US20160094576A1 - Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product - Google Patents
Anti-vulnerability system, method, and computer program product Download PDFInfo
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- US20160094576A1 US20160094576A1 US14/834,170 US201514834170A US2016094576A1 US 20160094576 A1 US20160094576 A1 US 20160094576A1 US 201514834170 A US201514834170 A US 201514834170A US 2016094576 A1 US2016094576 A1 US 2016094576A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
- G06F16/24—Querying
- G06F16/245—Query processing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/554—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving event detection and direct action
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
- G06F8/65—Updates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
- H04L63/0263—Rule management
Definitions
- the present invention relates to computer systems, and more particularly to management of security of computing and network devices that are connected to other such devices.
- a system, method, and computer program product are provided for accessing at least one data storage identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities, such that: each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option. Further, the system, method, and computer program product are provided for displaying at least one mitigation technique in connection with at least one vulnerability to be applied as an attack response, and receiving user input for selecting the at least one mitigation technique in connection with the at least one vulnerability.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a networked system of computers in one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing components of several computing devices in the system of FIG. 1 .
- FIGS. 3 and 4 trace signals that travel through the system of FIGS. 1 and 2 and the present invention is applied to them.
- FIG. 5A is a flow chart of a filtering proxy method according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIGS. 5B and 6 illustrate a platform, in accordance with possible embodiments.
- FIG. 7 illustrates an intelligent IDS, in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 illustrates an update system, in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 9 shows a configured network, in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 10 shows policy compliance and enforcement, in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 11 illustrates an intelligent IPS, in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 12 illustrates an SDK function call flow, in accordance with one embodiment.
- data warehouse a component that contains vulnerabilities and updates for devices that operate on at least one network.
- NOC server network operations center server that periodically synchronize latest vulnerability and update data with other servers.
- SDK software development kit that allows programmers to develop security applications that access data collected in a database.
- CM application change management application that controls documentation and logging of change.
- System 100 includes a vulnerability and remediation database 110 connected by Internet 120 to subnet 130 .
- firewall 131 serves as the gateway between Internet 120 and the rest of subnet 130 .
- Router 133 directs connections between computers 137 and each other and other devices on Internet 120 .
- Server 135 collects certain information and provides certain data services that will be discussed in further detail herein.
- security server 135 includes processor 142 , and memory 144 encoded with programming instructions executable by processor 142 to perform several important security-related functions. For example, security server 135 collects data from devices 131 , 133 , 137 , and 139 , including the software installed on those devices, their configuration and policy settings, and patches that have been installed. Security server 135 also obtains from vulnerability and remediation database 110 a regularly updated list of security vulnerabilities in software for a wide variety of operating systems, and even in the operating systems themselves. Security server 135 also downloads a regularly updated list of remediation techniques that can be applied to protect a device from damage due to those vulnerabilities. In one embodiment, each vulnerability in remediation database 110 is identified by a vulnerability identifier, and the vulnerability identifier can be used to retrieve remediation information from database 110 (and from database 146 , discussed below in relation to FIG. 2 ).
- computers 137 and 139 each comprise a processor 152 , 162 , memory 154 , 164 , and storage 156 , 166 .
- Computer 137 executes a client-side program (stored in storage 156 , loaded into memory 154 , and executed by processor 152 ) that maintains an up-to-date collection of information regarding the operating system, service pack (if applicable), software, and patches installed on computer 137 , and the policies and configuration data (including configuration files, and elements that may be contained in files, such as *.ini and *.conf files and registry information, for example), and communicates that information on a substantially real-time basis to security server 135 .
- the collection of information is not retained on computer 137 , but is only communicated once to security server 135 , then is updated in real time as changes to that collection occur.
- Computer 139 stores, loads, and executes a similar software program that communicates configuration information pertaining to computer 139 to security server 135 , also substantially in real time. Changes to the configuration registry in computer 139 are monitored, and selected changes are communicated to security server 135 so that relevant information is always available. Security server 135 may connect directly to and request software installation status and configuration information from firewall 131 and router 133 , for embodiments wherein firewall 131 and router 133 do not have a software program executing on them to communicate this information directly.
- This collection of information is made available at security server 135 , and combined with the vulnerability and remediation data from source 110 .
- the advanced functionality of system 100 is thereby enabled as discussed further herein.
- Computers 137 and 139 are traditional client or server machines, each having a processor 152 , 162 , memory 154 , 164 , and storage 156 , 166 .
- Firewall 131 and router 133 also have processors 172 , 182 and storage 174 , 184 , respectively, as is known in the art.
- devices 137 and 139 each execute a client-side program that continuously monitors the software installation and configuration status for that device. Changes to that status are communicated in substantially real time to security server 135 , which continuously maintains the information in database 146 .
- Security server 135 connects directly to firewall 131 and router 133 to obtain software installation and configuration status for those devices in the absence of a client-side program running thereon.
- Processors 142 , 152 , 162 may each be comprised of one or more components configured as a single unit. Alternatively, when of a multi-component form, processor 142 , 152 , 162 may each have one or more components located remotely relative to the others. One or more components of processor 142 , 152 , 162 may be of the electronic variety defining digital circuitry, analog circuitry, or both.
- processor 142 , 152 , 162 are of a conventional, integrated circuit microprocessor arrangement, such as one or more PENTIUM 4 or XEON processors from INTEL Corporation of 2200 Mission College Boulevard, Santa Clara, Calif., 95052, USA, or ATHLON XP processors from Advanced Micro Devices, One AMD Place, Sunnyvale, Calif., 94088, USA.
- PENTIUM 4 or XEON processors from INTEL Corporation of 2200 Mission College Boulevard, Santa Clara, Calif., 95052, USA
- ATHLON XP processors from Advanced Micro Devices, One AMD Place, Sunnyvale, Calif., 94088, USA.
- Memories 144 , 154 , 164 may include one or more types of solid-state electronic memory, magnetic memory, or optical memory, just to name a few.
- memory 40 b may include solid-state electronic Random Access Memory (RAM), Sequentially Accessible Memory (SAM) (such as the First-In, First-Out (FIFO) variety or the Last-In First-Out (LIFO) variety), Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), Electrically Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM), or Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM); an optical disc memory (such as a DVD or CD ROM); a magnetically encoded hard drive, floppy disk, tape, or cartridge media; or a combination of any of these memory types.
- memories 144 , 154 , 164 may be volatile, nonvolatile, or a hybrid combination of volatile and nonvolatile varieties.
- storage 146 , 156 , 166 comprises one or more of the memory types just given for memories 144 , 154 , 164 , preferably selected from the non-volatile types.
- connection request 211 arrives at firewall 131 requesting that data be transferred to computer 137 .
- the payload of request 211 is, in this example, a probe request for a worm that takes advantage of a particular security vulnerability in a certain computer operating system.
- firewall 131 sends a query 213 to security server 135 .
- Query 213 includes information that security server 135 uses to determine (1) the intended destination of connection request 211 , and (2) some characterization of the payload of connection request 211 , such as a vulnerability identifier.
- Security server 135 uses this information to determine whether connection request 211 is attempting to take advantage of a particular known vulnerability of destination machine 137 , and uses information from database 146 (see FIG. 2 ) to determine whether the destination computer 137 has the vulnerable software installed, and whether the vulnerability has been patched on computer 137 , or whether computer 137 has been configured so as to be invulnerable to a particular attack.
- Security server 135 sends result signal 217 back to firewall 131 with an indication of whether the connection request should be granted or rejected. If it is to be granted, firewall 131 passes the request to router 133 as request 219 , and router 133 relays the request as request 221 to computer 137 , as is understood in the art. If, on the other hand, signal 217 indicates that connection request 211 is to be rejected, firewall 133 drops or rejects the connection request 211 as is understood in the art.
- FIG. 4 illustrates subnet 130 with computer 137 compromised.
- computer 137 Under the control of a virus or worm, for example, computer 137 sends connection attempt 231 to router 133 in an attempt to probe or take advantage of a potential vulnerability in computer 139 .
- router 133 On receiving connection request 231 , router 133 sends relevant information about request 231 in a query 233 to security server 135 .
- security server 135 determines whether connection request 231 poses any threat, and in particular any threat to software on computer 139 .
- security server 135 determines whether the vulnerability has been patched, and if not, it determines whether computer 139 has been otherwise configured to avoid damage due to that vulnerability. Security server 135 replies with signal 235 to query 233 with that answer. Router 133 uses response 235 to determine whether to allow the connection attempt.
- security server 135 upon a determination by security server 135 that a connection attempt or other attack has occurred against a computer that is vulnerable (based on its current software, patch, policy, and configuration status), security server 135 selects one or more remediation techniques from database 146 that remediate the particular vulnerability. Based on a prioritization previously selected by an administrator or the system designer, the remediation technique(s) are applied (1) to the machine that was attacked, (2) to all devices subject to the same vulnerability (based on their real-time software, patch, policy, and configuration status), or (3) to all devices to which the selected remediation can be applied.
- remediation techniques include the closing of open ports on the device; installation of a patch that is known to correct the vulnerability; changing the device's configuration; stopping, disabling, or removing services; setting or modifying policies; and the like.
- events and actions are logged (preferably in a non-volatile medium) for later analysis and review by system administrators. In these embodiments, the log also stores information describing whether the target device was vulnerable to the attack.
- a real-time status database has many other applications as well.
- the database 146 is made available to an administrative console running on security server 135 or other administrative terminal.
- administrators can immediately see whether any devices in subnet 130 are vulnerable to it, and if so, which ones. If a means of remediation of the vulnerability is known, the remediation can be selectively applied to only those devices subject to the vulnerability.
- the database 146 is integrated into another device, such as firewall 131 or router 133 , or an individual device on the network. While some of these embodiments might avoid some failures due to network instability, they substantially increase the complexity of the device itself. For this reason, as well as the complexity of maintaining security database functions when integrated with other functions, the network-attached device embodiment described above in relation to FIGS. 1-4 is one possible embodiment.
- a software development kit allows programmers to develop security applications that access the data collected in database 146 .
- the applications developed with the SDK access information using a defined application programming interface (API) to retrieve vulnerability, remediation, and device status information available to the system.
- API application programming interface
- the applications then make security-related determinations and are enabled to take certain actions based on the available data.
- configuration information for each device may take the form of initialization files (often named *.ini or *.conf), configuration registry (such as, the Windows Registry on Microsoft WINDOWS operating systems), or configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory.
- initialization files often named *.ini or *.conf
- configuration registry such as, the Windows Registry on Microsoft WINDOWS operating systems
- configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory.
- Such configuration information often determines what and how data is accepted from other devices, sent to other devices, processed, stored, or otherwise handled, and in many cases determines what routines and sub-routines are executed in a particular application or operating system.
- security information management system wherein a database of potential vulnerabilities is maintained, along with data describing remediation techniques (patches, policy settings, and configuration options) available to protect against them. At least one vulnerability is associated in the database with multiple available remediation techniques.
- the system presents a user with the list of remediation techniques available to protect against a known vulnerability, accepts the user's selection from the list, and executes the selected technique.
- the system uses a predetermined prioritization schedule to automatically select among the available remediation techniques, then automatically executes the selected technique.
- One embodiment of the present invention is a database of information about a plurality of devices, updated in real-time and used by an application to make a security-related decision.
- the database stores data indicating the installed operating system(s), installed software, patches that have been applied, system policies that are in place, and configuration information for each device.
- the database answers queries by one or more devices or applications attached by a network to facilitate security-related decision making.
- a firewall or router handles a connection request or maintenance of a connection based on the configuration information stored in the database that relates to one or both of the devices involved in the transmission.
- database 146 includes vulnerability and remediation information such that, for at least one vulnerability, multiple methods of remediating the vulnerability are specified.
- remediation information such that, for at least one vulnerability, multiple methods of remediating the vulnerability are specified.
- all known alternatives are presented that are relevant to the device or machine's particular configuration or setup. For example, when a vulnerability of a device is presented to an administrator, the administrator is given a choice among the plurality of remediation options to remediate the vulnerability.
- the administrator can select a preferred type of remediation that will be applied if available and a fallback type. For example, an administrator may select application of a policy setting over installation of a software patch, so that the risk of disruption of critical business systems is minimized.
- an administrator or other user is presented with a set of user interface elements that identify multiple options for remediating and identifying the vulnerability. The administrator or user selects the method to be used, and that remediation is applied to the vulnerable device(s).
- FIG. 5A is a flow chart of a filtering proxy method according to one embodiment of the present invention.
- a database maintains security status information on each device in a network, based on whether the device's operating system, software, and patches are installed and configured to meet a baseline level of security.
- a network gateway proxy blocks connection attempts from devices for which the database indicates a substandard security status, but allows connections from other devices to pass normally.
- the database is preferably updated on a substantially real-time basis by client-side software run by each device in the network.
- connection proxy that filters connections originating within the network.
- one embodiment employs a proxy that denies connection attempts originating with devices in the network when the originating device has a status, reflected in the database, that fails to meet predetermined security characteristics in terms of installed operating system and software, patch levels, and system policy and configuration registry information.
- router 133 serves as a connection proxy for devices and subnet 130 , as will be understood by those skilled in the art.
- router 133 accesses database 146 on security server 135 via the SDK at each connection attempt. If, for example, device 137 attempts to connect to any device where the connection must pass through the proxy server (router 133 in this example), such as a device on Internet 120 , router 133 checks the security status of device 137 in database 146 , using the real-time status therein to determine whether device 137 complies with one or more predetermined security policies. If it does, router 133 allows the connection to be made. If it does not, router 133 prevents the connection, preferably redirecting the connection to a diagnostic page that explains why the connection is not being made.
- Method 200 begins with start point 201 .
- the proxy (router 133 in the above example) receives a connection request at block 203 , then retrieves the security status of the source device at block 205 . This preferably uses the real-time updated status information from database 146 (see FIG. 2 ) at decision block 207 . If the security status indicates that the source device complies with the predetermined security policy, the proxy allows the connection at block 209 . If not, the proxy refuses the connection at block 211 and redirects the connection to an explanation message (such as a locally generated web page or other message source) at block 213 . In either case, method 200 ends at end point 219 .
- the determination and decision at block 207 apply a comprehensive minimum policy set that protects other devices in subnet 130 (see FIG. 1 ) from viruses, trojans, worms, and other malware that might be inadvertently and/or carelessly acquired due to the requested connection.
