US8027923B2 - Certified transmission system - Google Patents
Certified transmission system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US8027923B2 US8027923B2 US11/949,690 US94969007A US8027923B2 US 8027923 B2 US8027923 B2 US 8027923B2 US 94969007 A US94969007 A US 94969007A US 8027923 B2 US8027923 B2 US 8027923B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- message
- recipient
- receipt
- sender
- symmetric key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related, expires
Links
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 title description 11
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 100
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 49
- 230000006854 communication Effects 0.000 description 23
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 23
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 22
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 15
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 15
- OKTJSMMVPCPJKN-UHFFFAOYSA-N Carbon Chemical compound [C] OKTJSMMVPCPJKN-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 6
- 229910052799 carbon Inorganic materials 0.000 description 6
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 4
- HEFNNWSXXWATRW-UHFFFAOYSA-N Ibuprofen Chemical compound CC(C)CC1=CC=C(C(C)C(O)=O)C=C1 HEFNNWSXXWATRW-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000004075 alteration Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 2
- 241000577979 Peromyscus spicilegus Species 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005242 forging Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
Definitions
- the invention relates generally to communication systems and to a method and system for providing irrefutable proof of a transmission between network users.
- B2B business-to-business
- B2C business-to-consumer/customer
- Payment systems and messaging systems are widely used to transfer data across the Internet.
- the senders of such data desire to receive confirmation of receipt of data returned from the intended recipients.
- conventional email systems can support a return receipt feature.
- a return receipt indicates that “a user” has received the intended message.
- the return receipt does not guarantee that the intended recipient has received the intended message, because anyone, including the sender, can easily forge such a receipt.
- What is desired is a system that allows the sender to obtain an irrefutable proof that the recipient has received a particular message/data.
- the system should prevent the sender from obtaining such proof unless the message/data has actually been delivered to the recipient.
- the invention provides a method for transmitting a message from a sender to an intended recipient.
- the method includes encrypting a message using a symmetric key, sending the encrypted message to an intended recipient without the symmetric key and providing the symmetric key to a third party. If the intended recipient signs and returns to the third party a receipt for the message, the method includes transferring, by the third party, the receipt to the sender and providing the symmetric key to the intended recipient.
- the receipt signed by the recipient can include an identifier computed from the message and the symmetric key using cryptographically secure hash functions.
- the invention provides a method for transmitting a message from a sender to an intended recipient.
- the method includes, at the sender, encrypting a message using a symmetric key, encrypting the symmetric key to make the symmetric key accessible to a third party but not to a recipient and sending the encrypted message and the encrypted symmetric key to an intended recipient.
- the method includes signing a receipt for the message and sending the receipt and the encrypted symmetric key to the third party.
- the method includes transferring the receipt to the sender and providing the symmetric key to the intended recipient if the receipt is properly signed.
- the invention provides a method for certifying receipt of a message.
- the message is sent from a sender to an intended recipient and is encrypted by a symmetric key where the symmetric key is encrypted to be only accessible to the third party.
- the method executes at a third party distinct from the sender and the recipient and include receiving a signed receipt and the encrypted symmetric key from an intended recipient.
- the signed receipt memorializes receipt of the encrypted message by the intended recipient.
- the method includes verifying the signed receipt, transferring the verified receipt to the sender and providing the symmetric key to the intended recipient.
- the invention provides a method for certifying receipt of a message.
- the message is sent from a sender to an intended recipient and is encrypted by a symmetric key.
- the message includes a separately encrypted message header including the symmetric key and a message identifier associated with the message.
- the method executes at a third party distinct from the sender and the recipient and includes receiving a separately encrypted message header and a certified receipt originating from the intended recipient.
- the certified receipt includes the message identifier signed by the recipient.
- the method includes decrypting the separately encrypted message header to expose the symmetric key and the message identifier, verifying the certified receipt including verifying the signature of the intended recipient and the message identifier in the certified receipt is the same as the message identifier obtained from the separately encrypted message header, forwarding the certified receipt to the sender and forwarding the symmetric key to the intended recipient.
- the invention provides a method for transmitting a message from a sender to an intended recipient and includes encrypting a message using a symmetric key, storing the symmetric key and the message, sending the encrypted message to an intended recipient without the symmetric key, forwarding the encrypted symmetric key to a third party, receiving from the third party a certified receipt verified by the third party indicating receipt of the message by the intended recipient and verifying the validity of the certified receipt using the stored symmetric key and the certified message.
- the invention provides a method for transmitting a message from a sender to an intended recipient and includes identifying a message for transmission to an intended recipient, creating a message header that includes a symmetric key and a message identifier associated with the message, encrypting the message using the symmetric key, public key encrypting the message header using a public key of a third party, attaching the message header to the encrypted message forming a certified message and forwarding the certified message to the intended recipient, storing a copy of the certified message and the symmetric key and receiving a certified receipt originating from the intended recipient.
- the certified receipt is verified at the third party and forwarded to the sender after verification.
- the method includes verifying the validity of the receipt using the stored symmetric key and the certified message.
- the invention provides a method for providing a receipt for a message where the message is sent from a sender to an intended recipient and the method executes at the recipient.
- the method includes receiving an encrypted message from the sender, the message encrypted by a symmetric key and creating a receipt for the encrypted message including signing a hash of the encrypted message and returning the signed receipt to a third party.
- the method includes receiving the symmetric key from the third party so that the intended recipient can decrypt the encrypted message.
- the step of receiving the symmetric key can include not receiving the symmetric key until the signed receipt is delivered to the sender.
- Implementations of the invention can include one or more of the following advantages.
- a system allows the sender of a secure message or data to obtain a certified receipt from the recipient as an irrefutable proof that the message/data has been delivered.
- the system prevents the recipient from obtaining the message/data, unless a valid certified receipt is signed and sent back to the sender.
- the system prevents the sender from forging or otherwise tricking the recipients into providing the certified receipt without actually allowing the recipient to obtain the message or data.
- the system will provide additional security features, including certified time stamps that can be used to prove that the message or data was sent and received at specific times.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a system that provides the basic security features for certified communications.
- FIG. 2 is the basic process for sending and receiving certified messages using the certified messaging system shown in FIG. 1 .
- FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an enhanced system that provides additional security features such as time stamping, authentication, and data secrecy for certified communications.
- FIGS. 4 a - b show a flow diagram for an enhanced process using the system shown in FIG. 3 .
- the present invention provides a communication system for securely and easily generating, sending, and verifying the authenticity of messages or data sent to a recipient over a network.
- the system provides irrefutable proof that the recipient received a particular message/data.
- Network refers to a private or public network.
- Private networks include an intranet, that is, a network connecting one or more private servers such as a local area network (LAN).
- the network can be a public network, such as the Internet, in which data is passed over untrusted communication links.
- the network configuration can include a combination of public and private networks. For example, two or more LAN's can be coupled together with individual terminals using a public network such as the Internet.
- Internet refers to all of the networks that use the TCPIIP suite, which cooperate to form a seamless network for their collective users.
- the invention has particular applicability to communications on the Internet between clients.
- other communications over other networks can also benefit from the secure transmission features disclosed herein.
- Encryption refers to a process of encoding a document or data in orde; to hide its content from anyone except an intended recipient. “Decryption” refers to the reciprocal process, by a recipient, of recovering the original data. Two encryption methods are used and described in greater detail below: symmetric key encryption and public key encryption.
- “Symmetric key encryption” refers to an encryption method in which the encipher key and the decipher key are the same. In one implementation, AES, DES or Triple DES encryption is used for symmetric key encryption.
- the phrases “encrypted by a session key” and “decrypted by a session key” refer to steps implemented when using symmetric key encryption.
- SKE(symmetricKey, Data) is the notation used herein to denote symmetric key encryption (i.e., the Data is encrypted by the symmetricKey using a symmetric key encryption algorithm, such as Triple-DES).
- Public key encryption refers to an encryption method in which the encipher key and decipher key are different.
- the encipher key can be made public to alleviate difficulty of a symmetric key exchange between the sender and recipient.
- data can be symmetrically encrypted using a random symmetric key, and then the random symmetric key can be encrypted using a public key and an asymmetric key encryption algorithm.
- a variation of the Rabin public key encryption algorithm is used to encrypt a randomly generated symmetric key, and then the symmetric key is used to encrypt a given message using AES, DES or Triple DES encryption.
- PKE(publicKey, Data) is the notation used herein to denote public key encryption (i.e., the Data is encrypted by the publicKey). If the data to be encrypted is small enough, the data can be directly encrypted by the public key without using a public key/symmetric key hybrid.
- HASH refers to a process of applying a one-way hash function to the Data.
- One-way hash function includes a message digest five (MD5) hash function.
- Signature refers to a designator that is attached to a document that can be verified to authenticate the originator and the integrity of the document.
- “Signing” or “signed” or “sign” refer to a specific operation that is applied to a document, message or string to produce a verifiable form of a signature.
- “Signature Verification” is the reciprocal process for validating the signature produced by the signing process.
- SIGNED(privateKey, Data) is the notation used herein to denote the result of a signing process (i.e., denotes the Data is signed by the privateKey).
- the Signature can be computed using an asymmetric key digital signature algorithm (such as Rabin public key digital signature algorithm).
- SIGNED(privateKey, Data) will include the Data itself and the signature attached.
- the signature may be directly computed from the Data instead of the hash of the Data.
- SIGNED(privateKey, Data) can contain only the signature.
- SIGNED privateKey, Data1 ⁇ Data2+Data3 indicates that Data1, Data2, Data3 are first packed into one data package and then the package is signed using the privateKey
- the time stamp certificate can be used to certify the sender, the recipient, the time the message was sent, the public key of the sender, and the public key of the recipient.
- a TSC can be of the form of SIGNED(TSCServerPrivateKey, Time+MessageID+SenderInfo+RecipientInfo+Rootcertificate) using the notations defined above. In this notation, Time is the time of the message.
- MessageID is a quantity irrefutably tied to the message.
- the SenderInfo can include the sender's public key or the hash of the public key, and sender's email address or the hash of the email address.
- RecipientInfo can include the recipient's public key or the hash of the public key, and email address or the hash of email address. If a message is to be sent to several recipients, the TSC may include multiple RecipientInfo.
- the TSC is signed by the Time Stamp Certificate Server using TSCServerPrivateKey.
- the public key of the Time Stamp Certificate Server can be certified by use of a root certificate (RootCertificate).
- Time Stamp Certificate Server An example of a Time Stamp Certificate Server and the process for issuing a time stamp certificate are described in greater detail as part of the Signature Server described in co-pending and commonly owned application entitled “Secure Transmission System”, filed Jun. 28, 1999, and assigned Ser. No. 09/340,853, the contents of which are expressly incorporated herein by reference.
