flowchart showing a general method of programming and using a smart card according to the present invention
  • Figure 5 is a schematic of a screen for inputting the • medical information according to the present invention.
  • Figure 6A is a schematic of a first access rights table to determine the type of access that is allowed to a first smart card based on a supplied PIN;
  • Figure 6B is a schematic of a second access rights table to determine the type of access that is allowed to a first smart card based on a supplied PIN;
  • Figure 6C is a schematic of a third access rights table to determine the type of access that is allowed to a first smart card based on a supplied PIN;
  • Figure 7 is a flowchart depicting a method of programming and using a smart card according to another embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 8 is a schematic of a screen for inputting immigration information according to the present invention.
  • Figure 9 is a schematic of a screen for inputting hotel register information according to the present invention.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic of a screen for inputting car rental information according to the present invention.
  • Figure IIA is a flowchart depicting three types of access allowed to the smart card
  • Figure 11B is a flowchart showing five additional types of access allowed to the smart card of the present invention.
  • Figure 12 is a schematic showing a telephone adapted to receive a smart card with a magnetic strip.
  • Figure IA is a view showing a first embodiment of a smart card 2 utilized according to the present invention.
  • Smart card 2 includes a picture 4 and a smart card chip 8, with the smart card chip 8 containing plural leads 5.
  • a second embodiment of a smart card 2 is shown in Figure IB, in which picture 4 is also available and a different smart card chip 6 is present on the front face of the smart card 2, again with plural leads 5. The position of the leads is set forth in ISO 7186-2.
  • a magnetic strip 10 is attached to the back face of the smart card 2.
  • the smart card can therefore be used for identification as well as information storage.
  • the smart card can be used to prove identity when making credit card purchases.
  • the picture 4 is used in combination with information stored on the magnetic strip or smart card chip about what credit cards a person is authorized to use.
  • the picture 4 is printed directly onto the smart cards to prevent someone from removing a laminated picture, adding a new picture in the place of the original picture and relaminating the smart card.
  • parts of customers' credit card numbers are stored on the smart card or magnetic strip. For example, in the case of a customer with a credit card number "123-456-789- 0," on the smart card would be stored "235689" which is a portion of the whole number.
  • the smart card 2 is used in conjunction with a computer system 20 which is attached to a double smart card reader 38 or a pair of single smart card readers 39.
  • Computer system 20 comprises a motherboard 22, a central processing unit 24 (i.e., Intel 80x86, Motorola 680x0, PowerPC, Sparc, DEC Alpha) , and memory 26.
  • the computer system further includes programs on a high capacity fixed storage device (i.e., SCSI or IDE devices) 28 for manipulating the smart - 10 -
  • Additional removable storage media devices 30 provide a means for updating the programs stored on the high capacity fixed storage device 28 and the smart card 2.
  • a network adaptor 31 provides another means for updating programs and the smart card 2.
  • the monitor 32 provides a method for interactively updating the information stored on a smart card, while input devices (keyboard 34 and mouse 36) provide a means for entering data to be stored on the smart card 2 .
  • the smart card 2 is read by either a double smart card reader 38 or by plural single smart card readers 39.
  • a generic smart card reader, GCR500 is available from Gemplus and can be used to read and write data stored on a smart card 2. Bull also makes a smart card reader/writer unit named the CP8.
  • the magnetic strip on the back of the smart card can be read by a magnetic strip reader 37. It is also possible for either of the smart card readers (38 and 39) to be equipped with a magnetic strip reader to provide a combined magnetic strip and smart card reader. These smart card readers (38 and 39) can also be housed in the computer system 20.
  • the programs stored on high capacity fixed storage device 28 include a series of programs which allow data to be read from or written to the smart card 2 according to the types of accesses allowed by the reader or writer.
  • data is also written at the manufacturing stage and at a customization phase. During these phases, a unique ID for the card, a manufacturer's ID, a manufacturing date and other information is stored permanently and may not be modified.
  • Figure 3 shows part of a representative set of information 40 to be stored on a smart card 2 by the present invention.
  • This information 40 is split into several segments, with access to individual segments being controlled by the rights of the requestor.
  • the personality information 41 contains the general information about the owner of a smart card and is written to a blank smart card 2 during a customization process.
  • a user's family name, first name, address, country of citizenship, country of residence, birthdate, language, place of birth, social security number, height and sex are all permanently associated with the card during the customization process.
  • a card owner's phone number, driver's license number, issuing country, license expiration date, auto insurance carrier, policy number, profession, emergency contact, second emergency contact, religion and city in which his/her visa was issued are shown as representative of the type of information that can be generally stored about a user which may change and therefore may need to be updated.