- a security information management system wherein client-side devices preferably collect and monitor information describing the operating system, software, and patches installed on the device(s), as well as configuration thereof.
- a database of this information is maintained, along with data describing vulnerabilities of available software and associated remediation techniques available for it.
- the system exposes an API to support security-related decisions by other applications. For example, an intrusion detection system (IDS) accesses the database to determine whether an actual threat exists and should be (or has been) blocked.
- IDS intrusion detection system
- client software runs on each monitored device and reports configuration information to the database, so that the database has substantially real-time-current information.
- the present embodiment of the present invention advantageously acquires the real-time status information from each client using client-side software. In this manner, a resource burden of monitoring is spread among the devices being monitored, and uses far fewer network resources in the process.
- configuration information for each device may take the form of initialization files (often named *.ini or *.conf), configuration registry (such as the Windows Registry on Microsoft Windows operating systems), or configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory.
- initialization files often named *.ini or *.conf
- configuration registry such as the Windows Registry on Microsoft Windows operating systems
- configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory.
- Such configuration information often determines what and how data is accepted from other devices, sent to other devices, processed, stored, or otherwise handled, and in many cases determines what routines and sub-routines are executed in a particular application or operating system.
- a system maintains a database of vulnerabilities and associated remediation techniques.
- the remediation techniques include software patches, policy settings or changes, and registry settings or changes. This multi-faceted provides novel flexibility in management of security issues, and convenience for security administrators in both determining available options and selecting remediation steps for vulnerable systems.
- patches, policy changes, software updates, and configuration changes are rolled out to devices on a network using a staged roll-out technique.
- the change is applied to a selected device or set of devices identified by an administrator. After a predetermined amount of time passes, unless the administrator has canceled the roll-out, the change is applied to an additional group of devices on the network.
- Third- and fourth-tier groups may also be identified by the administrator, where implementation of the remediation or upgrade is automatically effected in subsequent stages a predetermined amount of time after the preceding stage roll-out.
- FIGS. 5B and 6 illustrate a platform, in accordance with possible embodiments.
- a platform and underlying back end that includes a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse. It may easily integrate with and enable network security products such as IDS, scanners, or firewalls to intelligently reference and share the same vulnerability data set, and independently provide complete vulnerability remediation (patching) functionalities such as that provided by the patch management and vulnerability remediation application. Thereby, the technology may improve system accuracy and efficiencies, minimize false positives and false negatives, and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities.
- the latest network compromises are combining qualities of viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks into new blended attacks. Additionally, blended attacks may now utilize metamorphic or polymorphic abilities to change their signatures to avoid detection.
- organizations are now deploying a multi-tiered network defense strategy comprised of a variety of network security components layered at the perimeter and to internal network machines and devices. The security components are managed separately, and possibly their data is ported into a Security Information Management System (SIMS) correlation engine.
- SIMS Security Information Management System
- network security components and correlation engines rely on signatures or anomalies, producing an ever-increasing quantity of data, including false positive, benign, and erroneous events. They also lack the intelligence to identify, reference, or remediate the vulnerabilities targeted by the attack. Furthermore, the time and cost to acquire, manage, and maintain these numerous network security components is overwhelming the end user. Therefore, more sophisticated technology is provided to resolve these performance and management issues.
- technology may be provided that addresses these requirements by making each security component smarter and provides managers with remote remediation options. Thereby, improving system performance and streamlining management processes.
- an intelligent integration platform and SDK are provided to meet the above requirements.
- security products are enhanced and system intelligence may be provided.
- the same vulnerability data warehouse information is shared with the products so that more intelligent actions may then be taken to mitigate complex threats.
- One embodiment cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration.
- the threat's CVE ID, or other identifier, and the destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's existing OS, application, and patch configuration profile. An answer is returned accurately indicating if the machine is vulnerable.
- network vulnerabilities are identified.
- the platform may independently identify which network machines and devices have vulnerabilities by querying a client agent, or a device's OS or firmware directly.
- One embodiment proactively remediates the vulnerability. Once a vulnerability is identified, a remediation function may be provided that may remotely and automatically deploy the appropriate update to each machine or device, install it, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Anti-Vulnerability applications that may be integrated into network security products for enterprise and small office home office (SOHO) networks when integrated with one embodiment, via the SDK, will be described.
- SOHO small office home office
- update or patch deployment are provided, which remotely remediate network vulnerabilities and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities. And, for the consumer market, it may additionally support non-security related updates such as application version, performance, and bug-fix upgrades.
- an IDS may be provided that accurately determines if the targeted machine is actually vulnerable to an attack; virtually eliminates false positives and false negatives; and adds vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- a scanner may be provided that virtually eliminates false positive and false negatives, and adds vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- a firewall may be provided that virtually eliminates false positive and false negatives, preventing the security system from denying valid traffic to the organization—self-inflicted denial of service attacks—and adds vulnerability remediation, and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- vulnerability management may be provided, as set forth above.
- multiple products including an IDS, scanner, and firewall.
- Each may communicate with the same back-end data warehouse, sharing the same vulnerability information, attaining intelligence and more accurate information about the target and its vulnerabilities, thereby more effectively mitigating complex threats.
- change management may be provided, which may automatically create a change request in the system, specifying what update/patch is applicable to what system or groups of systems by vulnerability. After approval of the request, they may automatically deploy and install the update/patch. Finally, they may also verify correct operation after installation and automatically provide all necessary documentation and logging required.
- the platform may also provide product upgrades and signature updates to each of these various security products.
- the platform is comprised of the following software components: SDK, client agent, logic engine, and data warehouse stored on a dedicated on-site server.
- Network operations center (NOC) Servers periodically synchronize the customers' servers with the latest vulnerability and update data. See FIG. 5B .
- the same client agent and on-site server support all security applications that are integrated onto the platform, thereby providing the added anti-vulnerability functionalities presented in the previous section.
- TCP/IP connectivity There are two system requirements: TCP/IP connectivity, and supported network machines and devices.
- platforms supported are set forth below in Table 1.
- Platform support is scalable to any network size or architecture; consumer, small office home office (SOHO), enterprise, and distributed networks.
- SOHO small office home office
- technology may be provided that includes a backend platform that includes a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse. It may easily integrate with and enable network security products such as IDS, scanners, or firewalls to intelligently reference and share the same vulnerability data set, and independently provide complete vulnerability remediation (patching) functionalities such as that provided by the patch management and vulnerability remediation application, update application and the intelligent IDS. Thereby, the technology may improve system accuracy and efficiencies, minimize false positives and false negatives, and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities.
- network security products such as IDS, scanners, or firewalls
- the technology may meet market requirements, presented in the next section.
- networks are probed at an ever-increasing frequency for vulnerabilities, which may be exploited with compromise attacks.
- administrators have traditionally set up perimeter defense strategies.
- the latest malicious code may combine qualities of viruses, worms, and direct compromise attacks into new blended attacks.
- Virus payloads are becoming more complex and by using metamorphic or polymorphic abilities, viruses are able to change their signatures to avoid the fingerprint-type filtering that most applications employ.
- ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇
- Each of these systems is based on specific signatures, rules, or anomalies of each attack and their variants, and do not identify and remediate the specific network vulnerabilities the attack is targeting. So each attack, and its variants, must be identified and analyzed, a signature prepared, then finally deployed to each point product on each customer's network. This process is uncoordinated among multiple disparate systems, and creates an ever-increasing number of signatures producing more and more attack alerts requiring immediate attention—many of which are erroneous.
- the security components are managed separately, and possibly their data is ported into a security information management system (SIMS) correlation engine.
- SIMS security information management system
- the multi-tiered network defense strategy is falling short primarily for four reasons.
- the vulnerabilities targeted by malicious code are not accurately identified nor proactively remediated.
- technology is provided to meet the following market requirements: integrate network security products to share information; provide system intelligence; and remediate network vulnerabilities.
- technology may integrate with and enable network security products to intelligently reference and share information from the same vulnerability data set, provide vulnerability identification and remediation functionalities, and efficiently meet policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- the platform is a complimentary network security technology. When integrated into the defense strategy, it adds intelligence that more accurately and efficiently mitigates blended threats and offloads the time-consuming functions that burden network administrators.
- the platform enables network security products to share information via its proprietary logic engine to automatically cross-reference the threat identifier with the targeted machine's configuration to determine if it is actually vulnerable to that threat.
- Previously separate and uncoordinated processes are now more intelligent and automated, resulting in improved system accuracy and efficiency. Therefore the need to layer more and more point products and add a SIMS is reduced, in-turn decreasing the amount of data—particularly erroneous data—to manage. Subsequently, the costs to acquire, operate, and manage the additional multiple point products, and the need to implement a SIMS, are also reduced.
- the platform may also remotely and proactively remediate vulnerabilities by first determining which updates are needed and compatible with each machine or device, taking into account the OS, applications, or firmware installed. Then, the updates may be deployed, installed, and validated. Thereby, policy compliance is effectively and efficiently enforced, and documented.
- the present technology fulfills market requirements noted in the previous section. For example, it may integrate network security products and provides system intelligence. The same vulnerability data warehouse information is shared with all products so that more intelligent actions may then be taken to mitigate complex threats.
- the threat's CVE ID, or other identifier, and the destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's existing OS, application, and patch configuration profile. An answer is returned accurately indicating if the machine is vulnerable. Thereby, minimizes erroneous, benign, and false positive data produced by each security product.
- the platform may independently identify which network machines and devices have vulnerabilities by querying a client agent, or a device's OS or firmware directly.
- One embodiment proactively remediates the vulnerability. Once a vulnerability is identified, a remediation function may be provided that may remotely and automatically deploy the appropriate update to each machine or device, install it, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Various possible benefits include blended attacks being more effectively mitigated and the overwhelming management and maintenance burden on administrators to purchase, operate, and maintain multiple network security products being reduced, while increasing productivity, reducing costs, and more effectively and efficiently meeting policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- Table 2 illustrates a plurality of end user details.
- Vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement may be integrated with existing security network security products, and their respective interfaces.
- Anti-Vulnerability applications are transparently integrated, retaining pre- existing architecture, processes, and interfaces. Therefore, the end user experience remains the same, or improved with simplified or automated processes. User experience remains the same - additional time or costs to understand and execute new technologies are minimized
- Anti-Vulnerability applications may be integrated transparently and seamlessly, and the pre-existing operational processes and user interfaces are virtually unchanged. Supports both the enterprise and SOHO networks Data warehouse contains vulnerabilities and updates for many machines and devices that operate on both enterprise and SOHO networks.
- update or patch deployment is provided.
- a patch management and vulnerability remediation solution is provided.
- the technology enables products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance functions. With such technology, products may gain intelligence, accuracy and efficiency, eliminate false positives and false negatives, and ensure policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money.
- Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks. And, for the consumer market, it may additionally support non-security related updates such as application version, performance, and bug-fix updates for widely distributed programs, which may optimize system performance and enhance the consumer experience.
- an IDS is provided.
- IDS products attempt to identify malicious code by signatures at both the network and host client level. While they may be able to identify malicious code by CVE ID or other identifier, and targeted machines by IP address, but they generally do not have the intelligence to determine if the any of the machines on the network are susceptible to that attack, or with finer granularity, if any machine has a specific vulnerability to that specific attack, or if the targeted vulnerability has already been patched. For example, if the malicious code has been written as a Windows based attack targeting a Windows vulnerability, is the Destination IP actually running Windows, or a UNIX variant? And, if Windows, is it vulnerable to the attack, or has it already been patched? IDS do not have the intelligence to answer these questions, and incident alerts are generated indiscriminately. Lastly, even if the targeted machine is vulnerable—it remains unremediated—an IDS does not have the capability to remediate it.
- a product architect can integrate functionalities listed in the previous section to enable the IDS to access the Anti-Vulnerability logic engine and platform. It may then have the intelligence to determine if any machine on the network is susceptible to the attack, remediate the vulnerability, mitigate the attack, and verify policy compliance. Now, if no machines were susceptible to the attack, it is identified as an event but not an incident, no further data or alert is generated, and a management response is not required. Integrated products may gain intelligence, accuracy, and efficiency, eliminate false positives and false negatives, and ensure policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money. Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- scanners may be provided.
- Vulnerability scanners assess each machine on the network for vulnerabilities, and create lists of potential vulnerabilities to the system managers. The lists commonly contain many false positives and false negatives, burdening the system and managers with inaccuracies.
- a product architect can integrate functionalities listed in the previous section to enable the scanner to access the logic engine and platform, and then have the intelligence to determine if the machine has actual vulnerabilities, remediate them, and verify policy compliance.
- Integrated products may gain intelligence, accuracy, and efficiency, eliminated false positives and false negatives, and ensured policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money.
- a firewall may be provided. “Smart” firewalls are based in part on signatures and other similar functionalities as the IDS products described above.
- the firewall can determine whether an attack is valid or a false positive, thereby preventing the security system from denying valid traffic to the organization—self-inflicted DoS attacks.
- Such functionalities and benefits may be available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- vulnerability management may be provided.
- Vulnerability management products enable managers to set policy and identify potential network vulnerabilities. They typically do not accurately identify each vulnerability on each network machine and device, nor remediate each vulnerability, meeting policy compliance enforcement requirements.
- the present embodiment offers similar functionalities and benefits as the patch deployment products described above. In short, it enables products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance and enforcement. Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- IDS infrastructure-to-distance data
- scanner a product that provides security and security services.
- firewall a product that provides security services.
- vulnerability management a product that provides vulnerability to the public Internet.
- Each product functions as the individual products noted above.
- Each may be deployed and operated on the network in a multi-tiered network defense strategy. They may be disparate system, and their signatures and update deployment schedules may vary. Therefore, the probability of mitigating a new and complex threat decreases, while management requirements and cost increases.
- they each may communicate with the same backend data warehouse, sharing the same vulnerability information, attaining intelligence and more accurate information about the target and its vulnerabilities, thereby more effectively mitigating complex threats. It may also enable the products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- CM change management
- existing CM applications control the documentation and logging of change throughout the enterprise. These applications ensure that an organization maintains consistent records of what happened and when.
- administrators must independently recognize that a security patch/update must be deployed to a computer or group of computers.
