JPH08273164A - Recording and reproducing device - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE: To detect a illegally duplicated disk by collating the physical position information of a medium by means of a physical arrangement information recorded in a recording medium and a position detecting means in a collating part. CONSTITUTION: This device is provided with a first physical information detecting means 38 for detecting a first physical feature information 532 cipered/recorded at the time of manufacturing an optical recording medium 2 from the information read out of an optical head 6 or a magnetic head 8 and a deciphering means 534 for deciphering the information 532. The device has a means 17a for measuring the physical feature of the optical recording medium 2 and obtaining a second physical feature information and a collating means 535 for collating the second physical feature information with the first physical feature information 532 and judging whether or not there is a specified relation between them. When the feature information has no relation to the physical feature information 532 by the collating means, this device has a control means for stopping the operation of a specified program read out of the optical recording medium 2, stopping for reading information from the optical recording medium 2 thereafter or stopping a prescribed processing of the information read out of the optical recording medium 2 by means of a signal processing means.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a recording / reproducing apparatus for recording or reproducing information on a recording medium.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art In recent years, applications of optical discs are expanding in various fields. Optical disks are divided into recordable RAM disks and non-recordable ROM disks.
RAM disk is 5 to 10 times as much as ROM disk
Double media manufacturing cost is high. Therefore, the ROM disk is mainly used for the purpose of distributing a large amount of information to a large number of people, for example, for the purpose of electronic publishing or for supplying music software or video software, which requires a low media cost. However, CDROM game machines and CDR
As the applications for interactive applications are widened as seen in OM built-in personal computers, ROM disks are also required to have RAM functions. Since there are few consumer applications that require a large RAM capacity, the emergence of a new concept medium that realizes the three conditions of small RAM function, large ROM function and low cost in interactive consumer applications is awaited. It was In addition, recently R such as CD
Unauthorized copies of OM discs have been around, causing serious damage to copyright holders. There is also a demand for a copy protection system for CDs and the like. In addition, a software distribution method in which a plurality of encrypted programs are put on a disk and unlocked by a password is becoming popular.
It is required to record a different ID number for each OM.

One method for realizing this concept is to provide a magnetic recording layer on the back surface of the ROM disk. The process of forming the recording layer in this case is one of the costs of the ROM disk.
Since it can be reduced to 1/0 or less, a partial RAM disk can be realized without increasing the cost of the ROM disk. CDRO without cartridge as one method
For ROM discs such as M, Japanese Patent Publication Nos. 56-163536, 57-6446, 57-21
2642, 2-179951, CDR
A method of providing an optical recording portion on the front surface of the OM and a magnetic recording portion on the back surface has already been proposed. Also, as shown in 60-70543, an optical recording section made of a non-magnetic material such as an optical disk using an Amosphas material is provided on the front surface, and a disk having a magnetic recording layer on the back surface is used. It is disclosed that a magnetic head is provided on the magnetic recording medium.

With respect to the anti-duplication method as well, it is said that the disc cannot be manufactured unless it has a special manufacturing apparatus by intentionally scratching or inserting a watermark or by making a special disc by a special process. Only the anti-duplication means using points was disclosed.

[0005]

However, these methods do not disclose any requirements necessary to realize them concretely by simply combining the magnetic recording section and the optical recording section. For example, a method of preventing mutual interference between the optical recording section and the magnetic recording section, a method of accessing a magnetic track with a simple configuration, a method of sharing a circuit, or a magnetic field of a medium used without a cartridge, which is important when realizing a device. It does not disclose a method of protecting recorded information from an external environment such as magnetism or wear, a method of compressing information recorded in a RAM area, a method of speeding up access, a specific physical format of a track, and the like.

Further, a method of mass-producing a medium important for realizing the medium at a low cost, a method of conforming the medium to the CD standard, and the like, that is, a method for concretely realizing a consumer partial RAM disk, is completely absent. It has not been disclosed in the conventional example. Therefore, the method disclosed heretofore has a big problem that it is difficult to practically put the medium and system usable for consumer use into practical use.

In the present invention, a ROM disk type partial RAM used without a cartridge such as a CD-ROM
It is an object of the present invention to provide a recording / reproducing device and a medium that realizes a disk and a system specifically for the above items.

Next, regarding the illegal duplication prevention method, the present invention does not use a special construction method conventionally proposed,
A second object is to realize a copy protection disk and device by changing the physical arrangement of addresses.

[0009]

In order to achieve this object, the recording / reproducing apparatus of the present invention is a recording medium comprising a transparent substrate and an optical recording layer, in which light is emitted from a light source by an optical head and the optical recording is performed from the transparent substrate side. A recording / reproducing apparatus for recording or reproducing a signal by forming an image on a layer has a position detecting means for detecting the position of the address information recorded on the medium or a pit depth, an encryption decrypting means, and a collating section. are doing.

[0010]

With this configuration, an illegally duplicated disc can be detected by collating the physical location information recorded on the recording medium with the physical location information of the medium by the collating unit by the position detecting means.

[0011]

【Example】

(Example 1) CDs and CDRs illegally copied in Example 1
A method for preventing illegal copying of programs from the OM or CD-ROM to a regular number of personal computers or more will be described. First, a detailed description will be given of a method of unlocking a specific program of an optical disk such as a CDROM in which a large number of programs each having a key such as Password are recorded. As shown in FIG. 59, since this CD adopts the disc copy protection system of the present invention, C
D cannot be duplicated. Further, in the optical mark portion 387 of the CD, an ID No. different for each disc. Is recorded. The optical sensor 386 including the light emitting unit 386a and the light receiving unit 386b reads the data, for example, data “204312001” and reads the key management table 404 in the memory of the CPU.
Disk ID No. Put in (OPT). This method is usually acceptable, but the optical mark may be copied to the printing machine by an unauthorized duplicator. In order to further enhance the anti-duplication effect, as described above, 4
A high Hc portion 401 having an extremely high Hc such as 000 Oe is provided, and the magnetic ID No. (Mag) Data "20
5162 ″ is magnetically recorded. Since this data can be reproduced by a normal magnetic head, it can be reproduced, and is put in the item of Disk ID No. (Mag) of the key management table 404.

As shown in the process diagram of the ID number of FIG. 8A, by using the magnetizing machine 540 shown in FIG. 9, the process of recording the ID number on the medium 2 can be completed within 1 second or less. The magnetizer 540 has a ring shape as shown in FIGS. 9A and 9B, and has a plurality of magnetized magnetic poles 542a as shown in FIGS.
To f, and coils 545a to 545 are wound respectively.
The current from the magnetizing current generator 543 is applied to the current direction switching device 5
By 44, an arbitrary current flows through the coils 545a to 545f, so that an arbitrary magnetization direction is obtained. FIG. 9D shows the case where the magnetization directions of the S, N, S, S, N, and S poles are set from the left. In this case, the magnetic recording layer 3 has arrows 51a, 5
Magnetic recording signals in the directions of 1b, 51c and 51d are recorded in an instant. Recording is possible even with a magnetic material having a high Hc of 4000 Oe. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 8A, the CD in which the ID is recorded at the same time is compared with the conventional process chart 8B.
Can be produced.

In the method of magnetically recording the ID number while rotating the medium 2 using the magnetic head, it takes several seconds including the medium rotation start-up, several rotations, and rotation stop. Therefore, C, which allows only a process time of about 1 second,
There is a problem that it is difficult to introduce it into the mass production process of D without changing the flow of the process.

As shown in the process diagram of the ID number of FIG. 8A, by using the magnetizing machine 540 shown in FIG. 9, the process of recording the ID number on the medium 2 can be completed within 1 second.
It is more suitable for high throughput processes. The recording operation of the magnetizer 540 will be described with reference to FIGS.
9 (c) and 9 (d), each of which has a plurality of magnetized magnetic poles 542a-f, and each of which has a coil 545a-
f is wound. As for the current from the magnetizing current generator 543, an arbitrary current flows through the coils 545a to 545a by the current direction switch 544, so that an arbitrary magnetization direction can be obtained. FIG. 9D shows the case where the magnetization directions of the S, N, S, S, N, and S poles are set from the left. In this case, in the magnetic recording layer 3, magnetic recording signals in the directions of the arrows 51a, 51b, 51c, 51d are recorded on a specific track in an instant, for example, in several ms. In the case of a magnetizing machine, a large current can be flowed, so recording can be performed even with a magnetic material having a high Hc of 4000 Oe. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 8A, the ID can be recorded in the same working time as that of the other steps in the conventional process chart of FIG. 8B, so that the CD can be produced without changing the flow of the process. . Moreover, when the magnetizer 540 is used, since the ID number can be magnetically recorded without rotating the medium 2, the throughput of the process can be shortened and the medium is not rotated.
As shown in the process diagram of FIG. 8A, even if printing is performed in the printing process after recording the ID number, there is an effect that printing can be performed accurately at a predetermined angle.

At present, a magnetic head capable of recording on a magnetic recording layer having Hc of about 2700 Oe is commercially available. Therefore, H
A problem that the ID number is falsified when c is low can be assumed. In order to solve this problem, the magnetizer 540 of the present invention generates a strong magnetic field, so that the ID number can be recorded even in the magnetic recording layer 3 having a high Hc such as Hc = 4000 Oe. When the high Hc magnetic recording layer 3 is used for a specific track to record an ID number, the ID number of this medium cannot be rewritten, that is, cannot be tampered with by a magnetic head 8 that is normally available. This has the effect of improving security.

Further, in the present invention, as shown in FIG. 10, the mixer 547 outputs the data of the physical arrangement table 532 of the disk and the signal of the generator 546 of the unique ID number to the mixer 547.
If there is no separation key, they are mixed so that they are difficult to separate, and the mixed signal is sent together with the separation key 548 to the encryption device 537 to be the code 538, which is recorded on the magnetic recording track 67 after the molding process or the optical recording track in the master forming process. Record at 65. On the recording / reproducing apparatus 1 side, the cipher decoder 543 deciphers the cipher, and the separator key 549 separates the ID number 550 and the disk physical layout table 532 by the separation key by the separation key. The disk check method checks an illegal disk and stops the operation of the illegal disk.

In the case of the system of FIG. 10, the magnetic recording track 6
The unique ID number generator 546 encrypts the mixed signal of the ID number and the disk physical layout table, so that the code 538 recorded in No. 7 is different for each disk. As a matter of course, since this disc uses the illegal duplication prevention system of the present invention, an illegal duplication trader can purchase a CD.
Unauthorized duplication of the optical recording part of. For this reason, an unauthorized user can only tamper with the ID number. By finding a disc of the same master disc as the disc for which the password is known and recording the same cipher in the magnetic recording unit, it is possible to illegally use by using this password. When the encryption of the disk physical layout table and the encryption of the ID number are recorded separately, the encryption of the same physical layout table is recorded on the magnetic recording layers of all the disks of the same master, and by reading this code, the disks of the same master can be read. Therefore, there is a problem in that the encryption of the ID number is rewritten with the encryption of the ID number for which the password is known, so that the password is illegally used. However, in the method of FIG. 10, there are a plurality of different masters for one disk, and since the encryption is completely different for each disk, it is confirmed that two disks are the same master. You can't just check it.

First, the principle of making it difficult to find a disk made from the same master disk from the first cipher will be described.
Although a large amount of the first physical characteristic information of the master can be detected, there is a limit to the capacity that can be recorded on the disc 2. Further, even if a large amount of the first physical characteristic information is recorded, the encryption / decryption requires a processing time. Since the time allowed for the decryption time is about 1 second, the data amount of the first cipher is limited. From this fact, a part of information is realistically selected from the obtained first physical characteristic information to obtain the first physical characteristic information of each disk. That is, the first physical characteristic information may be selected from a large number of selection values. In this description, this selected value is shown in FIG.
It is changed for each disc by the physical information selection unit 532a of 0. As a result, even in the case of discs made from the same master disc, the first physical characteristic information differs from disc to disc in the present invention, and naturally the first cipher also differs.

As described above, usually several masters are created for one software, and the first physical characteristic information of each master is different. From the above, the probability that a disc with the same first encryption exists will be extremely low, and therefore it will not be possible to find a disc created from the same master by simply obtaining the data of the first encryption. In order to find out, it is necessary to actually measure the physical characteristic information of many discs. For this reason, it becomes difficult for a general user level to find a disc of the same master.

Next, in the present invention, as described with reference to FIG. 10, different IDs and the first physical characteristic information for each disk are collectively encrypted. Therefore, even if you obtain a disk whose decryption password is known and replace this first cipher with the first cipher of another disk, the first physical feature information, that is, if the master is not the same, the pirated copy protection program stops the operation. , Does not work at all. With the method of FIG. 10, it is difficult to find a disc created from the same master, so that a general user cannot substantially tamper with the ID itself, and it is possible to prevent unauthorized use by a general user.

There is no choice but to read the information in the disk physical layout table 532 of the disk over the entire area of one disk and check whether it is the same master disk. Checking all data such as address, angle, tracking, pit depth, and error rate requires a large-scale device and confirmation time. Therefore, it becomes difficult for an illegal duplication trader to find a disc having the same original disc as a disc such as a CD whose password is known, which makes it difficult for the illegal duplication trader to falsify the ID number.

A specific procedure will be described here with reference to the flowchart of FIG. In step 405, the program No. When the N start command is received, it is read at step 405a whether the key information of the program is recorded on the magnetic track. At this time, a recording current is passed through the magnetic head to erase this data. If the disc is legitimate, the key information cannot be erased because Hc is high. If the disc is an unauthorized disc, Hc is low and the key information is lost. Next, in step 405b, it is checked whether or not there is key data, that is, Password, and N
If it is o, in step 405c the user is informed of the key input command as shown in the screen view of FIG. 81, in step 405d the user inputs "123456", for example, and in step 405
If it is "No", check step 405.
Stop at f and display "Incorrect key or duplicate disk" on the screen. If Yes, proceed to step 405g to program No. The key data for opening N is recorded on the magnetic track of the recording medium 2, and step 405i is skipped.

Returning to step 405b, if Yes, in step 405h the program number. Read the key data of N,
In step 405i, the disc ID (OPT) of the optical recording layer
Read the disk ID (Mag) recorded in the magnetic recording layer in step 405j, and
Check if it is correct with 05k. If No, step 4
At 05m, "It is a duplicate disk" is displayed and it stops. Ye
If s, in step 405n the key data and disk ID (O
Decryption operation of PT) and disk ID (Mag) is performed to check whether the data is correct. Check at step 405p, if No, an error is displayed at step 405q, and if Yes, at step 405s the program No. is displayed. N
Start using.

