US20140181842A1 - Secure mobile app connection bus - Google Patents
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- US20140181842A1 US20140181842A1 US14/137,845 US201314137845A US2014181842A1 US 20140181842 A1 US20140181842 A1 US 20140181842A1 US 201314137845 A US201314137845 A US 201314137845A US 2014181842 A1 US2014181842 A1 US 2014181842A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6281—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database at program execution time, where the protection is within the operating system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
- G06F9/54—Interprogram communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
Definitions
- FIG. 1 is a table including applications according to various embodiments.
- FIG. 2 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus.
- FIG. 3 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus.
- Techniques described herein help the management server and management agent to have a two-way secure application command bus to manage apps (configurations and policies) on mobile devices while keeping the user experience intact.
- an AppConnect bus is provided in mobile devices, which may be used to send command/information securely between managed apps and a trusted management agent running on the mobile device.
- VSP stands for Virtual Smartphone Platform by Mobilelron. All managed mobile devices' configuration, policies and apps are managed from here. Mobilelron clients connect to VSP on a periodic basis to update the device status as well as get the new configuration and policies.
- Sentry is a reverse proxy for enterprise app traffic between mobile devices and the enterprise backend servers.
- FIG. 1 is a table including applications according to various embodiments.
- FIG. 2 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus.
- VSP compile this information with parameters specific to user/devices (for example, change $USER_ID$ to actual user id for login, or issuing identity certificate for user/device).
- VSP will push Compiled and encrypted configuration to management agent (It can be standalone apps on mobile device or agent module part of enterprise apps.) This configuration is decrypted by each target app with proper decryption keys.
- Management Agent will push received AppConnect configuration to device specific AppConnect Bus with timestamps and checksums.
- an embedded AppConnect library reads the latest configuration and applies a new configuration if there are changes.
- the AppConnect library is embedded in the application code of the app, e.g., the app developer embeds the library in the app using a software development kit (SDK) or other tool, or subsequent to app development by the original developer the app is “wrapped” or otherwise modified by adding or changing app code to embed the library.
- the new configuration if any, may include a new configuration data and/or policy for the app.
- the configuration may affect or control how the app should work, for example, or a policy may govern how the app should or may behave.
- An example of policy includes, without limitation, whether the app is permitted to perform copy/paste operations, is it allowed to print, etc.
- Examples of configuration include, without limitation, which server the app should connect to, etc.
- Management Agent will read the result. If local policy enforcement is enabled, Management Agent can push predefined configuration to AppConnect bus if local policy condition met.
- Management agent will update result to VSP.
- VSP analyzes the result and if it does meet quarantine policy requirement the VSP can send a command to Sentry to quarantine the device. Also this quarantine command will be sent to the device.
- the device may be configured to perform an action in response to the command, such as wipe all or only enterprise data, not all the use of enterprise apps, etc.
- VSP will update result to each app configuration and app policies.
- FIG. 3 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus.
- AppConnect Bus communication bus in devices which send/receive information between applications securely. Depends on device OS and capability, AppConnect Bus can be implemented in different ways depending on the requirements, capabilities, and limitations of the OS.
- Application configuration Each application requires certain configuration/setting to operate. For example:
- Information Description Server Server name or IP address to access data information User Identity User name with password or User or device certificate to information identify it to server
- Application Policies want to force application management policy to application depends on enterprise policy, location, device security state, other application install state or user's group changes.
- Storage access Block access to device's storage SD, Flash, Photo
- control PIM access Block access to device Email, Calendar, Contacts or allow to limited control to certain email account, calendar or contacts. For example, only allow to company email, calendar or contacts instead of personal.
- Sharing device Sharing device, user or list of installed application with apps to allow application add functions based on this information.
- Application Firewall Application is not build to identify security of it's connected Wi-Fi networks or even it's identity and security of it's connected server. Application Firewall will validate and protect application from receiving untrusted party's data.
- firewall rules For example firewall rules:
- Server certificate will be Server validated before allow connection certificate validation Allowed only allow made connection to allowed network network Augmented
- application Address firewall can use secure DNS server which provide lookup additional security with authentic address information. (for example, opendns) or using host file pushed by management server Content Client side only inspection or Server assisted content inspection inspection to remove any malicious content
- Enterprise authentication Before allowing access to enterprise command bus (i.e., AppConnect bus), User has to authenticate identity.
- enterprise command bus i.e., AppConnect bus
- User ID with Password or preconfigured PIN, onetime password, NFC, 2D Barcode can be used to identify user, for example upon opening a protected app.
- this pasteboard is used as a place to exchange the AppConnect (secure app connection bus) information/data between apps as disclosed herein.
- AppConnect secure app connection bus
- Applications can register their URL scheme with the OS so that either OS or other apps can reference/invoke the app.
- an application “ABC” can register the URL scheme “abc://” so that anytime OS or other apps need to invoke “ABC” they can call it by the URL “abc://”.
- OS will look up and see who registered for that URL and call that app.