- Valid certified receipt refers to a certified receipt that is signed by the recipient, and therefore, provides an irrefutable proof that the recipient has received a certain message.
- a valid certified receipt contains a “Message ID” which can be irrefutably verified against the certified mail the recipient receives or a carbon copy the sender keeps.
- FIG. 1 a system for facilitating certified communications between two computing devices (e.g., a “Sender” 1 and a “Recipient” 2 ) over a network 4 is shown.
- a Remailer 3 is also coupled to the network 4 and can be accessed by each recipient 2 .
- the present invention will be described in terms of a generic messaging system. However, those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the principles disclosed herein are applicable to many forms of messaging systems including E-mail and electronic transaction and payment systems.
- the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 are all computing devices capable of cryptographic computations.
- Each includes a computing/control unit 10 , a storage (memory) 12 , and a set of cryptographic functions (i.e., PKE engine 14 , SKE engine 16 , signature engine (sign) 18 , hash engine 20 and random number generator 22 ).
- each computing device is a general-purpose computer, in which the computing/control unit 10 is one or more CPUs, and the storage 12 is one or more RAM chips or disks.
- the computing devices can be special devices, in which all the functional units are implemented using one or more FPGAs, ASICs, and other type of integrated circuits.
- the cryptographic functions include engines to handle computations associated with PKE, SKE, SIGNED, and HASH functions defined above.
- PKE engine 14 is used to compute PKE(PublicKey, Data), or reverse the process to recover Data from PKE(PublicKey, Data) using the corresponding private key.
- SKE engine 16 is used to compute SKE(SymmetricKey, Data), or reverse the process to recover the Data using the same SymmetricKey.
- the signature engine 18 is used to compute SIGNED(PrivateKey, Data), or verify a signature using the corresponding public key.
- the hash engine 20 is used to compute HASH(Data).
- the cryptographic functions also include a secure random number generator (RNG 22 ).
- the random number generator (RNG 22 ) is used to generate random symmetric keys to be used in the symmetric key and public key encryption processes.
- the hash engine 20 uses a MD5 algorithm
- the SKE engine 16 uses a Triple-DES algorithm
- the PKE engine 14 uses a 1024-bit Rabin public key encryption algorithm to encrypt a random Triple-DES key and then uses the Triple-DES key to encrypt the data
- the signature engine 18 uses a 1024-bit Rabin public key digital signature algorithm
- the RNG 22 uses random user input events (e.g. mouse movements, key board hits, etc.) to generate random numbers. Not all the cryptographic functions are needed by all three parties (the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 ). Which function is needed by which party will be clear when the certified communication processes are discussed below in association with FIGS. 2 and 4 a - b.
- Network 4 can be any type of communication link between the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 and the Remailer 3 .
- Network 4 is the Internet.
- Network 4 can also be an intranet or a combination of public and private networks.
- the basic process allows the Sender 1 to obtain irrefutable proof that the Recipient 2 has received the certified message and it ensures that neither party can spoof the system. More specifically, the Recipient 2 cannot spoof the system to read the certified message without giving the Sender 1 a certified receipt irrefutably tied to the certified message. The Sender 1 , on the other hand, cannot spoof the system to obtain such a certified receipt without actually delivering the exact certified message content to the Recipient 2 .
- the basic process does not contain some elements that may be necessary in many practical applications.
- the basic process does not contain elements that certify the time of sending and receiving, elements to ensure additional data secrecy for communications between the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 , and elements to authenticate the public keys of these parties.
- elements to ensure additional data secrecy for communications between the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 and elements to authenticate the public keys of these parties.
- the basic process starts at Step 101 , the Sender 1 creates the message content (Mailcontent) and then randomly generates an encryption key (SymmetricKey) which will be used to hide the certified message content from the Recipient 2 until a valid certified receipt is verified by the Remailer 3 .
- the random encryption key is 168-bit long and can be used as a Triple-DES key.
- the Sender 1 constructs the certified message (CertifiedMail) and sends it to the Recipient 2 .
- the certified message consists of two parts, the certified mail header (CertMailHeader), and the certified mail body (CertMailBody).
- the certified mail body contains the hash of the SymmetricKey and the message content encrypted by the SymmetricKey.
- the certified mail header contains the SymmetricKey and the MessageID, which in one implementation is the hash of the CertMailBody.
- the certified mail header is encrypted by the public key of the Remailer 3 .
- the message content is encrypted by the SymmetricKey using Triple-DES and the CertMailHeader is encrypted by the public key of the Remailer using a 1024-bit Rabin Public Key Encryption Algorithm.
- the CertMailHeader can be encrypted by a hybrid public key/symmetric key encryption technique, in which the Remailer's public key is used to encrypt a random session key and the random session key is used to encrypt the CertMailHeader.
- One example of the hash function that can be used here is MD5.
- Step 103 after receiving the CertifiedMail, the Recipient 2 signs a certified receipt and sends it to the Remailer 3 along with the encrypted CertMailHeader and the hash of the SymmetricKey.
- the signed certified receipt is sent to the Remailer 3 along with the encrypted CertMailHeader and the hash of the SymmetricKey (they are obtained from the received CertifiedMail). Because MessageID 2 is a small piece of data (for example, a 128-bit MD5 hash), it can be directly signed using the public key algorithm. In this case, the signed certified receipt is simply the signature produced by the public key algorithm. Alternatively, the certified receipt can be signed using conventional means. In this case, the hash of MessageID 2 is first computed, then the hash is signed using the public key algorithm, and finally, the signature is attached to MessageID 2 to produce the signed certified receipt.
- MessageID 2 is a small piece of data (for example, a 128-bit MD5 hash)
- the signed certified receipt is simply the signature produced by the public key algorithm.
- the certified receipt can be signed using conventional means. In this case, the hash of MessageID 2 is first computed, then the hash is signed using the public key algorithm, and finally, the signature is attached to
- Step 104 when the Remailer 3 receives the data sent by the Recipient 2 in Step 103 , it decrypts the encrypted CertMailHeader and verifies the validity of the SignedReceipt.
- the verifications include verifying the Recipient's signature that signed the SignedReceipt using the Recipient's public key, verifying that the MessageID obtained from CertMailHeader is the same as the MessageID 2 in the SignedReceipt, and verifying that the hash of the SymmetricKey sent by the Recipient 2 agrees with the same hash computed from the SymmetricKey obtained from CertMailHeader. If all these verifications are successful, the Remailer 3 sends the Signed Receipt to the Sender and sends the SymmetricKey to the Recipient 2 .
- Step 105 after receiving the SymmetricKey from the Remailer 3 , the Recipient 2 can use the SymmetricKey to decrypt SKE(SymmetricKey, MailContent) in CertMailBody and obtain the message content.
- Step 106 after receiving the SignedReceipt, the Sender 1 can use it to prove that the Recipient 2 has received the message content. This can be done by demonstrating: a) the SignedReceipt can be verified by the public key of the Recipient 2 and, b) the MessageID 2 agrees with the hash of CertMailBody reconstructed from the SymmetricKey and MailContent kept by the Sender 1 .
- the process described above ensures that the Recipient 2 cannot spoof the system to read the certified mail without sending a valid certified receipt. Likewise, the Sender 1 cannot spoof the system in order to obtain a valid receipt without actually delivering the certified mail content to the Recipient 2 .
- An additional advantage is that the Remailer 3 can be made “Stateless”. In other words, the Remailer 3 does not need to handle the certified message nor store any information related to it.
- the Remailer 3 can process the encrypted CertMailHeader and SignedReceipt dynamically and does not have to rely on any information saved previously. This greatly simplifies the Remailer 3 design.
- a Recipient 2 attempting to spoof the system desires to read the certified mail without signing and sending a valid receipt to the Remailer 3 . Since the SymmetricKey is needed to decrypt the message content and the SymmetricKey is encrypted by the Remailer's public key (as part of the CertMailHeader), the Recipient 2 must send the encrypted CertMailHeader [PKE(RemailerPublicKey, CertMailHeader)] to the Remailer 3 to get it decrypted. However, because the Remailer 3 expects a signed receipt to be sent along with the encrypted CertMailHeader, the only way the Recipient 2 can spoof the system is to send an invalid receipt.
- Step 104 the Remailer 3 verifies the Recipient's signature on the Receipt and verifies that the MessageID 2 is the same as the message ID put into the CertMailHeader by the Sender 1 . If any verification fails, the SymmetricKey is not sent to the Recipient 2 . For this reason, if the Recipient 2 wants to put a wrong MessageID 2 into the receipt, the Recipient 2 must also change the MessageID in the encrypted CertMailHeader.
- the encrypted CertMailHeader can include format information and redundancies, making this type of tampering even more difficult.
- Another way to prevent tampering of CertMailHeader is to sign it using the private key of the Sender 1 . Signing the CertMailHeader is one of the improvements discussed in the enhanced system described with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4 a and 4 b.
- a Sender 1 attempting to spoof the system desires to obtain a valid receipt that can be verified according to Step 106 without actually delivering the Message Content to the Recipient 2 . Since the receipt must be signed by the Recipient 2 to be valid, the Sender 1 cannot fake the receipt directly. The only thing the Sender 1 can do is to trick the Recipient 2 into signing and sending a receipt without delivering the actual Message Content. However, if the actual Message Content is not delivered and instead a rogue message is delivered, the MessageID 2 computed by the Recipient 2 will not match the MessageID computed by the Sender 1 and included in CertMailHeader. It is cryptographically difficult for the Sender 1 to create two different copies of the message content that have the same MessageID.
- the Sender 1 can attempt to trick the Recipient 2 into signing a receipt without giving the Recipient 2 the correct Symmetric Key. To do this, the Sender 1 can either send a corrupted public key encrypted CertMailHeader that cannot be decrypted or put a wrong SymmetricKey into an otherwise valid CertMailHeader. If the public key encrypted CertMailHeader is corrupted, the Remailer 3 process will fail and the Sender will not be able to obtain a receipt, even if the Recipient 2 is tricked into signing and sending a valid receipt to the Remailer 3 .
- the Remailer 3 guards against this kind of attack by ensuring that the SymmetricKey obtained from the CertMailHeader agrees with the hash of the SymmetricKey sent by the Recipient 2 .
- the hash of the SymmetricKey sent by the Recipient 2 must be the correct copy, because it is included in the MessageID 2 computation. (Otherwise, the Sender 1 will get a receipt with a wrong MessageID that cannot be verified in Step 106 ).