  • Medical information 42 includes more specific information about a card's owner which is independently protected from other personal information 41.
  • the medical information includes, but is not limited to, an attending doctor's name, phone numbers (both office and emergency) , fax number, time zone and, native language, along with a person's medical insurance information (i.e., policy number and co-insurance company) .
  • the information about a user's attending physician can be used to contact the attending physician in case of an emergency.
  • the information allows the physician to be automatically dialed by emergency medical professionals or other medical professionals to receive additional information about a patient in need of care. By storing both a phone number for use during normal office hours and an emergency or pager number, a patient's attending physician can always be contacted.
  • the emergency/pager number is automatically dialed after receiving no answer at the office number.
  • the caller and the attending physician may also be directly connected by computer where the computer system of the caller and the computer system of the attending physician are connected by the automatic dialing system.
  • additional information including a more extensive medial history, x-rays, test results, etc.
  • Medical information 46 may be stored as either text or as medical codes/numbers designating, e.g., symptoms or diagnoses describing a patient's condition. By using a medical code system, more information can be stored on the same card.
  • medical codes it should be understood that numbers, letters or a mixture can be used to represent a standardized condition. For example, "HI” is used to represent a failing heart valve, “H2” is use to represent the presence of a pace maker, "Al” is used to represent an allergy to penicillin, etc.
  • business, airline and service provider (hotel, car, immigration) information 43 can be stored as an addition to the updatable part of the general information 41.
  • Medical and general information is also stored on a second smart card 2, belonging to a medical professional.
  • a means for identifying the type of smart card is also stored on the smart card 2 of the medical professional.
  • a medical professional password is also stored on the smart card 2 of the medical professional.
  • the information of Figure 3 may be needed and recalled in various medical (i.e., during doctor visits, or in emergency medical situations) and non-medical (i.e., immigration, hotel registration, car rental) situations.
  • medical i.e., during doctor visits, or in emergency medical situations
  • non-medical i.e., immigration, hotel registration, car rental
  • the examples given below will be described using a user's/patient's smart card in a first smart card reader 39 and a doctor's smart card in a second smart card reader 39, although the method works equally well with the user's/patient's smart card being inserted into a first slot in a double smart card reader 38 and the doctor's smart card being inserted into a second slot of the double smart card reader 38.
  • a doctor uses a computer system to access medical information 46, by inserting a patient's smart card into a first of two smart card readers 39.
  • the doctor's smart card 2 then is inserted into a second smart card reader 39.
  • the computer system controlling access to the general and medical information starts the first step in allowing access to the medical information 46.
  • the computer system determines whether the card inserted into the second smart card reader is a doctor's card.
  • the card inserted into the second smart card reader is not a doctor's card
  • appropriate failure processing is performed by the computer system (i.e., an error message is displayed, or audible alarm is emitted) , and access to the medical information 46 is not provided by the computer system.
  • a second step to allowing access to the medical information 46 of a patient is performed by reading a password from the keyboard 34 to ensure that a doctor's lost smart card 2 cannot be used to read medical information 46 by un-authorized individuals.
  • the password is authenticated by the computer system, and if the password authentication is unsuccessful, the computer system performs appropriate failure processing. If the password is authenticated, the computer system provides read and write access to the medical information 46.
  • the medical information 46 is then read or written as required by the doctor. As shown in Figure 5, the medical information 46 is used to check blood types, existing conditions, medical history, etc., and the computer system updates the medical information 46, including prescription information, as requested by the doctor.
  • the computer system is also equipped with a means for decoding the diagnosis or symptom codes and displaying information about the condition which the code represents.
  • This means for decoding includes at least one of a textual description, an audible description and a visual description, wherein the visual description is represented with an animated or virtual body.
  • the prompts (used to display or receive general information and medical information from the smart card and provided to a computer display 32) are in a native language of choice, either according to who is using the display or according to the language specified by an authenticating card.
  • a non-volatile memory card is used to implement doctor and user/patient smart cards. Because these smart cards provide no automatic protection, the segmentation and protection of the medical information 46 from the general information is done by the computer system.
  • first and second programmed smart cards are inserted into first and second smart card readers. If the second smart card is determined to be a doctor's card, then the password or PIN is optionally prompted to further authenticate that the person using the second smart card is authorized to do so. Having authenticated the doctor, the computer system controls the reading of information from the first smart card and the writing of medical information back to the first smart card to correspond to the information entered into the computer system using a computer entry screen comparable to Figure 5.