When this system of the present invention is used, 120 CD-compressed songs can be inserted in a CD, and several hundred titles can be inserted in a game software so that only 12 CDs or one game can be heard first. Then, you can sell it at a price commensurate with the copyright fee for 12 songs or 1 game. Then, after the user pays the fee, the software company makes the disc ID No. By notifying the key corresponding to, the software such as the additional music or the additional game can be used as shown in FIG. In this case, by adopting the voice decompression block 407, it is possible to enter up to 120 pieces of music software, because it is 370 minutes, which is five times as long as that of a CD.
It can be stored on a CD and you can listen to your favorite songs by unlocking the keys. Since the key data is recorded when the key is released once, there is an effect that it is not necessary to insert the key every time. The same effect can be obtained by using an electronic dictionary or a photo CD general program in addition to the music CD and the game CD. In addition, in order to reduce the cost, I of the high Hc portion 401
DNo. May be omitted.

Next, a method for preventing duplication of the CD itself will be described. CDs are currently being illegally duplicated in various forms, and there is a need for a method of preventing duplication. Unauthorized copying cannot be prevented only by software such as encryption. In the present invention, a method of preventing duplication by using a CD pit arrangement and an encryption method will be described.

As shown in the block diagram of the mastering device in FIG. 1, a mastering device 529 for producing a master of a CLV type optical disk such as a CD has a linear velocity control section 26a, and in the case of a CD, it is 1.2 m / s to 1 While maintaining the linear velocity within the range of 0.4 m / s, the optical head 6 allows the disk 2
A latent image of a pit is recorded on the upper photoconductor by exposure with a light beam. In the case of a CD, the tracking circuit 24 increases the radius r at a pitch of about 1.6 μm per rotation, so that the pits are recorded in a spiral shape. In this way, the data is spirally recorded on the master as shown in FIG. CA like Videodisk
In the case of a V optical disc, the original disc is played,
A master can be created by perfectly interlocking this rotation and rotation control. Therefore, a third party may
, The mastering device 529 can easily produce a master disc of an optical disc having exactly the same pit pattern as that of the CAV optical disc manufactured in a regular manner. CAV
In the case of 1, the difference between the bit patterns of the normally manufactured master and the illegally manufactured master is kept within several μm. For this reason, it is not possible to distinguish from an illegally created optical disk that is properly created by the conventional method from the physical arrangement of the pit pattern.

On the other hand, in the case of a CLV optical disk such as a CD-ROM, the spiral recording is performed on the master at a constant linear velocity set at the beginning within the range of 1.2 to 1.4 m / s. In the case of CAV, the number of data recorded in one round is always constant, but in the case of CLV, by changing the linear velocity,
The number of data in one round changes. When the linear velocity is slow, Fig. 3
The data layout 530a is as shown in FIG. 3A, and the data layout 530b is as shown in FIG. 3B when the linear velocity is high. In this way, in a normal mastering device, a regular CD
It can be seen that the data arrangement 530 is different in the illegally copied CD. In a commercially available mastering device for CD, the linear velocity can be set with high accuracy of 0.001 m / s. And the master is made at a constant linear velocity,
Even when a CD master of 74 minutes is created at a linear velocity of 1.2 m / s with this high accuracy, an error of 11.783 laps occurs when the error is shifted to the plus side in the outermost track. In other words, compared with the ideal master, the outermost circumference is 11.783 laps x 36
A master having a data arrangement 530b having an angle error of 0 degree is formed. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B, the data arrangement 530, that is, the address 323 of each A _{1 to} A ₂₆ .
a to x are different between the regular CD and the illegally copied CD. For example, when the arrangement zone 531 of Z _{1 to} Z ₄ is defined by dividing into _four , the arrangement zone 531 of the address 323 of A _{1 to} A ₂₆ is different. Therefore, the correspondence table of the arrangement zones 531 of the two CDs and the address 323, that is, the physical position table 5
When 32 is created, as shown in FIGS. 3A and 3B, it can be seen that the physical position tables 532a and 532 are different between the regular CD and the illegally copied CD. By utilizing this difference, it is possible to discriminate an illegally copied CD from a legitimate CD.

However, even if a CD that is difficult to physically copy is simply made, the effect is weak if the method of checking a regular CD as a regular CD is easily tampered with. As shown in FIG. 5, according to the present invention, the physical position table 532 is created during the manufacture of the CD master or after the master manufacture is completed. This physical arrangement table 532 is encrypted by the encryption means 537 using a one-way function such as an RSA public encryption key method, and recorded on the optical ROM section 65 of the CD medium 2 or the magnetic recording track 67 of the CD medium 2a. To do.

Next, on the drive side, the CD medium 2 or 2
The encrypted signal 538b is reproduced from a and the physical arrangement table 532 is restored by using the decryption program 534 reproduced from the optical recording unit of the CD. Similarly, using the disc check program 533a reproduced from the CD, the actual CD
The disk rotation angle information 335 for the address 38a is obtained from the above-described rotation pulse signal or index from the FG and collated with the data in the physical arrangement table 532.
If OK, START, if NO, illegally copied CD
Then, the operation of the software program and the reproduction of the music software are stopped. In the illegally copied CD shown in FIG. 3B, the physical position table 532b is different from the regular one, and is rejected. The illegally copied CD will not operate unless the encryption encoding program 537 can be decoded. Therefore, even if the encrypted signal is copied, it is rejected. Thus, there is a great effect that the reproduction of the illegally copied CD can be almost completely prevented.

If an illegal duplication company can take measures against the CD drive of the present invention, the following three can be considered.

1. Make a master disc of a CLV disc with exactly the same pit pattern. 2. The encryption encoding program of secrefkey in FIG.
Decode from 34. 3. All the programs in the CD-ROM are analyzed, and the encryption decoding program 534 and the disk check program 533a are replaced by the program modification. The third method out of the above is meaningless because it takes time to decode the program and modify the program, that is, a high cost, so that the profit of the CD duplication is reduced. Further, in the case of the present invention, since the encryption decoding program 534 and the disk check program 533a are placed not on the drive side but on the medium side, the CD-
It can be changed for each ROM title and each press. Therefore, investment of program decryption and encryption decryption is required for each title, which has the effect of deteriorating the profitability of an illegal duplication trader and economically preventing duplication.

In the second method, the present invention uses a one-way function such as the public encryption key method such as the RSA method shown in FIG. For example, the arithmetic expression C = E (M) =
It can be used M ^e _{m od} n. Therefore, the CD-RO
Even if the cryptographic decoding program, that is, one of the keys is open to the public on M, the cryptographic encoding program 537 of the other key cannot be decrypted because it takes 1 billion years, for example. However, the information of the encryption encoding program 537 may leak. However, in the method of FIG. 5, the encryption decoding program 534 is provided not on the drive side but on the medium side. Therefore, even if it should leak out, it is possible to easily restore the copy protection again by changing both encryption program pairs at the time of leaking.

Finally, the CLV master having the exact same pit pattern as in the first method is used to detect the rotation angle with high precision although the current CLV mastering device 529 outputs a rotation signal of 1 pulse per rotation. However, it is difficult because it has no control mechanism. However, by reading the rotation angle information and the recording signal of the copy source CD and synchronizing the rotation pulse at the time of copying, it is possible to draw a similar pit pattern with a certain degree of positional accuracy although it is not accurate. However, this is true only when the original CD is recorded at the same linear velocity.

The mastering device 529 of the present invention is shown in FIG.
The CLV modulation signal generators 10a to CLV modulation signals are generated and sent to the linear velocity modulator 26a in some cases and to the time axis modulator 37a of the optical recording circuit 37 in some cases to perform CLV modulation. Has a linear velocity modulator 26a,
As shown in FIG. 2A, the linear velocity is 1.2 within the range of the CD standard.
Modulation is randomly applied from m / s to 1.4 m / s. This means that the linear velocity is kept constant and the time axis modulator 37a
The same can be achieved by modulating the signal. In this case, there is no need to modify the device. It is difficult to detect this linear velocity modulation from the copy source CD with high accuracy. Since it is recorded randomly without control, it cannot be duplicated even with the mastering device that made the master. Each time it becomes a different master. Therefore, it is almost impossible to completely reproduce the CD containing the linear velocity modulation of the present invention. However, since the linear velocity of the CD is within the standard range of 1.2 to 1.4 m / s, the data can be normally reproduced by the normal CD-ROM player currently on the market.

Next, as shown in FIG. 2B, when the same data is recorded on a specific optical track 65a at a constant linear velocity of 1.2 m / a, the starting point is S, and the end point A1 at which the data recording is completed. Let's assume that is at 360 °. In this case, as shown in FIG. 2C, 1.2 m / s per rotation.
To 1.4 m / s, the address A
The physical position 539a of 3 is a physical position 539b displaced by 30 °.
Come. When the speed is increased by 1/2 rotation, the physical position 539c is displaced by 45 °. In other words, a maximum of 4 per lap
The position can be changed by 5 °. Since a normal CLV mastering device generates a rotation pulse only once per revolution, this error is accumulated and a positional deviation of 90 ° occurs until two rotations are made. In the future, even if the illegal copying company controls the rotation, the linear velocity modulation of the present invention causes a positional deviation of 90 ° between the regular master and the illegal master. An unauthorized copy CD can be detected by detecting this positional shift. It can be seen that the positional resolution detection resolution may be 90 degrees or less. Therefore, the linear velocity is 1.2-1.4m
When changing in the range of / s, an illegal CD is detected by setting at least four 90 ° divided zones of Z ₁ , Z ₂ , Z ₃ , and Z ₄ as shown in FIGS. 3 (a) and 3 (b). it can. It can be said that the angle division of 4 division abnormal is effective.

Of course, if a new mastering device for CLV with extremely high accuracy is newly developed, it is possible for an illegal duplication trader to create the exact same bit pattern. However, such a device can be developed by only a few companies in the world, and it is a function that is not necessary for normal use. By limiting the shipment of such a mastering device for copyright protection, unauthorized copying is completely prevented.

Next, the rotation angle sensor 17a shown in FIG.
Address information of input data in the mastering device
32a and the position information 32b of the rotation angle from the motor 17
Create a physical position table 532 from the
It is encrypted by 537, and the master 2 is recorded by the optical recording circuit 37.
Record on the outer circumference. As a result, the disk of FIG.
Encrypted physical location table on optical track 65
The file 532 can be recorded when the master is created. Therefore
This disc is a normal CD without a magnetic head
It can also be played on a ROM drive. However, in this case
5, the disk rotation angle sensor in the drive as shown in FIG.
-335 needs to be provided. This detection means is an address
323 relative position and if it can detect the 90 ° zone
Because it ’s good, be sure to use a complicated sensor such as an angle sensor.
There is no need to use it. Figure 4 shows the relative position detection method.
Describe. For example, as shown in Fig. 4 (a),
The index signal of the optical sensor
Occurs once per roll. As shown in Fig. 4 (b),
By dividing the time, in the case of 6-division zone, the signal level
Oki Time Slot Z₁~ Z₆Is determined. On the other hand, the playback signal
The address signals 323a and 32
3b is obtained. Signal position signal to address A ₁Is zo
Z₁At address A₂Is zone Z₃To be in
You can get out.

In this case, if the rotation signal or the Zone signal is recorded in the sub code, the structure is certainly simple,
Since this data can be copied exactly, there is no copy protection effect. Therefore, the method of providing a means for detecting the rotation angle other than the optical recording portion as in the present invention has a high anti-duplication effect.

Returning to FIG. 6, in the recording / reproducing apparatus 1, the signal is reproduced by the optical reproducing circuit 38, and if the optical track has the physical arrangement table 532, the process proceeds from step 471b to steps 471d and 471e in the flowchart of FIG. . If No in step 471b, it is checked in step 471c whether or not there is encrypted data in the magnetic recording unit 67. If No, the process proceeds to step 471r to permit activation. If Yes, the process proceeds to steps 471d and 471e, the cipher data is reproduced, the cipher decoding program of the cipher decoder 534 recorded in the ROM or the disk of the drive is activated, the cipher is deciphered, and in step 471f, the physical arrangement table 532, that is, An: Zn. Create a zone address correspondence table of. In step 471w, it is checked whether or not there is a disc check program in the medium. If No, the process proceeds to step 471p, and if Yes, the disc check program recorded in the disc is started in step 471g. In the disk check program of step 471f, first, n = 0 is set in step 471h, and n is set in step 471i.
= N + 1, and at step 471j, the address An of the disk 2 is searched and reproduced on the drive side. At step 471k, the above-mentioned address position detecting means 335 detects the position information Z'n and outputs it. In step 471m, Z'n = Zn is checked, and if No, it is determined in step 471u that the CD is an illegal copy CD, the display of "illegal copy CD" is displayed on the display unit 16, and STOP is performed in step 471s. If step 471m is Yes, step 471n
Check n = last, and if No, step 471i
If Yes, go to Step 471p. In step 471p, it is checked whether or not there is a disk check program in the ROM or RAM on the drive side. If No, the software is started in step 471r. In the case of Yes, the disk check program is run in step 471q. The contents are exactly the same as in step 471t. In No, it progresses to steps 471u and 471s.
In the case of Yes, the reproduction of the software in the disc is started in step 471r.

In the currently produced CD player, when a disc whose linear velocity is changed between 1.2 and 1.4 m / s is reproduced, the original signal can be reproduced without any problem. On the other hand, the mastering device can perform cutting with a very strict linear velocity accuracy of 0.001 m / s or more. Therefore, as a standard for the mastering device, linear velocity = ± 0.
The CD standard of 01 m / s is provided. This CD
When the standard is followed, as shown in FIGS. 11A and 11B, it is possible to increase the linear velocity from 1.20 m / s to 1.22 m / s within the standard. In this case, FIG.
(C) As shown in (d), 5.
The physical layout of the angle of the same address is 53 for the angle of 9 degrees.
Shift from 9a to 539b. As shown in FIG. 13, if a rotation angle sensor 335 for detecting the angle shift of 5.9 degrees is provided on the recording / reproducing apparatus side, this physical arrangement difference can be discriminated. In the case of a CD, the rotation angle sensor 335 divides the image into 6 ° resolution, that is, one rotation 1/60 or more.
You should have.

The structure of the rotation angle sensor 355 is shown in FIG.
6 is a block diagram of the recording / reproducing apparatus. The pulse output from the rotation angle sensor 17a such as the FG of the motor 17 is time-divided by the time division circuit 553a in the angular position detection unit 553 in the disk physical arrangement detection unit 556 to rotate once per rotation. Even if only a pulse signal can be obtained, for example, when a time accuracy of ± 5% is obtained, 20 divisions can be performed, so that an angular resolution of about 18 ° can be obtained. This operation has been described with reference to FIGS. 4 (a) (b) (c). In the case of a CD, since there is an eccentricity of ± 200 μm, an angle measurement error occurs due to the eccentricity. In the case of a CD standard disc, an eccentricity causes an angle measurement error of 0.8 degrees at maximum in PP. Therefore, if the angle measurement resolution of 1 ° is required, the measurement cannot be performed. In order to avoid this, if a highly accurate angular resolution is required, the angular position detection unit 5 of FIG.
53 is provided with an eccentricity detection unit 553c to detect the eccentricity,
The eccentricity correction unit 553b performs a correction calculation to correct the influence of eccentricity. A method of detecting the amount of eccentricity and calculating a correction value will be described. As shown in FIG. 19A, when there is no eccentricity, three points A, B, and C on the same radius of the disk have a true disk center 557 at the center of the triangle when θa = θb = θc. is there. Actually, as shown in FIG. 19B, an eccentricity 559 occurs due to the eccentricity of the disk and the disc mounting deviation. As shown in FIG. 19B, by detecting the relative angle of the three addresses A, B, and C by the angle sensor 353, the discrepancy L'a between the disc rotation center 558 and the true disc center 557 is L'a as shown
= F (θa, θb, θc). The eccentricity correction unit 553b corrects and calculates the rotation angle signal of the rotation angle sensor 17a by using the calculated eccentricity amount, so that the influence due to the eccentricity can be corrected and the angular resolution is improved to 1 ° or less. The effect of doing
The accuracy of detecting illegal disks can be improved.

