RU2321893C2 - Method for conducting a secret vote - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: methods for conducting secret votes.

SUBSTANCE: method is realized either using an electronic system or without it. In first case, the voter selects a unique personal identification code, and performs the voting, using a personal computer, with its screen covered by a non-transparent cover, which has a narrow elongated sight window, through which only the voter may see the image on the screen, after the vote a certificate is dispensed to the voter, which contains the unique identification code of voter, his choice, and also choices of other voters and their identification codes. In second case, the voter selects aforementioned code and performs voting at election center which has a retractable case and a window, after the vote aforementioned certificate is also dispensed to the voter.

EFFECT: reduced distortions of will of voters, due to each voter being capable of controlling correctness of his vote record without violations of the anonymity principle.

2 cl

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to methods for identifying winners of election campaigns of any level, as well as to methods for identifying public opinion on any issue.

State of the art

There is an open method of voting by "show of hands" or using electronic means with the possible publication of roll-call totals, which does not provide for secrecy of the will of the voter, and therefore does not guarantee freedom of choice. Therefore, the open method has limited application.

There are known methods of secret voting, both using electronic means, and according to the traditional scheme “ballot paper - booth for filling it out - ballot box”, in which no check is provided and impossible for the voter to correctly include his own vote in the total vote count.

The most common way is the standard voting scheme in modern state electoral systems, in which, after the mandatory registration of voters according to identity documents, a choice of two different voting procedures is offered:

A) The majority of voters vote at polling stations, dropping their ballot paper in the ballot box, filled in the voting booth, separated from prying eyes, or in the same place using the electronic system, if any, immediately enter the result of their choice into the database. Elderly, sick and disabled people, as well as voters from remote and inaccessible areas, vote at their location, but according to the same “ballot box - ballot box”, for which the authorized commission delivers ballots and a ballot box for them, or using a portable electronic system they immediately enter the result of their choice into the database;

B) Voters wishing to vote on the Internet are excluded from registration at the polling station during registration and receive a unique code and password, which they can then use to participate in various votes, including in election campaigns. Internet voting results are then included in the national results (Switzerland, for example).

There are known varieties of forums and polls on the Internet, in which the registration of participants is anonymous, only the participants themselves know who is hiding behind the unique identifiers issued to them, and the opinion of each participant in the survey or forum is openly published with an indication of its identifier.

Unlike the Internet, when voting at a polling station according to the traditional scheme, it is strictly forbidden to give out ballots marked with an identifier to voters - this creates the possibility of violating the principle of secrecy of voting.

The disadvantage of the standard voting scheme is the large dependence of the reliability of the results both on the good faith of the members of election commissions and on the good faith of voters.

Voting under scheme A) under administrative pressure on the election commission allows for the possibility of a variety of frauds that go as far as falsification of precinct protocols and voter lists, distortion of results when summing up precinct results in territorial commissions, printing and throwing in additional ballots, spoiling and destroying unwanted ballots and even substitutions whole ballot boxes.

Ordinary voting according to the scheme "ballot paper - booth for filling it - ballot box" is also subject to such danger as voluntary or forced sale of votes, because the voter can always show the completed ballot to those present at the polling station, and it is also possible for the voter to shoot on the camera of a mobile phone or similar device the moment of filling out the ballot with the subsequent sale of the vote. No security camera installed on the polling station, and no observers in this case, can interfere with this, since the ballot filled out behind the screen, due to the principle of secrecy of voting, must be hidden from the observers and from the security cameras, and together with the ballot it can be hidden Voter video camera.

B) Internet voting does not imply the presence of election commission members and independent observers near the voter, which creates the ground for unauthorized persons to be present at the time of voting and their pressure on the will of the Internet voter or simply for the voter to sell his code and password to someone or forced. In the event of publication of each-week voting results, the Internet environment would turn for vote buyers even into a convenient tool for controlling purchases.

Thus, in the standard scheme, dishonesty of only some participants in the voting process leads to a direct distortion of its overall results. And even if in reality all the procedures were strictly followed and all the participants in the voting were crystal honest, the theoretical possibility of fraud, which is laid down in the standard scheme, and on the other hand, the inability to exhaustively verify the final results with the participation of ordinary voters, can undermine the consent in society and create in it parts of an unhealthy atmosphere of disbelief in the legitimacy of the election.