- CertMailHeader can be matched to the HASH(SymmetricKey) in the CertMailBody, but a different symmetric key is used by the Sender 1 to encrypt the Mailcontent, then the Sender 1 cannot ever demonstrate that the returned SignedReceipt matches the real CertMailBody message ID, thus rendering the SignedReceipt useless.
- Sender's address can be added to the basic process.
- the Sender's address (e.g. Email address or IP address) can be included in the CertMailHeader.
- the SenderAddress can be any data that uniquely identifies where to send messages for the Sender 1 .
- the SenderAddress can be the Sender's email address. The inclusion of SenderAddress will allow the Remailer 3 to know where to send the signed receipt without using any previously stored data (so that the Remailer can remain stateless).
- the Recipient 2 may be able to tamper with the SenderAddress so that the receipt will be sent to somewhere other than the actual Sender's address. If such a spoof is successful, the Sender 1 will not obtain a receipt but the Recipient 2 will be able to read the certified message. It is very difficult to modify the Sender 1 address since it is inside an encrypted package PKE(RemailerPublicKey, CertMailHeader). To make the tampering of the Sender 1 address even harder, the SenderAddress can be added to the CertMailBody and the SignedReceipt.
- the Remailer 3 can then verify that the SenderAddress in CertMailHeader is the same as the SenderAddress in the SignedReceipt. (The reason SenderAddress should be put into CertMailBody is because the Recipient needs it in order to put it into SignedReceipt. The Recipient cannot get the SenderAddress inside the encrypted CertMailHeader.) If the certified receipt contains the Sender's address, the receipt, is not only tied to the particular certified message but also tied to the specific Sender 1 . Only the actual Sender 1 can use the receipt to prove that he has sent the certified message and the Recipient 2 has received it.
- Step 102 SenderAddress is added to both CertMailHeader and CertMailBody.
- Step 103 SenderAddress is added to SignedReceipt.
- Step 104 verification step c) not only verifies that the MessageID in CertMailHeader is the same as the MessageID 2 in the SignedReceipt but also verifies that the SenderAddress in CertMailHeader is the same as the one in SignedReceipt.
- a different SymmetricKey can be used for each Recipient 2 in creating SKE(SymmetricKey, MailContent).
- the certified message for each Recipient 2 will have a different MessageID.
- a Recipient 2 who has not sent a receipt can obtain the content from other recipients who have sent the receipt, he may not know whether his copy of the certified message contains the same content. He may think it is a different certified message. In order to find out whether his copy of the certified message contains the same content, he must send a receipt and open his copy of the certified message.
- the Sender 1 must keep all different SymmetricKeys for all the recipients.
- the MessageID 2 in each receipt will be different.
- the same SymmetricKey can be used for all recipients.
- the Sender 1 only needs to keep one SymmetricKey for all the recipients.
- all the receipts from the different recipients will have the same MessageID.
- one limitation of this implementation is that it makes it easier for the recipients to cooperate so that when one Recipient 2 has sent a certified receipt, all other recipients will be able to read certified mail without sending a receipt.
- the Recipient 2 who has obtained the SymmetricKey can send it to other recipients so that they can open the certified mail without sending a receipt. This might be easier than directly sending the certified mail content to other recipients if the content is a very big file.
- Step 104 the Remailer 3 can then verify that the RecipientAddress in the CertMailHeader is consistent with the Recipient 2 that signed the SignedReceipt.
- Time stamp functionality can be added to the basic process. For example, a time stamp certificate that contains a time and the hash of the message signed by a time stamping authority can be used to certify the time of sending. Another time stamp certificate that contains a time and the hash of the receipt can be used to certify the time of opening.
- the Recipient 2 can verify the Sender's signature and the certificate to ensure that the message is authentic before signing and sending the receipt. Likewise, the Recipient 2 may attach his/her (X.509) certificate to the signed certified receipt so that the Remailer 3 and the Sender 1 can verify the authenticity of the Recipient's public key used in verifying the receipt.
- the SymmetricKey is accessible to the Remailer 3 .
- the certified receipt does not contain the certified message itself, it may contain the hash of the message, along with Sender information, Recipient information, and the time. Therefore, it may be desirable to keep the receipt encrypted along the path from the Recipient 2 to the Remailer 3 and from the Remailer 3 to the Sender 1 .
- each party can send its public key to other parties prior to the communication.
- each party can post its public key to a key server and the other parties can retrieve the public key from the key server prior to the communication.
- Some public keys, such as the Remailer's public key can be hard coded into programs executed by the Sender 1 or Recipient 2 .
- Time stamping can be combined with the public key distribution and authentication. Such a method will provide additional advantages. The method and its advantages will be discussed in greater detail below.
- the system In addition to the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 , the system also includes a Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 (TSC Server) coupled to the network 4 .
- TSC Server Time Stamp Certificate Server 5
- Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 is a computing device, which, in addition to computing/control unit 10 , storage 12 , and cryptographic functions, also includes a time base 28 , a key list 24 , and a root certificate 26 .
- the time base 28 is a clock that keeps an accurate time used for time stamping purpose. In one implementation, the time base is an atomic clock periodically synchronized with a national time standard.
- the key list 24 is a list that contains the public keys of all Senders 1 , all Recipients 2 , and the Remailer 3 .
- the key list in one implementation can also contain the Time Stamp Server root certificates and associated public keys.
- the key list 24 maps the addresses and/or identities of these parties to their corresponding public keys.
- the root certificate 26 is a certificate issued by a higher-level certification authority or the system vendor to certify the public key of the Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 .
- the root certificate 26 is signed by four root private keys and the associated root public keys are hard coded into the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the Remailer 3 .
- the root certificate 26 is marked as optional.
- the public key of the Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 can be considered as the root key and is hard coded into every computing device.
- Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 An example of a Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 and the process for issuing a time stamp certificate are described in greater detail as part of the “Secure Transmission System”.
- FIGS. 4 a and 4 b A process that supports time stamping, authentication, and additional data secrecy using the system of FIG. 3 is described with respect to FIGS. 4 a and 4 b.
- Step 401 of FIG. 4 a which is identical to Step 101 of FIG. 2 except the Sender 1 does not store SymmetricKey and Mailcontent. To achieve additional data secrecy, these data are required to be stored in encrypted form. One convenient way of storing these data will be described in Step 404 .
- Step 402 the Sender 1 constructs CertMailBody and computes MessageID in the same way as in the basic process.
- Sender 1 sends a request to the Time Stamp Certificate Server 5 to retrieve a TSC.
- the request contains the SenderAddress, RecipientAddress, RemailerAddress, and MessageID. If the same certified message is to be sent to multiple Recipients 2 , the request may contain several RecipientAddresses.
- Sender 1 and Recipient 2 communicate through email (using SMTP), but they can communicate with the Remailer 3 through an HTTP protocol.
- SenderAddress and RecipientAddress are Email addresses, but the RemailerAddress may be a web address (URL).
- RemailerAddress is also an Email address even if the Sender 1 and Recipient 2 communicate with the Remailer 3 through HTTP.
- the RemailerAddress is only used as a unique identifier for the Remailer 3 , not an address actually used in communication.
- the advantage of such an approach is that the TSC Server 5 does not have to treat the Remailer 3 in any special way (i.e., the Remailer 3 can be treated as a conventional Recipient 2 ). This simplifies the design.
- the TSC contains MessageID, send time, sender information, recipient information, Remailer information, and the root certificate. In case the same certified message is to be sent to multiple recipients, there may be multiple recipient information data pieces included in the TSC.
- the sender information includes the Sender 1 address and the Sender's Public Key.
- the recipient information can include the Recipient 2 address and the Recipient's Public Key.
- the remailer information can include the Remailer 3 address and the Remailer's Public Key.
- the SenderInfo, RecipientInfo, and RemailerInfo may not contain the actual addresses and corresponding public keys. Instead, each may contain quantities securely tied to these data, for example, the hashes of the addresses and the hashes of the corresponding public keys.
- the public keys can then be transmitted outside the SendTSC.
- the hashes in the SendTSC can be used to verify the authenticity of the public keys received outside the process.
- the advantage of this approach is to make the SendTSC smaller, because a hash is usually smaller (e.g. 128-bit) than a public key (e.g. 1024-2048 bit). Accordingly, sending hashed values in the SendTSC helps to minimize the size of SendTSC, particularly when the message is to be transmitted to multiple recipients. In such case, a SendTSC containing many RecipientInfos will be sent to every Recipient 2 and carried in every certified receipt. A smaller SendTSC will make the system more efficient.
- the RootCertificate issued by a higher-level certification authority (CA) or the system vendor, is used to certify the public key of the TSC Server 5 .
- CA certification authority
- the RootCertificate is signed by four root keys and the four root public keys are hard coded into Sender 1 , Recipient 2 , and Remailer 3 .
- the SendTSC is not only a certificate that ties a time with a message hash, but also a certificate that ties the Sender's and Recipient's respective addresses with corresponding public keys.
- the SendTSC is a certificate that simultaneously certifies the time of the message and the public keys of the Sender 1 and Recipient 2 .
- the TSC Server 5 relies on the key list to issue the TSCs. It is important to ensure that a public key is authentic before putting it into a key list. It is also important to remove a public key from the list when it is no longer valid. These tasks can be accomplished by following certification and revocation procedures commonly used by certification authorities (CAs).
- CAs certification authorities
- the email address is usually the only user identity information that needs to be verified by a CA.
- An email verification and key posting/revocation procedure is described in “Secure Transmission System”.
- Step 404 the Sender 1 verifies the SendTSC and then constructs the certified message (CertifiedMail) and sends it to the Recipient 2 .
- the verification of SendTSC includes verifying the TSC Server's signature using the public key of the TSC Server 5 , verifying the RootCertificate to ensure that the public key of the TSC Server 5 is authentic, and checking the consistency between the data in the SendTSC and the data sent in the request.
- the consistency check includes checking if the MessageID, SenderAddress, RecipientAddress, and RemailerAddress in the SendTSC are the same as these items sent in the request. If all the verifications succeed, the Sender 1 constructs the certified message and sends it to the Recipient 2 .
- the certified message contains two parts, a certified mail header encrypted by the public key of the Remailer 3 , and a certified mail body encrypted by the public key of the Recipient 2 . Both the certified mail header and certified mail body are signed using the Sender's private key before encryption.
- CertifiedMail PKE(RemailerPublicKey,SignedCertMailHeader)+PKE(RecipientPublicKey,SignedCertMailBody)
- the Sender 1 For the purpose of validating the certified receipt later, the Sender 1 needs to keep a copy of the SymmetricKey and the Mailcontent. It is desirable to keep these sensitive data encrypted and only accessible to the Sender 1 .
- the advantage of using a similar structure for the certified message and the carbon copy is that it simplifies the implementation.