  • the overall security of the medical information is increased by encrypting the medical information using an encryption algorithm, preferably a symmetric algorithm (i.e., DES), and a shared key, i.e., shared by medical professionals.
  • an encryption algorithm preferably a symmetric algorithm (i.e., DES), and a shared key, i.e., shared by medical professionals.
  • the computer system provides access to the medical information, the shared key is read from an authenticated smart card 2 of a medical professional. The computer system then would decrypt the medical data using the shared key before displaying the data on the computer screen, and before writing medical information to the first smart card, the computer system encrypts the data entered on the computer screen by using the shared key.
  • the doctor's password is required and is stored on the doctor's smart card in encrypted form.
  • the shared key is encrypted using the doctor's password.
  • the computer system can still authenticate the doctor's password by encrypting the password typed by the doctor and comparing it with the encrypted version stored on the smart card. The typed password is then used to decrypt the shared key, preventing the shared key from being compromised by reading from a doctor's lost memory-based smart card.
  • both the stored, encrypted password and the encrypted shared key must be updated.
  • the doctor's password is required and stored on the smart card in encrypted form and the means for indicating that the smart card is a doctor's card and shared key are encrypted using the plain text version of the doctor's password, then stored on the smart card.
  • a smart card in another embodiment of the present invention in which a microprocessor-based smart card is used, a smart card is programmed with medical information 46 stored in one area of the smart card containing one set of access rights, and the general information is stored in a separate area of the smart card with a different set of access rights. Furthermore, an indication of the type (i.e., doctor's, pharmacist's, emergency professional's) of the smart card is stored in an area that either cannot be directly read or cannot be modified. The smart card controls enforcing the rights to the information.
  • the computer system When a second smart card is inserted into the second smart card reader, the computer system sends a command to authenticate that the second smart card is a doctor card. If the second smart card determines that it is not a doctor's card, appropriate error processing is performed. If the second smart card determines that it is a doctor's card, then the computer system waits for the doctor to type a password. This password is sent to the second smart card to authenticate that it matches the internally stored password. If the password is authenticated, then a protected area in the second smart card is made readable and a PIN is read from the protected area of the second smart card. This PIN is written to the first smart card to allow read and write access to the medical information.
  • the second smart card can be used to monitor the number of password mismatches to see if a doctor's password is being guessed at or "hacked.” By having set at customization a maximum number of allowable mismatches, the second smart card can disable itself when the maximum number of wrong guesses occurs. This provides a definite advantage over storing an encrypted password on a memory card.
  • the encrypted password could be read by a hacker, and attacked by using several known techniques (i.e., dictionary attack, brute force, random guessing) until a guessed password matches the encrypted password stored on the card.
  • the password having been compromised, could then be used to determine they key or PIN used to access the medical information stored on the first smart card.
  • the process of encrypting medical information to be stored on the first smart card and decrypting medical information read from the first smart card is performed internally in the second smart card.
  • the second smart card is first authenticated as described above, medical data is then read from the first card in blocks and sent to the second smart card, and the second smart card sends back the decrypted medical data.
  • the process is performed in reverse when storing information back to the 1
  • Information to be encrypted is sent in blocks from the computer system to the second smart card, encrypted, read out of the second smart card and written back to the first smart card.
  • a computer system could support any of the above embodiments or a combination of embodiments where the computer system automatically determines the type of each smart card and the processing required to authenticate the doctor's card and read and write the user's card.
  • a presently preferred embodiment utilizes microprocessor based smart cards with multiple protectable areas with multiple sets of access rights or areas.
  • the access rights for separate areas can be established in several ways.
  • access permissions are given by "R” for read, “W” for write, “C” for clear and “D” for decrement, as in refill numbers for prescription information.
  • R access permissions
  • W read
  • C clear
  • D decrement
  • refill numbers for prescription information.
  • PIN columns with an entry indicated by "0” no PIN is required for the shown type of access.
  • Figure 6A shows that a fixed number of entries are used to define rights for a single area per entry based on PINs. Using this configuration, access permissions may be distributed according to what PINs need access to what areas without presetting a number of PINs that can be assigned to any given area.
  • any PIN not in the list only allows access to the areas with a "0" PIN, and any PIN not associated with all areas only allows access to the areas with a "0" PIN and the areas for which a matching PIN exists.
  • this requires storing an additional piece of information per entry, i.e., the area identifier.
  • Figure 6B depicts an arrangement which avoids the need to store an area identifier per entry, by fixing the number of PINs per area and a search for valid PINs for a given area can be performed by knowing the number of PINs per area.
  • this configuration is more restrictive than the configuration of Figure 6A. For area 1, only one entry is needed because read access is always provided and no other rights are assigned to area 1. Therefore, all other associated entries for area 1 are wasted.