The closest solution (see patent RU 2178586) is the voting method, at the beginning of which the voter randomly receives a unique anonymous code, which he fixes together with his choice on two parts of the ballot, one of which he retains to control his vote when promulgating voting results. The disadvantage of this method is that the tear-off part of the ballot immediately shows how its holder voted, and this creates a convenient basis for the sale of votes, both voluntary and forced.

Disclosure of invention

The objective of the proposed method of voting is to reduce the distortion of the aggregate will of voters by ensuring that each voter can control the correctness of his vote without violating the principle of anonymity by providing voters with a document with which they can exercise such control, but no one except the owner has a certificate will be able to determine how this owner voted.

The indicated technical result in the secret voting method, including the receipt by each voter of a unique personal anonymous code and the publication of his per-day results after the polling day, is achieved by the fact that the voter votes openly, being in front of a computer accumulating the polling results, the screen of which is closed from prying eyes by a casing with narrow slit, or being at an isolated box office, inside which there is a cashier, a member of the precinct election commission, also accumulating podovy the results, moreover, the ticket office also has a gap through which, as with the electronic system, only the voter himself can see the voting process, and voters fix their choice by pointing with the computer mouse the desired item on the election menu screen or with a simple pointer for a similar menu laid out by the cashier on the table inside cash desks, and immediately after the voter votes, the computer or the cashier gives him a certificate, in the form of which the computer imprints, and the cashier enters the voter’s vote together with his code, if during the voting, the voter will try to put a video camera to the slot in order to shoot his choice for the subsequent sale of the vote, his voice will be canceled, and at the end of the voting, the lists of voting results will be published, the authenticity of which is controlled by the voters on the basis of their certificates, and also the lists of voters the accuracy of which is controlled by all voters. Knowing the code-by-vote results of previous voters, a computer or a cashier, in order to avoid buying and selling votes, records in the certificate not only the personal choice of the voter, but also the choice of several other unknown voters, and in all the certificate records the choice of so many voters, what is the number of choices, one per each option, therefore, the buyer of votes will not be able to determine from the certificate that the given voter did not vote as the buyer would like, since his personal identification codes are known We are only for the voters themselves.

The implementation of the invention

In practice, this method of voting is proposed to be implemented only at a polling station, and only polls are conducted on the Internet that are not so significant as to fear massive falsifications of their results and the sale and purchase of Internet votes.

Implementation is possible in two main versions: voting using an electronic system and voting without using computers.

A) Voting using an electronic system, which means the presence at the polling station of personal computers connected to a central database in which the voting results are recorded, as well as a printing device connected to those computers.

As with the usual system, a voter who arrives at the polling station presents identification documents, as well as an absentee ballot, if he is on a business trip, is marked and signed in the registration books. A registered voter does not gain access to one of the polling stations, but to a personal computer. The central database records how many voters voted at each polling station, although there is no record of how exactly voters voted in the polls. The precinct election commission is responsible for ensuring that the number of voters in its precinct recorded in the central database corresponds to the number of voters actually recorded in the registration journals and for which they are reporting. Therefore, near each computer on the site, one of the members of the commission monitors the voting, instructs voters and does not allow one voter to vote several times.

A portable computer with a printing device connected to the central database of the radio modem replaces the remote ballot box for voters at home and in remote inaccessible areas, while the voting procedure is no different from the procedure at a polling station.

The real danger that accompanies the usual way of filling out a ballot paper in an isolated booth is the voter’s attempt to film this procedure on a mobile phone camera, and then present this record as evidence to the “buyer of votes”. The proposed voting method allows to eliminate this danger as follows. The voting procedure is carried out not in isolated booths, but openly - in front of the precinct commission and observers, and is also filmed by a security camera. Secrecy is achieved by covering the computer screen with an opaque casing in the shape of a pyramid, at the top of which there is a narrow oblong peephole, through which you can only see the image on the screen during the voting procedure, and it is impossible for the observer outside to determine who voted for selector, for which the program specifically moves the mouse pointer to a randomly selected corner of the screen.