- the routine that constructs the certified message can be used to construct the carbon copy by using the Sender's public key in place of the public keys of the Remailer 3 and the Recipient 2 .
- the verification of SignedCertMailBody includes verifying the Sender's signature using the Sender's public key included in SenderInfo in SendTSC, verifying the TSC Server's signature in SendTSC using the TSC Server's public key included in the RootCertificate, and verifying the RootCertificate using the root keys.
- the verification of SignedCertMailBody also includes verifying that the MessageID in SendTSC agrees with MessageID 2 computed from CertMailBody, and verifying that the RecipientInfo in SendTSC agrees with the Recipient's own address and public key. If all the verifications are successful, the Recipient 2 sends a request to the TSC Server to retrieve a TSC for the receiving (opening) time.
- the request contains MessageID 2 , SenderAddress, RecipientAddress, and RemailerAddress.
- the ReceiveTSC is similar to the SendTSC except it has a different time (ReceiveTime) and the SenderInfo and RecipientInfo are swapped.
- the reason is ReceiveTSC is intended as a TSC for sending the receipt back to the original Sender 1 . Therefore, the “Sender” is the receipt sender (the original Recipient 2 ) and the “Recipient” is the receipt recipient (the original Sender 1 ).
- the SendTSC and the ReceiveTSC will be quite different.
- the SendTSC will contain several recipients.
- the ReceiveTSC will contain only one recipient, which is the original Sender 1 .
- the TSC Server does not have to distinguish whether a SendTSC or a ReceiveTSC is being retrieved. It only needs to find the public keys according to the addresses sent in the request, take the MessageID from the request, get a time from the Time Base, get the RootCertificate, combine all these items together, and then sign the combination using the TSCServerPrivateKey. The same process can be used to issue both SendTSC and ReceiveTSC without distinguishing which type is being requested.
- Step 407 the Recipient 2 verifies the ReceiveTSC and sends a receipt to the Remailer 3 .
- the verification is similar to the verification of SendTSC in Step 404 , including verifying the TSC Server's signature using the public key of the TSC Server, verifying the RootCertificate to ensure the public key of the TSC Server is authentic, and checking the consistency between the data in the ReceiveTSC and the data sent in the request.
- ReceiptSentToRemailer PKE(RemailerPublicKey,SignedCertMailHeader)+PKE(RemailerPublicKey,HASH(SymmetricKey)+ReturnSessionKey+SignedReceipt)
- Step 408 the Remailer 3 decrypts ReceiptSentToRemailer to obtain SignedCertMailHeader, HASH(SymmetricKey), and SignedReceipt. Then, the Remailer 3 conducts a series of verification steps to ensure that the SignedCertMailHeader, SignedReceipt, SendTSC and ReceiveTSC are all valid and the data contained in them are all consistent.
- the verifications include verifying Sender's signature in SignedCertMailHeader using the SenderPublicKey in SendTSC or ReceiveTSC, verifying Recipient's signature in SignedReceipt using the Recipient's PublicKey in SendTSC or ReceiveTSC, verifying TSC Server's signatures in both SendTSC and ReceiveTSC, and verifying the root certificate in both SendTSC and ReceiveTSC using the four root keys.
- the verifications include consistency checks including checking if MessageID and MessageID 2 in SignedCertMailHeader, SendTSC, and ReceiveTSC are all equal, checking if HASH(SymmetricKey) in ReceiptSentToRemailer is consistent with SymmetricKey in SignedCertMailHeader, checking if SendTime in SignedCertMailHeader is the same as the one in SendTSC, checking if SenderInfo, RecipientInfo, and RemailerInfo in SendTSC and ReceiveTSC are consistent, and checking if ReceiveTime in ReceiveTSC is later than the SendTime in SendTSC.
- consistency checks including checking if MessageID and MessageID 2 in SignedCertMailHeader, SendTSC, and ReceiveTSC are all equal, checking if HASH(SymmetricKey) in ReceiptSentToRemailer is consistent with SymmetricKey in SignedCertMailHeader, checking if SendTime in SignedC
- the Remailer 3 also uses the ReturnSessionKey to encrypt the Symmetric Key and sends SKE(ReturnSessionKey, SymmetricKey) to the Recipient 2 .
- ReturnSessionKey can be chosen to have the same length as the Symmetric Key, then SKE(ReturnSessionKey, SymmetricKey) can be replaced by a simple XOR (exclusive or) of ReturnSessionKey and SymmetricKey.
- ReturnSessionKey is used only once (the idea of one-time pad).
- a further alternative is to use public key encryption and send PKE(RecipientPublicKey, SymmetricKey) to the Recipient 2 .
- the advantage of this method is that ReturnSessionKey does not have to be sent to the Remailer 3 in Step 407 .
- public key encryption/decryption is much less efficient than symmetric key encryption/decryption or a simple XOR.
- Step 409 the Recipient 2 decrypts the data received from the Remailer 3 to recover the SymmetricKey and then use it to decrypt SKE(SymmetricKey, MailContent) to obtain MailContent. This completes the certified message delivery.
- Step 410 is carried out when/if the Sender 1 needs to prove that the MailContent existed at SendTime and was delivered to the Recipient 2 at the ReceiveTime.
- the proof includes verifying the Recipient's signature, the MessageID or messageID 2 , sender information, recipient information, remailer information, the signatures in the SendTSC and ReceiveTSC and the carbon copy SendTSC.
- the detailed verification steps are shown in FIG. 4 b.
- SignedCertMailHeader does not contain SenderAddress, it contains the Sender's signature, which also uniquely identifies the Sender 1 .
- the Remailer 3 can rely on the SenderAddress in SendTSC to determine where to send the receipt, as long as it can successfully verify the Sender's signature using the SenderPublicKey in the same SendTSC.
- the Remailer 3 cannot be tricked into sending the receipt to anywhere else other than the actual Sender 1 .
- the SenderAddress is not explicitly put into SignedReceipt, the receipt still contains SenderAddress, because it contains SendTSC. This shows that the type of spoofing discussed in the multiple sender case can be prevented.
- SenderAddress is not in CertMailBody, the Recipient 2 can still get it from the SendTSC.
- RecipientAddress is not in SignedCertMailHeader
- the type of spoofing discussed in multiple recipient cases can still be prevented. Reconsidering such spoofing under the enhanced process, if Bob signs the receipt, the signature will be inconsistent with the RecipientInfo in SendTSC. Even if Bob can retrieve a new SendTSC with himself as the recipient and Carol as the sender, it will not have the same time as the SendTime in SignedCertMailHeader. In either case, the Remailer 3 will be able to detect such spoofing and refuse to give Bob the SymmetricKey required to read the message. This means the type of spoofing discussed in the multiple recipient case can be prevented.
- SendTSC is used to prove that the message content existed at the SendTime, there is no way for the Sender 1 to obtain a false proof. If the message content does not exist yet, the Sender 1 cannot get the correct MessageID to send to Time Stamp Server 5 in order to have the Message ID put into SendTSC. Since the Recipient 2 must first retrieve ReceiveTSC and send the receipt before being able to get the message content, the Recipient 2 cannot claim that the certified message is received at some later time. Therefore, the ReceiveTSC inside the signed receipt is a proof that the Recipient 2 has received the certified message no later than ReceiveTime.
- the Recipient 2 wants to read the certified message, he has no way to avoid sending such a proof to the Sender 1 . However, there is still one type of spoofing the Recipient 2 might be able to do. After receiving the certified message, the Recipient 2 can use the MessageID computed from the message to retrieve another TSC pretending to be the Sender 1 . Then the Recipient 2 can replace the SendTSC in the certified message with the fake one and proceed with the normal receiving process. If such a spoofing is successful, the Recipient 2 will be able to read the certified message but the Sender 1 will get a receipt that is otherwise valid except containing a SendTime later than the time the certified message was actually sent.
- the SendTSC in the receipt will not match the one in the Carboncopy.
- This type of spoofing is prevented, because the SendTime is in the SignedCertMailHeader.
- the advantages of the combined time stamping and public key authentication are clear from the above discussions of the enhanced process.
- the combined structure offers more than the sum of the elements when each element is used independently.
- the certificate not only certifies the time of the message and certifies the public keys, but also certifies that the public keys are valid at the exact time the message is sent.
- the certificate also becomes a one-time use, real time certificate that can only be used for only one particular message. This eliminates the need for a certificate revocation list (CRL).
- CTL certificate revocation list
- the TSC Server 5 certifies all these items with one certificate.
- Such a certificate not only certifies the Sender 1 , Recipient 2 , and time, but also certifies the association between them.
- the certification of such an association plays an important roll in preventing spoofing in the multiple recipient case discussed above. If SendTSC were replaced by three separate traditional certificates for the Sender 1 , the Recipient 2 , and the time, then Bob could keep the certificates for the Sender 1 and the time intact, but replace the recipient certificate with his own certificate. In such case, the spoofing would succeed.
- the certified message can have a subject title (Subject).
- the Subject can be included in the SignedReceipt and in the CarbonCopy so that the Sender can readily determine which SignedReceipt corresponds to which CarbonCopy.
- the Subject can be put into the SignedCertMailHeader so that the Remailer 3 can catch such spoofing.
- Remailer 3 functionality can be located in the TSC Server 5 so that some common elements such as the cryptographic functions do not have to be duplicated in two places.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
Abstract
Description
-
- CertMailHeader=SenderAddress+MessageID+Symmetric Key, and
- CertMailBody=SenderAddress+HASH(SymmetricKey)+SKE(SymmetricKey, Mailcontent)
-
- SignedReceipt=SIGNED(RecipientPrivateKey, SenderAddress+MessageID2)
CertMailHeader=RecipientAddress+MessageID+SymmetricKey.
There is no need to add the RecipientAddress into the SignedReceipt, because the Recipient's signature is already a unique identification. In
Enhanced Process—Time Stamping, Authentication, and Additional Data Secrecy
SendTSC=SIGNED(TSCServerPrivateKey,MessageID+SendTime+SenderInfo+RecipientInfo+RemailerInfo+Rootcertificate);
CertifiedMail=PKE(RemailerPublicKey,SignedCertMailHeader)+PKE(RecipientPublicKey,SignedCertMailBody)
SignedCertMailHeader=SIGNED(SenderPrivateKey, SendTime+MessageID+SymmetricKey) and
SignedCertMailBody=SIGNED(SenderPublicKey, CertMailBody+SendTSC).