  • a third configuration combines 6A and 6B and uses a map of all areas and the access rights allowed to each area based on the PINs specified in the first column. This configuration is advantageous in cases where different rights for many different areas are assigned to each PIN.
  • the first area, area l is used as the general information area and is assigned with a PIN number "0" which represents that all users have the access rights shown for area 1.
  • PIN number As the rights for area 1 are indicated by an "R”, area 1 only may be read by all users.
  • area 2 is used as the area in which medical information is stored, and access to this area is restricted -22-
  • PIN "1234" provides read, write and clear access, an authenticated doctor can perform any of these operations on the medical data.
  • area 1 has a single PIN of "0” allowing read access by all users.
  • PIN "1234" is provided in area 1 and allows read, write and clear access by a doctor.
  • PIN "0” allows read access to all users for area 1
  • PIN "1234" allows read access to area 1 and read, write and clear access for area 2.
  • access rights have been used to partition the general information from the medical information based on whether a smart card had doctor's rights.
  • An additional level of rights is added in another embodiment of the present invention wherein a pharmacist is given read access, but not write access, to the prescription portion of the medical information so that the pharmacist can fill prescriptions written by a doctor that are stored on a smart card. However, in this embodiment, the pharmacist is blocked from reading or writing the rest of the medical information.
  • the computer system enforces the protection by only reading and displaying prescription information from the medical information and not allowing writing to the prescription information.
  • the computer system encrypts the prescription portion of the medical information shared by pharmacists and doctors, and encrypts the rest of the medical information using a shared key for doctors that is not known to pharmacists. Furthermore, all the methods used to encrypt means for identifying doctor cards and doctor passwords are also applicable to encrypting the means for identifying pharmacist cards and passwords.
  • the pharmacist's rights may also include the right to decrement the number of refills to which a patient is entitled.
  • the computer system because the computer system must be able to write/update the prescription information, the computer system restricts the number of refills of a drug is only decremented and not incremented or set to a new value.
  • all prescriptions written by doctors are electronically "signed" using an encryption algorithm, preferably a public key encryption algorithm, and the electronic "signature" is authorized before a prescription is filled.
  • processor-based smart cards are used to provide access control to the various types of information on the smart card.
  • general information is stored in area 1
  • prescription information is stored in area 3
  • all non-prescription medical information is stored in area 2.
  • PIN "5678” the smart card controls enforcement of rights to the information, for example, such that pharmacists are given read, clear and decrement access to the prescription information without being given any permission for the rest of the medical information.
  • the computer system sends a command to authenticate that the second smart card is a pharmacist card. If the second smart card determines that it is not a pharmacist's card, appropriate error processing is performed.
  • the computer system waits for the pharmacist to type a password.
  • This password is sent to the second smart card to authenticate that it matches the internally stored password. If the password is authenticated, then a protected area in the second smart card is made readable and a PIN is read from the protected area of the second smart card. This PIN is written to the first smart card to allow read access to the prescription information without providing write access to the prescription information and without providing read or write access to the rest of the medical information.
  • This access control is made possible by storing the prescription information in an area (area 3) separately protected from the rest of the medical information, which is in area 2.
  • the first smart card allows direct read and write access to the prescription information and medical information when a doctor's PIN is read from the second smart card and written to the first smart card, but only allows direct read access to the prescription information and no access to the rest of the medical information area when a pharmacist's PIN is read from the second smart card and written to the first smart card. Additionally, erase and decrement functions for prescription information on the first smart card are performed by sending either the doctor's or the pharmacist's PIN to the first smart card, and then sending a command to erase prescription information or decrement the number of available refills. Since the microprocessor in the first smart card performs these functions, unauthorized writing or refilling of prescription information is prevented.
  • a portion of medical information 46 is available by using an emergency service's smart card. Providing access to part, but not all, of the medical information is provided by methods analogous to providing access to prescription information by pharmacists without providing access to all medical information.
  • general information is stored in area 1
  • prescription information is stored in area 3
  • medical information required by emergency personnel is stored in area 4. All remaining medical information is stored in area 2 and the access rights in Figure 6A-6B are assigned to the areas.
  • a doctor's card uses PIN "1234”
  • a pharmacist's card uses PIN "5678”
  • medical emergency personnel's card uses PIN "0911.”
  • Emergency medical professionals' cards use PIN "0911” and are allowed read access to the prescription information in area 3 and the medical alert information in area 4. Availability of this information is very helpful in cases where an accident victim is unconscious or does not have an adequate command of the language used by the emergency medical professionals.