The voter’s attempt to bring the camera to the eye is recorded in the recording of the security camera on the precinct, and since this recording is a reporting document of the precinct commission, the commission members will have to intervene in a timely manner and annul the vote of that voter.

After the voter is seated at a table with a computer and looks into the peephole of the casing, a program is activated on the computer screen that cannot “know” which of the voters is currently voting, and allows this anonymous voter to make his choice, the result of which is printed and issued to the voter in the form of an official document-certificate, equipped with an electronic signature of the system, signatures of commission members and a seal. After that, the central database is supplemented by a new record consisting of two fields: 1) the choice made by the voter and 2) the unique identification code of this voter. This new entry, after a random number of minutes, but no more than 5-7 minutes, will be published on the Internet and the voter, at the exit from the polling station, will already be able to verify the compliance of the published results with those printed on the received certificate, if a special computer is provided for this section connected to the Internet.

The principle of operation of the interactive voting program is as follows.

Initially, with the direct participation of the voter, a unique identification code for this voter is generated on the screen. The uniqueness of the code is ensured by a sufficiently large number of its bits, as well as by checking the uniqueness by querying the central database. The code generation procedure excludes even the theoretical possibility that the generated code is not random and not selected by the voter himself, but artificially substituted by the program. The generation interface is as follows: a rectangle (matrix) appears on the screen, consisting of N (N - code digits) columns in which digits from 0 to 9 are "infinitely looped". The chains of numbers in the columns randomly drop or rise, each with its own speed. The system guarantees absolute randomness of the direction and speed of the movement of numbers, but the voter, not sure about this, can independently determine for each column the direction of movement of the chain of numbers and its speed. After that, at the moment determined by the voter himself, he clicks on the mouse button, the columns stop at their current position and one of the rows (for example, the one in the middle) of the resulting matrix is taken as the desired identification code. Despite the fact that each digit in the code thus obtained is determined by the voter himself, the voter is not able to make sure that the previously conceived digit falls into the previously conceived code category. Such an opportunity would create a prerequisite for the “sale of votes”, it is excluded by the fact that after clicking the mouse button the numbers in the columns do not stop immediately, but with a random delay of several seconds.

After the code generation procedure, this code remains on the screen, where a menu appears with the proposed voting options, and the voter votes by clicking on the desired option. Thus, in the general case, the entire procedure requires the voter to only double-click the mouse button.

In addition, in order to exclude the possibility of “buying and selling” votes, the program makes a request in advance to the central database, from which, from among the new entries not yet published on the Internet, several other people's entries are randomly selected, displayed on the screen and printed in the certificate for this voter . The number of entries reflected in the certificate is equal to the number of choices, one entry for each of the options. The voter, who received the printout, will only have to check the identity code, on the contrary to the choice made in the certificate, to the one displayed on the computer screen.

To simplify this check and to remember your code as soon as possible, instead of a long chain of decimal digits, the identification code can be just five pictograms representing a 5-bit number in the number system, which can run through 10 billion values at once. A hundred drawings-pictograms can be formed from easily distinguishable and recognizable silhouettes of animals and plants, tools, household items and emblems. Thus, a randomly dropped code can make the following five: 1) a star; 2) a hammer; 3) an elephant; 4) scissors; 5) an apple. Any illiterate voter will instantly remember such a code and easily recognize it in the certificate opposite to his choice.

After leaving the polling station, the voter can present the certificate to the “buyer of votes”, claiming that he made exactly the choice that the buyer needed, indicating the corresponding entry in the certificate. In fact, this record may not belong to this voter, but to some unknown person who voted somewhere in Kamchatka at about the same time, but it will be impossible to prove this, since only these two voters themselves know their identification codes. The impossibility of control will prevent all attempts to "buy and sell" the votes.

After the end of voting, the election commission members will not need to count the votes, but they will need to use the same computers that were used for voting to connect to another database containing a pre-formed complete list of voters of this polling station, access to which will be open only from a minute the end of voting in this polling station. Members of the commission who have personal passwords in the electronic voting system and are personally responsible for the accuracy of voter registration, in accordance with the registration logs, note in the central database all voters who voted on the polls. If necessary, an authorized member of the election commission, right after the electronic signature, can make the necessary additions and corrections to the electronic voter list.