CarbonCopy=PKE(SenderPublicKey,SignedCertMailHeader)+PKE(SenderPublicKey,SignedCertMailBody)
Note that the carbon copy is exactly the same as the certified message except that both SignedCertMailHeader and SignedCertMailBody are encrypted by the public key of the
ReceiveTSC=SIGNED(TSCServerPrivateKey,MessageID2+ReceiveTime+RecipientInfo+SenderMo+RemailerInfo+RootCertificate).
The ReceiveTSC is similar to the SendTSC except it has a different time (ReceiveTime) and the SenderInfo and RecipientInfo are swapped. The reason is ReceiveTSC is intended as a TSC for sending the receipt back to the
ReceiptSentToRemailer=PKE(RemailerPublicKey,SignedCertMailHeader)+PKE(RemailerPublicKey,HASH(SymmetricKey)+ReturnSessionKey+SignedReceipt)
-
- where: SignedReceipt=SIGNED(RecipientPrivateKey, SendTSC+ReceiveTSC)
The ReturnSessionKey can be used to secure later communications between theRecipient 2 and theRemailer 3. Although MessageID2 is not explicitly shown in the definition of SignedReceipt here, it is included in both SendTSC and ReceiveTSC implicitly.
- where: SignedReceipt=SIGNED(RecipientPrivateKey, SendTSC+ReceiveTSC)
CertifedReceipt=PKE(SenderPublicKey,SignedReceipt).
The
Claims (18)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/949,690 US8027923B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2007-12-03 | Certified transmission system |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US09/826,320 US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2001-04-03 | Certified transmission system |
US11/949,690 US8027923B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2007-12-03 | Certified transmission system |
Related Parent Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US09/826,320 Continuation US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2001-04-03 | Certified transmission system |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20080155253A1 US20080155253A1 (en) | 2008-06-26 |
US8027923B2 true US8027923B2 (en) | 2011-09-27 |
Family
ID=25246233
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US09/826,320 Expired - Lifetime US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2001-04-03 | Certified transmission system |
US11/949,690 Expired - Fee Related US8027923B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2007-12-03 | Certified transmission system |
Family Applications Before (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US09/826,320 Expired - Lifetime US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2001-04-03 | Certified transmission system |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US7353204B2 (en) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20130227274A1 (en) * | 2012-02-23 | 2013-08-29 | Applied Communications Sciences | Privacy-preserving publish-subscribe protocol in a cloud-assisted model |
Families Citing this family (293)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7010683B2 (en) * | 2000-01-14 | 2006-03-07 | Howlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Public key validation service |
US7269726B1 (en) | 2000-01-14 | 2007-09-11 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Lightweight public key infrastructure employing unsigned certificates |
US6802002B1 (en) * | 2000-01-14 | 2004-10-05 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Method and apparatus for providing field confidentiality in digital certificates |
US6763459B1 (en) | 2000-01-14 | 2004-07-13 | Hewlett-Packard Company, L.P. | Lightweight public key infrastructure employing disposable certificates |
US7340600B1 (en) | 2000-01-14 | 2008-03-04 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Authorization infrastructure based on public key cryptography |
US6732101B1 (en) * | 2000-06-15 | 2004-05-04 | Zix Corporation | Secure message forwarding system detecting user's preferences including security preferences |
US8972717B2 (en) | 2000-06-15 | 2015-03-03 | Zixcorp Systems, Inc. | Automatic delivery selection for electronic content |
US6820081B1 (en) * | 2001-03-19 | 2004-11-16 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for evaluating a structured message store for message redundancy |
US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2008-04-01 | Zix Corporation | Certified transmission system |
US7136840B2 (en) * | 2001-04-20 | 2006-11-14 | Intertrust Technologies Corp. | Systems and methods for conducting transactions and communications using a trusted third party |
US6778995B1 (en) | 2001-08-31 | 2004-08-17 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for efficiently generating cluster groupings in a multi-dimensional concept space |
US6978274B1 (en) | 2001-08-31 | 2005-12-20 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for dynamically evaluating latent concepts in unstructured documents |
US6888548B1 (en) | 2001-08-31 | 2005-05-03 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for generating a visualized data representation preserving independent variable geometric relationships |
US7921450B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2011-04-05 | Klimenty Vainstein | Security system using indirect key generation from access rules and methods therefor |
US10360545B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2019-07-23 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Method and apparatus for accessing secured electronic data off-line |
US7681034B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2010-03-16 | Chang-Ping Lee | Method and apparatus for securing electronic data |
US8065713B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2011-11-22 | Klimenty Vainstein | System and method for providing multi-location access management to secured items |
US7178033B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2007-02-13 | Pss Systems, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securing digital assets |
US7380120B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2008-05-27 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Secured data format for access control |
US7260555B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2007-08-21 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Method and architecture for providing pervasive security to digital assets |
US7930756B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2011-04-19 | Crocker Steven Toye | Multi-level cryptographic transformations for securing digital assets |
US7783765B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2010-08-24 | Hildebrand Hal S | System and method for providing distributed access control to secured documents |
USRE41546E1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2010-08-17 | Klimenty Vainstein | Method and system for managing security tiers |
US8006280B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2011-08-23 | Hildebrand Hal S | Security system for generating keys from access rules in a decentralized manner and methods therefor |
US7921284B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2011-04-05 | Gary Mark Kinghorn | Method and system for protecting electronic data in enterprise environment |
US7921288B1 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2011-04-05 | Hildebrand Hal S | System and method for providing different levels of key security for controlling access to secured items |
US7565683B1 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2009-07-21 | Weiqing Huang | Method and system for implementing changes to security policies in a distributed security system |
US10033700B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2018-07-24 | Intellectual Ventures I Llc | Dynamic evaluation of access rights |
US7950066B1 (en) | 2001-12-21 | 2011-05-24 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Method and system for restricting use of a clipboard application |
US7213150B1 (en) * | 2002-01-11 | 2007-05-01 | Oracle International Corp. | Method and apparatus for secure message queuing |
US8176334B2 (en) | 2002-09-30 | 2012-05-08 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Document security system that permits external users to gain access to secured files |
US7271804B2 (en) | 2002-02-25 | 2007-09-18 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for arranging concept clusters in thematic relationships in a two-dimensional visual display area |
US8613102B2 (en) | 2004-03-30 | 2013-12-17 | Intellectual Ventures I Llc | Method and system for providing document retention using cryptography |
US20030204741A1 (en) * | 2002-04-26 | 2003-10-30 | Isadore Schoen | Secure PKI proxy and method for instant messaging clients |
JP2003323357A (en) * | 2002-05-08 | 2003-11-14 | Hitachi Ltd | Time stamp generation system |
WO2004012415A1 (en) * | 2002-07-30 | 2004-02-05 | Security And Standards Limited | Electronic sealing for electronic transactions |
US8165993B2 (en) | 2002-09-06 | 2012-04-24 | Oracle International Corporation | Business intelligence system with interface that provides for immediate user action |
US7941542B2 (en) | 2002-09-06 | 2011-05-10 | Oracle International Corporation | Methods and apparatus for maintaining application execution over an intermittent network connection |
US8255454B2 (en) | 2002-09-06 | 2012-08-28 | Oracle International Corporation | Method and apparatus for a multiplexed active data window in a near real-time business intelligence system |
US7899879B2 (en) | 2002-09-06 | 2011-03-01 | Oracle International Corporation | Method and apparatus for a report cache in a near real-time business intelligence system |
US7945846B2 (en) | 2002-09-06 | 2011-05-17 | Oracle International Corporation | Application-specific personalization for data display |
US7243124B1 (en) * | 2002-09-06 | 2007-07-10 | Oracle International Corporation | Architecture for general purpose near real-time business intelligence system with client devices and methods therefor |
US7912899B2 (en) * | 2002-09-06 | 2011-03-22 | Oracle International Corporation | Method for selectively sending a notification to an instant messaging device |
US7412481B2 (en) | 2002-09-16 | 2008-08-12 | Oracle International Corporation | Method and apparatus for distributed rule evaluation in a near real-time business intelligence system |
US7512810B1 (en) | 2002-09-11 | 2009-03-31 | Guardian Data Storage Llc | Method and system for protecting encrypted files transmitted over a network |
US7668917B2 (en) | 2002-09-16 | 2010-02-23 | Oracle International Corporation | Method and apparatus for ensuring accountability in the examination of a set of data elements by a user |
US7401158B2 (en) | 2002-09-16 | 2008-07-15 | Oracle International Corporation | Apparatus and method for instant messaging collaboration |
US7836310B1 (en) | 2002-11-01 | 2010-11-16 | Yevgeniy Gutnik | Security system that uses indirect password-based encryption |
US20050171948A1 (en) * | 2002-12-11 | 2005-08-04 | Knight William C. | System and method for identifying critical features in an ordered scale space within a multi-dimensional feature space |
US7890990B1 (en) | 2002-12-20 | 2011-02-15 | Klimenty Vainstein | Security system with staging capabilities |
US7904823B2 (en) | 2003-03-17 | 2011-03-08 | Oracle International Corporation | Transparent windows methods and apparatus therefor |
US8005899B2 (en) * | 2003-03-19 | 2011-08-23 | Message Level Llc | System and method for detecting and filtering unsolicited and undesired electronic messages |
US8707034B1 (en) | 2003-05-30 | 2014-04-22 | Intellectual Ventures I Llc | Method and system for using remote headers to secure electronic files |
US7730543B1 (en) | 2003-06-30 | 2010-06-01 | Satyajit Nath | Method and system for enabling users of a group shared across multiple file security systems to access secured files |
US7610313B2 (en) | 2003-07-25 | 2009-10-27 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for performing efficient document scoring and clustering |
US20070172066A1 (en) * | 2003-09-12 | 2007-07-26 | Secured Email Goteborg Ab | Message security |
US7703140B2 (en) | 2003-09-30 | 2010-04-20 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Method and system for securing digital assets using process-driven security policies |
US8127366B2 (en) | 2003-09-30 | 2012-02-28 | Guardian Data Storage, Llc | Method and apparatus for transitioning between states of security policies used to secure electronic documents |
CN1864377B (en) * | 2003-10-17 | 2010-09-01 | 日本电信电话株式会社 | Mail distribution system, mail distribution method |
US7191175B2 (en) | 2004-02-13 | 2007-03-13 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for arranging concept clusters in thematic neighborhood relationships in a two-dimensional visual display space |
US7747860B2 (en) * | 2004-05-04 | 2010-06-29 | Message Level, Llc | System and method for preventing delivery of unsolicited and undesired electronic messages by key generation and comparison |
AU2005255517B2 (en) * | 2004-06-21 | 2009-10-08 | Blackberry Limited | System and method for handling message receipt notification |
US7707427B1 (en) | 2004-07-19 | 2010-04-27 | Michael Frederick Kenrich | Multi-level file digests |
JP4822677B2 (en) * | 2004-07-20 | 2011-11-24 | キヤノン株式会社 | COMMUNICATION DEVICE, COMMUNICATION METHOD, COMPUTER PROGRAM, AND COMPUTER-READABLE STORAGE MEDIUM |
US7814216B2 (en) * | 2004-09-07 | 2010-10-12 | Route 1 Inc. | System and method for accessing host computer via remote computer |
US20080086532A1 (en) * | 2004-10-04 | 2008-04-10 | Brian Cunningham | Method for the Verification of Electronic Message Delivery and for the Collection of Data Related to Electronic Messages Sent with False Origination Addresses |
US8099598B1 (en) * | 2005-01-03 | 2012-01-17 | Gary Gang Liu | Secure messaging system with automatic recipient enrollment |
US7356777B2 (en) | 2005-01-26 | 2008-04-08 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for providing a dynamic user interface for a dense three-dimensional scene |
US7404151B2 (en) | 2005-01-26 | 2008-07-22 | Attenex Corporation | System and method for providing a dynamic user interface for a dense three-dimensional scene |
KR100606748B1 (en) * | 2005-05-27 | 2006-08-01 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | Method for certificating message, and terminal and system for the same |
DE102005027858A1 (en) * | 2005-06-16 | 2006-12-21 | Continental Aktiengesellschaft | Rubber compound and tires |
FR2892876A1 (en) * | 2005-11-02 | 2007-05-04 | Gemplus Sa | Data e.g. digital data, deposition method for mobile communication field, involves encrypting data with key using symmetric encrypting method, and encrypting transfer key with public key of third party by asymmetric encrypting method |
JP4600248B2 (en) * | 2005-11-07 | 2010-12-15 | ソニー株式会社 | Data communication system and data communication method |
WO2007071041A1 (en) * | 2005-12-19 | 2007-06-28 | Kryptiva Inc. | System and method for end-to-end electronic mail encryption |
US8171293B2 (en) * | 2005-12-30 | 2012-05-01 | Apple Inc. | Receiver non-repudiation via a secure device |
US7890757B2 (en) * | 2005-12-30 | 2011-02-15 | Novell, Inc. | Receiver non-repudiation |