  • the segmented general and medical information is also used in alternate embodiments of the present invention to aid in providing parts of the general information to police, insurance and other service providers, banks, immigrations and customs, hotel, automotive, etc., while protecting service specific information from other unauthorized service providers.
  • Figure 8 shows a computer screen utilizing a portion of using parts of the general information 41, wherein the general information is used in completing an immigration application.
  • Immigration information 49 contains a subset of the general information 41 stored on the smart card 2.
  • the immigration access optionally allows the address 50 in the visited country (e.g., United States) and the information for immigration 51 (i.e., date of departure) to be read and updated by authorized immigration personnel.
  • visa type is also recordable on the smart card, for example, to reflect the length of stay allowed in a country being visited.
  • the date and time of arrival can be read from the smart card to automatically generate an embarkment card or any other immigration papers required upon entering/exiting a country.
  • the identity of the departing individual can be recorded and uploaded to an immigration computer or a central immigration computer to track visitors to the country.
  • every entry and exit to a country can be recorded on the smart card.
  • Figure 9 shows a computer screen associated with using portions of the general information 41 to speed the registration process at a hotel.
  • a hotel can more accurately register guests.
  • a user may optionally erase its own hotel information using a PIN before checking into a new hotel to prevent one -28 -
  • a similar process can be performed for other service industries, such as car rentals shown in Figure 10, by reading a portion of the general information 41 from the smart card and applying it to a car rental registration template 56.
  • Figures IIA and 11B show an overall set of representative types of information to be stored on a smart card, the type of professional that is allowed access to each type of information, and what types of access to the available types of information each professional is permitted.
  • Figure 12 shows another use of the combination smart card and magnetic card of the present invention. Because this card is envisioned to be used by people who do not possess a strong command of a language of the country in which they are visiting, a combination phone and smart card/magnetic strip combines the information stored on the magnetic strip/smart card with automatic dialing and caller identification. E ergency medical professionals can therefore be dispatched directly to a telephone used to call in an emergency, and the professionals dispatched are sent based on the information read from the card (i.e., based on language, age, medical condition of the owner of the smart card) .

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Medical Treatment And Welfare Office Work (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un appareil pour mémoriser des informations générales (ou non confidentielles) et médicales (ou autres données confidentielles) séparément sur une carte à mémoire. Cette carte a pour but de permettre à un personnel non médical ou toute autre personne non autorisée d'avoir accès à des informations générales, tout en interdisant l'accès aux données médicales. Ce procédé permet d'authentifier le personnel médical utilisant une carte à mémoire contenant des informations médicales. Dans ce but, une identification vérifie que la carte appartient bien à un membre du personnel médical. Ce procédé permet également d'authentifier un mot de passe médical éventuel avant de permettre l'accès aux informations médicales mémorisées sur cette carte. En fonction du type de personnel médical, (ou de personne autorisée) souhaitant accéder à cette carte, divers niveaux d'accès sont attribués à cette dernière. Par exemple, les médecins sont autorisés à lire et écrire les données relatives aux antécédents du patient et aux médicaments prescrits, tandis que les pharmaciens ne peuvent ni les lire ni les écrire. Par ailleurs, ils sont limités à la lecture et à l'effacement des données relatives aux médicaments prescrits sans avoir le droit de rédiger de nouvelles ordonnances. De la même manière, le personnel médical des services d'urgence peut accéder à une partie des informations médicales nécessaires pour administrer les soins requis (c'est-à-dire, groupe sanguin et état général). Les informations générales sont accessibles par d'autres prestataires de services pour faciliter les services de réception (par exemple, lecture des noms et des adresses pour les services d'immigration, de location de voitures et hôtels).
PCT/US1996/019418 1995-12-14 1996-12-13 Carte de donnees personnelles protegees et procede d'utilisation de cette carte WO1997022092A2 (fr)

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US57275195A 1995-12-14 1995-12-14
US08/572,751 1995-12-14

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WO1997022092A3 WO1997022092A3 (fr) 1998-06-25

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BE1012002A4 (nl) * 1997-10-28 2000-04-04 Cuypers Johan De gezondheidskaart, het draagbaar medisch en farmaceutisch dossier, is een chip card, of hybride card, eigendom van de patient, bestemd voor het geneeskundig korps (arts, apotheker, verpleger) met de historiek van behandeling.