When the angular position is detected with a low resolution of about 6 ° as described above, strictness is required for the result of discriminating between an illegal disc and a legitimate disc. In particular, it is absolutely necessary to avoid that a legitimate disk is judged to be illegal because it causes a great deal of damage to legitimate users. Therefore, as shown in steps 551t, 551u, and 551v of the flowchart in FIG. 14, an address that is determined to be incorrect is accessed twice or more times, reproduced, and checked to avoid erroneous determination. Figure 7 shows the basic flowchart.
Since it is omitted, the additional step will be described. If it is determined in step 551r that the value is not within the allowable value, the address An is re-accessed multiple times in step 551t, and the zone number indicating the relative angle with respect to An in step 551u. Z'n is detected, and it is checked a plurality of times whether it is within the allowable value at step 551v. If Yes, it is regarded as a regular disk, and the process proceeds to step 551s. If No, it is regarded as an illegal disk, the process proceeds to steps 471u and 471s, and the program is not operated.

As another method for preventing erroneous judgment, the accuracy of judgment is improved by adding statistical processing. As shown in FIG. 12A, graph 1 shows the frequency distributions of the read angle-address, angle-tracking direction, address-tracking direction, angle-pit depth, and address-pit depth on a regular master. Therefore, when specific data is selected and reproduced by the player as shown in Graph 2, the data of the sample address that is easy to discriminate is selected.
Then, the disc molded as shown in FIG. 12 (b) is reproduced, and a signal portion out of the allowable value is found as shown in black in Graph 3, and an abnormal value out of the allowable value is shown in Graph 4. From the list. Although the frequency distribution of the angle-address arrangement is shown in the figure, the same effect can be obtained with the distribution of the pit depth and the distribution of the address-tracking amount. In this way, it is possible to eliminate from the list the copy protection signal portion that is difficult to discriminate, that is, is easily determined to be an error. By re-accessing the address determined to be illegal twice or more, the error probability is further reduced.

On the other hand, in the case of an illegally duplicated master, as shown in FIG. 12C, since the master is read by reading the address of the molded disk, there is a certain probability as shown in Graph 5. CP distributed in the range (copy protection)
A signal is generated. In this case, since the physical disk layout table cannot be tampered with as described above, the data selection operation as shown in graph (2) cannot be performed. Therefore, the physical layout destination of the unauthorized master has data that is very close to the allowable value limit or CP signal that exceeds the allowable value. As shown in FIG. 12D, an error due to molding variation is further added to the optical disk molded and pressed from such an unauthorized master.
The distribution is as shown in the graph 6, and the physical arrangement signal 552b exceeding the allowable value is created as shown by the blackened portion. Since the physical layout signal 552b peculiar to this illegal disk is detected by the disk check program, the operation of the program is stopped and the use of the copy disk is prevented. Thus, the angle-address CP (COPY
The distribution of the (PROTECT) signal is
Disperses within a small range. On the other hand, in the case of the pit depth shown in FIG. 17 (b), the depth significantly changes depending on the cutting and molding conditions, and it is extremely difficult to precisely control this. Fractionation is greatly reduced. Therefore, at the pit depth, strong copy protection can be applied.

Now, the reproduction apparatus for detecting the frequency distribution of the physical arrangement of the discs in FIG. 12 to prevent copy and the flow chart will be described. As shown in FIGS. 13 and 16, the recording / reproducing apparatus 1 has a disc physical arrangement detection unit 556, in which three detection units of an angular position detection unit 553, a tracking displacement detection unit 554, and a pit depth detection unit 555 are provided. There is angular position information Z'n, tracking displacement T '
n and the pit depth D'n are detected and a detection signal is output. By confirming the temporal coincidence with the signal A'n of the address detection unit 557, A'n-Z'n, A'n-T'n,
A'n-D'n, Z'n-T'n, Z'n-D'n,
Corresponding data of T'n-D'n, is obtained. By collating this data with An, Zn, Tn, and Dn of the regular reference disk physical layout table 532 decrypted by the encryption decoder 534 in the collating unit 535, if the disc is not a regular disc, the output / operation stopping unit 536 causes The operation of the program can be stopped.

Next, a flow chart for reducing the erroneous determination of the disc discrimination by using the statistical method will be described. The description of the same parts as those in FIG. 7 of the flowchart of FIG. 14 is omitted, and attention is paid to the distribution frequencies shown in graphs 1 to 6 of the disk physical arrangement data in FIG. To do. First, the disk check program 471t
In step 551w CP (COPY P
ROTECT) Decryption program, that is, whether the first cipher decoder 534a having the one-way function operation unit 534c for deciphering the reference physical arrangement table 532 in the cipher decoder 534 of FIG. In other words, check points are provided everywhere in the disk check program and the application program to check whether or not the code has been tampered with illegally and illegally decrypted by an illegitimate cryptographic decoder. If Yes, the operation is stopped. This can prevent an illegal duplication trader from replacing the first encryption decoder 534a with an unauthorized encryption decoder.
This has the effect of increasing the security level of encryption and strengthening copy protection. Next, step 551f will be described. In this step, in the case of an angular position, the position of the specific address is measured, and the distribution state of the deviation amount with respect to the reference angle of the reference physical layout table 532 of the zone number is measured. If m = 0 is defined as no deviation, and m = ± n is defined as a case where n number of zones are displaced, m = −1 is set in step 551g and step 5 is set.
At 51h, m = m + 1 is set, and it is checked whether the angular zone Z'n measured at step 551i is misaligned by m, and No.
If so, return to step 551h, and if Yes, step 55
1j is added to the deviation distribution list of Z'n, and the deviation amount distribution table is created one after another. If last in step 551k, the process proceeds to next step 471n, and if no, step 55
Return to 1h. Thus, the angular position of the specific address shown in FIG. 16, the tracking displacement, the pit depth and the angle /
The distribution state of the deviation from the address position and the reference is measured.

Step 551m in the disc check program 471t is a legitimacy determination program, which is based on the reference value of the angular arrangement Z'n of the address n which is encrypted and recorded in the magnetic layer or the optical recording layer in step 551n. The maximum permissible value Pn (m) for the shift amount m is read and encrypted, and the shift distribution table 556a shown in FIG. 18 and the reference physical layout table created by the physical position shift distribution measuring program in step 551f described above are created. 532a is checked to determine the authenticity of the disc. First, step 551p
And m = m + 1 in step 551q, and it is checked in step 551r whether it is within the allowable value range. Z'n
It is checked whether it is within the allowable value range by checking whether the number of is smaller than Pn (m) in FIG. If No, the process proceeds to the above step 551f, the address is accessed again, if not, it is determined to be illegal, and if OK, step 551s
Go to. If step 551r is Yes, step 551
Go to s. If m is the last, proceed to step 471p, N
If it is o, the process returns to step 551q. Thus Z'n Zn
By measuring the distribution of the deviation with respect to, a statistical process is performed to determine that the disk is a normal disk if it is within the allowable value and an illegal disk if it is outside the allowable value range. As a result, there is an effect that the probability of erroneously determining a legitimate disk as an illegal disk and vice versa decreases.

Also, in the flowchart of FIG. 14, in step 551a, the random extractor 582 such as the random number generator 583 as shown in FIG. 16 sends a partial selection signal to the encryption decoder 534 and the magnetic reproducing circuit 30 to encrypt. The selected magnetic tracks or optical tracks of all recorded tracks are selected for access and reproduced. As a result, one copy of the total number of encrypted data,
For example, there is an effect that the mechanical access time is shortened and the copy check time is shortened because it is sufficient to access about 100 of 10,000 pieces. Also random extractor 582
Sends a selection signal to the cipher decoder 534 to decipher a part of the reproduced cipher data. For example 51
In the case of 2-bit one-way function encryption, 3 is required for decryption.
Even a 2-bit microcomputer requires a fraction of a second. But,
Adopting this partial selection method has the effect of shortening the decryption time. Since the random number generator 584 disc-checks different sample data each time by the minimum required sample amount each time, for example, even in a system in which only 100 sample points out of 10000 sample points are checked each time, the final value is 10000. You will check the sample points. Therefore, it is necessary for the duplication company to duplicate the physical arrangement of all 10,000 sample points in the same shape as the reference disk. Since it is difficult to duplicate the angle, tracking amount, and pit depth of all sample points, the anti-duplication effect is high. By adding the random extractor 582, the disk check time can be significantly shortened without deteriorating the high copy protection effect.

Now, returning to the drawings of the recording / reproducing apparatus of FIGS. 13 and 16, description will be made. The angular position detector 55 described above is included in the disk physical arrangement detector of the recording / reproducing apparatus 1 of FIG.
In addition to 3, there are two detection units, a tracking amount detection unit 554 and a pit depth detection unit 555. First, the tracking amount detection unit 554 includes the tracking control unit 24 of the optical head 6.
Receiving the tracking amount Tn of the address n from the tracking amount sensor 24a such as a tracking error detection circuit capable of measuring the wobbling of the other, and detecting the tracking amount and other A'n, Z'n, D'n and the like. The time coincidence with the signal is measured and output as T′n to the matching unit 535. This principle will be described with reference to FIGS. 20 (a) and 20 (b). The physical position 539a at the address A _{1 in} the regular disk of FIG. 20 (a) has been subjected to modulation in the tracking direction such as wobbling at the time of creating the master. Therefore, tracking is shifted in the outer peripheral direction. If this is defined as T ₁ = + 1, then T ₂ = −1 at the physical location 539b of address A ₂ . Since this information can be discriminated at the time of making the master or after making the master, the reference physical layout table 532 is created, encrypted and recorded in the medium 2.

Next, in the illegally copied medium 2 shown in FIG. 20 (b), the normal tracking displacement is not added. Even if the tracking displacement is added, the tracking displacements T ′ ₁ and T ′ ₂ of the addresses A ₁ and A ₂ in the same angle zone Z ₁ become, for example, O ₁ +1 as shown in FIG. The layout table 556 is different from the standard physical layout table 532 for regular disks. Therefore, the collating unit 535 of the disk check unit 533 of FIG. 16 detects the output of the program by the output / operation stopping unit 536, the operation of the program, or the decryption of the application program by the second cipher decoder 534b is stopped, A display indicating “illegal copy disk” is output to the display unit 16. In the case of FIG. 16, since the disk check program itself is encrypted by the second encryption decoder 534b, it is difficult to tamper with the disk check program 533, and the illegal copy prevention effect can be enhanced.

Next, the pit depth detector will be described.
As shown in FIG. 16, the optical reproduction signal from the optical head 6 is sent to the pit depth detector 555 such as the envelope amplitude or modulation degree variation, or to the amplitude amount detector 555a such as a multilevel slicer. , The pit depth is detected by the change of the swing, and the detection output D'n is sent to the collating unit 535 and collated with the data of the reference physical layout table 532. If they are different, the copy protection operation starts. 21 (a) (b) (c)
As shown in (d), four check parameters including an address An, an angle Zn, a tracking displacement amount Tn, and a pit depth Dn are physical arrangements 539a and 539 of one sample point.
Since it is possible to check each of b and 539c, it is necessary to duplicate a master disc in which the conditions of the four parameters match at all sample points. It is difficult to retain a master disc satisfying such conditions and reproduce it well. Therefore, strong copy protection is realized. In particular, it is extremely difficult to duplicate a pit group with a uniform pit depth after changing the width, and the retention will be poor, so it will not be economically feasible. In the case of the present invention, in step 584a as shown in FIG.
When 000 groups of pits are recorded on the same master under different recording conditions of 1000 sets of recording output, pulse width, etc., step 584b is a fixed fraction, for example 1/200 fraction is 5 sets. A pit group that passes the conditions is created. In step 564c, the physical arrangement of the passed pits is found by monitoring the master with a laser beam. In step 584d, a physical layout table of the pass pit group is created, in step 584e the physical layout table is encrypted, and in step 584f, if it is an optical recording unit, this code is recorded in the second photosensitive portion 572a of the master in step 584g. Step 5
At 84h, plastic is injected into the master to form an optical disc, and at step 584i a reflective film is formed, and then at step 5
If there is no magnetic layer in 84j, it is completed, and if there is, a magnetic recording portion is created in step 584k, and an encryption is recorded in the magnetic recording portion in step 584m, and the optical disc is completed. Since the pit depth is measured after the master is created and the layout table is encrypted and recorded, the yield when the master is created can be increased to nearly 100%.

Here, a method of detecting the pit depth in the pit depth detecting portion 555 will be described. The pits 561a to f of the illegally duplicated disc shown in FIG. 17A have the same pit depth. Of the regular disk pits of FIG. 17B, the pits 560c, d, and e have shallow pits. Therefore,
As shown in FIG. 17C, the reproduction pulses 562c, d, and e have low peak values, and at the reference slice level S ₀ of the multi-level slicer 555b, output can be made as shown in FIG. At level S ₁ , FIG.
There is no output like. Therefore, by taking the logical product of the inverse value of S ₁ and S ₀ , the copy protection signals 563c, 563d, 56 can be obtained only in the case of the regular disk as shown in FIG.
3e is obtained. In the illegal disk, the detection slice level S ₁ is continuously output as 1, and thus the copy protection signal is not output. Therefore, a duplicate disk can be detected.
It should be noted that in this case, 17 a reduction in envelope Fuhaba reduce or modulation factor of the optical output waveform as shown in (e) is detected by Fuhaba amount detecting unit 555a, the opposite sign to obtain even the same effect of S ₁ Is obtained.

As is apparent from the comparison table of the anti-duplication effect of FIG. 23, since the normal CD or MD master disc forming apparatus does not have the angle control function, the disc check in the angle direction, that is, A
Is valid. On the other hand, for laser discs (LD) and M
Since the master forming apparatus for the ROM for D or the CD does not have the control means in the wobbling, that is, the tracking direction, the displacement in the tracking direction, that is, B is effective. On the other hand, in the depth direction, that is, C, an IC for existing CDs is required because a detection circuit for amplitude or modulation degree is required in the input circuit in addition to the conventional circuit.
Can not be detected. Therefore, A + B is the most effective combination for CD and MD at the present time because it has a high copy protection effect and is compatible with existing ICs. It can be seen that the check method using the combination of two parameters of A + B, that is, the angle direction and the tracking direction is the most effective in the current master disk manufacturing apparatus.