- CM software assists in documentation, very little if any assistance may be provided to identify the patches/updates needed, nor verifying correct function after the update/patch is installed.
- change management integration may greatly streamline this process further reducing total cost of ownership, ease of use, and a higher standard of documentation.
- the products may then automatically create a change request in the system, specifying what update/patch is applicable to what system or groups of systems by vulnerability. After approval of the request, they may automatically deploy and install the update/patch. Finally, they may also verify correct operation after installation and automatically provide all necessary documentation and logging required.
- one possible embodiment may also provide product upgrades and signature updates to each of these various security products—including all of the technology benefits such as ensuring compliance of signature versions, logging, reporting, and verification of installation.
- one possible embodiment includes an intelligent platform that may supplement any existing defense strategy.
- security products may share the same vulnerability data set to improve automation and accuracy—increasing efficiencies and minimizing false positives and false negatives. It also enables remote identification, management, and remediation of network vulnerabilities, and provides update deployment, validation, and reporting capabilities. Thereby, the technology improves network security and integrity, mitigation of blended threats, while increasing productivity, reducing total cost ownership, and more effectively and efficiently attaining policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- IDS intelligence, accuracy and remote patching functions integrated with the aforementioned platform via the SDK.
- the platform's underlying backend including a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse provides the added functions and performance.
- an intelligent IDS is provided to meet market requirements.
- the alert data output from a distribution of Snort is integrated with the platform via the SDK, which may add the following functions.
- the threat cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration.
- the CVE ID, or other identifier, and the Destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's configuration profile.
- the backend accurately determines in real time if the targeted machine is susceptible to the attack. And, if the machine is not susceptible, it is filtered and reported back as an event and not an incident. No further data or alert is generated, and a management response is not required.
- a remediation function may be provided to the administrator to remotely deploy the appropriate update to the machine or device, install it, verifies the files and hashes, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Table 3 sets forth a plurality of features.
- FIG. 7 illustrates an intelligent IDS, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the NOC servers.
- updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server.
- a sensor monitors and processes network traffic, and sends real time alert data to the on-site server where it cross-references the data with the backend.
- centralized IDS console filters alerts; separating events from incidents. It also offers administrators remote patching function.
- agents are deployed to each client, accurately identifying which OS, apps, and updates are installed.
- the logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed to remediate the targeted machine.
- appropriate updates are remotely deployed, installed, and validated on each client.
- the intelligent patch management and vulnerability remediation application automatically updates computer OS and application vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by hackers and viruses.
- SysUpdate the first technology to fully automate the updating and reporting processes, as described below.
- one possible embodiment automatically researches updates. In collaboration with software development companies, it receives updates and their respective compatibility and installation guidelines, which are thoroughly reviewed and tested in a lab for system compatibility and stability.
- One embodiment automatically and securely downloads, and archives, all updates. Once the updates and guidelines are thoroughly reviewed and tested, they are automatically downloaded to each customer's on-site server, verified with MD5 hashes, and archived in a self-populating patch repository database.
- One possible embodiment automatically determines the update and dependency requirements for all computers on a network, based on their individual operating systems, applications, and previously installed updates.
- the logic engine automatically matches the tested updates and their guidelines across each computer's configuration profile.
- Updates may be tested on a test group, and then queued for release to each computer on the network, consistently in accordance with the policy determined by the network administrator.
- One possible embodiment automatically verifies the updates are installed and running correctly.
- Each computer's client agent installs the updates, and verifies the files and hashes.
- Change tracking and audit trail reports may be selected and printed from the management console reporting modules. Additionally, application license audit reports may be generated, which lists software installed on each machine, by license key.
- Table 4 illustrates possible features in one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 illustrates an update system, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the off-site NOC servers.
- updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server.
- the centralized MMC snap-in console offers flexible security policy options and comprehensive reporting capabilities.
- agents accurately identifies OS, apps, and updates installed on each client by file versions and hashes.
- logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed on each client, taking into account OS, app, and update dependencies.
- appropriate updates are automatically deployed, installed, and validated on each client.
- a secure computer log management application is provided with fully automated archiving, querying, and reporting options.
- the present possible embodiment automatically and continuously transfers logs from each computer into a self-configuring, self-populating, maintenance-free database where they may be archived for years on end.
- the transfer process utilizes AES encryption for authentication between the client and server, and a guarantee delivery protocol—ensuring no data is compromised or lost.
- Flexible cross-correlation queries may be run from a single, remote viewer console, and the data is then automatically formatted into reports.
- cross-correlation query type descriptions are provided. Such embodiment may provide the following three flexible cross-correlation queries in Table 5, which provide increasing detail and breadth of filtering/sorting capabilities, respectively.
- features shown in Table 6 may be provided.
- automated reports may be provided.
- Query data is automatically formatted into professional reports.
- a separate reporting interface is available to generate general, machine, and user statistics. The present embodiment quickly and easily fulfills best practice and government compliance requirements for log event archiving and reporting.
- FIG. 9 shows a configured network, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the server component automatically configures the application, and the database and communicates with the client agents.
- client agents are deployed, which then identifies, manages, and continuously transfers all logs to the server.
- all client log data may be automatically archived the self-populating database, for years on end.
- general, specific, or advanced cross-correlation queries may be run. See Table 7. Query and statistics data is automatically formatted into professional reports to easily document audit and compliance requirements.
- One possible embodiment provides best practice security policy templates to proactively and remotely manage and enforce enterprise security compliance policies.
- One embodiment offers an intelligent application to manage and enforce security policies—the first technology to fully automate the policy configuration, enforcement, and reporting processes, as described below.
- centralized, remote management is provided.
- the policy compliance and enforcement module is managed via the centralized management console—in MMC format, and automates the deployment, assessment, and enforcement of the policy chosen.
- One embodiment provides standardized policies selected from many standardized policy templates recommended by NSA, SANS, US Navy, and ISO 17799, or custom policy options to formulate policies that meet the individual needs of any organization.
- One possible embodiment automatically determines out-of-compliance parameters for all computers and devices on a network. Based on each client's individual policy parameter settings and configuration profile, the system's logic engine automatically reports back each client's out-of-compliance parameters.
- Policy changes may be automatically enforced to each computer or device individually, or by group, consistently in accordance with the policy selected by the network administrator.
- Policy configuration profiles are transmitted between client agent and server in an AES encrypted format for security and privacy. Policy options may be rolled back with one-click.
- Change tracking and audit trail reports may be selected and printed from the Management Console's Reporting Center.
- Table 8 sets forth some possible features.
- FIG. 10 shows policy compliance and enforcement, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the off-site NOC servers.
- templates, rules, and updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server.
- a centralized management console offers flexible security policy templates, options, and comprehensive reporting capabilities.
- agents are automatically deployed to each client, accurately identifying which policy parameters, OS, apps, and updates are applied or installed.
- a logic engine automatically determines which clients are out of compliance.
- appropriate policy changes are automatically enforced on each client.
- an intelligent IPS may be provided that provides intelligence, accuracy, real-time prevention, and remote patching functions. In one embodiment, it accurately identifies and prevents malicious code from reaching their destination at the in-line IPS Sensor. Thereafter, a security officer may remotely patch the targeted vulnerability.
- IDS/IPS produce an ever-increasing quantity of alert data, including erroneous and false positive data. They also lack the intelligence to identify or remediate the vulnerabilities targeted by the attack. Furthermore, the cost of the acquiring, managing, and maintaining conventional IPS is overwhelming the end user.
- the alert data output from a standard distribution of Snort is integrated with the platform via the SDK which accurately identifies attacks, and the attack is terminated at the in-line sensor—as described in the following functions.
- One embodiment cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration.
- the in-line Sensor monitors and processes traffic and sends alert data to the on-site server where its logic engine queries the backend in real-time to determine if the destination IP is vulnerable to the attack.
- One possible embodiment provides enhanced flex response. If the destination IP is vulnerable to the attack, the in-line Sensor is commanded to immediately drop the exploit packets—preventing the attack. Further, it remotely remediates the vulnerability. When a machine is identified as vulnerable to an attack, an incident, a remediation function is also provided to the administrator to remotely deploy the appropriate update to the machine or device, install it, verifies the files and hashes, and documents it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- attacks are accurately identified and mitigated before they reach their targets, and targeted vulnerabilities may be remotely remediated. Therefore, complex threats are more effectively and efficiently mitigated. Correspondingly, the management and maintenance burden on administrators is reduced, saving time and effort.
- Table 9 illustrates some possible features.
- FIG. 11 illustrates an intelligent IPS, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the NOC servers.
- updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server.
- an IPS in-line sensor monitors and processes network traffic, and sends real time alert data to the on-site server where it cross-references the data with the backend.
- the in-line Sensor is commanded in real-time to drop the malicious packets.
- agents are deployed to each client, accurately identifying which OS, apps, and updates are installed.
- the logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed to remediate the targeted machine, and may be remotely deployed from the IPS console.
- appropriate updates are remotely deployed, installed, and validated on each client.
- an anti-vulnerability SDK is provided.
- the SDK was designed to be a simple integration pathway to the Anti-Vulnerability platform backend.
- the SDK is documented and deliverable.
- the SDK is compatible with many different programming languages such as C, C++, VB, Java, and others.
- a product architect chooses the functionality desired, inserts the provided functionality SDK code into the product code.
- the SDK code may then query—via the logic engine—the data warehouse, and in turn may return an answer to the point product.
- the architect can then show the results in any format desired in the product's interface.
- Full vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities may be integrated as well.
- FIG. 12 illustrates an SDK function call flow, in accordance with one embodiment.
- the SDK serves as the architect's tool belt or building blocks needed to quickly and transparently access the Anti-Vulnerability backend and seamlessly integrate the desired functionality into the product without changing or complicating the end user experience.
- the SDK enables system architects to use the Anti-Vulnerability platform to integrate multiple security products and functionalities. Products may then share the same vulnerability data set, improve system automation and accuracy—increasing efficiencies and minimizing false positives and false negatives, and coordinate policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- Anti-Vulnerability functions that are accessible via the SDK.
- the functions are presented in groups, as follows in Table 10.
- Table 12 sets forth Group Management Functions.
- EditGroup - Parameters GROUP to be edited, GROUPINFO to be applied Returns: Success or failure Description: This function changes a GROUP's information GetGroupPolicyOSCategories - Parameters: GROUP to get information about Returns: A LIST of OPERATINGSYSYTEMCATEGORYs that have group policies configured Description: This function retrieves a list of operating system categories that have group policies configured GetGroupPolicyOSSubCategories - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY to get sub category information about Returns: A LIST of OPERATINGSYSTEMSUBCATEGORYs Description: This function retrieves a list of operating system sub-categories of OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY that have policies for the GROUP GetGroupPolicyInfo - Parameters: GROUPPOLICY to get information about, GROUPPOLICYINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function fills the passed GROUPPOLICYINFO structure
- MoveClientToGroup - Parameters CLIENT to move, GROUP to move client to Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function moves CLIENT to GROUP GetUngroupedClients - Parameters: None Returns: LIST of ungrouped clients Description: This function Returns a LIST of the clients that do not belong to any group GetUngroupedClientsEx - Parameters: None Returns: LIST of CLIENTINFO structures Description: This function Returns a LIST of CLIENTINFO structures for the clients that do not belong to any group GetGroupInfo - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, GROUPINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function retrieves the information for the GROUP
- Table 13 sets forth Client Management Functions.
- LIST of PATCHes corresponding to the installed patches on the client Description This function retrieves a list of patches that were verified as installed on the last polling GetClientInstalledPatchesEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from
- LIST of PATCHINFO structures corresponding to the installed patches on the client Description This function retrieves a LIST of PATCHINFO structures for patches that were verified as installed on the last polling GetClientPendingPatches - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from.
- LIST of PATCHes corresponding to the pending patches for the client Description This function returns a list of patches that the client needs (according to group policy) as of the last polling.
- GetClientPendingSoftware - Parameters CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of SOFTWARE that is pending Description: This function returns a list of software that is pending for the client (according to group policy) as of the last polling GetClientLogs - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of LOGs for the client. Description: This function returns a list of logs for a particular client. GetClientLogsEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of LOGINFO structures Description: This function returns a list of LOGINFO structures containing log entries for a particular client.
- DeleteClient - Parameters CLIENT to delete. Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function removes all information pertaining to this client from the SysUpdate database. GetClientOS - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: OPERATINGSYSTEM installed on client Description: This function returns the OPERATINGSYSTEM installed on the client GetClientServicePack - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: SERVICEPACK installed on client or 0 Description: This function returns the service pack installed on the client or 0 if the client does not have a service pack installed, or if service packs are not applicable to the client's platform GetClientInfo - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from CLIENTINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function fills the passed CLIENTINFO structure with information pertaining to the passed CLIENT GetClientFromIP - Parameters: IP address of client Returns: CLIENT that corresponds to the passed IP address Description: This function maps
- Table 14 sets forth Patch Management Functions.
- Installation proceeds asynchronously InstallPatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install the patch on, PATCH to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys the patch to all clients in the group InstallAllPendingForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to install patches on Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys all pending patches for a client to the client InstallAllPendingForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install patches on Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys all pending patches to all clients in a group RejectPatchForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to reject patch for, PATCH to reject Returns: Success or failure Description: This function rejects a patch for a client.
- This patch will not be queued down or installed RejectPatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to reject patch for, PATCH to reject Returns: Success or failure Description: This function rejects a patch for every client in a group. This patch will not be queued down or installed RequeuePatchForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to requeue the patch for, PATCH to requeue Returns: Success or failure Description: This function requeues a previously rejected patch for a client RequeuePatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to requeue the patch for, PATCH to requeue Returns: Success or failure Description: This function requeues a previously rejected patch for every client in a group RemovePatchFromClient - Parameters: CLIENT to remove patch from, PATCH to remove Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will uninstall a patch from a client RemovePatchFromGroup - Parameters: GROUP to remove patch
- Table 15 sets forth Polling Functions.
- PollClient - Parameters CLIENT to poll Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes a client to be polled by the OnSite Server immediately. PollGroup - Parameters: GROUP to poll Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes all the clients in a particular group to be polled immediately. PollAll - Parameters: NONE Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes all clients to be polled immediately.
- Table 16 sets forth User Management Functions.