WO2007095159A2 (en) | 2006-02-14 | 2007-08-23 | Message Level, Llc | Predelivery verification of an intended recipient and dynamic generation of message content upon verif |
JP4251186B2 (en) * | 2006-02-23 | 2009-04-08 | コニカミノルタビジネステクノロジーズ株式会社 | Information processing apparatus, control program thereof, and control method thereof |
WO2007097604A1 (en) | 2006-02-27 | 2007-08-30 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Method and system for protecting broadcast service/content in a mobile broadcast system, and method for generating short term key message therefor |
US8156168B2 (en) * | 2006-08-17 | 2012-04-10 | University Of Miami | Method and system for data security |
US8484263B2 (en) * | 2006-08-17 | 2013-07-09 | University Of Miami | Method for keyless protection of data using a local array of disks |
TWI319675B (en) * | 2006-11-02 | 2010-01-11 | Compal Electronics Inc | A method for delivering a confidential e-mail |
US20080165972A1 (en) * | 2007-01-08 | 2008-07-10 | I-Fax.Com Inc. | Method and system for encrypted email communication |
US8566239B2 (en) | 2007-02-22 | 2013-10-22 | First Data Corporation | Mobile commerce systems and methods |
US20090003588A1 (en) * | 2007-06-26 | 2009-01-01 | John Gordon Ross | Counter Sealing Archives of Electronic Seals |
US20090006258A1 (en) * | 2007-06-26 | 2009-01-01 | John Gordon Ross | Registration Process |
US20090006860A1 (en) * | 2007-06-26 | 2009-01-01 | John Gordon Ross | Generating multiple seals for electronic data |
US20090006842A1 (en) * | 2007-06-26 | 2009-01-01 | John Gordon Ross | Sealing Electronic Data Associated With Multiple Electronic Documents |
US20090031139A1 (en) * | 2007-07-27 | 2009-01-29 | Mohammed Alawi Geoffrey | System and Method for Electronic Certification and Authentification |
US7975144B2 (en) | 2008-01-10 | 2011-07-05 | Research In Motion Limited | Systems and methods for server aided processing of a signed receipt |
US8806214B2 (en) | 2008-12-01 | 2014-08-12 | Novell, Inc. | Communication with non-repudiation and blind signatures |
US8458477B2 (en) * | 2008-12-01 | 2013-06-04 | Novell, Inc. | Communication with non-repudiation |
US8589372B2 (en) | 2008-12-16 | 2013-11-19 | Clinton A. Krislov | Method and system for automated document registration with cloud computing |
US8341141B2 (en) * | 2008-12-16 | 2012-12-25 | Krislov Clinton A | Method and system for automated document registration |
US8914351B2 (en) | 2008-12-16 | 2014-12-16 | Clinton A. Krislov | Method and system for secure automated document registration from social media networks |
US8515957B2 (en) | 2009-07-28 | 2013-08-20 | Fti Consulting, Inc. | System and method for displaying relationships between electronically stored information to provide classification suggestions via injection |
US8612446B2 (en) | 2009-08-24 | 2013-12-17 | Fti Consulting, Inc. | System and method for generating a reference set for use during document review |
US8726009B1 (en) * | 2010-01-26 | 2014-05-13 | David P. Cook | Secure messaging using a trusted third party |
WO2011103561A2 (en) * | 2010-02-22 | 2011-08-25 | Lockify, Inc. | Encryption system using web browsers and untrusted web servers |
US9363088B2 (en) | 2010-07-22 | 2016-06-07 | Zixcorp Systems, Inc. | Automated provisioning of a network appliance |
SG179320A1 (en) * | 2010-09-30 | 2012-04-27 | Hee Chai Ooi | Ussd wallet and payment system |
EP2597902B1 (en) * | 2010-11-16 | 2017-04-19 | BlackBerry Limited | Handling receipts in cross component message processing |
US20140229741A1 (en) * | 2011-12-30 | 2014-08-14 | Sanu K. Mathew | Dual Composite Field Advanced Encryption Standard Memory Encryption Engine |
US8799675B2 (en) | 2012-01-05 | 2014-08-05 | House Of Development Llc | System and method for electronic certification and authentication of data |
PT2723023T (en) * | 2012-10-19 | 2020-04-30 | Lleidanetworks Serveis Telematics Sa | Method for the registration and certification of receipt of electronic mail |
US9178862B1 (en) * | 2012-11-16 | 2015-11-03 | Isaac S. Daniel | System and method for convenient and secure electronic postmarking using an electronic postmarking terminal |
US9531707B1 (en) | 2012-11-21 | 2016-12-27 | Isaac S. Daniel | Convenient and secure biometrically authenticated system and method for delivering E-mail and parcels |
US8725645B1 (en) | 2013-01-04 | 2014-05-13 | Cetrus LLC | Non-invasive metering system for software licenses |
CN104079614B (en) * | 2013-03-29 | 2017-09-12 | 国际商业机器公司 | The method and system obtained in order for distributed post ordering system message |
US9071429B1 (en) * | 2013-04-29 | 2015-06-30 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Revocable shredding of security credentials |
WO2015144764A1 (en) * | 2014-03-26 | 2015-10-01 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | Method and system for improving the data security during a communication process |
US9729583B1 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2017-08-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for performing privacy assessments and monitoring of new versions of computer code for privacy compliance |
US10181051B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-01-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory for processing data access requests |
US9749297B2 (en) * | 2014-11-12 | 2017-08-29 | Yaron Gvili | Manicoding for communication verification |
WO2016179334A1 (en) | 2015-05-05 | 2016-11-10 | ShoCard, Inc. | Identity management service using a block chain |
US9876646B2 (en) | 2015-05-05 | 2018-01-23 | ShoCard, Inc. | User identification management system and method |
CN104899277B (en) * | 2015-05-29 | 2018-08-10 | 北京京东尚科信息技术有限公司 | A kind of message distributing method and device |
US10567357B2 (en) | 2015-10-02 | 2020-02-18 | Zixcorp Systems, Inc. | Secure transmission system with upgraded encryption strength |
DK3188435T3 (en) * | 2015-12-28 | 2020-01-27 | Lleidanetworks Serveis Telematics Sa | METHOD OF CERTIFICATING ELECTRONIC MAIL INCLUDING A SECURE DIGITAL SIGNATURE FROM A TELECOMMUNICATION OPERATOR |
WO2017152150A1 (en) | 2016-03-04 | 2017-09-08 | ShoCard, Inc. | Method and system for authenticated login using static or dynamic codes |
US10007826B2 (en) | 2016-03-07 | 2018-06-26 | ShoCard, Inc. | Transferring data files using a series of visual codes |
US10509932B2 (en) | 2016-03-07 | 2019-12-17 | ShoCard, Inc. | Large data transfer using visual codes with feedback confirmation |
US10423996B2 (en) | 2016-04-01 | 2019-09-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and communication systems and methods for the efficient generation of privacy risk assessments |
US10706447B2 (en) | 2016-04-01 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and communication systems and methods for the efficient generation of privacy risk assessments |
US20220164840A1 (en) | 2016-04-01 | 2022-05-26 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for integrating privacy information management systems with data loss prevention tools or other tools for privacy design |
US11244367B2 (en) | 2016-04-01 | 2022-02-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for integrating privacy information management systems with data loss prevention tools or other tools for privacy design |
US11004125B2 (en) | 2016-04-01 | 2021-05-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for integrating privacy information management systems with data loss prevention tools or other tools for privacy design |
WO2017210618A1 (en) | 2016-06-02 | 2017-12-07 | Fti Consulting, Inc. | Analyzing clusters of coded documents |
US11544667B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-01-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US11188862B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-11-30 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US11222142B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-01-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for validating authorization for personal data collection, storage, and processing |
US10565236B1 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-02-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US10510031B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying, assessing, and remediating data processing risks using data modeling techniques |
US11038925B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-06-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10430740B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-01 | One Trust, LLC | Data processing systems for calculating and communicating cost of fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US10607028B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-31 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data testing to confirm data deletion and related methods |
US10467432B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-11-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for use in automatically generating, populating, and submitting data subject access requests |
US10740487B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-08-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for populating and maintaining a centralized database of personal data |
US12136055B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2024-11-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying, assessing, and remediating data processing risks using data modeling techniques |
US10685140B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-06-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10353674B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-07-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and communications systems and methods for the efficient implementation of privacy by design |
US10586075B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-10 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for orphaned data identification and deletion and related methods |
US11416589B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US11025675B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-06-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for performing privacy assessments and monitoring of new versions of computer code for privacy compliance |
US10452866B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-22 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US12118121B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2024-10-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data subject access request processing systems and related methods |
US10454973B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-22 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10438017B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing data subject access requests |
US10242228B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-03-26 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for measuring privacy maturity within an organization |
US11222309B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-01-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US10997315B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-05-04 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US10803200B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-10-13 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing and managing data subject access in a distributed environment |
US10452864B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-22 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for webform crawling to map processing activities and related methods |
US10762236B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing user interface monitoring systems and related methods |
US10776518B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10181019B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-01-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and communications systems and methods for integrating privacy compliance systems with software development and agile tools for privacy design |
US10282700B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-05-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US11651104B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-05-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US11727141B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-08-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for synching privacy-related user consent across multiple computing devices |
US11277448B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-03-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10282559B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-05-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying, assessing, and remediating data processing risks using data modeling techniques |
US11416798B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for providing training in a vendor procurement process |
US10949565B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-03-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US10437412B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10496803B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for efficiently assessing the risk of privacy campaigns |
US10235534B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-03-19 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for prioritizing data subject access requests for fulfillment and related methods |
US11475136B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-10-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data transfer risk identification and related methods |
US11210420B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-12-28 | OneTrust, LLC | Data subject access request processing systems and related methods |
US11100444B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-08-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for providing training in a vendor procurement process |
US10997318B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-05-04 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory for processing data access requests |
US11074367B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-07-27 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identity validation for consumer rights requests and related methods |
US10346638B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-07-09 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying and modifying processes that are subject to data subject access requests |
US11343284B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-05-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for performing privacy assessments and monitoring of new versions of computer code for privacy compliance |
US10885485B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-01-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US10592648B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10509920B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing data subject access requests |