FIG. 24 shows a disk master forming apparatus in which modulation is applied in the angle direction, the track direction and the pit depth direction. The mastering device 529 of FIG. 24 has basically the same configuration and operation as the mastering device of FIG. 1 already described, and therefore description thereof will be omitted and only different parts will be described.
First, the tracking modulation method will be described. The system control unit has a tracking modulation signal generation unit 564,
A modulation signal is sent to the tracking controller 24 to perform tracking with a substantially constant radius r ₀ based on the reference track pitch 24a. Modulation such as wobbling is applied within the range of r ₀ ± dr of the radius of this track. Therefore, master 5
A meandering track as shown in FIGS. 20 (a) and 20 (b) is created on 72. This tracking displacement amount is sent to the tracking displacement information unit 32g of the position information input unit 32b. In the copy protection signal generator 565, the address An, the angle Zn, and the tracking displacement amount T described in FIG.
Standard physical layout table 532 in which n and pit depth Dn are in the table
Is created and encrypted by the encryption encoder 537. This code is the second master 572a provided on the outer periphery of the master as shown in FIGS. 32 and 33 or FIGS.
It is recorded on the master of the second area provided on the outer peripheral portion as shown in FIG. Also, the modulation Dn in the pit depth direction can be added independently. The system control unit 10 of FIG. 24 has an optical output modulation signal generation unit 566, and the amplitude of the laser output of the output modulation unit 567 of the optical recording unit 37b is changed as shown in FIG. The effective value of the laser output can be changed by modulating the pulse width or the pulse interval by the pulse width modulator 568 with a constant amplitude as in a). Then, as shown in FIG.
Photosensitive portions 574 having different depths are formed on the photosensitive portion 573 of FIG. Through the etching process, pits 560a to 560e having different depths are formed as shown in FIG. 30D, and the deep pits 560a and 560 having a depth near λ / 4 are formed.
c, 560d and shallow pit 5 with a depth near λ / 6, for example
Pits of 60b and 560e are formed. This master 57
2 is plated with a metal such as nickel.
A metal master 575 as shown in (e) is formed, and a molding disk 576 is formed by plastic molding.
When the pits are formed on the master by changing the amplitude of the laser output in this way, the peak value of the reproduction output decreases as shown in the waveform chart of waveform (5) in FIG. When sliced with, the pulse width is detected narrower than that of a pit with a deep pit, and a normal digital output cannot be obtained. Therefore, FIG.
The pulse width adjusting unit 569 generates a pulse having a wide width of T + ΔT as shown in the waveform (2) with respect to the original signal of the synchronous T as shown in the waveform (1) in FIG. The digital signal is corrected as shown in FIG. If not corrected, a sliced digital output having a width narrower than the original signal is obtained as shown in the waveform (7), and an erroneous digital signal is output.

In this way, the pit depth is modulated by the light output modulation section 567, and the pit depth information Dn is sent from the light output modulation signal generation section 566 to the pit depth information section 32h. An, Z
A reference physical layout table 532 having n, Tn, and Dn as a table is created, encrypted by the encryption encoder 537, and magnetically recorded on the magnetic recording layer. Or like the process of FIG. 34,
After the unexposed area 577 provided on the outer periphery of the original master is created, the pit depth and the like are measured as shown in step 5, a physical layout table is obtained and encrypted, and in step 6, this code is copied to the second photosensitive area 5.
By recording in 77, the physical layout table 532 can be recorded together with the program software on one master as shown in steps 7, 8 and 9. If a different ID number cannot be entered for each disk, a magnetic layer is not always necessary, and this method can provide copy protection with only the optical recording section. FIG. 35 shows a top view and a sectional view of the master. Further, as shown in FIGS. 32 and 33, two masters may be attached together. Further, in FIG. 24, an external communication interface section 588 is provided, and in the external encryption encoder 579 owned by the copyright holder of the external software as shown in FIG.
The physical layout table is encrypted by the first cipher Key 32d and the cipher is sent back from the external cipher encoder 579 to the mastering device 529 of the optical disk manufacturing company through the second communication interface 578a, the communication line and the communication interface 578. In this method, since the copyright holder's first encryption key 32d is not passed to the optical disk manufacturing company, the security of the encryption is increased and the first encryption key is
Even if 32d is stolen by a third party, the optical disk manufacturer does not have to take responsibility.

Further, the precise processing control in the depth direction of the optical pit is performed by controlling the sensitivity and gamma characteristics of the photosensitive material, the output variation of the laser light and the beam shape, the thermal characteristics of the glass substrate, the etching characteristics, the dimensional error of the molding press, and the like. It is quite difficult as it includes many variables. For example, as shown in FIG. 22, when the pulse width and the depth of the pit are combined and changed, the optimum conditions of the amplitude of the laser output and the pulse width differ depending on the width of the pulse. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 22, n combination conditions are created in which the output value of the laser output and the pulse width are variously changed in consideration of the gamma characteristic. For example, if a combination of several hundred laser outputs is created and a master is created several hundred times differently, the depth of each pit will be optimized several times. In other words, out of hundreds of masters, several masters can be accepted. In this pass master, when the signal is reproduced, a pit group that reaches the reference voltage S ₀ and does not reach the detection voltage S ₁ is formed as shown by the waveforms 581a and 581c of the waveform (3) in FIG. It will be. But,
Creating hundreds of useless masters for one piece of software requires tens of millions of yen, which is not economically feasible.
Therefore, in the present invention, a method is used in which an optimum pit is created by making a master once, as shown in FIG.
A group of 580a to d pits is provided, and n sets of different laser output conditions are used for recording. Then, a pit group having a pit depth, a pit shape, and a pulse width that pass the target condition can be obtained with a probability of several out of n sets, for example, several out of several hundred sets. As shown in FIG. 15, the physical layout table 532 of the passed pits 580c is encrypted and the optical recording of the magnetic recording part of the disk 2 or the master 572 of the second master or the second photosensitive part shown in FIG. 33 or FIG. If it is recorded in the area, a copy protection disk using the pit depth can be made. In this case, the worse the number of passing pit groups formed is, the more the number of n sets of pit groups increases, but the copy protection capability increases accordingly. In reality, the number of combinations is increased by increasing the total number of pits in the pit group 560 and the types of pulse widths, and the fractionation can be deteriorated to several hundredths. Since the physical arrangement table 532 is encrypted by the one-way function as described above, it cannot be tampered with without knowing the encryption key. Therefore, a duplication company cannot duplicate unless it makes hundreds of masters that cost 100,000 yen or more. That is,
Since it takes tens of millions of yen to obtain one copy master, it is economically meaningless, and the copy dealer gives up the copy, which prevents copy. On the other hand, even if several hundred 10-bit pit groups are provided and each of these 100 pit groups is made, the total capacity is several tens of KB, and for example, the effect on the CD-ROM capacity of 640 MB is 1/10000. The effect of the present invention is that the capacity is hardly reduced.

In the figure, an example using a ROM disk such as a CD has been described, but a recording type optical disk such as a partial ROM is used to encrypt and record the physical layout table in the recording layer portion of the optical RAM. However, the same effect can be obtained. As shown in the flowchart of FIG. 37, the disk check program 584 should be arranged in various places such as the program installation routine 584d in the program 586 in the application software, the print routine 584e, the save routine 584f, etc. Therefore, the desk check program 585 cannot be tampered with or deleted unless the entire application program is decoded, so that even if some disk check programs 585 are omitted, the operation is stopped by the remaining check programs. Distributing a plurality of disk check programs in this way has the effect of making illegal copying more difficult.

Now, a second method of the first embodiment, that is, a method of creating and detecting a physical ID mark will be described. Specifically, A of a ROM optical disk such as a CD-ROM
A physical ID is formed by intentionally providing a region without a reflection layer in a part of the light reflection layer made of L or the like. 38, 39, and 40 are block diagrams of a system showing the principle of the second method of the first embodiment. Further, FIG. 41 shows a state in which a physical ID unique to the disc of the medium is formed. FIG.
As shown in (d), ten low-reflection portions 584 and 584a to 584i without the reflection film 48 in the radial direction and 11 reference low-reflection portions 585 are intentionally provided at the time of forming the reflection film. When the light beam of the optical head 6 is focused on the low reflection portion 584, the amount of reflected light is extremely reduced as compared with the reflection portion 48. Therefore, the signal level is extremely lowered as shown in the optical reproduction signal diagram of FIG. As shown in the block diagram of FIG. 39, the signal level is significantly reduced by the comparator 587 of the low-reflected light amount detection unit 586 detecting an analog optical reproduction signal having a signal level lower than the optical reference value 588. The amount of reflected light is detected. During the detection period, the low reflection portion detection signal having the waveform as shown in (5) of FIG. 42 is output. The address and clock position of the start position and end position of this signal are estimated.

Now, the optical reproduction signal is subjected to waveform shaping by the waveform shaping circuit 590 having the AGC 590a and becomes a digital signal. The clock recovery unit 38a uses the waveform shaping signal to
Regenerate the clock signal. The EFM demodulator 592 of the demodulation unit 591 demodulates the signal, the ECC corrects the error, and the digital signal is output. In the EFM demodulated signal, the physical address output unit 593 outputs the MSF address from the Q bit of the subcode in the case of CD from the address output unit 594, and the synchronization signal such as the frame synchronization signal is output from the synchronization signal output unit 595. The demodulated clock is output from the clock recovery unit 38a.

In the low reflection part address / clock signal position signal output part 596, the n-1 address detection part 597 is provided.
Using the address signal, the clock counter 598, and the synchronous clock signal or the demodulation clock, the low reflection part start / end position detection part 599 accurately measures the start and end points of the low reflection part 584. This method will be specifically described with reference to the waveform chart of FIG. As shown in the sectional view of the optical disc in (1) of FIG.
84 is partially provided. The reflected light signal as shown in FIG. 42 (2), that is, the envelope signal as shown in FIG. 42 (3), is output, and becomes lower than the light amount reference value 588 in the reflecting portion. This is detected by the light amount level comparator 587, and the low reflected light amount detection signal as shown in FIG. 42 (5) is output from the low reflected light amount detection unit 586.

Next, in order to obtain the start and end positions of this low reflected light amount detection signal, the address information and FIG. 42 (6) are used.
The demodulation clock or synchronous clock of is used. First,
The reference clock 605 at the address n in FIG. 42 (7) is measured. When the n-1 address output unit 597 detects the address immediately before the address n in advance, the next sync
It can be seen that 604 is the sync of the address n. The clock counter 598 counts the number of clocks up to the start point of the sync 604 and the low reflected light amount detection signal, that is, the reference clock 605. The number of clocks is defined as a reference delay time T _D, the reference delay time T _D measuring unit 608 measures and stores. Since the delay time of the circuit differs depending on the reproducing device, the reference delay time T _D differs. So this T _D
By performing time correction by the time delay correction unit 607 using, there is an effect that the number of start clocks of the low reflection part can be accurately measured in any reproducing device. Next, FIG.
As shown in (8), the optical mark No. of the next track. When the start and end address clock numbers for 1 are calculated, the clock m + 14 of the address n + 12 is obtained. T _D = m +
Since it is 2, the number of clocks is corrected to 12, but n + 14 is used in the description.

Here, the low reflection portion address table will be described. In the factory, the low reflection portion 584 is measured for each disk as shown in FIG.
Create This table is encrypted with a one-way function as shown in FIG. 44, and as shown in FIG.
The low reflection portion group without the barcode-like reflection layer is recorded in the second reflection layer forming step. Alternatively, as shown in FIG. 38, the data may be recorded in the magnetic recording section 67 of the CD-ROM. As shown in FIG. 3, the low reflection portion address tables 609 and 609x are significantly different between the regular CD and the illegally duplicated CD. Therefore, by decrypting this encrypted table as shown in FIG. 38, creating a regular table, and collating by the collation program 535, it is possible to distinguish between the regular disc and the illegally duplicated disc. The operation of can be stopped. In the example of FIG. 42, as shown in FIG. 43, the values of the low reflection portion address tables 609 and 609x are different between the normal disc and the illegally duplicated disc. As shown in FIG. 42 (8), the start and end are m + 14 and m + 267 in the track next to the mark 1 on the regular disc, but FIG.
In the case of illegally copied discs like m + 21, m + 2
77 and different. In this way, as shown in FIG. 43, the values of the low reflection part address tables 609 and 609x are different, and the duplicate disk can be identified. This is because in the case of CLV, the coordinate arrangement of the address of the master is different as described above.
FIG. 45 shows the result of measuring the actual CD address position. Thus, it can be seen that the address coordinates are quite different. Further, in the method of the present invention, even if the master is the same, the low reflection portion is different for each disc because the reflection film is partially removed in the reflection film forming step. Accurate partial removal of the reflective film in pit units is almost impossible in the normal process. Therefore, duplication of the disk of the present invention is not economically feasible, and the effect of preventing duplication is high. FIG. 30 shows a flowchart for detecting a duplicated CD by the low reflection part address table. The description is omitted because it is duplicated.

Next, a method of forming the low reflection portion will be described.
FIG. 47 shows the vapor deposition prevention unit 610 in the step (2) of FIG.
Is provided and brought into contact with the substrate of the disc. When sputtering is performed in the step (3) of FIG. 47, a low reflection part 584 without a reflection layer is formed. Once you have nearly the refractive index n ₂ of the refractive index n ₁ and the protective layer 611 of the substrate in the step (4) the amount of reflected light of the low reflective portion 584 is reduced. Since n ₁ = 1.55, 1.3 ≦ n ₂ ≦ 1.7 may be set.

In FIG. 48, UV curing is performed in the step (3) of applying the ink 612 having a low light transmittance, and a reflective film is attached in the step (4). Since the ink 612 has a low transmittance, the low reflection portion 5
FIG. 49 in which 84 is formed is shown in FIG.
In the step (3) of adhering 13 to the substrate with the adhesive portion 614, a reflective film is formed on the inner peripheral portion other than the optical track by the first mask, and the low reflective portion 584 is formed. In the step (4), the position of the low reflection part 584 is detected by the optical head 6,
A low reflection part address table 609 is created and encrypted in step (5). In step (6), the encrypted data is modulated into a modulated signal such as bar code data, and the printing section 617 and the ink 612 create the modulated signal as an optical mark on the substrate of the encrypted data recording section 618. In the step (7), the ink is cured, and in the step (8), the reflective film 48 is formed by sputtering or the like using the second mask 616 masked except for the encrypted data recording portion 619. In the ink 612 portion, the amount of reflected light is reduced, and the second low reflection portion 584 is formed. In step (9), the envelope in which the light amount is partially reduced is reproduced, in step (10), the low reflection portion detection signal is reproduced, and the bar code demodulating portion 621 reproduces the encrypted data. As shown in step (12) of FIG. 49, not only the barcode 620 but also the character pattern 622 can be printed in the encrypted data recording unit 619, so that the characters of the ID number are printed on each disk to visually identify the ID number. The effect is that you can check. FIG. 50 shows the encrypted data recording unit 6
In order to print the circular bar code 620 and the character pattern 622 on 19, the heating head 624 having the heating portion 623 for thermal transfer is used, and the ink 6 applied on the film 625 is used.
By partially thermally transferring 12 onto the substrate, ink 612 remains on the substrate as in step (2). If necessary, UV curing is performed in step (3) using UV ink. In step (4), the second mask 616 is used to form a metal reflection film only in the encrypted data recording portion, so that the optical head 6 can be formed only in the low reflection portion in step (6) as in step (5). An attenuated reproduced waveform is obtained. In step (6), a low reflection part detection signal is obtained. As shown in FIG. 49, the bar code decoder 621 outputs digital data to obtain a CP master encrypted signal. Since this signal is different for each disc, a different physical ID is obtained for each disc. This master cipher 626, as shown in FIG. 52, is a low reflection part address table 60 which is the unique physical information of each disk described in FIG.
9 is a disk physical ID peculiar to each disk such as 9 or a stamper physical ID 627 like the physical layout table of FIG.
And the disk management ID 628, which is a serial management number arbitrarily assigned by the software company, is encrypted as a data string by a one-way function encryption encoder and the master encryption 6
29 are created. Therefore, if the user manages the disk I
Disk physical ID 62 even if you try to tamper with D628
Since 6 cannot be changed, it has the effect that it cannot be tampered with.