- GetSoftwareCategoriesForOperatingSystemCategoryEx - As above only, returning the appropriate “info” structures in the list GetSoftwareCategoryInfo - Parameters: SOFTWARECATEGORY to get information for, SOFTWARECATEGORYIFNO pointer to contain the information Returns: Success or failure
- Table 18 sets forth Policy Compliance Functions.
- Policy tree Policy Compliance and Enforcement module
- Functions include: Password/system access policies, log configurations, audit settings, user/group privilege rights, general service settings, service permissions, registry values, registry permissions, file permissions. It can also perform deltas on and get information about: groups, users, services, and all the “Run” registry keys.
- the function calls are being integrated into the live production tree and subject to change.
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Abstract
A system, method, and computer program product are provided for accessing at least one data storage identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities, such that: each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option. Further, the system, method, and computer program product are provided for displaying at least one mitigation technique in connection with at least one vulnerability to be applied as an attack response, and receiving user input for selecting the at least one mitigation technique in connection with the at least one vulnerability.
Description
- This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 14/499,246 filed Sep. 29, 2014 which, in turn, is a continuation-in-part (for the purposes of providing a glossary in accordance with the Glossary Pilot Program) of U.S. application Ser. No. 14/138,014 filed Dec. 21, 2013 which, in turn, is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 10/882,852 filed Jul. 1, 2004 which, in turn, claims priority to U.S. App. No. 60/484,085 filed Jul. 1, 2003, which are all incorporated herein by reference in their entirety for all purposes.
- The present invention relates to computer systems, and more particularly to management of security of computing and network devices that are connected to other such devices.
- A system, method, and computer program product are provided for accessing at least one data storage identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities, such that: each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option. Further, the system, method, and computer program product are provided for displaying at least one mitigation technique in connection with at least one vulnerability to be applied as an attack response, and receiving user input for selecting the at least one mitigation technique in connection with the at least one vulnerability.
-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a networked system of computers in one embodiment of the present invention. -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing components of several computing devices in the system ofFIG. 1 . -
FIGS. 3 and 4 trace signals that travel through the system ofFIGS. 1 and 2 and the present invention is applied to them. -
FIG. 5A is a flow chart of a filtering proxy method according to one embodiment of the present invention. -
FIGS. 5B and 6 illustrate a platform, in accordance with possible embodiments. -
FIG. 7 illustrates an intelligent IDS, in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 8 illustrates an update system, in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 9 shows a configured network, in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 10 shows policy compliance and enforcement, in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 11 illustrates an intelligent IPS, in accordance with one embodiment. -
FIG. 12 illustrates an SDK function call flow, in accordance with one embodiment. - data warehouse=a component that contains vulnerabilities and updates for devices that operate on at least one network.
- NOC server=network operations center server that periodically synchronize latest vulnerability and update data with other servers.
- SDK=software development kit that allows programmers to develop security applications that access data collected in a database.
- CM application=change management application that controls documentation and logging of change.
- For the purpose of promoting an understanding of the principles of the present invention, reference will now be made to the embodiment illustrated in the drawings and specific language will be used to describe the same. It will, nevertheless, be understood that no limitation of the scope of the invention is thereby intended; any alterations and further modifications of the described or illustrated embodiments, and any further applications of the principles of the invention as illustrated therein are contemplated as would normally occur to one skilled in the art to which the invention relates.
- Generally, the present invention in one embodiment operates in the context of a network as shown in
FIG. 1 .System 100 includes a vulnerability andremediation database 110 connected by Internet 120 tosubnet 130. In this exemplary embodiment,firewall 131 serves as the gateway between Internet 120 and the rest ofsubnet 130.Router 133 directs connections betweencomputers 137 and each other and other devices on Internet 120.Server 135 collects certain information and provides certain data services that will be discussed in further detail herein. - In particular,
security server 135 includesprocessor 142, andmemory 144 encoded with programming instructions executable byprocessor 142 to perform several important security-related functions. For example,security server 135 collects data fromdevices Security server 135 also obtains from vulnerability and remediation database 110 a regularly updated list of security vulnerabilities in software for a wide variety of operating systems, and even in the operating systems themselves.Security server 135 also downloads a regularly updated list of remediation techniques that can be applied to protect a device from damage due to those vulnerabilities. In one embodiment, each vulnerability inremediation database 110 is identified by a vulnerability identifier, and the vulnerability identifier can be used to retrieve remediation information from database 110 (and fromdatabase 146, discussed below in relation toFIG. 2 ). - In one embodiment,
computers processor memory storage Computer 137 executes a client-side program (stored instorage 156, loaded intomemory 154, and executed by processor 152) that maintains an up-to-date collection of information regarding the operating system, service pack (if applicable), software, and patches installed oncomputer 137, and the policies and configuration data (including configuration files, and elements that may be contained in files, such as *.ini and *.conf files and registry information, for example), and communicates that information on a substantially real-time basis tosecurity server 135. In an alternative embodiment, the collection of information is not retained oncomputer 137, but is only communicated once tosecurity server 135, then is updated in real time as changes to that collection occur. -
Computer 139 stores, loads, and executes a similar software program that communicates configuration information pertaining tocomputer 139 tosecurity server 135, also substantially in real time. Changes to the configuration registry incomputer 139 are monitored, and selected changes are communicated tosecurity server 135 so that relevant information is always available.Security server 135 may connect directly to and request software installation status and configuration information fromfirewall 131 androuter 133, for embodiments whereinfirewall 131 androuter 133 do not have a software program executing on them to communicate this information directly. - This collection of information is made available at
security server 135, and combined with the vulnerability and remediation data fromsource 110. The advanced functionality ofsystem 100 is thereby enabled as discussed further herein. - Turning to
FIG. 2 , one sees additional details and components of the devices insubnet 130.Computers processor memory storage Firewall 131 androuter 133 also haveprocessors storage devices security server 135, which continuously maintains the information indatabase 146.Security server 135 connects directly tofirewall 131 androuter 133 to obtain software installation and configuration status for those devices in the absence of a client-side program running thereon. -
Processors processor processor processor -
Memories memories - In this exemplary embodiment,
storage memories - This collection of information is used by
system 100 in a wide variety of ways. With reference toFIG. 3 , assume for example that aconnection request 211 arrives atfirewall 131 requesting that data be transferred tocomputer 137. The payload ofrequest 211 is, in this example, a probe request for a worm that takes advantage of a particular security vulnerability in a certain computer operating system. Based on characteristics of theconnection request 211,firewall 131 sends aquery 213 tosecurity server 135.Query 213 includes information thatsecurity server 135 uses to determine (1) the intended destination ofconnection request 211, and (2) some characterization of the payload ofconnection request 211, such as a vulnerability identifier.Security server 135 uses this information to determine whetherconnection request 211 is attempting to take advantage of a particular known vulnerability ofdestination machine 137, and uses information from database 146 (seeFIG. 2 ) to determine whether thedestination computer 137 has the vulnerable software installed, and whether the vulnerability has been patched oncomputer 137, or whethercomputer 137 has been configured so as to be invulnerable to a particular attack. -
Security server 135 sendsresult signal 217 back tofirewall 131 with an indication of whether the connection request should be granted or rejected. If it is to be granted,firewall 131 passes the request torouter 133 asrequest 219, androuter 133 relays the request asrequest 221 tocomputer 137, as is understood in the art. If, on the other hand, signal 217 indicates thatconnection request 211 is to be rejected,firewall 133 drops or rejects theconnection request 211 as is understood in the art. - Analogous operation can protect computers within
subnet 130 from compromised devices withinsubnet 130 as well. For example,FIG. 4 illustratessubnet 130 withcomputer 137 compromised. Under the control of a virus or worm, for example,computer 137 sendsconnection attempt 231 torouter 133 in an attempt to probe or take advantage of a potential vulnerability incomputer 139. On receivingconnection request 231,router 133 sends relevant information aboutrequest 231 in aquery 233 tosecurity server 135. Similarly to the operation discussed above in relation toFIG. 3 ,security server 135 determines whetherconnection request 231 poses any threat, and in particular any threat to software oncomputer 139. If so,security server 135 determines whether the vulnerability has been patched, and if not, it determines whethercomputer 139 has been otherwise configured to avoid damage due to that vulnerability.Security server 135 replies withsignal 235 to query 233 with that answer.Router 133 usesresponse 235 to determine whether to allow the connection attempt. - In some embodiments, upon a determination by
security server 135 that a connection attempt or other attack has occurred against a computer that is vulnerable (based on its current software, patch, policy, and configuration status),security server 135 selects one or more remediation techniques fromdatabase 146 that remediate the particular vulnerability. Based on a prioritization previously selected by an administrator or the system designer, the remediation technique(s) are applied (1) to the machine that was attacked, (2) to all devices subject to the same vulnerability (based on their real-time software, patch, policy, and configuration status), or (3) to all devices to which the selected remediation can be applied. - In various embodiments, remediation techniques include the closing of open ports on the device; installation of a patch that is known to correct the vulnerability; changing the device's configuration; stopping, disabling, or removing services; setting or modifying policies; and the like. Furthermore, in various embodiments, events and actions are logged (preferably in a non-volatile medium) for later analysis and review by system administrators. In these embodiments, the log also stores information describing whether the target device was vulnerable to the attack.
- A real-time status database according to the present invention has many other applications as well. In some embodiments, the
database 146 is made available to an administrative console running onsecurity server 135 or other administrative terminal. When a vulnerability is newly discovered in software that exists insubnet 130, administrators can immediately see whether any devices insubnet 130 are vulnerable to it, and if so, which ones. If a means of remediation of the vulnerability is known, the remediation can be selectively applied to only those devices subject to the vulnerability. - In some embodiments, the
database 146 is integrated into another device, such asfirewall 131 orrouter 133, or an individual device on the network. While some of these embodiments might avoid some failures due to network instability, they substantially increase the complexity of the device itself. For this reason, as well as the complexity of maintaining security database functions when integrated with other functions, the network-attached device embodiment described above in relation toFIGS. 1-4 is one possible embodiment. - In one embodiment, a software development kit (SDK) allows programmers to develop security applications that access the data collected in
database 146. The applications developed with the SDK access information using a defined application programming interface (API) to retrieve vulnerability, remediation, and device status information available to the system. The applications then make security-related determinations and are enabled to take certain actions based on the available data. - In these exemplary systems, “configuration information” for each device may take the form of initialization files (often named *.ini or *.conf), configuration registry (such as, the Windows Registry on Microsoft WINDOWS operating systems), or configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory. Such configuration information often determines what and how data is accepted from other devices, sent to other devices, processed, stored, or otherwise handled, and in many cases determines what routines and sub-routines are executed in a particular application or operating system.
- In one embodiment, security information management system is provided, wherein a database of potential vulnerabilities is maintained, along with data describing remediation techniques (patches, policy settings, and configuration options) available to protect against them. At least one vulnerability is associated in the database with multiple available remediation techniques. In one embodiment, the system presents a user with the list of remediation techniques available to protect against a known vulnerability, accepts the user's selection from the list, and executes the selected technique. In other embodiments, the system uses a predetermined prioritization schedule to automatically select among the available remediation techniques, then automatically executes the selected technique.
- One embodiment of the present invention is a database of information about a plurality of devices, updated in real-time and used by an application to make a security-related decision. The database stores data indicating the installed operating system(s), installed software, patches that have been applied, system policies that are in place, and configuration information for each device. The database answers queries by one or more devices or applications attached by a network to facilitate security-related decision making. In one form of this embodiment, a firewall or router handles a connection request or maintenance of a connection based on the configuration information stored in the database that relates to one or both of the devices involved in the transmission.
- In one embodiment,
database 146 includes vulnerability and remediation information such that, for at least one vulnerability, multiple methods of remediating the vulnerability are specified. When the system has occasion to implement or offer remediation of a vulnerability, all known alternatives are presented that are relevant to the device or machine's particular configuration or setup. For example, when a vulnerability of a device is presented to an administrator, the administrator is given a choice among the plurality of remediation options to remediate the vulnerability. In some embodiments, the administrator can select a preferred type of remediation that will be applied if available and a fallback type. For example, an administrator may select application of a policy setting over installation of a software patch, so that the risk of disruption of critical business systems is minimized. - In other embodiments, an administrator or other user is presented with a set of user interface elements that identify multiple options for remediating and identifying the vulnerability. The administrator or user selects the method to be used, and that remediation is applied to the vulnerable device(s).
-
FIG. 5A is a flow chart of a filtering proxy method according to one embodiment of the present invention. - In use, a database maintains security status information on each device in a network, based on whether the device's operating system, software, and patches are installed and configured to meet a baseline level of security. A network gateway proxy blocks connection attempts from devices for which the database indicates a substandard security status, but allows connections from other devices to pass normally. The database is preferably updated on a substantially real-time basis by client-side software run by each device in the network.
- Another form of the present embodiment includes a connection proxy that filters connections originating within the network. In particular, one embodiment employs a proxy that denies connection attempts originating with devices in the network when the originating device has a status, reflected in the database, that fails to meet predetermined security characteristics in terms of installed operating system and software, patch levels, and system policy and configuration registry information.
- In this embodiment,
router 133 serves as a connection proxy for devices andsubnet 130, as will be understood by those skilled in the art. In addition to basic proxy functionality, however,router 133 accessesdatabase 146 onsecurity server 135 via the SDK at each connection attempt. If, for example,device 137 attempts to connect to any device where the connection must pass through the proxy server (router 133 in this example), such as a device onInternet 120,router 133 checks the security status ofdevice 137 indatabase 146, using the real-time status therein to determine whetherdevice 137 complies with one or more predetermined security policies. If it does,router 133 allows the connection to be made. If it does not,router 133 prevents the connection, preferably redirecting the connection to a diagnostic page that explains why the connection is not being made. - This system is illustrated by
method 200 inFIG. 5A .Method 200 begins withstart point 201. The proxy (router 133 in the above example) receives a connection request atblock 203, then retrieves the security status of the source device atblock 205. This preferably uses the real-time updated status information from database 146 (seeFIG. 2 ) atdecision block 207. If the security status indicates that the source device complies with the predetermined security policy, the proxy allows the connection atblock 209. If not, the proxy refuses the connection atblock 211 and redirects the connection to an explanation message (such as a locally generated web page or other message source) atblock 213. In either case,method 200 ends atend point 219. - In possible embodiments, the determination and decision at
block 207 apply a comprehensive minimum policy set that protects other devices in subnet 130 (seeFIG. 1 ) from viruses, trojans, worms, and other malware that might be inadvertently and/or carelessly acquired due to the requested connection. - In another embodiment, a security information management system is provided, wherein client-side devices preferably collect and monitor information describing the operating system, software, and patches installed on the device(s), as well as configuration thereof. A database of this information is maintained, along with data describing vulnerabilities of available software and associated remediation techniques available for it. The system exposes an API to support security-related decisions by other applications. For example, an intrusion detection system (IDS) accesses the database to determine whether an actual threat exists and should be (or has been) blocked.