It remains to clarify where the "alien" unpublished records will come from, which will fill out the certificates for the very first voters? This should not concern local election commissions, the electronic system will take care of everything, which will form in advance a minimum number of fictitious votes, equal for each candidate candidate, which will be printed in the presence of an independent commission and hidden in a sealed envelope. Fictitious entries will be published on the Internet in a timely manner as genuine. These fictitious entries will be announced, their number will be taken into account during the final vote count, this fact will be recorded and verified by an independent commission, after which the envelope with printouts will be destroyed and never, and no one except this commission will know which entries were fictitious .

The procedure for checking the voting results does not begin from the moment the polling stations are closed, but within a few minutes after the very first voter votes, when entries from two fields begin to be published on the Internet: 1) the choice made and 2) the identification code of the voter who made this choice. On the day of voting on the Internet and on television, it will be possible to monitor in real time how many votes are currently cast for each candidate, what percentage of votes they have overcome and other indicators. The task of ordinary voters will be to check whether their personal choice reflected in the certificate matches the one published on the Internet (this is control from the bottom up). The voter will be able to check this already at the polling station, if there is a computer connected to the Internet, and also later, if he has Internet access at home or at work, otherwise he may ask his relatives, neighbors or acquaintances to do this check who has such an opportunity. At the same time, the voter can check not only one, his own record in the certificate, but all the others, since all of them must be reliable. In case of inconsistencies, the certificate can be transferred to the interested election association to initiate a judicial investigation.

Top-down control is carried out through audits by various election associations, any groups of observers, public and human rights organizations. Upon their request, the CEC must transfer to their disposal on non-erasable certified CD-ROMs a copy of the database with the election-by-election results, as well as a copy of the database with a complete list of voters, both those who participated in the elections and those who did not vote, including their passport data, for verification independent software for published results of the vote count, as well as the correspondence of the code-based results in the database with those published on the Internet.

Since the check at the lower level, by ordinary voters, ensures the reliability of each-time results, which would distort the prosecution of the guilty persons, and an independent check eliminates the possibility of arithmetic errors when summing up the results, the only theoretical way to distort the voting results will remain as follows: 1) due to someone’s malicious intent, the number of voters participating in the vote is artificially inflated in the database by throwing nonexistent into the database their voters of "dead souls" or registration in the database as those who voted voters who did not actually vote; 2) the same number of falsified records are thrown into the database of code-based results.

This possibility is ruled out by publishing on the Internet information about those who took part in the vote for verification by ordinary voters. To do this, it is enough to publish a complete list of addresses of registration of voters indicating the number of voters who vote at each address. The total number of voters should be exactly equal to the number of entries in the database of each-time results, for which the CEC (Central Election Commission) and territorial commissions are responsible.

Thus, with proper control by ordinary voters, voting on the proposed method eliminates the possibility of imperceptible distortion of the voting results by anyone.

B) Voting without using computers

Upon arrival at the polling station, the voter registers, but instead of the ballot receives a pass to the "box office". The box office refers to the isolated premises occupied by the "cashier", which means the authorized member of the precinct election commission. The box office window is a narrow observation slit, a retractable pencil case and an opening into which the pointer is inserted, with the handle facing outward, or the like. Going to the box office window, the voter puts his pass into the pencil case and pushes it inside the box office. The voting process begins.

Having looked into the observation slit, directed from top to bottom, on the cashier's table, which is under the window inside the ticket office, the voter sees the cashier's table and hands, and the cashier cannot see and does not know which of the voters is voting. In front of the voter’s eyes, the cashier sets up on the table a pre-partyed pack of cards-numbers and asks the voter to point out one of the cards with a pointer. The cashier removes the selected card from the deck and puts it on the table so that the voter sees the number he has drawn. Then, the election menu is laid out on the table and the voter is invited to indicate with a pointer to the option for which he is voting. The observer from the outside will not be able to determine how the voter voted in the direction of movement of the pointer handle, because the cashier deliberately slightly changes the location of the menu on the table each time.