This disc physical ID is randomly created in the CP optical mark portion 618 of the disc top view of FIG. 49 by the optical mark as shown in FIG. When this signal is reproduced,
By dividing the address into 10 angle numbers of 0 to 9 for each optical mark as shown in 3, 10 data are obtained and 10 digits, that is, a 32 bit disc physical ID 62.
6 can be defined. And as mentioned above, the physical ID of the disk
Even if the master is the same, since it differs for each disc, encryption corresponds to a specific disc management ID 628, and tampering with the disc management ID can be prevented. This has the effect of greatly improving the security of the password for releasing the program protection. Further, the embodiment in which the position of the optical mark is detected by the address and the number of clocks has been described, but as described with reference to FIG. 82, FIG.
From the disc rotation angle information of the disc rotation angle detection unit 335 and the low reflection light amount detection signal, the low reflection portion angle position signal output unit 6
The low reflection portion angular position detection unit 602 of 01 can output the low reflection portion angular position signal to create a disk physical table 609 as shown in FIG.

By providing the writable writing layer 630 as shown in FIG. 51, not only a password and the like can be written with a pen, but also the writing layer 630 becomes thick, so that the magnetic recording portion can be prevented from being damaged. . The disc management ID 62 is formed on the writing layer 630.
By printing the character 8 and the barcode, the ID can be collated at the store.

Next, a method of intentionally arranging the error signal on the disk and using it as a copy protection signal will be described.

As shown in FIG. 54, the normal disk 2 has a specific error code 63 in a specific address / clock section.
2 are arranged. This arrangement information is encrypted and recorded on the disc 2 as an error code-address table 631. This encrypted information is output from the physical ID output unit 633 in the encryption decoder 534. On the other hand, the CP error code 632 “11011001” on the disk 2 is collated with the error code list 634 by the error CP code detector 633, and the error code-address / clock position output unit 635 indicates the address of the error CP code. The clock is output, and the collation program 535 collates with the error code-address table 631.
_{If 1} is equal to or higher than a certain ratio, it is discriminated as a regular disc. This error CP code “11011001” is ECC
Error correction is performed by the decoder 36e, and "1101101"
Since the output data is 1 ", there is no problem in the output data. On the other hand, since the illegal duplication disk 2a duplicates the normal code 635 after error correction, there is a difference from the CP error code 632 of the normal disk 2. In this case, the output data Is a regular disk 2
The same as "11011011". But error C
The P code detector 633 discriminates that the disc is a duplicate disc by the collation program 535 because the number of error codes detected is small and the arrangement of the error code-address table and the error code do not match at the same time, and the operation is prevented. In this way, a copy protection disc is realized. In this case, since it is only necessary to change the signal and the error CP code detection unit 633 is added, there is an effect that the system is simplified.

Next, copy protection (CP) as shown in FIG.
A method of performing copy protection using a special EFM conversion table 636 for the following will be described. Original data 6 in EFM conversion
37 is a standard code 635 "00100000100001"
Is modulated to 0 ", and in the EFM decoder 592,
The decrypted data 638 is decrypted. In the anti-duplication disk 2, CP is used only at a specific address instead of the standard code 635.
The special code 639 is recorded. When the code is EFM-demodulated, it is decoded into normal decoded data 638 "01101111", and therefore it cannot be distinguished only by the output data.

A specific configuration will be described with reference to the block diagram of FIG. In the regular disk 2, the CP special code detection unit 646 detects the CP special code 639, and the CP special code address output unit 641 outputs the address of the CP special code. In the regular disk collating unit 535, the CP special code-address table 642 decrypted by the encryption decoder 534 is collated, and if there is a collation value of the reference value n ₀ or more, it is discriminated as a regular disc. Since only the standard signal 635 is recorded on the illegally copied disk 2a, the CP special code detection signal is not generated by the CP special code detection unit 640 except in the case of an error. Therefore, the regular disk collating unit determines that the disk is an illegal disk and stops the operation.

In this way, the EFM special conversion table 6
By using 36, copy protection can be performed at the stage of the modulation signal. Compared with the error special code system of FIG. 54, it is more effective to copy. The effect is that the configuration is simple because it can be done only by changing the signal.

Next, an installation management method using the master code 629 and the dealer code will be described. FIG. 58 illustrates the overall flow of the sub-encryption decoder 643. This flowchart is a software company processing step 405a, a dealer processing step 405b, and a user processing step 405c.
It consists of two major steps. First, in the processing step 405a of the software company, as described with reference to FIG. 52 of the first embodiment, a master ID 627 unique to the master, a physical ID 626 of the disk, and a disk management ID 62 such as a serial number.
8 and the sub cipher decoder number n _s , for example, n _s = 151 by the master cipher encoder 537 as a master cipher 6
It is encrypted as 29. Therefore, falsification can be prevented. One is given to each dealer or the dealer with the dealer number n _{s at} the service center. The sub-encryption decoder number: n _s 644, for example, n _s = 151 is set in the master cipher 629 for each disk. Therefore, the sub-encryption 645 of the disc of FIG. 57 can be encoded only by the sub-encryption encoder 646 of the dealer number 151. In this disc, the sub-encryption decoder 6
47 is set in the master cipher 629 with n _s , for example, n _s = 151. Therefore, even if the sub-encryption encoder 646 of another number is encoded, it will not be decrypted and will not operate.

Therefore, for example, only the dealer of n _s = 151 of the encryption encoder 646a of n _s = 151 can control the distribution of the disk, that is, cancel the program and set the number of installed disks.

In the next dealer processing step 405b, the sub management data 649 is created. In addition to the disk physical ID 626, this includes a disk management ID 628 installation limit number 650, usage limit time 651, service password, and the like. This sub management data 6
49 maintaining the dealer secret n _s = 151, encrypted with sub cipher encoder 646a for n _s = 151 owned, to create a sub-cipher 645 is recorded on the magnetic recording portion of the disc 2.

In the next user processing step 405c, the master cipher 629 is reproduced, and the master cipher decoder 534 decodes the master management data 648. The master disk physical ID in this is used to check the master disk duplication, and the disk physical ID 626 and the disk management ID 628 are used to check the ID number falsification. Sub encryption decoder number 644
Is decrypted, and the sub-encryption decoder number: n _s, for example, n _s = 151 is selected in step 405d. In the optical ROM section of the disk 2, for example, programs and data for sub-code decoding of 001 to 999 are encrypted and recorded. From this, specific data, that is, n _s = 151 data is reproduced, and n _s = 1 is reproduced by the master encryption decoder 534.
The sub-encryption decoder 647 of 51 is decrypted. In this case, the sub-encryption decoder has an effect that it cannot be tampered with because it is encrypted. The sub-encryption decoder 647 decrypts the sub-management data 549 from the sub-encryption. Since the sub management data 549 includes the physical ID 626, data tampering can be checked. Further, since the number of installed programs 650, the use time limit 651, and the release program number 652 are recorded, it is possible to limit the number of released programs of this disk 2 and the number of installable programs. This setting can be arbitrarily set by the dealer with the dealer number n _s . Therefore, there is an effect that dealers in each region of each country can make optimum settings in the sales situation of discs and software.

The flow of FIG. 57 will be described in more detail with reference to the flow chart of FIG. In FIG. 58, in addition to the disc manufacturing routine 405a of the software company and the disc use restriction routine 405b of the dealer, a dealer program use permission routine 405d and a user installation routine 405c are newly added.
First, in the disc manufacturing routine 405a, step 41
A master is created in the master manufacturing process of 0a, and master physical IDs such as this address-coordinate table and error-address table are extracted. Physical characteristics that differ from disk to disk by manufacturing the disk substrate from the master and, in the first metal reflection film manufacturing step of step 410b, by means such as intermittently providing the low reflection portion without a reflection layer as described above. And the disk physical ID is extracted.

In the serial number generation step of step 410c, the disk management I having a different serial number for each disk is performed.
D is generated, the sub-encryption decoder number n _s is designated, encryption is performed by the master encryption decoder in step 410d to create a disk master encryption, and the second encryption is performed in step 410e.
In the metal reflection film process, a different recording number is recorded on each disc, such as a circular barcode. Alternatively, in step 410f, recording is performed on the magnetic recording layer to manufacture the disk 2. At the next step 405b of the dealer with the number n _s , the disk sub management data 649 is obtained at step 410g.
In step 410h, an n _s- th sub-encryption encoder 646 creates a disk sub-encryption, and in step 41
0i records on the magnetic recording layer. In the next user's installation routine 405c, first, the machine ID is read, and the machine ID is registered in the machine ID recording area 655 of the installation management data 654. Next Step 41
The machine ID is recorded in the HDD at 0k, and the installation permission flag 653 of the basic program number permitted to be installed in the disk 2 is confirmed. Flag 653a,
Reference numerals 653b and 653c denote installation permission to the machines having the machine IDs 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In the case of the figure, Machine I
It can be seen that only D1 and 3 are allowed to install. After the installation, all installation management data 653 is recorded in step 410m. Step 410n
Then, I will start the work of installing a new program: _np for a fee. In step 410p, additional installation management data 654a for newly installing n _p on the machine IDs 1 and 3 is created. In the data, the installation permission flags 653f and 653h are set with the installation permission flag 653. Then, this data is transmitted to the dealer. When the dealer's use permission routine 405d is entered, the dealer confirms receipt of the program installation fee in step 410u. Ye
Only in the case of s, the process proceeds to step 410v, and the additional installation management data 654a is added to the sub encryption encoder No. n
Encrypt with _s , create an installation management number in step 410w, and send it to the user. The user receives the installation management number 655 in step 410q, and in step 410s, the sub-encryption decoder No. The encryption is decrypted at n _s , the additional installation management data 654a is decrypted, and the new program is installed at step 410t. At this time, the physical ID data decrypted in step 410x is collated with the physical ID data measured from the disk, and if OK, the process proceeds to step 410z to start the installation of the program n _p . In the case of tampering, the physical IDs do not match, thus preventing unauthorized tampering. In this case, since the installation permission flags 653a and 653c of the additional program n _p are set to 1, only the machine IDs 1 and 3 are permitted to install the program. Note that FIG. 5 shows a method of encrypting the address-coordinate position information 532 and recording it on the master of the optical ROM section. However, as shown in FIG. 15, the address-coordinate position information 532 is encrypted to form a bar code-shaped mask pattern to form a reflective film having a bar code-shaped non-reflective portion, and this bar code pattern is used as an optical head. It can also be played at 6. In this case, the protective layer 61 on the light reproduction surface and the reflection side
It is also possible to make 0 transparent and provide an optical sensor on the side opposite to the optical head 6 to read the bar code and reproduce the duplication prevention signal. In this case, by reproducing the clock signal from the bar code and controlling the rotation of the motor,
Even if the G motor is not used, the motor can be rotated at a constant speed for recording in the magnetic recording unit. As shown in FIG. 46, the address position of the optical mark for copy protection and the pit arrangement are detected, and the regular disc and the illegally duplicated disc are identified and eliminated. Although the RSA function is used as the cryptographic function, the same applies when the elliptic curve function or the DES function is used.
The angular positional relationship between the optical mark 387 and the address position on the optical surface in FIG. 59 differs for each disc. This angle difference can be used as the physical ID of the disc.

The bar code-shaped low reflection portion 584 can also be formed by using a laser trimming device as shown in the process diagram of FIG. In the primary laser trimming step of steps (3) and (4), the light flux of the laser 643 is scanned by the laser scanner 644 to form a non-linear pattern 653, and the low reflection portion 584 as in step (4) is formed.
Create In the present invention, laser cutting is performed in a zigzag shape instead of a linear shape as in step (3). Therefore, in the present invention, the low reflection portion is detected in units of 1T, and therefore, in order to copy the disc of the present invention, it is necessary to perform cutting in pit units, that is, in both horizontal and vertical directions with an accuracy of 0.8 μm or less. On the other hand, since the accuracy of the general-purpose laser scanner is 10 μm or more, there is an effect that the non-reflective portion 584 cannot be duplicated by a commercially available device. Similar to FIG. 49, by laser trimming as shown in FIG. 61, a random ID mark is created in step (3), the address and clock number of the ID mark are detected in step (5), and these data and logic are used. ID numbers are collectively encrypted. This code is recorded as a pulse width modulated signal such as a bar code in the secondary laser trimming step of step (6). In this way, a disc ID number, which is different for each disc and cannot be tampered with, is formed in the optical recording portion of the CD. Figure 6
As shown in FIG. 7, in the step (2), the physical layout information 532 of the master is set.
Is detected in advance and encrypted by the encryption encoder 537, and the pulse width modulation unit 656 creates a CP bar code signal. A part of the master is removed by laser trimming or cutting material in step (3) on the inner or outer circumference of the completed master, and CP
The pit-free part is provided with the pulse width of the barcode signal. Only 0 continuous data is reproduced in this area. In step (7), the PWM demodulation section 621 measures the pulse width in the form of bar code to demodulate the copy protection data. In this way, duplicate disks can be detected at the user stage. Further, as shown in FIG. 68, in the same manner as in the case of FIG. 32, the disk 2 is completed from the first master in the step (6), and the physical arrangement information 532 of the first master 575 is processed in the step (7).
A second master disk 575a in which is encrypted is recorded, and a 30 μm transparent layer is provided on the first reflective film 48 in step (8), and pits are formed by the second master disk 575a by a known 2P method. Then, the second reflective film 48a is formed. As a result, the physical arrangement information 532 of the first reflection film 48 is recorded on the second reflection film 48a, so that a copy protection disc having a high protection level is realized.

The recording method and the detecting method of the second low reflection portion 751a recorded on the recording medium 2 will be described more specifically with reference to FIGS. 39 and 97.