- In another form of this embodiment, client software runs on each monitored device and reports configuration information to the database, so that the database has substantially real-time-current information.
- The present embodiment of the present invention advantageously acquires the real-time status information from each client using client-side software. In this manner, a resource burden of monitoring is spread among the devices being monitored, and uses far fewer network resources in the process.
- In these exemplary systems, “configuration information” for each device may take the form of initialization files (often named *.ini or *.conf), configuration registry (such as the Windows Registry on Microsoft Windows operating systems), or configuration data held in volatile or non-volatile memory. Such configuration information often determines what and how data is accepted from other devices, sent to other devices, processed, stored, or otherwise handled, and in many cases determines what routines and sub-routines are executed in a particular application or operating system.
- In one embodiment, a system maintains a database of vulnerabilities and associated remediation techniques. The remediation techniques include software patches, policy settings or changes, and registry settings or changes. This multi-faceted provides novel flexibility in management of security issues, and convenience for security administrators in both determining available options and selecting remediation steps for vulnerable systems.
- In another embodiment of the present invention, patches, policy changes, software updates, and configuration changes are rolled out to devices on a network using a staged roll-out technique. In this technique, the change is applied to a selected device or set of devices identified by an administrator. After a predetermined amount of time passes, unless the administrator has canceled the roll-out, the change is applied to an additional group of devices on the network. Third- and fourth-tier groups may also be identified by the administrator, where implementation of the remediation or upgrade is automatically effected in subsequent stages a predetermined amount of time after the preceding stage roll-out. Thus, if no failures are noted following a more limited roll-out (on a first set of devices), then the remediation or upgrade is automatically applied to other devices. If, on the other hand, an error or failure is observed, the subsequent roll-out can be canceled so that further failures and problems are avoided.
-
FIGS. 5B and 6 illustrate a platform, in accordance with possible embodiments. - In one possible embodiment, provided is a platform and underlying back end that includes a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse. It may easily integrate with and enable network security products such as IDS, scanners, or firewalls to intelligently reference and share the same vulnerability data set, and independently provide complete vulnerability remediation (patching) functionalities such as that provided by the patch management and vulnerability remediation application. Thereby, the technology may improve system accuracy and efficiencies, minimize false positives and false negatives, and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities.
- The latest network compromises are combining qualities of viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks into new blended attacks. Additionally, blended attacks may now utilize metamorphic or polymorphic abilities to change their signatures to avoid detection. To mitigate these new risks, organizations are now deploying a multi-tiered network defense strategy comprised of a variety of network security components layered at the perimeter and to internal network machines and devices. The security components are managed separately, and possibly their data is ported into a Security Information Management System (SIMS) correlation engine.
- However, network security components and correlation engines rely on signatures or anomalies, producing an ever-increasing quantity of data, including false positive, benign, and erroneous events. They also lack the intelligence to identify, reference, or remediate the vulnerabilities targeted by the attack. Furthermore, the time and cost to acquire, manage, and maintain these numerous network security components is overwhelming the end user. Therefore, more sophisticated technology is provided to resolve these performance and management issues.
- In one embodiment, technology may be provided that addresses these requirements by making each security component smarter and provides managers with remote remediation options. Thereby, improving system performance and streamlining management processes.
- In one embodiment, an intelligent integration platform and SDK are provided to meet the above requirements.
- In one embodiment, security products are enhanced and system intelligence may be provided. The same vulnerability data warehouse information is shared with the products so that more intelligent actions may then be taken to mitigate complex threats.
- One embodiment cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration. The threat's CVE ID, or other identifier, and the destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's existing OS, application, and patch configuration profile. An answer is returned accurately indicating if the machine is vulnerable.
- In one embodiment, network vulnerabilities are identified. The platform may independently identify which network machines and devices have vulnerabilities by querying a client agent, or a device's OS or firmware directly.
- One embodiment proactively remediates the vulnerability. Once a vulnerability is identified, a remediation function may be provided that may remotely and automatically deploy the appropriate update to each machine or device, install it, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Examples of Anti-Vulnerability applications that may be integrated into network security products for enterprise and small office home office (SOHO) networks when integrated with one embodiment, via the SDK, will be described.
- In one embodiment, update or patch deployment are provided, which remotely remediate network vulnerabilities and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities. And, for the consumer market, it may additionally support non-security related updates such as application version, performance, and bug-fix upgrades.
- In one embodiment, an IDS may be provided that accurately determines if the targeted machine is actually vulnerable to an attack; virtually eliminates false positives and false negatives; and adds vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- In one embodiment, a scanner may be provided that virtually eliminates false positive and false negatives, and adds vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- In one embodiment, a firewall may be provided that virtually eliminates false positive and false negatives, preventing the security system from denying valid traffic to the organization—self-inflicted denial of service attacks—and adds vulnerability remediation, and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- In one embodiment, vulnerability management may be provided, as set forth above.
- In one embodiment, multiple products are provided including an IDS, scanner, and firewall. Each may communicate with the same back-end data warehouse, sharing the same vulnerability information, attaining intelligence and more accurate information about the target and its vulnerabilities, thereby more effectively mitigating complex threats.
- In one embodiment, change management may be provided, which may automatically create a change request in the system, specifying what update/patch is applicable to what system or groups of systems by vulnerability. After approval of the request, they may automatically deploy and install the update/patch. Finally, they may also verify correct operation after installation and automatically provide all necessary documentation and logging required.
- Lastly, the platform may also provide product upgrades and signature updates to each of these various security products.
- The platform is comprised of the following software components: SDK, client agent, logic engine, and data warehouse stored on a dedicated on-site server. Network operations center (NOC) Servers periodically synchronize the customers' servers with the latest vulnerability and update data. See
FIG. 5B . - The same client agent and on-site server support all security applications that are integrated onto the platform, thereby providing the added anti-vulnerability functionalities presented in the previous section.
- There are two system requirements: TCP/IP connectivity, and supported network machines and devices. In one embodiment, platforms supported are set forth below in Table 1.
-
TABLE 1 All Windows Operating Systems and their applications All UNIX variants Cisco routers and firewalls Toshiba network devices Netgear network devices Linksys network devices, including wireless access points - Platform support is scalable to any network size or architecture; consumer, small office home office (SOHO), enterprise, and distributed networks.
- In one embodiment, technology may be provided that includes a backend platform that includes a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse. It may easily integrate with and enable network security products such as IDS, scanners, or firewalls to intelligently reference and share the same vulnerability data set, and independently provide complete vulnerability remediation (patching) functionalities such as that provided by the patch management and vulnerability remediation application, update application and the intelligent IDS. Thereby, the technology may improve system accuracy and efficiencies, minimize false positives and false negatives, and provide policy compliance and enforcement capabilities.
- As shown in
FIG. 5B , the technology may meet market requirements, presented in the next section. - For example, networks are probed at an ever-increasing frequency for vulnerabilities, which may be exploited with compromise attacks. To protect the network, administrators have traditionally set up perimeter defense strategies.
- These strategies generally call for network managers to lock down core servers, and monitor/scan/filter all incoming and outgoing traffic at the network perimeter with several network security products such as antivirus and firewalls to identify and attempt to neutralize hackers and malicious code. In the past, these strategies worked well, however new threats are becoming more complex.
- The latest malicious code may combine qualities of viruses, worms, and direct compromise attacks into new blended attacks. Virus payloads are becoming more complex and by using metamorphic or polymorphic abilities, viruses are able to change their signatures to avoid the fingerprint-type filtering that most applications employ.
- To mitigate these new risks, organizations deploy a multi-tiered network defense strategy comprised of a variety of additional network security products layered at the perimeter and to internal network machines and devices. Such network security products include antivirus, firewall, scanners, and network and host based intrusion detection systems.
- Each of these systems is based on specific signatures, rules, or anomalies of each attack and their variants, and do not identify and remediate the specific network vulnerabilities the attack is targeting. So each attack, and its variants, must be identified and analyzed, a signature prepared, then finally deployed to each point product on each customer's network. This process is uncoordinated among multiple disparate systems, and creates an ever-increasing number of signatures producing more and more attack alerts requiring immediate attention—many of which are erroneous. The security components are managed separately, and possibly their data is ported into a security information management system (SIMS) correlation engine.
- Additionally, to proactively remediate the vulnerabilities the malicious code is targeting, administrators quickly and diligently update or “patch” each network machine and device, which is a time-consuming and costly process. Further compounding the burden on administrators, best practice and government compliance directives may require higher standards of network security and integrity to protect consumer privacy, and they are documented with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Therefore, it is increasingly difficult and costly to effectively mitigate new threats and manage numerous systems—particularly in an environment of rising security standards and policy compliance requirements.
- Thus, the multi-tiered network defense strategy is falling short primarily for four reasons. First, there is an inability of multi-tiered network security products to communicate and share information necessary to mitigate blended threats, and minimize false positives and false negatives. The vulnerabilities targeted by malicious code are not accurately identified nor proactively remediated. The associated excessive aggregate cost of ownership of multiple systems. The excessive administrative burden and cost of managing and maintaining multiple systems.
- Hence, there is a need to integrate systems, share information intelligently to better defend against blended threats, reduce management and cost requirements, and automate vulnerability identification and remediation functionalities, as presented in the high-level requirements.
- In one embodiment, technology is provided to meet the following market requirements: integrate network security products to share information; provide system intelligence; and remediate network vulnerabilities.
- In one embodiment, technology may integrate with and enable network security products to intelligently reference and share information from the same vulnerability data set, provide vulnerability identification and remediation functionalities, and efficiently meet policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- In one embodiment, the platform is a complimentary network security technology. When integrated into the defense strategy, it adds intelligence that more accurately and efficiently mitigates blended threats and offloads the time-consuming functions that burden network administrators.
- In one embodiment, the platform enables network security products to share information via its proprietary logic engine to automatically cross-reference the threat identifier with the targeted machine's configuration to determine if it is actually vulnerable to that threat. Previously separate and uncoordinated processes are now more intelligent and automated, resulting in improved system accuracy and efficiency. Therefore the need to layer more and more point products and add a SIMS is reduced, in-turn decreasing the amount of data—particularly erroneous data—to manage. Subsequently, the costs to acquire, operate, and manage the additional multiple point products, and the need to implement a SIMS, are also reduced.
- In one embodiment, the platform may also remotely and proactively remediate vulnerabilities by first determining which updates are needed and compatible with each machine or device, taking into account the OS, applications, or firmware installed. Then, the updates may be deployed, installed, and validated. Thereby, policy compliance is effectively and efficiently enforced, and documented.
- In one embodiment, the present technology fulfills market requirements noted in the previous section. For example, it may integrate network security products and provides system intelligence. The same vulnerability data warehouse information is shared with all products so that more intelligent actions may then be taken to mitigate complex threats.
- Still yet, it may cross-reference the threat's identifier with the target's configuration. The threat's CVE ID, or other identifier, and the destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's existing OS, application, and patch configuration profile. An answer is returned accurately indicating if the machine is vulnerable. Thereby, minimizes erroneous, benign, and false positive data produced by each security product.
- One embodiment identifies network vulnerabilities. The platform may independently identify which network machines and devices have vulnerabilities by querying a client agent, or a device's OS or firmware directly.
- One embodiment proactively remediates the vulnerability. Once a vulnerability is identified, a remediation function may be provided that may remotely and automatically deploy the appropriate update to each machine or device, install it, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Various possible benefits include blended attacks being more effectively mitigated and the overwhelming management and maintenance burden on administrators to purchase, operate, and maintain multiple network security products being reduced, while increasing productivity, reducing costs, and more effectively and efficiently meeting policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- Table 2 illustrates a plurality of end user details.
-
TABLE 2 Supplements existing technology to better defend against blended attacks Intelligently accesses the vulnerability data warehouse, and remediates vulnerabilities. Offers policy compliance and enforcement functionality Vulnerabilities may be automatically remediated, verified and documented, therefore enforcing compliance. No additional software or hardware implementation costs Anti-Vulnerability functionalities may be integrated into existing product platforms. Reduces cost of ownership of multi network security products Shared vulnerability data sets and added vulnerability remediation functionalities may reduce the number of network security products needed to adequately attain defense strategy requirements. Reduces management and maintenance costs Increased accuracy of vulnerability identification, remediation and policy enforcement, and reduction of false positives, false negatives and denial of service (DoS), significantly reduces management time and costs. Manage more machines and devices on the network through one portal Vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement may be integrated with existing security network security products, and their respective interfaces. Minimize end user education/absorption costs Anti-Vulnerability applications are transparently integrated, retaining pre- existing architecture, processes, and interfaces. Therefore, the end user experience remains the same, or improved with simplified or automated processes. User experience remains the same - additional time or costs to understand and execute new technologies are minimized Anti-Vulnerability applications may be integrated transparently and seamlessly, and the pre-existing operational processes and user interfaces are virtually unchanged. Supports both the enterprise and SOHO networks Data warehouse contains vulnerabilities and updates for many machines and devices that operate on both enterprise and SOHO networks. Applications presented hereinafter - Examples of applications that may be made available for enterprise and small office home office (SOHO) networks when integrated with Anti-Vulnerability technology via the SDK will now be set forth.
- In one embodiment, update or patch deployment is provided. In one embodiment, a patch management and vulnerability remediation solution is provided. The technology enables products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance functions. With such technology, products may gain intelligence, accuracy and efficiency, eliminate false positives and false negatives, and ensure policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money. Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks. And, for the consumer market, it may additionally support non-security related updates such as application version, performance, and bug-fix updates for widely distributed programs, which may optimize system performance and enhance the consumer experience.