After that, the cashier fills in the certificate form, that is, writes the number by hand opposite the option chosen by the voter, but also fills in the remaining lines of the certificate, entering the numbers of voters who actually voted earlier for the corresponding options. If the number of choices is too large, the cashier may limit himself to filling out only a few lines of the certificate, but in any case, the number of the holder of the certificate should be entered. In addition, in this case, the cashier proposes to indicate with a pointer another option from the menu specifically for the voter report in front of the “buyer of votes” and fills in the ordered certificate line. After that, the cashier takes the voter’s number card lying on the table, checks the certificate, puts the card in the container corresponding to the chosen voting option, and issues a certificate certified by the cashier’s signature and seal through the drawer.

Thus, in this case, the isolated election ticket office replaces a computer whose screen is isolated from outside observers by a cover with a slot, a deck of card numbers replaces the identification code generator, the cashier acts as an interactive program and printer, and the pointer plays the role of a mouse.

As in the case of electronic voting, an attempt to capture the moment of voting on the camera should be stopped by the members of the election commission who are responsible for this and who monitor all the actions of the voter outside the box office, and it is impossible to determine by the certificate how the holder voted, which removes the danger of buying and selling votes. The exception is cases when the number of voters at the polling station is small, especially when the danger of full administrative control over all voters (for example, in military units) is not excluded, in which voters leaving the polling station immediately pass their certificates to the authorities, each vote is timed and analysis of the sequence of occurrence of numbers in certificates. In such situations, as in voting at home, the absence of an electronic system forces one to return to the old "ballot box - ballot box" scheme.

A precinct election commission operating on a precinct election scheme will have to take care of the minimum number of fictitious votes that will fit into the certificates of the very first voters. Already during the voting, one of the members of the precinct commission gradually fills out the precinct protocol, which indicates how each extended number voted. Another member of the commission gradually fills out a precinct list of voters during the election day, that is, a complete list of registration addresses for this precinct indicating the number of voters voting at each address. After the end of voting, the precinct protocol and list are finalized, certified and given to the printing house for replication. Printed in the form of newspaper sheets, district results are sent out to the site, hung out at the entrances of houses and in public places. In case of discrepancy between the published result and the one indicated in the certificate, this document is the basis to challenge the voting results.

In territorial (for example, city) newspapers, a table of the results of voting for each precinct is published, in the newspapers of the constituent entities of the federation, a table of the totals by territory, and in federal newspapers, a table of the totals of the federal constituencies. For each of these tables, it will be easy to check if there were any arithmetic errors when summing up the results. Thus, each ordinary voter after checking the correct inclusion of his personal vote in the precinct results can buy three newspapers - city, regional and federal and check:

1) the correct inclusion of the results for your site in the city results;

2) the correct inclusion of the results for your city in the regional results;

3) the correct inclusion of the results for its constituent entity in the federal results. So any voter will be able to conduct end-to-end control "from the bottom up."

Thus, a voting method is realized with control of one’s own voice even without the Internet and without using computers.

Claims (2)

1. The method of conducting secret voting at a polling station, which consists in registering a voter, giving the voter the opportunity to choose a unique personal identification code, and at the end of the voting, they will publish the voter's voting result, as well as his identification code, characterized in that the voting is carried out either with using an electronic system, while the voter selects his unique personal identification code and votes using a personal mouse a computer, which is designed to generate identification codes and to memorize each-time voting results, moreover, the personal computer screen is covered with an opaque casing, in which there is a narrow oblong peephole, through which only the voter himself can see the image on the screen, after voting, the voter is issued a certificate containing the voter's unique personal identification code, his choice, as well as the election of other voters and their identification codes, or voting is carried out without using an electronic system, while the voter selects his unique personal identification code and votes while being in an isolated room, the ticket office having a retractable pencil box, a window that is a narrow observation slit through which only the voter can see the voting process, and the hole in which the pointing device is inserted, through which the voter selects his unique personal identification code and votes, after voting, to the voter issue a certificate containing the voter's unique personal identification code, his choice, as well as the election of other voters and their identification codes, and this certificate allows the voter to verify the accuracy of the published voting results. 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the opaque casing, which covers the computer screen, is made in the form of a pyramid, and a narrow observing eye-slot is placed at the top of the pyramid.