First, as shown in FIG. 97, T of the recording medium 2 is
A plurality of second low reflection portions 751 are provided in the OC region 752. A data error occurs due to the presence of the second reflector 751. That is, if the area of the second low reflection portion 751 is too large, a normal signal may not be output. As a method of avoiding this, two methods are adopted in the present invention. In the first method, as shown in FIG. 97, the second low reflection part region 758 without the second low reflection part is changed to the second low reflection part region 7.
This is a method provided on a track having 59. in this case,
The second low-reflection portion area 758 is required to be larger than the 1-track TOC information area 760. This way
Even if no data can be decoded in the second low reflection area 759, the data is completely reproduced in the second low reflection area 760. Therefore, assuming that the length of the second low-reflection portion region 760 on the track is dN and the length of the one-track TOC information region on the track is dT, if dN> dT, the TOC data for one track is Is played. In order to surely reproduce by one rotation, dN> 2dT is sufficient.
In the case of a CD-ROM, since only one track of data is recorded in the TOC, if dN> 2dT, the TOC data can be reliably reproduced by one rotation.
In the case of a CD-ROM, dT is about 15 mm, so if a portion without a second low reflection portion of about 3 cm is provided in the circumference, the rest can be used for the barcode of the second reflection portion.

Next, the distance dr between the second low reflection portions 751a and the like in the second low reflection portion area will be described. If the interval is too narrow, the frame sync signal cannot be detected and the rotation control cannot be performed. For example, the width of the second reflecting portion is about 10 μm. In case of CD, the interval of frame sync signal is 1
Since it is 80 microns, if dr is 36 microns, the probability that the frame sync signal will be destroyed becomes 1/4 and rotation servo will be applied. Since it is necessary to reproduce one out of every two frame synchronization signals, if dw is at least the average width of the second reflecting portion, rotation can be controlled by setting at least dw <dr.

As a second method, when the amount of data to be recorded in the second low reflection portion 751 is small, the interval 753 between the second low reflection portions 751 of dr is not less than the interleave length dI, that is, dr> dI. In this case, since the data error is corrected and the error does not occur, the data can be recorded in the second low reflection area.

As shown in FIG. 62A, when the control unit 10 detects the address An, an off-track switching signal is sent to the tracking control circuit 24, and the tracking servo polarity reversing circuit 646 causes the tracking servo circuit 24a. Reverse the polarity of. Then, the On Tracking state by the positive polarity servo shown in FIG.
That is, the running state on the pit 46 is switched to the reverse polarity servo shown in FIG. And the optical sensor 6
Since the patterns of the pits 46a and 46b are located at both ends of the 48a and 648b, the light beam travels just in the middle of two adjacent tracks. As shown in FIG. 62 (c), when the pits 46a and 46b of the adjacent tracks are in phase, the crosstalk signals of both are emphasized and the in-phase reproduction signal 650 is reproduced. When not in phase, normal signals are not reproduced. In particular, in the case of opposite phases, the crosstalk signals cancel each other out, and a signal whose amplitude does not change is reproduced.

As shown in FIG. 63, when the off-track signal of all the data on the CD is reproduced, with a very low probability, a plurality of pits 46 on the adjacent tracks completely coincide with each other and become in phase. . In this area, a certain time T
common-mode signal blocks 653a and 653 that continue for s
b and 653c can be detected. Specific address A
When jumping from n to off-track, only the in-phase block 653 that reaches the frame Sync signal 654a of the in-phase block S1 is selected and a plurality of sets are extracted.
Then, the master disk physical ID table 532 stores the address An, the arrangement angle θn, and the in-phase reproduction codes 652a and 652b. This table is recorded in the bar code non-reflective portion in the optical ROM portion of the CD. Alternatively, it is recorded in the magnetic recording unit. This C
When D is reproduced, the master physical layout table 532 is reproduced by the optical reproducing unit or the magnetic reproducing unit shown in FIG.
Send data to. Based on this data, the angle Ak is first set to 0 at the address Ak as shown in FIG. Next, the off-track jump is performed at the address A1, and the frame Syn is first.
The c signal 654a is detected, and the angle θ1 at this time is measured. Simultaneous in-phase playback code 652a 10001000
1001 "is reproduced and the reverse phase reproduction code" 0000000 "is reproduced.
Also plays. This measured data is the master disk physical ID table 5
The collating unit 535 collates whether or not 32 matches, and when they do not coincide, the output / operation stopping unit 536 stops the operation or output of the program. The same collation work is also performed on the in-phase block 653b of the address A2, and it is collated whether the angle θ2 of the frame Sync signal of the in-phase reproduction signal and the in-phase reproduction code 652 "10010010001 ..." Match the master physical ID table 532. .

In the system of FIG. 63, it is first checked whether the in-phase reproduction code 652 of the in-phase block matches. To duplicate this part, 0.5T of period T at 4.3MHz
It is necessary to accurately create the pit positions of adjacent tracks with the accuracy of. This accuracy cannot be obtained unless the master is cut with CAV. At the same time, the angular position On of the frame Sync654a is measured. In-phase blocks 653a, 6
During 53b, it is recorded by CLV. Therefore, in order to match the angular position θn, it is necessary to record with high precision CLV. That is, in order to completely match the angle θn with the in-phase reproduction code, it is necessary to perform CLV control with an accuracy of 0.5T and create a master. This is almost impossible with current devices. In this way, by combining the angle θn and the in-phase reproduction code, duplication of the master is prevented.

In FIG. 63, adjacent frame synchronization signals 729a and 729b of two tracks are in phase, and a region where the in-phase frame synchronization signal 654a can be detected is searched for, and this region is used as the first physical characteristic information. As shown in FIG. 93 (a), this is the rotation angle θ for CLV recording.
The number of recording pulses for one rotation increases as shown by the curve 730a. In the case of a disc manufactured by CAV, since the motor rotates at a constant speed, the recording signal can be duplicated with an angular accuracy of 0.5T. On the other hand, the disk produced by CLV has a constant linear velocity, and the angle of the pit arrangement cannot be accurately reproduced. Since the optical disc of the present invention is made of CLV, it cannot be duplicated because it cannot be produced with accurate angular accuracy by a normal CLV or CAV master making device. However, in FIG.
Paying attention to the fact that the number of recording pulses between the pair of in-phase recording signals 731a and 731b is n ₀ , a constant rotational angular velocity at which the number of recording pulses for one rotation is just n ₀ is calculated, and only the area AB is obtained. , CLV is switched to CAV, the motor is rotated at the number of revolutions of CAV, and CAV recording is performed only in the area AB, so that the curve 730b can be recorded. That is, at the time when a CLV / CAV switching type master disk creating apparatus is developed in the future, the points A and B will be duplicated with an accuracy of 0.5T in the two-point method. The life span will be about 3 to 5 years.

FIG. 92 shows a three-point coincidence method for applications requiring a higher protection level. Three
In the point matching method, the adjacent tracks 727a, 727b, 72
7c three frame synchronization signals 729a, 729b, 7
The first physical feature information is obtained from the in-phase region 732 in which 29c is arranged in the in-phase state. As described above, the probability that the three frame synchronization signals are in phase is low, but in the case of the CD-ROM in the calculation of the probability, there are, for example, 63 locations per sheet. In other words, there are always several places on any CD-ROM.

A method of detection will be described in the same manner as in FIG. First, in the (1) pit arrangement of FIG. 92, when the mark signal 726a following the specific An address 725a of the track 727a is detected, the tracking is jumped to the outer peripheral side and the polarity of the track servo is changed as shown in FIG. Turned over and run off-track, off-track 728 between tracks 727a and 727b.
Jump to a. Then, the off-track portion of the in-phase signal area 732 is reached, and the in-phase frame synchronization signal 654a is output as shown by the waveform A in FIG. Since the frame synchronization signal has the maximum pit length of 11T, it can be easily distinguished from other pits. It is confirmed whether the pulse number count n _s 734 from the mark signal 726a of the reproduced clock signal 733 of the reproduced clock waveform of FIG. 92 (3) matches the pulse number 734 included in the first physical characteristic information of FIG. 63 in advance. By doing so, it is possible to prevent erroneous detection of another in-phase frame synchronization signal. In-phase frame sync signal 65
After detecting 4a, by jumping from the off-track 728a to the on-track 727b in the outer peripheral portion and confirming the address 727d of Ap + 1, the detected in-phase frame synchronization signal 654a is the track 727a and the track 727.
Since it can be confirmed that it is the in-phase signal of b, the security is further improved.

Next, a method for detecting the in-phase frame synchronization signal 654b between the tracks 727a and 727c will be described.
First, after detecting the mark signal 726a after the address 725a of the pit arrangement shown in FIG. 92 (1), a track jump is made to the inner peripheral side, the track servo is made in the opposite phase, and the off-track 72
When running 8b, the in-phase frame synchronization signal 654b can be detected with a regular disk as shown by the waveform B in FIG. 92 (5). If it is a duplicate disk, it will not be detected. Next, an on-track jump is made to the inner track 727c, a predetermined address 727e is detected, and tracks 727a and 7
It can be confirmed that off-tracking was performed during 27c. In this way, three in-phase frame synchronization signals can be detected.

As shown by the curve 730c in FIG. 93 (b), the in-phase signals are arranged at three points with an accuracy of sub-micron at exactly 360 ° intervals, and the number of recording pulses between them is n ₀ between AB. On the other hand, between BC is n ₀ + Δn ₀ .
Therefore, by performing CAV recording, it is possible to copy between AB, but between BC, since it becomes the curve 730d, C cannot be copied and only C ′ can be copied, and the number of recording pulses is insufficient by Δn ₀ , and CAV / CLV It cannot be duplicated by the switching master recording device. In this way, the difficulty of duplication increases in the three-point coincidence method, so that the duplication prevention effect of the pirated optical disk is enhanced.

In FIG. 94, in order to further increase the duplication difficulty of the two-point coincidence method, duplication in the case where a track having two sets of in-phase recording signal areas in one rotation is used as the first physical characteristic information. It is a figure explaining a difficulty. 93 in FIG. 93 (b)
The point matching method has a high degree of difficulty in copying, but may be copied by adding a clock control method to the CAV / CLV switching type. However, as shown in FIG. 94, the curve 73
As shown in 0e, when the two-point coincidence method of the CD point in addition to the AB point is used on one round, that is, the four-point coincidence method is adopted, C
A technique for measuring points with an angle accuracy of 10 ⁻⁷ is required, and duplication becomes very difficult. In addition to the above clock control method, an extremely high-precision angle detecting means is required, and considerably future technology is required to realize it. Thus, as shown in FIG. 94, by using the four-point coincidence method, that is, by using the area having two or more in-phase recording pits in one circumference as the first physical characteristic information, there is an effect that duplication becomes extremely difficult.

The present invention has a magnetic recording layer on the label side of a CD. Therefore, as shown in FIG. 64 (a), when foreign matter 655a, 655b, 655c such as dust is present on the magnetic recording layer, the recording characteristics are deteriorated. Reproduction output detection unit 65 of FIG.
7, the reproduction output is compared with the reproduction output reference value 658 by the comparator 659, so that this lowered state can be detected. In this case, the disc rotation angle detector 3
Since it is seen relative angle by 35, the position and the angular position O _D number of tracks that are present in the foreign object 655 can be detected. In this case, the angle of the output lowering portion on the label printing surface can be calculated by recording the position of the light surface and the angle deviation of the label printing on the magnetic recording layer. This position is displayed on the display unit 16 in FIG.
In the window 567 of, the disc label printing angle and
The reproduction output reduction section 659 is set to output reduction marks 660a, 66.
0b and 660c are displayed simultaneously. Since the user can recognize where the foreign matter 655 is, the foreign matter 655 can be easily removed. By providing the coordinates 1 to 7 and the coordinates A to G on the disk 2 and the window 567 of the display unit, the removal becomes easier. FIG. 65 shows an example of an error message to the user of the specific windows 567a and 567b. The flowchart of FIG. 66 shows a specific foreign matter cleaning instruction routine 471a. Step 4
When recording the track Tn with 71a, step 471
The track Tn is reproduced at d, and it is checked at step 471f whether the output of the reproduction output detector 657 is the reference value or more. If the output is less than the reference value, the process proceeds to step 471i. If it is the first time, the error message of FIG. The cleaning indication is displayed and the disc is ejected. Then, returning to step 471d, if the output level is equal to or higher than the reference value, recording is performed. If the reproduction output is not recovered even after the third time, the process proceeds to step 471x, the track Tn is discarded, and data is recreated from the interleaved data of another track.
Data is recorded on a new track Tn + t, and step 4
Recording and reproduction are completed at 71z. Further, as shown in the waveform 2 in FIG. 31, when the master disc is cut and the duty ratio is changed by changing the pulse width of the signal based on the offset signal, the waveform 1 is obtained.
As shown at 51, an offset voltage ΔVs is generated. This can be detected by detecting the offset voltage ΔVs of the difference between the slice level voltage from the slice level Vs output unit 38b of the waveform shaper 38a in the block diagram of FIG. 40 and the reference slice level voltage. As shown in FIG. 38, an illegally duplicated disk can be detected by collating the offset voltage arrangement information of the disk physical shape table 532 with the angular position or address arrangement of the offset voltage detector 660.

Now, a more specific method of stopping the operation of the program on the pirated disk or the operation of the illegally copied program will be described. Since the CPU 665 in the personal computer 676 having the disk drive shown in FIG. 69 is mainly processed by software, the difference from the hardware shown in FIG. 40 will be described. First, in FIG. 69, a second demodulator 662 having a method different from that of the MFM demodulator 30d is provided as a demodulator in the magnetic reproducing circuit, and is switched by the switching unit 661. This is because the corresponding modulator only has a factory, so it can be reproduced but not completely recorded. Therefore, when the specially modulated area is recorded at the factory, the specially modulated signal is not recorded. On the drive side, the CPU 665 controls so that recording cannot be performed unless the special modulation signal is reproduced in this area. Therefore, logical, Write On
The ce area can be recorded only once. Therefore machine I
If D is recorded in this area, it cannot be tampered with by the user's drive, and it is possible to prevent unauthorized installation of more than the permitted number. In addition, the network interface unit 14 allows the network 6
The HDD in the second personal computer 663 connected to the computer 64 is monitored so that the program having the same ID number does not start or operate. Thus, the operation of the illegally copied software is prevented. Including this, CPU6
The operation of 65 and the like will be described using a flowchart.