- In one embodiment, an IDS is provided. IDS products attempt to identify malicious code by signatures at both the network and host client level. While they may be able to identify malicious code by CVE ID or other identifier, and targeted machines by IP address, but they generally do not have the intelligence to determine if the any of the machines on the network are susceptible to that attack, or with finer granularity, if any machine has a specific vulnerability to that specific attack, or if the targeted vulnerability has already been patched. For example, if the malicious code has been written as a Windows based attack targeting a Windows vulnerability, is the Destination IP actually running Windows, or a UNIX variant? And, if Windows, is it vulnerable to the attack, or has it already been patched? IDS do not have the intelligence to answer these questions, and incident alerts are generated indiscriminately. Lastly, even if the targeted machine is vulnerable—it remains unremediated—an IDS does not have the capability to remediate it.
- With the present embodiment, a product architect can integrate functionalities listed in the previous section to enable the IDS to access the Anti-Vulnerability logic engine and platform. It may then have the intelligence to determine if any machine on the network is susceptible to the attack, remediate the vulnerability, mitigate the attack, and verify policy compliance. Now, if no machines were susceptible to the attack, it is identified as an event but not an incident, no further data or alert is generated, and a management response is not required. Integrated products may gain intelligence, accuracy, and efficiency, eliminate false positives and false negatives, and ensure policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money. Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- In one embodiment, scanners may be provided. Vulnerability scanners assess each machine on the network for vulnerabilities, and create lists of potential vulnerabilities to the system managers. The lists commonly contain many false positives and false negatives, burdening the system and managers with inaccuracies.
- With the present embodiment, a product architect can integrate functionalities listed in the previous section to enable the scanner to access the logic engine and platform, and then have the intelligence to determine if the machine has actual vulnerabilities, remediate them, and verify policy compliance. Integrated products may gain intelligence, accuracy, and efficiency, eliminated false positives and false negatives, and ensured policy compliance, thereby saving the organization time and money.
- In one embodiment, a firewall may be provided. “Smart” firewalls are based in part on signatures and other similar functionalities as the IDS products described above.
- With the present embodiment, the firewall can determine whether an attack is valid or a false positive, thereby preventing the security system from denying valid traffic to the organization—self-inflicted DoS attacks. Such functionalities and benefits may be available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- In one embodiment, vulnerability management may be provided. Vulnerability management products enable managers to set policy and identify potential network vulnerabilities. They typically do not accurately identify each vulnerability on each network machine and device, nor remediate each vulnerability, meeting policy compliance enforcement requirements.
- The present embodiment offers similar functionalities and benefits as the patch deployment products described above. In short, it enables products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance and enforcement. Such functionalities and benefits are available for both the enterprise and SOHO networks.
- To this end, multiple products may be provided: IDS, scanner, firewall, and vulnerability management. Each product functions as the individual products noted above. Each may be deployed and operated on the network in a multi-tiered network defense strategy. They may be disparate system, and their signatures and update deployment schedules may vary. Therefore, the probability of mitigating a new and complex threat decreases, while management requirements and cost increases.
- In one embodiment, they each may communicate with the same backend data warehouse, sharing the same vulnerability information, attaining intelligence and more accurate information about the target and its vulnerabilities, thereby more effectively mitigating complex threats. It may also enable the products to add accurate vulnerability identification, remediation, verification, and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- In one embodiment, change management (CM) may be provided. Existing CM applications control the documentation and logging of change throughout the enterprise. These applications ensure that an organization maintains consistent records of what happened and when. Currently administrators must independently recognize that a security patch/update must be deployed to a computer or group of computers.
- The user enters the request in the system, through the pipelined process of change management the request would be approved, the patch/update would be manually installed by a user, then documented in the change management software that the process has been completed. While CM software assists in documentation, very little if any assistance may be provided to identify the patches/updates needed, nor verifying correct function after the update/patch is installed.
- With the current possible embodiment, change management integration may greatly streamline this process further reducing total cost of ownership, ease of use, and a higher standard of documentation. The products may then automatically create a change request in the system, specifying what update/patch is applicable to what system or groups of systems by vulnerability. After approval of the request, they may automatically deploy and install the update/patch. Finally, they may also verify correct operation after installation and automatically provide all necessary documentation and logging required.
- Lastly, one possible embodiment may also provide product upgrades and signature updates to each of these various security products—including all of the technology benefits such as ensuring compliance of signature versions, logging, reporting, and verification of installation.
- Thus, one possible embodiment includes an intelligent platform that may supplement any existing defense strategy. Once integrated with the technology, security products may share the same vulnerability data set to improve automation and accuracy—increasing efficiencies and minimizing false positives and false negatives. It also enables remote identification, management, and remediation of network vulnerabilities, and provides update deployment, validation, and reporting capabilities. Thereby, the technology improves network security and integrity, mitigation of blended threats, while increasing productivity, reducing total cost ownership, and more effectively and efficiently attaining policy compliance and enforcement requirements.
- One embodiment provides IDS intelligence, accuracy and remote patching functions—IDS data output integrated with the aforementioned platform via the SDK. The platform's underlying backend including a logic engine and vulnerability data warehouse provides the added functions and performance.
- Conventional IDS produce an ever-increasing quantity of alert data, including erroneous and false positive data. They also lack the intelligence to identify or remediate the vulnerabilities targeted by the attack. Furthermore, the cost of the acquiring, managing, and maintaining conventional IDS is overwhelming the end user.
- Therefore, a more sophisticated, intelligent technology is provided to resolve these issues. In one embodiment, an intelligent IDS is provided to meet market requirements. The alert data output from a distribution of Snort is integrated with the platform via the SDK, which may add the following functions.
- In one embodiment, it cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration. The CVE ID, or other identifier, and the Destination IP address are fed into the logic engine where it cross-references the threat with the machine's configuration profile.
- In one embodiment, it virtually eliminates false positives and false negatives. The backend accurately determines in real time if the targeted machine is susceptible to the attack. And, if the machine is not susceptible, it is filtered and reported back as an event and not an incident. No further data or alert is generated, and a management response is not required.
- In one embodiment, it remotely remediates the vulnerability. When a machine is identified as vulnerable to an attack, an incident, a remediation function may be provided to the administrator to remotely deploy the appropriate update to the machine or device, install it, verifies the files and hashes, and document it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- Table 3 sets forth a plurality of features.
-
TABLE 3 Supports Windows and UNIX variants Determines if targeted machine is vulnerable to an attack in real time Filters out erroneous, benign and false positive alerts Remotely patches targeted vulnerabilities in one click Installs in minutes - To this end, erroneous, benign, and false positive data is filtered out, and incidents may be remotely remediated. Therefore, complex threats are more effectively and efficiently mitigated. Correspondingly, the management and maintenance burden on administrators is reduced, saving time and effort.
-
FIG. 7 illustrates an intelligent IDS, in accordance with one embodiment. As shown in 701, the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the NOC servers. In 702, updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server. In 703 a, a sensor monitors and processes network traffic, and sends real time alert data to the on-site server where it cross-references the data with the backend. In 703 b, centralized IDS console filters alerts; separating events from incidents. It also offers administrators remote patching function. In 704, agents are deployed to each client, accurately identifying which OS, apps, and updates are installed. In 705, the logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed to remediate the targeted machine. As shown in 706, appropriate updates are remotely deployed, installed, and validated on each client. - In one embodiment, the intelligent patch management and vulnerability remediation application automatically updates computer OS and application vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by hackers and viruses.
- Networks are probed at an ever-increasing frequency for vulnerabilities, which may be exploited with directed compromise attacks. To protect the network, administrators must diligently update or “patch” server and workstation vulnerabilities, which is a time-consuming and costly process. Further compounding the burden on administrators, best practice and government compliance directives now require higher standards of network security to protect consumer privacy and proprietary data, which must be documented with change tracking and audit trail reports. Therefore, fully automated technology is provided to resolve these issues.
- In one embodiment, a intelligent application called SysUpdate—the first technology to fully automate the updating and reporting processes, as described below.
- In terms of function, one possible embodiment automatically researches updates. In collaboration with software development companies, it receives updates and their respective compatibility and installation guidelines, which are thoroughly reviewed and tested in a lab for system compatibility and stability. One embodiment automatically and securely downloads, and archives, all updates. Once the updates and guidelines are thoroughly reviewed and tested, they are automatically downloaded to each customer's on-site server, verified with MD5 hashes, and archived in a self-populating patch repository database.
- One possible embodiment automatically determines the update and dependency requirements for all computers on a network, based on their individual operating systems, applications, and previously installed updates. The logic engine automatically matches the tested updates and their guidelines across each computer's configuration profile.
- One possible embodiment remotely, securely, and automatically deploys updates to each computer and device. Updates may be tested on a test group, and then queued for release to each computer on the network, consistently in accordance with the policy determined by the network administrator.
- One possible embodiment automatically verifies the updates are installed and running correctly. Each computer's client agent installs the updates, and verifies the files and hashes.
- One possible embodiment automatically generates change tracking and audit trail reports. Change tracking and audit trail reports may be selected and printed from the management console reporting modules. Additionally, application license audit reports may be generated, which lists software installed on each machine, by license key.
- Table 4 illustrates possible features in one embodiment.
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TABLE 4 Supports Windows, UNIX variants, and network devices Supports non-Microsoft applications Logic engine provides system intelligence Files verified with SHA1 or MD5 hashes MMC snap-in console with Crystal Reports AES encryption -
FIG. 8 illustrates an update system, in accordance with one embodiment. As shown in 801, the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the off-site NOC servers. In 802, updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server. In 803, the centralized MMC snap-in console offers flexible security policy options and comprehensive reporting capabilities. In 804. agents accurately identifies OS, apps, and updates installed on each client by file versions and hashes. In 805, logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed on each client, taking into account OS, app, and update dependencies. In 806, appropriate updates are automatically deployed, installed, and validated on each client. - In one embodiment, a secure computer log management application is provided with fully automated archiving, querying, and reporting options.
- Best practice directives and government compliancy regulations now require administrators to archive log events over an extended period of time, and extensively document log and audit trail reports. With existing tools, these are time-consuming processes. Furthermore, existing tools transfer logs in clear text and are subject to malicious manipulation, and logs may be lost since few utilize guaranteed delivery protocols. Therefore, the integrity and security of the log data is not assured. In the event of an internal or external compromise, logs may be deleted, manipulated, or the network flooded with decoy log data.
- The present possible embodiment automatically and continuously transfers logs from each computer into a self-configuring, self-populating, maintenance-free database where they may be archived for years on end. The transfer process utilizes AES encryption for authentication between the client and server, and a guarantee delivery protocol—ensuring no data is compromised or lost. Flexible cross-correlation queries may be run from a single, remote viewer console, and the data is then automatically formatted into reports.
- In one embodiment, cross-correlation query type descriptions are provided. Such embodiment may provide the following three flexible cross-correlation queries in Table 5, which provide increasing detail and breadth of filtering/sorting capabilities, respectively.
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TABLE 5 General Queries - This is the default query. It filters or sorts the logs of any one computer, by any one of the three log types. Specific Queries - Detailed queries across all machines, and all log types. Advanced Queries - Query across any combination of machines, by any combination of sources, events, and log types, over any period of time. - In one embodiment, features shown in Table 6 may be provided.
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TABLE 6 Continuously pulls all logs into a central database, which may be archived for years on end AES encryption and a guarantee delivery protocol ensure logs are not compromised or lost Queries may be across any computer, for any log type, over any time frame Automatically generates event log reports - ideal for documenting audit and compliance requirements Easy download installation - In one embodiment, automated reports may be provided. Query data is automatically formatted into professional reports. Also, a separate reporting interface is available to generate general, machine, and user statistics. The present embodiment quickly and easily fulfills best practice and government compliance requirements for log event archiving and reporting.
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FIG. 9 shows a configured network, in accordance with one embodiment. - As shown in 901, the server component automatically configures the application, and the database and communicates with the client agents. In 902, client agents are deployed, which then identifies, manages, and continuously transfers all logs to the server. In 903, all client log data may be automatically archived the self-populating database, for years on end. In 904, from the centralized viewer, general, specific, or advanced cross-correlation queries may be run. See Table 7. Query and statistics data is automatically formatted into professional reports to easily document audit and compliance requirements.
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TABLE 7 Filter/Sort By: General Specific Advanced # of Computers Any One Any One Any # of Log Types Any One All Any Period of Time Last or All Last or All Any # of Event Detail By ID Only Any One Any Fields* *Defined as Time/Date Written, UserID, ComputerID, EventID, Source, Type, and Category - One possible embodiment provides best practice security policy templates to proactively and remotely manage and enforce enterprise security compliance policies.
- Best practice and government compliance directives require higher standards of network security to protect consumer privacy and proprietary data, which must be consistently enforced, and documented with change tracking and audit trail reports for compliance verification. Therefore, a fully automated technology is provided to resolve these issues.
- One embodiment offers an intelligent application to manage and enforce security policies—the first technology to fully automate the policy configuration, enforcement, and reporting processes, as described below.
- In one embodiment, centralized, remote management is provided. The policy compliance and enforcement module is managed via the centralized management console—in MMC format, and automates the deployment, assessment, and enforcement of the policy chosen.
- One embodiment provides standardized policies selected from many standardized policy templates recommended by NSA, SANS, US Navy, and ISO 17799, or custom policy options to formulate policies that meet the individual needs of any organization.
- One possible embodiment automatically determines out-of-compliance parameters for all computers and devices on a network. Based on each client's individual policy parameter settings and configuration profile, the system's logic engine automatically reports back each client's out-of-compliance parameters.
- In one embodiment, it remotely, securely, and automatically enforces policy to each computer or device. Policy changes may be automatically enforced to each computer or device individually, or by group, consistently in accordance with the policy selected by the network administrator. Policy configuration profiles are transmitted between client agent and server in an AES encrypted format for security and privacy. Policy options may be rolled back with one-click.
- Automatically generates change tracking and audit trail reports. Change tracking and audit trail reports may be selected and printed from the Management Console's Reporting Center. Table 8 sets forth some possible features.