US10706379B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for automatic preparation for remediation and related methods |
US11366909B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-06-21 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US10853501B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-12-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US10706174B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for prioritizing data subject access requests for fulfillment and related methods |
US10798133B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-10-06 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US11392720B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-07-19 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for verification of consent and notice processing and related methods |
US11222139B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-01-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatic discovery and assessment of mobile software development kits |
US10713387B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-14 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent conversion optimization systems and related methods |
US11366786B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-06-21 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing data subject access requests |
US10783256B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-22 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data transfer risk identification and related methods |
US10944725B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-03-09 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for using a data model to select a target data asset in a data migration |
US10796260B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-10-06 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US10839102B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-11-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying and modifying processes that are subject to data subject access requests |
US10204154B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-02-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US10706176B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data-processing consent refresh, re-prompt, and recapture systems and related methods |
US11675929B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-06-13 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing consent sharing systems and related methods |
US11625502B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-04-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying and modifying processes that are subject to data subject access requests |
US11438386B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-09-06 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10606916B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-31 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing user interface monitoring systems and related methods |
US10416966B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-09-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identity validation of data subject access requests and related methods |
US10909488B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-02-02 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for assessing readiness for responding to privacy-related incidents |
US12052289B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2024-07-30 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10169609B1 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-01-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US11134086B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-09-28 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent conversion optimization systems and related methods |
US10565397B1 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-02-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US10585968B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-10 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US11520928B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-12-06 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating personal data receipts and related methods |
US10909265B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-02-02 | OneTrust, LLC | Application privacy scanning systems and related methods |
US11354434B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-06-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for verification of consent and notice processing and related methods |
US11138242B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically detecting and documenting privacy-related aspects of computer software |
US10353673B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-07-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for integration of consumer feedback with data subject access requests and related methods |
US10726158B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-28 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management and automated process blocking systems and related methods |
US11586700B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-02-21 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically blocking the use of tracking tools |
US10565161B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-02-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing data subject access requests |
US10642870B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-05-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically detecting and documenting privacy-related aspects of computer software |
US10572686B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-02-25 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10346637B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-07-09 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for the identification and deletion of personal data in computer systems |
US11023842B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-06-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for bundled privacy policies |
US11301796B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-04-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for customizing privacy training |
US11328092B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-05-10 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for processing and managing data subject access in a distributed environment |
US11461500B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-10-04 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for cookie compliance testing with website scanning and related methods |
US11481710B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-10-25 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US10503926B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-10 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US11336697B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-05-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10614247B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-04-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for automated classification of personal information from documents and related methods |
US11238390B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-02-01 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US11228620B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-01-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US11157600B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-26 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US11416590B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US11227247B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-01-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for bundled privacy policies |
US11354435B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-06-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data testing to confirm data deletion and related methods |
US10496846B1 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and communications systems and methods for the efficient implementation of privacy by design |
US10440062B2 (en) * | 2016-06-10 | 2019-10-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US11416109B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Automated data processing systems and methods for automatically processing data subject access requests using a chatbot |
US11294939B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-04-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically detecting and documenting privacy-related aspects of computer software |
US11418492B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for using a data model to select a target data asset in a data migration |
US11295316B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-04-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identity validation for consumer rights requests and related methods |
US10678945B2 (en) * | 2016-06-10 | 2020-06-09 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10275614B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-04-30 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US11144622B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US12045266B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2024-07-23 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US11138299B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-05 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US10509894B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-12-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US10776517B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for calculating and communicating cost of fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US10592692B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-03-17 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for central consent repository and related methods |
US11636171B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-04-25 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing user interface monitoring systems and related methods |
US11057356B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-07-06 | OneTrust, LLC | Automated data processing systems and methods for automatically processing data subject access requests using a chatbot |
US11151233B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-19 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for assessing vendor risk |
US10318761B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-06-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for auditing data request compliance |
US10284604B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2019-05-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing and scanning systems for generating and populating a data inventory |
US11403377B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-08-02 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US11651106B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-05-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US10846433B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-11-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing consent management systems and related methods |
US10873606B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-12-22 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US10706131B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for efficiently assessing the risk of privacy campaigns |
US10878127B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-12-29 | OneTrust, LLC | Data subject access request processing systems and related methods |
US10769301B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-08 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for webform crawling to map processing activities and related methods |
US11200341B2 (en) * | 2016-06-10 | 2021-12-14 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US11146566B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-10-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for fulfilling data subject access requests and related methods |
US20190096020A1 (en) * | 2016-06-10 | 2019-03-28 | OneTrust, LLC | Consent receipt management systems and related methods |
US10708305B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-07-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Automated data processing systems and methods for automatically processing requests for privacy-related information |
US10848523B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-11-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for data-transfer risk identification, cross-border visualization generation, and related methods |
US11562097B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2023-01-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for central consent repository and related methods |
US10776514B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2020-09-15 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for the identification and deletion of personal data in computer systems |
US11087260B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-08-10 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for customizing privacy training |
US11188615B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-11-30 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing consent capture systems and related methods |
US10949170B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-03-16 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for integration of consumer feedback with data subject access requests and related methods |
US11341447B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2022-05-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US10896394B2 (en) | 2016-06-10 | 2021-01-19 | OneTrust, LLC | Privacy management systems and methods |
US10498541B2 (en) | 2017-02-06 | 2019-12-03 | ShocCard, Inc. | Electronic identification verification methods and systems |
USRE49968E1 (en) | 2017-02-06 | 2024-05-14 | Ping Identity Corporation | Electronic identification verification methods and systems with storage of certification records to a side chain |
US10013577B1 (en) | 2017-06-16 | 2018-07-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for identifying whether cookies contain personally identifying information |
US11206133B2 (en) | 2017-12-08 | 2021-12-21 | Ping Identity Corporation | Methods and systems for recovering data using dynamic passwords |
US20210089676A1 (en) * | 2018-02-16 | 2021-03-25 | Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale De Lausanne Epfl-Tto | Methods and systems for secure data exchange |
US11144675B2 (en) | 2018-09-07 | 2021-10-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically protecting sensitive data within privacy management systems |
US10803202B2 (en) | 2018-09-07 | 2020-10-13 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems for orphaned data identification and deletion and related methods |