The operation for installing the program will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. First step 6
At 66a, the disc insertion is confirmed, and at step 666b, the program installation instruction is received, and the installation is started. In step 666c, the user name and user environment input screen is displayed, and the user is prompted to input at least the user name. If the user name is input, the process proceeds to step 667.
In the regular disc matching routine 667, it is determined whether the disc is a regular disc or a pirated copy. This will be described in detail with reference to FIG. 72. In step 667a, a collation routine is entered, and in step 667b, the optical disc is played back. , Play the information of the crypto decoder. At step 667c, these ciphers are subjected to plain culture by this cipher decoder to obtain physical characteristic information and ID number as indicated by reference numeral 532 in FIG. Although it has been described with reference to FIG. 38, the description thereof is omitted, but in step 667d, the physical characteristic information of the disk is measured, the measured physical characteristic information is obtained, and the measured physical characteristic information is collated with the above-mentioned plain culture physical characteristic information. If the collation results do not match in step 667e, the display of "duplication disk" is displayed on the screen in step 667f and the program is stopped. Well, Y
In the case of es, the routine proceeds to step 667g and returns to the next step, that is, step 668 in FIG. 70, and the machine ID collation / creation / recording routine is executed. The detailed operation of this step will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. First, in step 668a, all of the installed machine ID numbers recorded in the magnetic recording portion of the optical disc, that is, the write-once layer 679 in FIG.
D and the machine ID number peculiar to the personal computer recorded in the ROM IC of the personal computer are read and the two are collated. If the collation results match in step 668b, step 668m
Then, exit this routine, and if they do not match, in step 668c, check this magnetic recording unit to see if there is still a flag indicating the number of machines that can be installed. If it is No in step 668d, stop it. Check if there is a machine ID in the PC or HDD, and if Yes, jump to Step 668h. If No, go to Step 668g.
A random number generator generates a machine ID and records it in the HDD.
At the next step 668h, it is checked whether or not the software has been installed on the HDD, and if No, at step 66.
Jump to 8m. In this case, this path does not exist, but if Yes, the new machine ID of this personal computer is recorded in the magnetic recording portion of the optical disk, that is, the write-once layer 679, and if OK, the process proceeds to step 668m to exit this routine. In this routine, write once layer 6 in FIG.
Since 79 is used, the user's drive cannot tamper with the machine ID, which prevents illegal dubbing. Next is Fig. 70
To step 666f. In the next step 666g, the installation work is started, and in step 669x, the regular cipher decoder matching routine is executed. This routine will be described in detail with reference to FIG. In step 669a, the encryption decoding program recorded in the optical disc or the installed program is called,
In step 669b, the specific encrypted data in the program or in the HDD is read out, and in step 669c, this cipher decoding program is plainly written.
In step 669d, it is checked whether the data is correct, and only when it is correct, the plain-text data is incorporated in a part of the program a and operated in step 669f. The operation is checked in step 669g, the program is stopped in step 669h if No, and the process proceeds to the next step in step 669i if Yes. In this case, the process returns to step 666h in FIG. 70, and the installation permission flag 653 described in FIG. 58 of the optical disc is checked.
Add one digit to "001" and issue program license ID number: IDn "00000013"
Record the program to be installed in by assigning this number. When the installation of the program is completed in step 666i, it is checked in step 666j whether the machine ID of the personal computer has been recorded in the HDD and the optical disc. If Yes, the process proceeds to step 666k, and if No, 668.
Proceeding to step x, the machine ID collation / creation / recording routine is carried out, and the work already described in FIG. 73 is carried out. Although a duplicate description is omitted, since the basic installation is completed this time and Step 668h is Yes, the new machine ID is recorded in the magnetic recording unit of the optical disc in Step 668i, and if the completion can be confirmed in Step 668j, the step is completed. 668m
Then, this subroutine is exited and step 6 in FIG.
Return to 66k and change the user name to Write Onc in FIG. 76.
Recorded in the e-layer 679 and rewritable environment setting information
Recording in the le layer 680. As described above, since the user name cannot be tampered with by the user's drive, there is a copy protection effect by detecting unauthorized copyrs. In step 666m, the HDD of the installed program
Physical address arrangement in the HDD, for example, start and end FAT information or / and install ID mark information in the HDD
And used later as copy detection information. If it is OK in step 666n, the disc ejection is completed in step 666p, and the installation is completed in step 666q. In the present invention, the pirated copy can be eliminated by disc matching. Next, the security is enhanced by checking the replacement of the cryptographic decoder.

Next, the flow following FIG. 70 will be described with reference to FIG. Thus, the program is once stored in the HDD 6 of FIG.
Installed in 82. If the start instruction of this program is input in step 671a, step 6
At 70x, the illegal copy software use stop routine operates. This subroutine will be described in detail with reference to FIG. First, the steps consist of four blocks: a software operation stop routine 672 having the same ID number, a program movement detection step 673, a machine ID verification routine 674, and an encryption / decryption verification step 675. First, step 67
In step 2, the license IDn of the program originally given from the optical disk is read in step 672a, and in step 672b, the network 664 is viewed by the network unit 14 in FIG. 69 and the program of the same IDn is stored in the HDD in another second personal computer 663. Check if is working. If a program with the same IDn is found in step 672c, the process proceeds to step 672d, and the display section 16 displays "Inoperable because software with the same ID number is in operation" and stops the operation. On the other hand, if there is no same ID, that is, No, the process proceeds to step 673a, where the allocation information A such as FAT information on the regular HDD of this program is stored.
c or the regular mark Mc recorded in a place other than the program area at the time of regular installation is reproduced. Step 67
In 3b, the allocation address of FAT or the like on the HDD of this program is measured to obtain Ap or the regular mark Mp is reproduced, and it is checked in step 673c whether Ac = Ap or Mc = Mp. At least another H
Since it has been moved to the DD, "Re-insertion of optical disc" is displayed in step 673d, and if it is not inserted in step 673e, it is stopped. If it is inserted, it is confirmed by the regular disc matching routine described in FIG. 72 that it is a regular disc, and In step 673g, the program ID number is the optical disk ID.
Check if the numbers match, and if OK, step 67
Go to 4a. In step 674a, the regular machine ID given to the program is reproduced and collated with the machine ID of the personal computer storing the program or the machine ID of the HDD. If No, step 674c, that is, the machine ID collation described in FIG. 73.・ Create / Record Routine 6
68 is executed, the machine ID is collated, and newly recorded.
If No in step 674d, the process is stopped, and if OK, the process proceeds to step 675a to check the encryption decoder. Since this routine is the same as that in FIG. 74, its explanation is omitted. Step 674b
If not OK, the cryptodecoder has been replaced. Therefore, in step 675c, "Not installed from a legitimate disk" is displayed and the operation is stopped. If step 674b is OK, the process proceeds to step 670a, returns to FIG. 71, returns to the next step 671b, starts the program at step 671w, and if OK, issues a file read command at step 671c, similarly activates the illegal copy use stop routine at step 670y. , OK, the file is read in step 671e, and when a print command and a file SAVE command are received in steps 671f and 671h, the illegal copy software use stop routine is activated and the printing operation and the file SAVE are executed only in the case of OK. In this way, since the copy of the software is checked at each command, the use of the software illegally copied to another personal computer on the network or the like can be stopped. In the case of the present invention, there is an effect that the security is high by combining the pirated copy protection method using the one-way function and the copy protection method.

FIG. 77 shows an MPEG scramble encoder. The MPEG image compression signal is divided into a variable length coding unit 683 and a fixed length coding unit 684 for AC components, each of which has random number adding units 686a and 686b and is scrambled. In the present invention, the descrambling signal of Key687 is encrypted by the one-way function encryption encoder 689a. Further, a part of the compression program of the image compression control unit 689b is compressed by the encryption encoder 689b. For this reason, it becomes difficult for the duplication company to replace the encryption encoder.

FIG. 78 shows the side where the parameters of the compression parameter section 691 are encrypted. FIG. 79 shows a flow chart of the reproducing device. In steps 681a and 681b, the one-way function encryption decoder and the encryption are reproduced from the TOC part of the optical disc, and the step 681c decoder decrypts the encryption and obtains the physical characteristic data. 681d
Measure the physical characteristics of the disc, and only if OK
Playback starts at 81f. At step 681g, the scramble key and decompression key are reproduced, and step 6
In 81h, these and the image expansion program are flatly written. If these are correct in step 681i, the scrambled video signal is descrambled in 681j, and step 681
The compressed image signal is expanded at k, and if it is correctly expanded at step 681m, the reproduction is continued at step 681p.

In the case of the present invention, it is necessary to prevent the one-way function cryptographic encoder from being replaced.
In the method of FIG. 79, a part of the image compression program is encrypted by the same encryption encoder, and therefore the encryption encoder cannot be replaced unless the image compression program and the compression parameter are canceled, so that the security can be improved.

More specifically, a plurality of cryptographic decoders are stored in the ROM of the drive, and the k
A flow chart of a system for plainly encrypting the encryption coded by ey will be described with reference to FIG. First, step 6
In 93a, a part or all of the data content is first to first
Encrypt with the m-sub encryption encoder to create C _{s1 to} C _sm . When recording before the TOC in step 693b,
In step 693c, the data including this cipher is recorded in the first recording area of the master, and in step 693e, the physical characteristic information of the disc is measured as described above, and in step 69
In 3f, the physical feature information and the sub-encryption decryption information are intern
It is transmitted to the first to n-th master encryption devices via the communication line of et. The first master cryptographic center of the first to nth steps receives the data of step 694a,
At 4b, encryption is performed by the main encryption routine. This step will be described in detail with reference to FIG. 84. In step 695a, the plain text M
Input n, add an ID number, etc., and synthesize. Step 6
In 95b, a one-way function such as an RSA function is used, and encryption is performed with a secret key of d = 512 bits as shown in the figure.

At step 695c, the n-th Manter cipher Cn
Is output. Here, returning to step 694c in FIG. 83, it is checked whether the (n + 1) th, in this case, the second master encryption device is in operation. If Yes, in step 694d,
The first master cipher C ₁ is transmitted to the press factory. If No, in step 694e, the main encryption routine encrypts M ₁ by the second encryption encoder 693v that the first master encryption center has as a backup, and the second master encryption C
Create ₂ . In step 694f, the second master cipher C ₂
Send Receiving a first 1~n master encryption in step 693 g, synthesized in step 693H, to create an integrated cipher C _1, a C ₁ to check whether the recording on the master disk in step 693U, a C _1, Yes if step 693i Record in the second recording area of the master, proceed to Step 693j if No, record in the first recording area of the master in Step 693k only when the data content is not recorded, create the master, form the disc, and reflect. Create a membrane. In step 693q, it is checked whether or not C ₁ is recorded on the reflective film, and Y
If it is es, the process proceeds to a reflection film C ₁ recording routine in step 693r. This routine will be described with reference to FIG. In step 696b, it is checked whether or not the physical characteristics of the reflective film are created. If Yes, random missing parts are created in the reflective film by a laser trimmer or the like, and in step 696d, physical property information of the missing part is measured. If No, Step 696e
Go to. Now, in step 696e, it is checked whether or not the master encryption encoder is used, and if Yes, step 696
The physical characteristic and the sub-encrypted data are transmitted at f, the first to n-th master encryption is performed at the master encryption center, the data is received at step 696h, and the process proceeds to step 696k. In the case of No, the serial number IDd for each disk is issued in step 696i, the IDd and the physical information are encrypted by the m-th sub-encryption decoder, and the sub-encryption C _s is created. In the next step 696k, C _s or C _{R1 to} C _Rn is formed by forming a missing portion on the reflective film, and the process proceeds to the next step. Returning to FIG. 83, a protective layer or a magnetic layer is formed in step 693s, and the disc is completed in step 693t.
In this case, the mastering device 529 has the network external encryption encoder 579 shown in FIGS.
Since it has already been described, the description is omitted. In this case, different n encryption keys exist online in different parts of the world, so the risk is dispersed. Further, the security is high because the operation does not take place unless the encryptions of all n encryption keys match.

Only the operation of the encryption decoder when reproducing this disc will be described in detail with reference to FIG. Playback of the disc is started in step 697a, and step 69
7b reproduces the integrated cipher C ₁ and 697c reproduces C ₁ to C _{1 to} C
The ciphers are separated into n ciphers, and in the cipher cipher culture routine of step 697v, the n ciphers are ciphered by the corresponding cipher decoders DC (n). First, n = 0 is set, n is incremented by 1 in step 697f, and in step 697g, the process shown in FIG.
It is recorded in advance in the ROM section 699 of the drive of the personal computer 676. Master encryption decoder DC (1) ~
Read the corresponding decoder from DC (n), and execute encryption Cn
Flat culture. This plain culture routine will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

In step 698a of FIG. 87, the cipher Cn is input, and in step 698b, it is plain-textified by the one-way function. In the case of RSA, e is a number of 3 or more and n is 256 bits
The above public keys may be used, and both are public data.
Since it is difficult to obtain an encryption function from this decryption function as a feature of RSA, confidentiality is maintained. In step 698c, plaintext data Mn is output.

Now, returning to step 697h in FIG. 86, it is checked whether the plain text is correct. If Yes, it is checked at step 697i whether n is the final value. If No, the process returns to step 697f and step 697j is returned only if YES.
Go to, check if the plaintext data match method for all ciphers,
If Yes, check whether all the data of M _{1 to} Mn match, if No, stop, and if Yes, step 6
The physical characteristic information or the like is output at 97 m, the measured physical characteristic information data is measured at step 697 n, the both are compared at step 697 p, and if No, the operation is stopped, and if Yes, the operation is permitted. Next, in step 697r, based on the sub-encryption decryption information, the sub-encryptor decrypts the encrypted Scrabble Key and understands the sub-encryption of the ID number and specific data. If Taira culture is OK in step 697s, run it,
If NO, stop.

In this case, the sub-encryption decoder is plainly defined by the master encryption decoder in the ROM of the drive. Therefore,
This has the effect of preventing a pirated trader from duplicating the sub-encryption encoder and decoder by switching them. Also, if you have n master encryption keys and all the keys are leaked, the pirated version will not work. Duplicate one-way function encryption keys can greatly improve security.

A flow chart of encryption using an elliptic function will be described with reference to FIGS. 95 and 96 as a function different from the RSA function. As a large routine, the first physical characteristic information is created in step 735a, the authentication code of the first physical characteristic information is created in step 735f, the first physical characteristic information is authenticated in step 735n, and step 735.
Check the disc with w.

First, in step 735a, step 7
At 35b, the physical characteristics of the disc are measured to obtain the first physical characteristic information. In step 735c, the first physical feature information, the ID number, and the sub-encryption decoder number are combined, compressed in step 735d, and the information H compressed in step 735e is obtained.

At step 735f, an authentication number is created. First, in step 735g, a secret key X of X = 128 bits or more is input, and in step 735h, the public system parameter G is determined at a point on the elliptic curve, and f
When (x) is a one-way function and k is a secret random number, after R = f (G ^k ) is calculated, R ′ = f (R) is calculated and S = (K XR'-H) X
^In step 735i, the authentication ciphers R and S are generated by the formula of ⁻¹ modQ. In step 735j, the authentication code R, S
The plain text H including the first physical characteristic information is recorded on the disc or the master disc, and the disc is shipped at step 735k.