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TABLE 8 Supports Windows, UNIX variants, and network devices Supports NSA, SANS, Navy, ISO 17799 and other standardized policies Logic engine provides system intelligence One-click policy rollback Automatically generates change tracking and audit trail reports -
FIG. 10 shows policy compliance and enforcement, in accordance with one embodiment. - As shown in 1001, the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the off-site NOC servers. In 1002, templates, rules, and updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server. In 1003, a centralized management console offers flexible security policy templates, options, and comprehensive reporting capabilities. In 1004, agents are automatically deployed to each client, accurately identifying which policy parameters, OS, apps, and updates are applied or installed. In 1005, a logic engine automatically determines which clients are out of compliance. In 1006, appropriate policy changes are automatically enforced on each client.
- In one embodiment an intelligent IPS may be provided that provides intelligence, accuracy, real-time prevention, and remote patching functions. In one embodiment, it accurately identifies and prevents malicious code from reaching their destination at the in-line IPS Sensor. Thereafter, a security officer may remotely patch the targeted vulnerability.
- Conventional IDS/IPS produce an ever-increasing quantity of alert data, including erroneous and false positive data. They also lack the intelligence to identify or remediate the vulnerabilities targeted by the attack. Furthermore, the cost of the acquiring, managing, and maintaining conventional IPS is overwhelming the end user.
- Therefore, a more sophisticated, intelligent technology is provided to resolve these issues, by offering an intelligent IPS to meet market requirements. The alert data output from a standard distribution of Snort is integrated with the platform via the SDK which accurately identifies attacks, and the attack is terminated at the in-line sensor—as described in the following functions.
- One embodiment cross-references the threat's identifier with the target's configuration. The in-line Sensor monitors and processes traffic and sends alert data to the on-site server where its logic engine queries the backend in real-time to determine if the destination IP is vulnerable to the attack.
- One possible embodiment provides enhanced flex response. If the destination IP is vulnerable to the attack, the in-line Sensor is commanded to immediately drop the exploit packets—preventing the attack. Further, it remotely remediates the vulnerability. When a machine is identified as vulnerable to an attack, an incident, a remediation function is also provided to the administrator to remotely deploy the appropriate update to the machine or device, install it, verifies the files and hashes, and documents it with change tracking and audit trail reports.
- In one embodiment, attacks are accurately identified and mitigated before they reach their targets, and targeted vulnerabilities may be remotely remediated. Therefore, complex threats are more effectively and efficiently mitigated. Correspondingly, the management and maintenance burden on administrators is reduced, saving time and effort.
- Table 9 illustrates some possible features.
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TABLE 9 Supports Windows and UNIX variants Determines in real-time if targeted machine is vulnerable to an attack, virtually eliminating false positives in-line Sensor flex response terminates the attack Remotely patches targeted vulnerabilities in one click Installs in minutes -
FIG. 11 illustrates an intelligent IPS, in accordance with one embodiment. - As shown in 1101, the on-site server periodically initiates communication with the NOC servers. In 1102, updates are pulled from the NOC servers to the on-site server.
- In 1103 a, an IPS in-line sensor monitors and processes network traffic, and sends real time alert data to the on-site server where it cross-references the data with the backend. In 1103 b, if the destination IP is vulnerable to the attack, the in-line Sensor is commanded in real-time to drop the malicious packets. As shown in 1104, agents are deployed to each client, accurately identifying which OS, apps, and updates are installed. In 1105, the logic engine automatically determines which updates are needed to remediate the targeted machine, and may be remotely deployed from the IPS console. In 1106, appropriate updates are remotely deployed, installed, and validated on each client.
- In one embodiment, an anti-vulnerability SDK is provided. The SDK was designed to be a simple integration pathway to the Anti-Vulnerability platform backend. The SDK is documented and deliverable. The SDK is compatible with many different programming languages such as C, C++, VB, Java, and others.
- The technology is sophisticated, yet all of the details of managing the communications are implemented in the library, requiring the developer to only learn a simple function calls as detailed hereinafter. A product architect chooses the functionality desired, inserts the provided functionality SDK code into the product code. The SDK code may then query—via the logic engine—the data warehouse, and in turn may return an answer to the point product. The architect can then show the results in any format desired in the product's interface. Full vulnerability remediation and policy compliance and enforcement functionalities may be integrated as well.
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FIG. 12 illustrates an SDK function call flow, in accordance with one embodiment. - Hence, the SDK serves as the architect's tool belt or building blocks needed to quickly and transparently access the Anti-Vulnerability backend and seamlessly integrate the desired functionality into the product without changing or complicating the end user experience.
- Furthermore, the SDK enables system architects to use the Anti-Vulnerability platform to integrate multiple security products and functionalities. Products may then share the same vulnerability data set, improve system automation and accuracy—increasing efficiencies and minimizing false positives and false negatives, and coordinate policy compliance and enforcement functionalities.
- Anti-Vulnerability functions that are accessible via the SDK. The functions are presented in groups, as follows in Table 10.
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TABLE 10 Session Management Group Management Functions Client Management Functions Patch Management Functions Polling Functions User Management Functions Miscellaneous Functions Policy Compliance Functions Session Management Functions - Table 11 sets forth Session Management Functions
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TABLE 11 OpenSession - Parameters: HOST name or IP address, LOGIN and PASSWORD for host Returns: new SESSION Description: This function opens a new session to the OnSite Server CloseSession - Parameters: SESSION to close Returns: None Description: Closes a session that is no longer needed IsSessionGood - Parameters: SESSION to test Returns: TRUE or FALSE Description: returns TRUE if the session is still valid FALSE if it is not SUGetLastError - Parameters: None Returns: Error code of last error in the thread Description: Returns the error code of the last SDK error to occur in this thread SUSetLastError - Parameters: ERROR code to set Returns: None Description: Sets the error code for the thread to be returned by SUGetLastError GetSDKVersion - Parameters: None Returns: a WORD containing the version of the SDK Description: the MSB of the returned value is the major version number, the LSB is the minor version number Ping - Parameters: SESSION to use, VALUE to ping with Returns: VALUE on success 0 on failure Description: attempts to pass VALUE to the OnSite Server, which should pass it back. - Table 12 sets forth Group Management Functions.
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TABLE 12 CreateGroup - Parameters: Group NAME and Description Returns: GROUP that was just created or 0 on failure Description: This function creates a new group with the provided name and Description GetGroups - Parameters: None Returns: A LIST of GROUPs. Description: This function Returns a list of all configured groups. GetGroupsEx - Parameters: None Returns: A LIST of GROUPINFO structures Description: This function Returns a list of all configured groups' information DeleteGroup - Parameters: GROUP to be deleted. Returns: Success or failure Description: This function permanently removes a group. EditGroup - Parameters: GROUP to be edited, GROUPINFO to be applied Returns: Success or failure Description: This function changes a GROUP's information GetGroupPolicyOSCategories - Parameters: GROUP to get information about Returns: A LIST of OPERATINGSYSYTEMCATEGORYs that have group policies configured Description: This function retrieves a list of operating system categories that have group policies configured GetGroupPolicyOSSubCategories - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY to get sub category information about Returns: A LIST of OPERATINGSYSTEMSUBCATEGORYs Description: This function retrieves a list of operating system sub-categories of OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY that have policies for the GROUP GetGroupPolicyInfo - Parameters: GROUPPOLICY to get information about, GROUPPOLICYINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function fills the passed GROUPPOLICYINFO structure with the information for the GROUPPOLICY GetGroupPolicyInfoByOSCat - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY to get the policy for, GROUPPOLICYINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function retrieves the information for a policy for the OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY in the GROUP GetGroupPolicyInfoByOSSubCat - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, OPERATINGSYSTEMSUBCATEGORY to get the policy for, GROUPPOLICYINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function retrieves the information for a policy for the OPERATINGSYSTEMSUBCATEGORY in the GROUP DeleteGroupPolicy - Parameters: GROUPPOLICY to delete Returns: Success or failure Description: This function permanently deletes the GROUPPOLICY EditGroupPolicy - Parameters: GROUPPOLICYINFO with new information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function updates the group policy (contained in GROUPPOLICYINFO) with the information in GROUPPOLICYINFO AddGroupPolicy - Parameters: GROUP to add the policy to, GROUPPOLICYINFO containg the policy information Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function creates a new group policy and applies it to the GROUP GetClientsInGroup - Parameters: GROUP to retrieve the clients from Returns: LIST of CLIENTs belonging to the group Description: This function retrieves a list of clients that are members of a specific group GetClientsInGroupEx - Parameters: GROUP to retrieve the clients from Returns: LIST of CLIENTINFOs for clients belonging to the group Description: This function Returns a list of CLIENTINFO structures containing information for the clients that belong to this group AddClientToGroup - Parameters: CLIENT to add to a group, GROUP to add the client to. Returns: Success or failure Description: This function adds a client to a group RemoveClientFromGroup - Parameters: CLIENT to remove from group, GROUP to remove the client from Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function removes a client from a group. MoveClientToGroup - Parameters: CLIENT to move, GROUP to move client to Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function moves CLIENT to GROUP GetUngroupedClients - Parameters: None Returns: LIST of ungrouped clients Description: This function Returns a LIST of the clients that do not belong to any group GetUngroupedClientsEx - Parameters: None Returns: LIST of CLIENTINFO structures Description: This function Returns a LIST of CLIENTINFO structures for the clients that do not belong to any group GetGroupInfo - Parameters: GROUP to get information about, GROUPINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function retrieves the information for the GROUP - Table 13 sets forth Client Management Functions.
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TABLE 13 GetClientInstalledSoftware - Parameters: CLIENT to get information about Returns: LIST of SOFTWARE installed on the client Description: This function retrieves a list of the software that has been detected on the client GetClientInstalledSoftwareEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information about Returns: LIST of SOFTWAREINFO for software installed on the client Description: This function returns a LIST of SOFTWAREINFO structures describing the software detected on the client GetClientInstalledPatches - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from. Returns: LIST of PATCHes corresponding to the installed patches on the client Description: This function retrieves a list of patches that were verified as installed on the last polling GetClientInstalledPatchesEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of PATCHINFO structures corresponding to the installed patches on the client Description: This function retrieves a LIST of PATCHINFO structures for patches that were verified as installed on the last polling GetClientPendingPatches - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from. Returns: LIST of PATCHes corresponding to the pending patches for the client Description: This function returns a list of patches that the client needs (according to group policy) as of the last polling. GetClientPendingPatchesEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: A LIST of PATCHINFO structures corresponding to the pending patches for the client Description: This function returns a LIST of PATCHINFO structures for patches that the client needs (according to group policy) as of the last polling. GetClientPendingServicePack - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: SERVICEPACK if a service pack is pending or 0 if not Description: This function returns a SERVICEPACK if there is a service pack pending for the client (according to group policy) as of the last polling. If there is no service pack pending it returns 0 GetClientPendingSoftware - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of SOFTWARE that is pending Description: This function returns a list of software that is pending for the client (according to group policy) as of the last polling GetClientLogs - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of LOGs for the client. Description: This function returns a list of logs for a particular client. GetClientLogsEx - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: LIST of LOGINFO structures Description: This function returns a list of LOGINFO structures containing log entries for a particular client. DeleteClient - Parameters: CLIENT to delete. Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function removes all information pertaining to this client from the SysUpdate database. GetClientOS - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: OPERATINGSYSTEM installed on client Description: This function returns the OPERATINGSYSTEM installed on the client GetClientServicePack - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from Returns: SERVICEPACK installed on client or 0 Description: This function returns the service pack installed on the client or 0 if the client does not have a service pack installed, or if service packs are not applicable to the client's platform GetClientInfo - Parameters: CLIENT to get information from CLIENTINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function fills the passed CLIENTINFO structure with information pertaining to the passed CLIENT GetClientFromIP - Parameters: IP address of client Returns: CLIENT that corresponds to the passed IP address Description: This function maps IP addresses to clients - Table 14 sets forth Patch Management Functions.
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TABLE 14 GetPatchInfo - Parameters: PATCH to get information about, PATCHINFO pointer to receive information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function fills the passed patch info structure with information about the passed patch InstallPatchForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to install the patch on, PATCH to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys the patch to the client. Installation proceeds asynchronously InstallPatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install the patch on, PATCH to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys the patch to all clients in the group InstallAllPendingForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to install patches on Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys all pending patches for a client to the client InstallAllPendingForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install patches on Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deploys all pending patches to all clients in a group RejectPatchForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to reject patch for, PATCH to reject Returns: Success or failure Description: This function rejects a patch for a client. This patch will not be queued down or installed RejectPatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to reject patch for, PATCH to reject Returns: Success or failure Description: This function rejects a patch for every client in a group. This patch will not be queued down or installed RequeuePatchForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to requeue the patch for, PATCH to requeue Returns: Success or failure Description: This function requeues a previously rejected patch for a client RequeuePatchForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to requeue the patch for, PATCH to requeue Returns: Success or failure Description: This function requeues a previously rejected patch for every client in a group RemovePatchFromClient - Parameters: CLIENT to remove patch from, PATCH to remove Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will uninstall a patch from a client RemovePatchFromGroup - Parameters: GROUP to remove patch from, PATCH to remove Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will uninstall a patch for every client in a group InstallServicePackForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to install service pack on, SERVICEPACK to install on client Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will install a service pack on a client InstallServicePackForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install service pack on, SERVICEPACK to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will install a service pack on every client in a group InstallSoftwareForClient - Parameters: CLIENT to install software update on, SOFTWARE to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will install a software update on a client InstallSoftwareForGroup - Parameters: GROUP to install software update on, SOFTWARE to install Returns: Success or failure Description: This function will install a software update on every client in a group. GetCveIDsFromPatch - Parameters: PATCH to get CveIDs from Returns: A LIST of CVEIDs Description: This function returns a list of CVEIDs the correspond to the PATCH - Table 15 sets forth Polling Functions.
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TABLE 15 PollClient - Parameters: CLIENT to poll Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes a client to be polled by the OnSite Server immediately. PollGroup - Parameters: GROUP to poll Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes all the clients in a particular group to be polled immediately. PollAll - Parameters: NONE Returns: Success or failure. Description: This function causes all clients to be polled immediately. - Table 16 sets forth User Management Functions.