WO2000062263A1 (fr) * 1999-04-13 2000-10-19 Electronic Data Identification Limited Terminal pour systeme d'etiquetage actif
EP1065598A1 (fr) * 1999-06-24 2001-01-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode d'accès protégée à une mémoire et dispositif de mémoire correspondante
WO2001006468A1 (fr) * 1999-07-19 2001-01-25 Datacard Corporation Systeme et procede de stockage, gestion, et extraction d'informations de soins de sante sur une carte a memoire
EP1128342A1 (fr) * 2000-02-21 2001-08-29 IRIS CORPORATION BERHAD, Iris Smart Technology Complex Système et méthode pour autoriser l'accès à une zone ou à des données sécurisées
EP1168185A2 (fr) * 2000-05-08 2002-01-02 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. Procédé pour la protection d'une carte à mémoire et une carte à mémoire
GB2367937A (en) * 2000-04-24 2002-04-17 Ibm Privacy and security for smart cards
WO2002058019A1 (fr) * 2001-01-22 2002-07-25 Gemplus Procede pour la creation de fichiers de donnees, prives securises et carte a puce comportant un fichier prive securise
WO2002069222A1 (fr) * 2001-01-19 2002-09-06 Peter Hooglander Systeme et procede utilisant des dispositifs electroniques contenant des informations medicales
WO2002093508A1 (fr) * 2001-05-16 2002-11-21 Georges Chiche Systeme portable de dossier medical personnel
FR2831299A1 (fr) * 2001-10-19 2003-04-25 Jean Paul Delhaye Equipement d'information inter-actif mobile et universel pour la prise en charge notamment des personnes agees dependantes
EP1316926A2 (fr) * 2001-11-30 2003-06-04 Hitachi, Ltd. Système à cartes, méthode pour installer une application dans une carte et méthode pour confirmer l'exécution de l'application
WO2003046847A1 (fr) * 2001-11-28 2003-06-05 Brion Francois Procede, systeme et dispositif permettant d'authentifier des donnees transmises et/ou recues par un utilisateur
WO2003058551A1 (fr) * 2002-01-11 2003-07-17 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Dispositif d'identification d'animaux de rapport
AU770545B2 (en) * 2000-04-20 2004-02-26 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha A method and system for using multiple smartcards in a reader
WO2004055744A1 (fr) * 2002-12-16 2004-07-01 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Communication entre un appareil de commande, un module de vendeur et un module de client
US6758396B1 (en) * 2002-12-11 2004-07-06 Motorola, Inc. Smart card based drug prescriptions
EP1449044A2 (fr) * 2001-06-12 2004-08-25 W. Charles Jackson Procede et systeme de gestion de soins de sante
US6792334B2 (en) * 2000-04-18 2004-09-14 Chesterfield Holdings, Llc Vending machine for vending age-restricted products using an authorization card and associated methods
US6824045B2 (en) 2000-04-20 2004-11-30 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Method and system for using multiple smartcards in a reader
FR2872320A1 (fr) * 2004-06-28 2005-12-30 France Telecom Carte de visite electronique et utilisation de cette carte de visite electronique
WO2006015617A1 (fr) * 2004-08-13 2006-02-16 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Procede et systeme de gestion securisee de donnees stockees sur des etiquettes electroniques
US7013365B2 (en) 2003-06-16 2006-03-14 Michael Arnouse System of secure personal identification, information processing, and precise point of contact location and timing
EP1635302A1 (fr) * 2004-09-09 2006-03-15 Dietmar Sauer Carte à mémoire et procédé d'interrogation des informations d'une carte à mémoire
US7043754B2 (en) 2003-06-12 2006-05-09 Michael Arnouse Method of secure personal identification, information processing, and precise point of contact location and timing
US7139914B2 (en) 2003-06-13 2006-11-21 Michael Arnouse System and method for network security
WO2008017643A1 (fr) 2006-08-11 2008-02-14 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Lecteur pour un document, procédé de lecture d'un objet de données et produit de programme informatique
US7500107B2 (en) 2004-02-09 2009-03-03 Michael Arnouse Log-in security device
US7542911B2 (en) 2000-02-28 2009-06-02 International Business Machines Corporation Method for electronically maintaining medical information between patients and physicians
DE102008040416A1 (de) * 2008-07-15 2010-01-21 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Verfahren zum Lesen von Attributen aus einem ID-Token
US20120023559A1 (en) * 2008-09-22 2012-01-26 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Telecommunication method, computer program product and computer system
WO2013084242A2 (fr) 2011-12-07 2013-06-13 Rao Css Système et procédé pour produire une identification électronique sécurisée et système de gestion d'animaux d'élevage avec interface de propriété, gouvernance électronique et traçabilité de chaîne d'approvisionnement globale pour les produits d'origine animale
US8938615B2 (en) 2006-09-08 2015-01-20 Ceritcom Corp. System and method for authenticating radio frequency identification (RFID) tags
FR3048298A1 (fr) * 2016-02-26 2017-09-01 Gie Sesam-Vitale Systeme de simulation de cartes a puces.