- Any data that want to exchange between the apps then we can have the apps register their URLs and the management app can pass the data to those apps using URL mechanism. For example management want to pass the data “12345” to app “ABC” then it can call the URL “abc://12345” and when that app ABC receives the URL it will parse the URL and take the content “12345” for its use.
- OS provides a common place to store the certificates for the apps to use.
- that certificate store is used to exchange information between apps.
- the information is secured such that only the intended recipient app(s) can understand the encrypted message in the keychain.
- Each app can register for certain file type and that will help management app to put all the enterprise data in an encrypted file and when it tries to open the file the intended app will get called. (for more information http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/apps/hh464906.aspx)
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Abstract
A secure mobile app connection bus is disclosed. An application URL scheme may be registered with an operating system. Encrypted data may be passed from a management agent to an application using a URL call associated with the application URL scheme. A source of the URL call may be validated.
Description
- This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/745,052 entitled SECURE MOBILE APP CONNECTION BUS filed Dec. 21, 2012 which is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes.
- Today enterprise users on mobile devices, which may belong to the user or be owned by the enterprise, use apps developed by enterprise in-house developers, or apps from trusted app store or untrusted 3rd party app stores. Each app may have its own way of managing its configuration, policy and data. This makes it difficult for enterprises to manage and enforce apps configuration and policies while securing app data consistently across all apps.
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FIG. 1 is a table including applications according to various embodiments. -
FIG. 2 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus. -
FIG. 3 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus. - Techniques described herein help the management server and management agent to have a two-way secure application command bus to manage apps (configurations and policies) on mobile devices while keeping the user experience intact.
- In various embodiments, an AppConnect bus is provided in mobile devices, which may be used to send command/information securely between managed apps and a trusted management agent running on the mobile device.
- Detailed flow of the solution as implemented in some embodiments is described below:
- VSP stands for Virtual Smartphone Platform by Mobilelron. All managed mobile devices' configuration, policies and apps are managed from here. Mobilelron clients connect to VSP on a periodic basis to update the device status as well as get the new configuration and policies.
- Sentry is a reverse proxy for enterprise app traffic between mobile devices and the enterprise backend servers.
-
FIG. 1 is a table including applications according to various embodiments. -
FIG. 2 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus. - (1) User creates application policies and configuration on VSP. VSP compile this information with parameters specific to user/devices (for example, change $USER_ID$ to actual user id for login, or issuing identity certificate for user/device).
- (2) VSP will push Compiled and encrypted configuration to management agent (It can be standalone apps on mobile device or agent module part of enterprise apps.) This configuration is decrypted by each target app with proper decryption keys.
- (3) Management Agent will push received AppConnect configuration to device specific AppConnect Bus with timestamps and checksums.
- (4) When each app launches for the first time or becomes foreground, an embedded AppConnect library reads the latest configuration and applies a new configuration if there are changes. In some embodiments, the AppConnect library is embedded in the application code of the app, e.g., the app developer embeds the library in the app using a software development kit (SDK) or other tool, or subsequent to app development by the original developer the app is “wrapped” or otherwise modified by adding or changing app code to embed the library. In some embodiments, the new configuration, if any, may include a new configuration data and/or policy for the app. The configuration may affect or control how the app should work, for example, or a policy may govern how the app should or may behave. An example of policy includes, without limitation, whether the app is permitted to perform copy/paste operations, is it allowed to print, etc. Examples of configuration include, without limitation, which server the app should connect to, etc.
- (5) Each app which applies the changes will update AppConnect bus with result.
- (6) Management Agent will read the result. If local policy enforcement is enabled, Management Agent can push predefined configuration to AppConnect bus if local policy condition met.
- (7) Management agent will update result to VSP.
- (8) VSP analyzes the result and if it does meet quarantine policy requirement the VSP can send a command to Sentry to quarantine the device. Also this quarantine command will be sent to the device. In some embodiments, the device may be configured to perform an action in response to the command, such as wipe all or only enterprise data, not all the use of enterprise apps, etc.
- (9) VSP will update result to each app configuration and app policies.
-
FIG. 3 is block diagram illustrating embodiments of a system including a secure mobile app connection bus. - AppConnect Bus: communication bus in devices which send/receive information between applications securely. Depends on device OS and capability, AppConnect Bus can be implemented in different ways depending on the requirements, capabilities, and limitations of the OS.
- For example:
-
OS Description iOS Application pasteboard with security with encryption Registered URL scheme with encrypted payload with source validation Shared keychain with injected keychain-access-groups - Validated Protocols/URL Scheme: Validating Installed application with application's URL scheme, make sure trusted app holds protocols/URL schemes required. For example, before install apps, which require URL scheme ‘ironvault://’, check it whether it exist on the device. Android Certificate based Authenticated intention with encryption Windows Shared Certificate store and share protocol registration/file types Phone - Secure Information sharing between apps: Application naturally shares information with other apps like photo, text, URLS. For security, this information will be encrypted and only distributed to allowed apps using AppConnect Bus.