US11544409B2 (en) | 2018-09-07 | 2023-01-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically protecting sensitive data within privacy management systems |
US11082221B2 (en) | 2018-10-17 | 2021-08-03 | Ping Identity Corporation | Methods and systems for creating and recovering accounts using dynamic passwords |
US10979227B2 (en) | 2018-10-17 | 2021-04-13 | Ping Identity Corporation | Blockchain ID connect |
IT201900000154A1 (en) * | 2019-01-08 | 2020-07-08 | Get S R L | Method for certifying the transfer and the contents of a transferred file |
US11410066B2 (en) * | 2019-08-27 | 2022-08-09 | Spithre III Inc | Send time optimization for electronic communications campaign |
WO2022011142A1 (en) | 2020-07-08 | 2022-01-13 | OneTrust, LLC | Systems and methods for targeted data discovery |
WO2022026564A1 (en) | 2020-07-28 | 2022-02-03 | OneTrust, LLC | Systems and methods for automatically blocking the use of tracking tools |
US11475165B2 (en) | 2020-08-06 | 2022-10-18 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically redacting unstructured data from a data subject access request |
WO2022060860A1 (en) | 2020-09-15 | 2022-03-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for detecting tools for the automatic blocking of consent requests |
US11526624B2 (en) | 2020-09-21 | 2022-12-13 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for automatically detecting target data transfers and target data processing |
WO2022099023A1 (en) | 2020-11-06 | 2022-05-12 | OneTrust, LLC | Systems and methods for identifying data processing activities based on data discovery results |
US11687528B2 (en) | 2021-01-25 | 2023-06-27 | OneTrust, LLC | Systems and methods for discovery, classification, and indexing of data in a native computing system |
WO2022170047A1 (en) | 2021-02-04 | 2022-08-11 | OneTrust, LLC | Managing custom attributes for domain objects defined within microservices |
US20240111899A1 (en) | 2021-02-08 | 2024-04-04 | OneTrust, LLC | Data processing systems and methods for anonymizing data samples in classification analysis |
US11601464B2 (en) | 2021-02-10 | 2023-03-07 | OneTrust, LLC | Systems and methods for mitigating risks of third-party computing system functionality integration into a first-party computing system |
WO2022178089A1 (en) | 2021-02-17 | 2022-08-25 | OneTrust, LLC | Managing custom workflows for domain objects defined within microservices |
WO2022178219A1 (en) | 2021-02-18 | 2022-08-25 | OneTrust, LLC | Selective redaction of media content |
US20240311497A1 (en) | 2021-03-08 | 2024-09-19 | OneTrust, LLC | Data transfer discovery and analysis systems and related methods |
US11170130B1 (en) | 2021-04-08 | 2021-11-09 | Aster Key, LLC | Apparatus, systems and methods for storing user profile data on a distributed database for anonymous verification |
US11562078B2 (en) | 2021-04-16 | 2023-01-24 | OneTrust, LLC | Assessing and managing computational risk involved with integrating third party computing functionality within a computing system |
US11620142B1 (en) | 2022-06-03 | 2023-04-04 | OneTrust, LLC | Generating and customizing user interfaces for demonstrating functions of interactive user environments |
Citations (22)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4458109A (en) | 1982-02-05 | 1984-07-03 | Siemens Corporation | Method and apparatus providing registered mail features in an electronic communication system |
US5022080A (en) | 1990-04-16 | 1991-06-04 | Durst Robert T | Electronic notary |
US5136647A (en) | 1990-08-02 | 1992-08-04 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Method for secure time-stamping of digital documents |
US5136646A (en) | 1991-03-08 | 1992-08-04 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Digital document time-stamping with catenate certificate |
US5535276A (en) | 1994-11-09 | 1996-07-09 | Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. | Yaksha, an improved system and method for securing communications using split private key asymmetric cryptography |
US5539826A (en) | 1993-12-29 | 1996-07-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method for message authentication from non-malleable crypto systems |
US5615268A (en) | 1995-01-17 | 1997-03-25 | Document Authentication Systems, Inc. | System and method for electronic transmission storage and retrieval of authenticated documents |
US5638446A (en) | 1995-08-28 | 1997-06-10 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Method for the secure distribution of electronic files in a distributed environment |
JP2000050331A (en) | 1998-07-29 | 2000-02-18 | Casio Comput Co Ltd | Message receiver and message communication method |
US20020029337A1 (en) * | 1994-07-19 | 2002-03-07 | Certco, Llc. | Method for securely using digital signatures in a commercial cryptographic system |
US20020091927A1 (en) * | 2001-01-05 | 2002-07-11 | Wall David A.E. | System and method for processing digital documents utilizing secure communications over a network |
USRE38070E1 (en) | 1995-06-29 | 2003-04-08 | Microsoft Corporation | Cryptography system and method for providing cryptographic services for a computer application |
US6549626B1 (en) | 1997-10-20 | 2003-04-15 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Method and apparatus for encoding keys |
US6571334B1 (en) * | 1995-08-28 | 2003-05-27 | Authentix Technologies Ltd. | Apparatus and method for authenticating the dispatch and contents of documents |
US6912655B1 (en) * | 1999-08-09 | 2005-06-28 | Tristrata Security Inc. | Network security architecture system utilizing seals |
US20050257045A1 (en) * | 2004-04-12 | 2005-11-17 | Bushman M B | Secure messaging system |
US20060095792A1 (en) * | 1998-08-13 | 2006-05-04 | Hurtado Marco M | Super-distribution of protected digital content |
US7260552B2 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2007-08-21 | Scytl Online World Security, Sa | Secure remote electronic voting system and cryptographic protocols and computer programs employed |
US20080071685A1 (en) * | 2002-02-27 | 2008-03-20 | Amad Tayebi | Method for allowing a customer to preview, acquire and/or pay for information and a system therefor |
US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2008-04-01 | Zix Corporation | Certified transmission system |
US20100217979A1 (en) * | 2005-12-19 | 2010-08-26 | Karim Yaghmour | System and Method for Providing Certified Proof of Delivery Receipts for Electronic Mail |
US20100275030A1 (en) * | 2009-04-22 | 2010-10-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method for ensuring the validity of recovered electronic documents from remote storage |
-
2001
- 2001-04-03 US US09/826,320 patent/US7353204B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2007
- 2007-12-03 US US11/949,690 patent/US8027923B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (22)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4458109A (en) | 1982-02-05 | 1984-07-03 | Siemens Corporation | Method and apparatus providing registered mail features in an electronic communication system |
US5022080A (en) | 1990-04-16 | 1991-06-04 | Durst Robert T | Electronic notary |
US5136647A (en) | 1990-08-02 | 1992-08-04 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Method for secure time-stamping of digital documents |
US5136646A (en) | 1991-03-08 | 1992-08-04 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Digital document time-stamping with catenate certificate |
US5539826A (en) | 1993-12-29 | 1996-07-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method for message authentication from non-malleable crypto systems |
US20020029337A1 (en) * | 1994-07-19 | 2002-03-07 | Certco, Llc. | Method for securely using digital signatures in a commercial cryptographic system |
US5535276A (en) | 1994-11-09 | 1996-07-09 | Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. | Yaksha, an improved system and method for securing communications using split private key asymmetric cryptography |
US5615268A (en) | 1995-01-17 | 1997-03-25 | Document Authentication Systems, Inc. | System and method for electronic transmission storage and retrieval of authenticated documents |
USRE38070E1 (en) | 1995-06-29 | 2003-04-08 | Microsoft Corporation | Cryptography system and method for providing cryptographic services for a computer application |
US5638446A (en) | 1995-08-28 | 1997-06-10 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Method for the secure distribution of electronic files in a distributed environment |
US6571334B1 (en) * | 1995-08-28 | 2003-05-27 | Authentix Technologies Ltd. | Apparatus and method for authenticating the dispatch and contents of documents |
US6549626B1 (en) | 1997-10-20 | 2003-04-15 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Method and apparatus for encoding keys |
JP2000050331A (en) | 1998-07-29 | 2000-02-18 | Casio Comput Co Ltd | Message receiver and message communication method |
US20060095792A1 (en) * | 1998-08-13 | 2006-05-04 | Hurtado Marco M | Super-distribution of protected digital content |
US6912655B1 (en) * | 1999-08-09 | 2005-06-28 | Tristrata Security Inc. | Network security architecture system utilizing seals |
US20020091927A1 (en) * | 2001-01-05 | 2002-07-11 | Wall David A.E. | System and method for processing digital documents utilizing secure communications over a network |
US7353204B2 (en) | 2001-04-03 | 2008-04-01 | Zix Corporation | Certified transmission system |
US7260552B2 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2007-08-21 | Scytl Online World Security, Sa | Secure remote electronic voting system and cryptographic protocols and computer programs employed |
US20080071685A1 (en) * | 2002-02-27 | 2008-03-20 | Amad Tayebi | Method for allowing a customer to preview, acquire and/or pay for information and a system therefor |
US20050257045A1 (en) * | 2004-04-12 | 2005-11-17 | Bushman M B | Secure messaging system |
US20100217979A1 (en) * | 2005-12-19 | 2010-08-26 | Karim Yaghmour | System and Method for Providing Certified Proof of Delivery Receipts for Electronic Mail |
US20100275030A1 (en) * | 2009-04-22 | 2010-10-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method for ensuring the validity of recovered electronic documents from remote storage |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
Machine Translation (claims only) of Japanese Patent Publication No. 2000-050331 (published Feb. 2000). |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20130227274A1 (en) * | 2012-02-23 | 2013-08-29 | Applied Communications Sciences | Privacy-preserving publish-subscribe protocol in a cloud-assisted model |
US20130246791A1 (en) * | 2012-02-23 | 2013-09-19 | Applied Communications Sciences | Privacy-preserving publish-subscribe protocol in a cloud-assisted broadcast model |
US8990566B2 (en) * | 2012-02-23 | 2015-03-24 | Tt Government Solutions, Inc. | Privacy-preserving publish-subscribe protocol in a cloud-assisted broadcast model |
US9032202B2 (en) * | 2012-02-23 | 2015-05-12 | Vencore Labs, Inc. | Privacy-preserving publish-subscribe protocol in a cloud-assisted model |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US7353204B2 (en) | 2008-04-01 |
US20080155253A1 (en) | 2008-06-26 |
US20020143710A1 (en) | 2002-10-03 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US8027923B2 (en) | Certified transmission system | |
US6760752B1 (en) | Secure transmission system | |
US6956950B2 (en) | Computer readable medium having a private key encryption program | |
US7328350B2 (en) | Method and apparatus for secure cryptographic key generation, certification and use | |
US8108678B1 (en) | Identity-based signcryption system | |
US7142676B1 (en) | Method and apparatus for secure communications using third-party key provider | |
Ateniese et al. | TRICERT: A Distributed Certified E-Mail Scheme. | |
US20040236953A1 (en) | Method and device for transmitting an electronic message | |
US20030126085A1 (en) | Dynamic authentication of electronic messages using a reference to a certificate | |
WO2005062919A2 (en) | Public key encryption for groups | |
Schaad | Internet X. 509 public key infrastructure certificate request message format (CRMF) | |
US20040073790A1 (en) | Intermediated delivery scheme for asymmetric fair exchange of electronic items | |
US7660987B2 (en) | Method of establishing a secure e-mail transmission link | |
JP2005520364A (en) | System and method for updating and extending a digitally signed certificate | |
Simmons | Secure communications and asymmetric cryptosystems | |
JPH10105057A (en) | Time stamp server system | |
JP2002500842A (en) | Automatic recovery and automatic authentication possible encryption system | |
CA2344689C (en) | A secure data transfer system | |
Shao et al. | Some common attacks against certified email protocols and the countermeasures | |
Varshney et al. | Digital signatures | |
WO2002007376A1 (en) | Intermediated delivery scheme for asymmetric fair exchange of electronic items | |
Doraikannan | Efficient Implementation of Digital Signature Algorithms | |
Kotsakis | Secure Information Exchange in Electronic Reporting Systems | |
Schaad | RFC 4211: Internet X. 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) | |
Schmied | Security Mechanisms for EDI over the Internet |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: ZIX CORPORATION, TEXAS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:LIU, GARY G.;REEL/FRAME:020711/0639 Effective date: 20010419 |
|
ZAAA | Notice of allowance and fees due |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: NOA |
|
ZAAB | Notice of allowance mailed |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: MN/=. |
|
ZAAA | Notice of allowance and fees due |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: NOA |
|
ZAAB | Notice of allowance mailed |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: MN/=. |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
CC | Certificate of correction | ||
FPAY | Fee payment |
Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: ENTITY STATUS SET TO UNDISCOUNTED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: BIG.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YEAR, LARGE ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M1552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY Year of fee payment: 8 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: SUNTRUST BANK, AS COLLATERAL AGENT, GEORGIA Free format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:ZIX CORPORATION;REEL/FRAME:048831/0134 Effective date: 20190220 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: ZIX CORPORATION, TEXAS Free format text: RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS;ASSIGNOR:TRUIST BANK;REEL/FRAME:058591/0116 Effective date: 20211223 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
LAPS | Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: LARGE ENTITY |
|
STCH | Information on status: patent discontinuation |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362 |
|
FP | Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee |
Effective date: 20230927 |