CN113779609A (zh) * 2021-09-22 2021-12-10 北方健康医疗大数据科技有限公司 数据管理方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质

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Cited By (57)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
BE1012002A4 (nl) * 1997-10-28 2000-04-04 Cuypers Johan De gezondheidskaart, het draagbaar medisch en farmaceutisch dossier, is een chip card, of hybride card, eigendom van de patient, bestemd voor het geneeskundig korps (arts, apotheker, verpleger) met de historiek van behandeling.
AU769091B2 (en) * 1999-04-13 2004-01-15 Electronic Data Identification Limited Terminal for an active labelling system
WO2000062263A1 (fr) * 1999-04-13 2000-10-19 Electronic Data Identification Limited Terminal pour systeme d'etiquetage actif
US6554188B1 (en) 1999-04-13 2003-04-29 Electronic Data Holdings Limited Terminal for an active labelling system
EP1065598A1 (fr) * 1999-06-24 2001-01-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Méthode d'accès protégée à une mémoire et dispositif de mémoire correspondante
WO2001001258A1 (fr) * 1999-06-24 2001-01-04 Infineon Technologies Ag Procede d'acces a une memoire et unite de memoire destinee a cet effet
WO2001006468A1 (fr) * 1999-07-19 2001-01-25 Datacard Corporation Systeme et procede de stockage, gestion, et extraction d'informations de soins de sante sur une carte a memoire
EP1128342A1 (fr) * 2000-02-21 2001-08-29 IRIS CORPORATION BERHAD, Iris Smart Technology Complex Système et méthode pour autoriser l'accès à une zone ou à des données sécurisées
US8108226B2 (en) 2000-02-28 2012-01-31 International Business Machines Corporation System and program for electronically maintaining medical information between patients and physicians
US7542911B2 (en) 2000-02-28 2009-06-02 International Business Machines Corporation Method for electronically maintaining medical information between patients and physicians
US6792334B2 (en) * 2000-04-18 2004-09-14 Chesterfield Holdings, Llc Vending machine for vending age-restricted products using an authorization card and associated methods
US6824045B2 (en) 2000-04-20 2004-11-30 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Method and system for using multiple smartcards in a reader
AU770545B2 (en) * 2000-04-20 2004-02-26 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha A method and system for using multiple smartcards in a reader
GB2367937B (en) * 2000-04-24 2004-10-06 Ibm Privacy and security for smartcards
GB2367937A (en) * 2000-04-24 2002-04-17 Ibm Privacy and security for smart cards
US6802007B1 (en) * 2000-04-24 2004-10-05 International Business Machines Corporation Privacy and security for smartcards in a method, system and program
EP1168185A2 (fr) * 2000-05-08 2002-01-02 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. Procédé pour la protection d'une carte à mémoire et une carte à mémoire
EP1168185A3 (fr) * 2000-05-08 2004-01-02 Nokia Corporation Procédé pour la protection d'une carte à mémoire et une carte à mémoire
US7406604B2 (en) 2000-05-08 2008-07-29 Spyder Navigations, L.L.C. Method for protecting a memory card, and a memory card
EP1360633A1 (fr) * 2001-01-19 2003-11-12 Peter Hooglander Systeme et procede utilisant des dispositifs electroniques contenant des informations medicales
EP1360633A4 (fr) * 2001-01-19 2005-10-12 Peter Hooglander Systeme et procede utilisant des dispositifs electroniques contenant des informations medicales
WO2002069222A1 (fr) * 2001-01-19 2002-09-06 Peter Hooglander Systeme et procede utilisant des dispositifs electroniques contenant des informations medicales
FR2819909A1 (fr) * 2001-01-22 2002-07-26 Gemplus Card Int Procede pour la creation de fichiers de donnees, prives securises et carte a puce comportant un fichier prive securise
WO2002058019A1 (fr) * 2001-01-22 2002-07-25 Gemplus Procede pour la creation de fichiers de donnees, prives securises et carte a puce comportant un fichier prive securise
WO2002093508A1 (fr) * 2001-05-16 2002-11-21 Georges Chiche Systeme portable de dossier medical personnel
EP1449044A4 (fr) * 2001-06-12 2007-03-14 W Charles Jackson Procede et systeme de gestion de soins de sante
EP1449044A2 (fr) * 2001-06-12 2004-08-25 W. Charles Jackson Procede et systeme de gestion de soins de sante
WO2003040984A1 (fr) * 2001-10-19 2003-05-15 Jean-Paul Delhaye Equipement d'information interactif mobile et universel pour la prise en charge notamment des personnes agees dependantes