- For example:
-
Category Description Copy and Paste Secure pasteboard which will encrypt content and allowed to share between trusted apps File Exchange When a trusted app tries to share a file, it will be shared only between trusted apps. - The following are examples, without limitation, of configurations, settings, and/or policies that may be communicated and set via the AppConnect bus in some embodiments:
- Application configuration: Each application requires certain configuration/setting to operate. For example:
-
Information Description Server Server name or IP address to access data information User Identity User name with password or User or device certificate to information identify it to server - Application Policies: Management system want to force application management policy to application depends on enterprise policy, location, device security state, other application install state or user's group changes.
- For example:
-
Policy Description Hardware Block access by this app to Device's Camera, Bluetooth, NFC, USB, control other resources (set by user, group, app, time, location, etc.) Storage access Block access to device's storage (SD, Flash, Photo) control PIM access Block access to device Email, Calendar, Contacts or allow to limited control to certain email account, calendar or contacts. For example, only allow to company email, calendar or contacts instead of personal. Access control Block access to app from system services like AirPrint, Share Email, to system Share with other apps service - Information sharing: Sharing device, user or list of installed application with apps to allow application add functions based on this information.
-
Information Description Device Management ID, MAC address, IMEI or other management Information token Enterprise Enterprise Emergency information Information Installed Installed Application list with capability (open-in applications documents, secure copy paste support etcs) - Application Actions: When Enterprise administrator want to send command to application, it will be send to application via command bus.
- For example:
-
Command Action Wipe Wipe Application data and make it first installation state (option. Zero-out bytes before detele) Remote Enterprise access will be lock until user unlock. While locked Lock state any trusted apps's data will not able to accessed by apps. - Application Firewall: Application is not build to identify security of it's connected Wi-Fi networks or even it's identity and security of it's connected server. Application Firewall will validate and protect application from receiving untrusted party's data.
- For example firewall rules:
-
Command Action Enforced For each SSL/TLS connections, Server certificate will be Server validated before allow connection certificate validation Allowed only allow made connection to allowed network network Augmented Instead of relying system's DNS server, application Address firewall can use secure DNS server which provide lookup additional security with authentic address information. (for example, opendns) or using host file pushed by management server Content Client side only inspection or Server assisted content inspection inspection to remove any malicious content - Enterprise authentication: Before allowing access to enterprise command bus (i.e., AppConnect bus), User has to authenticate identity.
- For example, User ID with Password or preconfigured PIN, onetime password, NFC, 2D Barcode can be used to identify user, for example upon opening a protected app.
- The following examples illustrative aspects of techniques disclosed herein:
- 1. Application Pasteboard with Security with Encryption
- a. There is a common application paste board that is available in iOS. Applications can use them for exchange of data within or between applications (for more information read https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/#documentation/general/conceptual/Devpedia-CocoaApp/Pasteboard.html). In some embodiments, this pasteboard is used as a place to exchange the AppConnect (secure app connection bus) information/data between apps as disclosed herein. For example a management agent running on the mobile device will download the configuration or policy from the mobile device management server, and put that data on the pasteboard for recipient app to pick up that data.
- 2. Registered URL Scheme with Encrypted Payload with Source Validation
- a. Applications can register their URL scheme with the OS so that either OS or other apps can reference/invoke the app. For example an application “ABC” can register the URL scheme “abc://” so that anytime OS or other apps need to invoke “ABC” they can call it by the URL “abc://”. OS will look up and see who registered for that URL and call that app. Any data that want to exchange between the apps then we can have the apps register their URLs and the management app can pass the data to those apps using URL mechanism. For example management want to pass the data “12345” to app “ABC” then it can call the URL “abc://12345” and when that app ABC receives the URL it will parse the URL and take the content “12345” for its use.
- 3. Shared Keychain with Injected Keychain-Access-Groups
- a. OS provides a common place to store the certificates for the apps to use. In some embodiments, that certificate store is used to exchange information between apps. The information is secured such that only the intended recipient app(s) can understand the encrypted message in the keychain.
- 4. Certificate Based Authenticated Intention with Encryption
- a. In Android there are intents that can be used to communicate between apps. (more info can be found here
- https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html). We can encrypt the payload of the intent so that only intended recipient app(s) can understand the payload
- 5. Shared Certificate Store and Share Protocol Registration/File Types
- a. Shared certificate store is similar to what I have explained above.
- b. Shared protocol registration/file types
- i. Each app can register for certain file type and that will help management app to put all the enterprise data in an encrypted file and when it tries to open the file the intended app will get called. (for more information http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/apps/hh464906.aspx)
Claims (1)
1. A method, comprising:
registering an application URL scheme with an operating system;
passing encrypted data from a management agent to an application using a URL call associated with the application URL scheme; and
validating a source of the URL call.
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WO2014100756A1 (en) | 2014-06-26 |
US9537835B2 (en) | 2017-01-03 |
US20150319143A1 (en) | 2015-11-05 |
US9059974B2 (en) | 2015-06-16 |
EP2936733A1 (en) | 2015-10-28 |
EP2936733B1 (en) | 2018-08-22 |
US20140181518A1 (en) | 2014-06-26 |
CN105027493A (en) | 2015-11-04 |
CN105027493B (en) | 2018-09-07 |
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