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TABLE 16 GetUsers - Parameters: None Returns: A LIST of USERs Description: This function returns a list of all users for the system GetUserInfo - Parameters: USER to get information about, USERINFO pointer to receive the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function populates the passed USERINFO structure with information about the passed USER GetUserGroupPrivileges - Parameters: USER to get information about Returns: A LIST of USERGROUPPRIVILEGEs Description: This function returns a LIST of USERGROUPPRIVILEGES representing the privileges that a particular user has GetUserGroupPrivilegesEx - Parameters: USER to get information about Returns: A LIST of USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structures Description: This function returns a LIST of USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structures representing the privileges that a particular user has GetUserGroupPrivilegeInfo - Parameters: USERGROUPPRIVILEGE to get information about, USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO pointer to receive information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function populates the passed USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structure with the details of the particular privilege GetUserGroupPrivilegeInfoByGroup - Parameters: USER to get information about, GROUP to get information for, USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO pointer to populate Returns: Success or Failure Description: This function populates the passed USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structure with the detailed information regarding the permissions that the passed user has on the passed group AddUserGroupPrivilege - Parameters: USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structure to add Returns: Success or failure Description: This function adds a USERGROUPPRIVILEGE EditUserGroupPrivilege - Parameters: USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO with new values Returns: Success or failure Description: This function edits the USERGROUPPRIVILEGEINFO structure passed in, assign it the new values DeleteUserGroupPrivilege - Parameters: USERGROUPPRIVILEGE to delete Returns: Success or failure Description: This function deletes the passed USERGROUPPRIVILEGE from the system AddUser - Parameters: USERNAME, PASSWORD, and USERTYPE Returns: USER representing the user that was just created Description: This function creates a new user with the provided username, password, and type, and returns a USER representing the new user or 0 in the case of an error DeleteUser - Parameters: USER to delete Returns: Success or failure Description: This function permanently deletes the USER from the system along with any privileges the user may have had ChangeUserPassword - Parameters: USER to change password for, new PASSWORD Returns: Success or failure Description: This function changes the password for a user ChangeUserRole - Parameters: USER to change role, ROLE to change to Returns: Success or failure Description: This Function changes a user's role GetUserFromName - Parameters: USERNAME Returns: USER corresponding to the passed user name Description: This function provides a mapping from user names to USERs - Table 17 sets forth Miscellaneous Functions.
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TABLE 17 CreateList - Parameters: None Returns: A new, empty, LIST Description: This functions creates a new LIST that is initially empty GetListItemEx - Parameters: LIST to retrieve item from, INDEX of item to retrieve, VOID pointer to receive item Returns: Success or failure Description: This function populates the memory pointed to by VOID with the contents of the LIST item at INDEX GetListSize - Parameters: LIST to get the size of Returns: the size of the LIST Description: This function returns the number of elements currently in the list AddItemToList - pointer to LIST to add the item to, LONG item to add Returns: None Description: This function adds an “item” (such as a GROUP or a CLIENT) to a LIST AddClientInfoExToList - See AddItemToList AddGroupInfoToList - See AddItemToList AddPatchInfoExToList - See AddItemToList AddSoftwareInfoToList - See AddItemToList AddSoftwareCategoryInfoToList - See AddItemToList AddUserGroupPrivilegeInfoExToList - See AddItemToList RemoveItemFromList - Parameters: pointer to LIST to remove the item from, INDEX of item to remove Returns: None Description: This function removes the item at INDEX from the LIST FreeList - LIST to deallocate Returns: None Description: This function deallocates the resources used by LIST GetSoftwareInfo - Parameters: SOFTWARE to get information for, SOFTWAREINFO pointer to hold the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function populates the SOFTWAREINFO structure pointed at with information regarding the SOFTWARE GetLogInfo - Parameters: LOG to get information about, LOGINFO pointer to contain the information Returns: Success or failure Description: This function populates the LOGINFO structure pointed at with information regarding the LOG GetSoftwareCategories - Parameters: None Returns: A LIST of SOFTWARECATEGORYs Description: This function returns a LIST of SOFTWARECATEGORYs GetSoftwareCategoriesEx - Parameters: None Returns: A LIST of SOFTWARECATEGORYINFO structures Description: This function returns LIST of SOFTWARECATEGORYINFO structures for every software category known on the system GetSoftwareCategoriesForOperatingSystemCategory - Parameters: an OPERATINGSYSTEMCATEGORY to get information for Returns: A LIST of SOFTWARECATEGORYs Description: This function returns a LIST of software categories for the passed operating system category. GetSoftwareCategoriesForOperatingSystemCategoryEx - As above only, returning the appropriate “info” structures in the list GetSoftwareCategoryInfo - Parameters: SOFTWARECATEGORY to get information for, SOFTWARECATEGORYIFNO pointer to contain the information Returns: Success or failure - Table 18 sets forth Policy Compliance Functions.
- These functions are provided in a separate source tree (policy tree) for the Policy Compliance and Enforcement module. Function include: Password/system access policies, log configurations, audit settings, user/group privilege rights, general service settings, service permissions, registry values, registry permissions, file permissions. It can also perform deltas on and get information about: groups, users, services, and all the “Run” registry keys.
- The function calls are being integrated into the live production tree and subject to change.
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TABLE 18 GetPolicyItemInfo - As GetOperatingSystemInfo for POLICYITEM and POLICYITEMINFO InstallPolicyItemForClient - As InstallPatchForClient for POLICYITEM InstallPolicyItemForGroup - As InstallPatchForGroup for POLICYITEM InstallAllPendingPolicyItemsForClient - As InstallAllPendingPatchesForClient for POLICYITEM InstallAllPendingPolicyItemsForGroup - As InstallAllPendingPatchesForGroup for POLICYITEM RemovePolicyItemFromClient - As RemovePatchForClient for POLICYITEM RemovePolicyItemFromGroup - As RemovePatchFromGroup for POLICYITEM - All publications, prior applications, and other documents cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety as if each had been individually incorporated by reference and fully set forth.
- While the invention has been illustrated and described in detail in the drawings and foregoing description, the same is to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive in character, it being understood that only the preferred embodiments have been shown and described and that all changes and modifications that would occur to one skilled in the relevant art are desired to be protected.
Claims (20)
1. A computer program product embodied on a non-transitory computer readable medium, the computer program product comprising:
code for:
accessing at least one data storage identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities, such that:
each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option;
code for:
displaying at least one mitigation technique in connection with at least one vulnerability to be applied as an attack response, and
receiving user input for selecting the at least one mitigation technique in connection with the at least one vulnerability; and
code for:
receiving information in connection with at least one of a plurality of devices, and
identifying a particular attack in connection with the at least one device that takes advantage of the at least one vulnerability, based on the information;
wherein the computer program product is operable such that, as a result of the user input for selecting the at least one mitigation technique in connection with the at least one vulnerability, the particular attack is prevented from taking advantage of the at least one vulnerability, while there is no update at the at least one of the device that removes the at least one vulnerability from the at least one device.
2. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the displayed at least one mitigation technique includes at least two mitigation techniques include a firewall option for preventing at least one attack packet of the particular by terminating or dropping the same, and an intrusion detection or prevention option for preventing a connection request; the computer program product is further operable such that, in response to user input received prior to the particular, the firewall option is capable of being applied to a plurality of different devices for preventing the at least one attack packet at any of the different devices; and the computer program product is further operable such that, in response to additional user input after the particular in connection with a particular single device of the plurality of different devices, the intrusion detection or prevention option is capable of being applied to the particular single device for preventing the connection request at the particular single device.
3. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the displayed at least one mitigation technique includes at least two mitigation techniques include a firewall option for preventing at least one attack packet of the particular by terminating or dropping the same, and an intrusion detection or prevention option for preventing a connection request; the computer program product is further operable such that, in response to user input prior to the particular in connection, the intrusion detection or prevention option is capable of being applied to a plurality of different devices for preventing the connection request at the plurality of different devices; and the computer program product is further operable such that, in response to user input after the particular in connection with a particular single device of the plurality of different devices, the firewall option is capable of being applied to the particular single device for preventing the at least one attack packet at the particular single device.
4. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the at least one vulnerability is identified as a function of at least one of an operating system or an application identified in connection with a device, so that, in order to avoid false positives, only relevant vulnerabilities prompt mitigation technique user selection among at least two of the mitigation techniques, which involve both firewall and intrusion prevention system actions, for providing diverse mitigation options in connection with the particular.
5. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that which of the mitigation techniques that are displayed are based on actual vulnerabilities to which the at least one device is actually vulnerable so that only relevant mitigation techniques are displayed for selection by the user for real-time attack mitigation.
6. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the at least one vulnerability is identified as a function of at least one of an operating system or an application identified in connection with the at least one device and the at least one mitigation technique is specific to the at least one vulnerability, so that only relevant one or more vulnerabilities prompt selection of relevant one or more mitigation techniques by the user for application.
7. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the user input is capable of being received via at least one user interface for different devices, for allowing different attack mitigation actions including at least one intrusion prevention action and at least one firewall action to be selectively applied to the different devices for different actual vulnerabilities determined to be actually relevant based on a presence of at least one of an operating system or an application.
8. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the displayed at least one mitigation technique includes at least two mitigation techniques including a first mitigation technique that utilizes a firewall action for at least mitigating the particular attack that takes advantage of the at least one vulnerability and a second mitigation technique that utilizes an intrusion prevention action for at least mitigating the particular attack that takes advantage of the at least one vulnerability.
9. The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that different user input is capable of being received via at least one console for different devices, for allowing different mitigation techniques including the first mitigation technique and the second mitigation technique to be selectively applied by the user to the different devices for different actual vulnerabilities.
10. The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that different user input is capable of being received via at least one console for different devices, for allowing different mitigation techniques including the first mitigation technique and the second mitigation technique to be selectively applied by the user to the different devices for different actual vulnerabilities, such that the different user input is capable of resulting in: only the first mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one first device, only the second mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one second device, and both the first mitigation technique and the second mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one third device.
11. The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the displayed at least one mitigation technique further includes a third mitigation technique that utilizes a policy compliance action for at least mitigating the particular attack that takes advantage of the at least one vulnerability, wherein the computer program product is operable such that different user input is capable of being received via at least one console for different devices, for allowing different mitigation techniques including the first mitigation technique, the second mitigation technique, and the third mitigation technique to be selectively applied by the user to the different devices for different actual vulnerabilities, such that the different user input is capable of resulting in: only the first mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one first device, only the second mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one second device, both the first mitigation technique and the second mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to at least one third device, and the third mitigation technique being selectively applied by the user to the at least one first device, the at least one second device, and the at least one third device.
12. The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the first mitigation technique is automatically applied utilizing a first communication from a server to firewall-supporting client code, and the second technique is automatically applied utilizing a second communication from the server to intrusion prevention system-supporting client code, where the firewall-supporting client code and the system-supporting client code are part of the same client agent.
13. The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the first mitigation technique and the second technique are automatically applied by sending at least one encrypted communication from a server to an intrusion prevention system-supporting and firewall-supporting client code associated with the same single platform.
14. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the information is capable of being used to determine a characterization of a payload.
15. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the at least one data storage identifies the plurality of mitigation techniques based on receipt of an identification of an operating system of the at least one device.
16. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that such that the particular attack is prevented from taking advantage of the at least one vulnerability which includes an actual vulnerability of the at least one device related to the operating system thereof.
17. The computer program product of claim 16 , wherein the computer program product is operable such that the identification of the operating system of the at least one device is received as a result of a vulnerability assessment scan.
18. The computer program product of claim 1 , wherein at least one of:
said at least one data storage includes at least one database;
said at least one data storage is accessed by at least one of: receiving at least one update therefrom; pulling at least one update therefrom, communicating therewith, or synchronizing therewith;
said mitigation techniques include remediation techniques;
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including the patch;
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including the policy setting;
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including the configuration option;
each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating the effect of the attack that takes advantage of the corresponding vulnerability, by dropping packets associated with the attack or removing the corresponding vulnerability;
said information is capable of being used to determine an intended destination of a connection request; or
said information includes a vulnerability identifier;
wherein the computer program product is operable for use with at least one NOC server, a data warehouse, and an SDK for allowing access to information associated with at least one vulnerability and at least one remediation technique;
and wherein the computer program product is operable for determining which devices have vulnerabilities by directly querying a firmware or operating system of the devices.
19. A computer program product embodied on a non-transitory computer readable medium, the computer program product comprising:
code for:
accessing at least one data structure identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities, such that:
each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option;
code for:
receiving information in connection with at least one of a plurality of devices; and
identifying an attack on the at least one device that takes advantage of at least one of the vulnerabilities, based on the information;
code for:
automatically applying at least two of the plurality of mitigation techniques including at least one first mitigation technique of a first mitigation type and at least one second mitigation technique of a second mitigation type to the at least one device, in response to the attack for mitigating the attack;
wherein the computer program product is operable such that the attack is mitigated by preventing the attack from taking advantage of the at least one vulnerability, while there is no update at the at least one of the device that removes the at least one vulnerability from the at least one device.
20. A computer program product embodied on a non-transitory computer readable medium, the computer program product comprising:
at least one data storage identifying a plurality of mitigation techniques that mitigate effects of attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities associated with an operating system identified in connection with at least one of a plurality of devices, such that:
each mitigation technique is capable of mitigating an effect of an attack that takes advantage of a corresponding vulnerability, and
each mitigation technique has a mitigation type including at least one of a patch, a policy setting, or a configuration option;
code for:
displaying at least two of the mitigation techniques in connection with at least one vulnerability, and
receiving at least one user input in connection with the at least two mitigation techniques;
code for:
automatically applying the at least two mitigation techniques based on the user input, the at least two mitigation techniques including:
at least one first mitigation technique for utilizing a firewall for attack mitigation, and
at least one second mitigation technique for utilizing an intrusion prevention system for attack mitigation; and
code for:
receiving information in connection with the at least one device, and
identifying a particular attack in connection with the at least one device that takes advantage of the at least one vulnerability, based on the information;
wherein the computer program product is operable such that the attack is mitigated utilizing the first mitigation technique for utilizing the firewall for attack mitigation and the at least one second mitigation technique for second mitigation technique for utilizing the intrusion prevention system for attack mitigation, regardless of whether there is no update at the at least one of the device that removes the at least one vulnerability from the at least one device.
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Also Published As
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US20150033287A1 (en) | 2015-01-29 |
US9118711B2 (en) | 2015-08-25 |
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