FR2831299A1 (fr) * 2001-10-19 2003-04-25 Jean Paul Delhaye Equipement d'information inter-actif mobile et universel pour la prise en charge notamment des personnes agees dependantes
WO2003046847A1 (fr) * 2001-11-28 2003-06-05 Brion Francois Procede, systeme et dispositif permettant d'authentifier des donnees transmises et/ou recues par un utilisateur
EP1316926A3 (fr) * 2001-11-30 2004-04-21 Hitachi, Ltd. Système à cartes, méthode pour installer une application dans une carte et méthode pour confirmer l'exécution de l'application
EP1316926A2 (fr) * 2001-11-30 2003-06-04 Hitachi, Ltd. Système à cartes, méthode pour installer une application dans une carte et méthode pour confirmer l'exécution de l'application
WO2003058551A1 (fr) * 2002-01-11 2003-07-17 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Dispositif d'identification d'animaux de rapport
US6758396B1 (en) * 2002-12-11 2004-07-06 Motorola, Inc. Smart card based drug prescriptions
WO2004055744A1 (fr) * 2002-12-16 2004-07-01 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Communication entre un appareil de commande, un module de vendeur et un module de client
DE10258769C5 (de) * 2002-12-16 2017-08-17 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Kommunikation zwischen einem Bediengerät, einem Anbietermodul und einem Kundenmodul
US7043754B2 (en) 2003-06-12 2006-05-09 Michael Arnouse Method of secure personal identification, information processing, and precise point of contact location and timing
US7472275B2 (en) 2003-06-13 2008-12-30 Michael Arnouse System and method of electronic signature verification
US7139914B2 (en) 2003-06-13 2006-11-21 Michael Arnouse System and method for network security
US7013365B2 (en) 2003-06-16 2006-03-14 Michael Arnouse System of secure personal identification, information processing, and precise point of contact location and timing
US7500107B2 (en) 2004-02-09 2009-03-03 Michael Arnouse Log-in security device
FR2872320A1 (fr) * 2004-06-28 2005-12-30 France Telecom Carte de visite electronique et utilisation de cette carte de visite electronique
WO2006015617A1 (fr) * 2004-08-13 2006-02-16 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Procede et systeme de gestion securisee de donnees stockees sur des etiquettes electroniques
US8265282B2 (en) 2004-08-13 2012-09-11 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Method of and system for secure management of data stored on electronic tags
EP1635302A1 (fr) * 2004-09-09 2006-03-15 Dietmar Sauer Carte à mémoire et procédé d'interrogation des informations d'une carte à mémoire
EP2770484A1 (fr) * 2006-08-11 2014-08-27 Bundesdruckerei GmbH Appareil de lecture d'un document, procédé de lecture d'un objet de données et produit de programme informatique
WO2008017643A1 (fr) 2006-08-11 2008-02-14 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Lecteur pour un document, procédé de lecture d'un objet de données et produit de programme informatique
US9013266B2 (en) 2006-09-08 2015-04-21 Certicom Corp. Authenticated radio frequency identification and key distribution system therefor
US8938615B2 (en) 2006-09-08 2015-01-20 Ceritcom Corp. System and method for authenticating radio frequency identification (RFID) tags
US8627437B2 (en) 2008-07-15 2014-01-07 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for reading attributes from an ID token
DE102008040416A1 (de) * 2008-07-15 2010-01-21 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Verfahren zum Lesen von Attributen aus einem ID-Token
US8726360B2 (en) * 2008-09-22 2014-05-13 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Telecommunication method, computer program product and computer system
US20120023559A1 (en) * 2008-09-22 2012-01-26 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Telecommunication method, computer program product and computer system
WO2013084242A2 (fr) 2011-12-07 2013-06-13 Rao Css Système et procédé pour produire une identification électronique sécurisée et système de gestion d'animaux d'élevage avec interface de propriété, gouvernance électronique et traçabilité de chaîne d'approvisionnement globale pour les produits d'origine animale
FR3048298A1 (fr) * 2016-02-26 2017-09-01 Gie Sesam-Vitale Systeme de simulation de cartes a puces.
CN113779609A (zh) * 2021-09-22 2021-12-10 北方健康医疗大数据科技有限公司 数据管理方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质
CN113779609B (zh) * 2021-09-22 2024-03-22 北方健康医疗大数据科技有限公司 数据管理方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质

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