On the other hand, on the reproducing apparatus side, the disk is loaded in step 735m, and the authentication codes R and S are loaded in step 735p.
Then, the public parameters G and Q are obtained in step 735q, the public key Y of 128 bits or more is input in step 735r, and the decryption operation is performed in step 735s. And ^{Y = G x, A = SR} -1 modQ, B = HR - 1
The modQ is calculated. At step 735t, R = f
Performs the operation of (Y ^A G ^B), verifies whether the left and right sides coincide. If NO, it is determined to be a duplicate disk in step 735u and stopped in step 735v. If the answer is Yes, it means that the plaintext H has not been tampered with, and thus the process proceeds to step 735w. In step 735w of FIG. 96, the flat interval H
The first physical feature information and ID in step 736b.
Output the number and the sub-encryption decoder number. Step 73
At 6c, the physical characteristics of the disk are measured and the second physical characteristic information is obtained. In step 736d, the first in the matching unit
The physical characteristic information is collated with the second physical characteristic information, and step 7
It is checked at 36e whether the collation results match, and if NO, the display is "duplicate disk" at step 736f, and the program is stopped at step 736g. If Yes, the process proceeds to step 736h to execute the program or output the reproduction data. With the elliptic function, since the equal part of the first physical feature information and the authentication code are sent, there is an effect that the encryption / decryption time can be shortened because the data amount of the authentication code is small.

Next, the cryptographic information for pirated copy protection is sent to the optical disk.
The second recording area 70 in which TOC etc. are recorded in the master recording process
The method of recording in FIG.
-It will be explained using a chart. FIG. 88 (a) shows a master 70
Of 0a, mainly program software and video signals are recorded
For recording a signal in the first recording area 707 for recording
You In the case of a normal CD or LD, there is a TOC on the inner circumference,
And record from the inner circumference. However, the present invention reproduces
In the case of a normal signal, the recording signal is output in the direction opposite to the time axis.
The force unit 723 generates a signal. Therefore, the flow of FIG. 89
At step 711b of the chart, the optical head 6 is moved to the outer circumference.
Signal is started to be recorded from the optical section, and the optical head 6 moves to the inner peripheral direction.
It is racked and has a spiral shape like the first recording line 709.
Pits are recorded in the first recording area 707. This time,
At the same time, in the mastering device, the rotation angle of the motor 17
The detection unit 17a generates highly accurate rotation angle data and records it.
Data such as an address is output from the recording signal output unit 723.
It Therefore, in the physical characteristic measuring unit 703,
Simulate. By this, on the master
What kind of pits are formed
Can be simulated by the CPU 724 in units
It Thus, in step 711c, all of the master disks are
The physical characteristic information is measured and added in step 711d.
The angle at which each pit that has a certain relationship with the master
Location, and extract features that are extremely difficult to duplicate
I do. Just what address the pit is at
Information can be used. Also, pits of adjacent trucks
Accidentally searched for an area with the same pit table and pit arrangement.
However, this angular position or address position and track number
The phase pit data string may be used as the physical characteristic information. Physics
The signature information is shown in FIGS. 10, 18, 20, 38, and 43.
I have repeatedly explained various methods, so the explanation is omitted.
I do. In step 711e, ID is added to the physical characteristic information.
The number and the sub-encrypted decrypted data are combined, and step 694 is performed.
Sent to a plurality of encryption devices, received by the n-th encryption device,
In step 694j, it is encrypted by the nth encryption encoder,
Send in step 694k. This routine is shown in Figure 83.
Since it is shown in FIG. 84, it is omitted. Next step 711
encrypted by the one-way function cryptographic encoder 537 at f
Code C ₁~ C_nIs received and multiple ciphers are received in step 711g.
Encryption C received from the encryption center ₁~ C_nAnd synthesize the second
FIG. 88 shows a signal that is combined with the recording signal and that is continuous with the first recording signal.
It is created by the recording signal processing unit 723 of (a) and is stored in the recording unit 37.
Eddy on the recorded inner circumference of TOC etc. of master 700b
The pits of the second recording line 710 are recorded on the inner circumference side in a striped pattern,
Recording is completed in step 711h.

Normally, the master is created in the direction from the inner circumference to the outer circumference, that is, in the same direction as the reproduction direction at the time of reproduction. However, in the present invention, the time axis of the recording signal is reversed, the recording is performed from the outer circumference to the inner circumference to create the master, and finally the pirated copy prevention signal is recorded, so that one continuous pit can be formed. Therefore, the prevention of pirated copy is realized in the standard such as CD.

Next, the reproducing operation will be described with reference to the block diagram of the information processing apparatus shown in FIG. 90 and the flowchart at the time of reproducing shown in FIG. In step 712a, first, the second recording area 708 including the TOC area and the like is reproduced. This step is the same as for CD. Next, in step 712b, the information such as the _first to nth ciphers C _{1 to} C _n and the TOC is reproduced, and step 7
12c, a plurality of first to nth encryption decoders 534 with fixed keys in the ROM 699 of the master encryption decoder 534.
The ciphers C _{1 to} C _n are shown in FIG.
7 using Cryptographic Decoding Routine 698
_{1 to} M _n are obtained. In step 712d, M _{1 to} M _n, that is, physical characteristic information, sub-encryption decryption information, and ID number are output from the plaintext information output unit 714. In step 712e, the plaintext data collation unit 715 checks whether or not a part or all of M _{1 to} M _n are all the same. Step 712f
If OK, go to step 712f; if NO, go to step 71
3 and enter the stop routine. In this routine, the CPU 665 displays "Duplicate Disk" on the display unit 16 in step 713a, stops the program or reproduction operation by the program / reproduction operation stopping unit 717 in step 713b, and stops in step 713c.

Returning to step 712g, if Yes, the reproduction is started, and at step 712h, the physical characteristic measuring unit 703.
The address of the disk, the rotation angle, and the low reflection portion are obtained by a. Then, an off-track instruction signal is given to the tracking control unit 24, a light beam is caused to travel between tracks, a crosstalk signal is taken, an in-phase signal is detected, and a data string is obtained. In this way, the measured physical characteristic information of the first recording area 707 or the second recording area 708 is obtained. As shown in FIG.
This method has been described above and will be omitted. Step 712
In j, the physical characteristic information collating unit 535 collates the measured physical characteristic information with the physical characteristic information. If the collation result is incorrect in step 712j, the process proceeds to the stop routine 713 in step 713d. In the case of OK, in step 712k, the program / reproduction operation permission unit 722 continues the reproduction or permits the operation of the program.

In step 712m, it is checked whether or not the sub-encryption decoder is used. If NO, the process jumps to step 712r to output data, and if Yes, step 712.
At n and 712p, the encrypted signal in the first recording area is reproduced and plain-text is reproduced. Alternatively, the descrambling key added to the variable length coding unit 683 described with reference to FIG. 77 is encrypted with this sub-encryption, and the scramble signal is recorded on the optical disc.
In step 681h of the flowchart at the time of reproduction, the descrambling Key is descrambled by the sub-encryption decoder of FIG. 91, so that the user of the regular disc can reproduce the complete video. On the other hand, since an illegally duplicated disc cannot be descrambled, there is an effect that only a variable length code component, that is, a bad image without a high frequency component can be reproduced. Then, in step 712q, the data encrypted by the sub-encryption or the video signal in which the scrambled video signal is descrambled is output, and in step 7
At 12r, the final data is output from the output unit.

As described above, the time axis of the recorded data is reversed as shown in FIG. 88, the data is recorded from the outer circumference to the inner circumference, and the master disk is created to realize a write-once anti-piracy disk with one spiral track. To do. Since there is no need to change the standard and the write-once data can be reproduced by a normal optical head, there is an effect that the configuration is simplified.

[0115]

As described above, according to the present invention, the reliability of the medium having the magnetic recording portion on the back side of the optical recording surface and the recording / reproducing device can be ensured in the usage environment for consumer use while satisfying the standard such as CD. However, it can be realized at a cost for consumer use. In addition, by encrypting the physical ID of the disk with a one-way encryption encoder, it is possible to increase the safety level of copy protection.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a mastering device according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

2A is a time change diagram of linear velocity during recording in the first embodiment, and FIG. 2B is 1.2 m / cm on the optical disc in the first embodiment.
FIG. 6C shows the address position at the time of s.
Figure of address position when s → 1.4m / s

FIG. 3 is a physical layout diagram of addresses of a regular CD and a physical layout diagram of addresses of an illegally duplicated CD in the first embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a relationship between a disk rotation pulse, a physical position signal, address information and time in the first embodiment.

FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram of a CD copy prevention principle according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart for checking an illegally duplicated disk according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 8A is a process diagram of a CD on which an ID number is recorded in the first embodiment, and FIG. 8B is a process diagram of a conventional CD.

FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram of a magnetizing machine according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a principle diagram of ID number input in the first embodiment.

FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram of a physical arrangement of linear velocities and addresses according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram of a method for discriminating an illegally duplicated master disc of the regular master disc according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram of a CD creator and a recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 14 is a flowchart in the first embodiment.

FIG. 15 is a layout diagram of addresses of a disk master according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 16 is a block diagram of a recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram of a pit depth detection method for an illegally duplicated disc and a legitimate disc according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 18 is a diagram showing a disk physical layout table in the first embodiment.

FIG. 19 is an address layout diagram of an optical disc in the case where there is no eccentricity and the case where there is an eccentricity in the first embodiment

FIG. 20 is a diagram showing tracking displacement amounts of a regular disk and an illegally duplicated disk according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 21 is an address An and an angle Z in the first embodiment.
n, tracking amount Tn, and pit depth Dn

FIG. 22 is a diagram showing a laser output, a pit depth, and a reproduction signal according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 23 is a diagram showing an effect of preventing duplication for each master disk forming apparatus in the first embodiment.

FIG. 24 is a block diagram of a master recording device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 25 is a block diagram of a master disk creating apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 26 is a block diagram of a master disk creating apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 27 is a block diagram of a master recording device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 28 is a block diagram of the master recording device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 29 is an overall block diagram of a master disk creating system according to the first embodiment.

30A is a waveform diagram of laser output in the first embodiment, FIG. 30B is a waveform diagram of laser output in the first embodiment, FIG. 30C is a sectional view of a substrate in the first embodiment, and FIG. Sectional view of the substrate in Example 1 (e) is a sectional view of the molding disk in Example 1

FIG. 31 is a diagram showing a relationship between a laser recording output and a reproduction signal according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 32 is a process diagram of making a master according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 33 is an explanatory diagram of a master disk and its press die according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 34 is a process diagram of making a master according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 35 is an explanatory diagram of a production master and its press die according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 36 is a process flowchart of master recording and recording medium manufacturing according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 37 is a flowchart of the disk check method according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 38 is a block diagram of disc creation and disc creation in the first embodiment.

FIG. 39 is a block diagram of the low-reflectance portion position detection portion in the first embodiment

FIG. 40 is a block diagram of the recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 41 is an explanatory diagram of a disc according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 42 is a principle diagram of the address / clock position detection of the low reflection portion in the first embodiment.

FIG. 43 is a comparison diagram of the low reflection section address tables of the regular disc and the duplicate disc in Example 1.

FIG. 44 is a flowchart of disc matching by a one-way function in the first embodiment.

FIG. 45 is a comparison diagram of the coordinate position of the address for each master according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 46 is a flowchart of a low reflection position detection program in the first embodiment.

FIG. 47 is a process chart of the method for manufacturing the low reflection portion in Example 1.

FIG. 48 is a process drawing of the method for manufacturing the low reflection portion in Example 1.

FIG. 49 is a process drawing of the method for manufacturing the low-reflection portion in Example 1.

FIG. 50 is a process drawing of the method for manufacturing the low reflection portion in Example 1.

FIG. 51 is a top view of the disc in Example 1.

FIG. 52 is a data structure diagram of the master cipher in the first embodiment.

FIG. 53 is a physical generation diagram according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 54 is a principle diagram of copy detection by the error CP code according to the first embodiment.

55 is a principle diagram of copy detection by the EFM patent code in Embodiment 1. FIG.

FIG. 56 is a diagram of an EFM conversion table for copy prevention in the first example.

FIG. 57 is a flowchart of a method of selecting a plurality of sub-encryption encoders according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 58 is a flowchart of a method for permitting installation in the first embodiment.

FIG. 59 is a principle diagram of a copy-prevention type disc using an optical mark in Example 1.

FIG. 60 is a manufacturing process diagram of the low reflection portion of the optical disc in Example 1.

FIG. 61 is a manufacturing process diagram of the first low-reflection portion and the second low-reflection portion of the optical disc in Example 1.

62A is a block diagram of an off-track type recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment. FIG. 62B is a diagram of tracking of an on-track state of the off-track method according to the first embodiment. Off-track state tracking diagram

FIG. 63 is a principle diagram of a duplication prevention method in which the angular arrangement detection method and the off-track signal method are combined in the first embodiment.

64 (a) is a top view showing the arrangement of foreign matter on the label surface of the CD in Example 1; FIG. 64 (b) is a CD display state diagram of the display section in Example 1; FIG.

FIG. 65 is a display state diagram of an error message on the display unit according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 66 is a flowchart of a cleaning instruction according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 67 is a manufacturing process diagram of a barcode by cutting in Example 1.

FIG. 68 is a manufacturing process diagram of the first reflective film and the second reflective film in Example 1.

FIG. 69 is a block diagram of the magnetic recording apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 70 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 71 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 72 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 73 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 74 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 75 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 76 is a ROM section and a RAM of the optical disc according to the first embodiment.
Data hierarchy diagram of department

FIG. 77 is a block diagram of an image encoding unit according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 78 is a block diagram of an image compression encoder according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 79 is a flowchart of the operation of the first embodiment.

FIG. 80 is a flowchart of the installation program of the embodiment.

81 is a screen display diagram of the first embodiment. FIG.

FIG. 82 is a block diagram of a recording / reproducing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 83 is a flowchart of encryption in the first embodiment.

FIG. 84 is a flowchart of the main cipher according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 85 is a flowchart of a reflective film recording routine according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 86 is a flowchart for reproducing a disc according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 87 is a flowchart of cryptographic decoding in the first embodiment.

FIG. 88 is a block diagram of a mastering device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 89 is a flowchart for creating a master according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 90 is a block diagram of an information processing apparatus according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 91 is a flowchart at the time of reproducing information in the first embodiment.

FIG. 92 is a diagram showing the principle of regeneration of in-phase Shingo in the same Example 1.

FIG. 93 (a) Principle diagram of the two-point matching method in the first embodiment (b) Principle diagram of the three-point matching method in the first embodiment

FIG. 94 is a principle diagram of a four-point matching method in the first embodiment.

FIG. 95 is a flowchart (No. 1) according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 96 is a flowchart (No. 2) in the first embodiment.

FIG. 97 is a top view of a second low reflection portion in the first embodiment.

[Explanation of symbols]

1 recording / reproducing apparatus 2 recording medium 3 magnetic recording layer 4 optical recording layer 5 light transmitting layer 6 optical head 7 optical recording block 8 magnetic head 8a main magnetic pole 8b auxiliary magnetic pole 8c head cap 8e uniform magnetic field area 8m magnetic field modulation magnetic head 8s for canceling Magnetic head 9 Magnetic recording block 17 Motor 18 Optical head 19 Head stand 23 Head moving actuator 23a Traverse actuator 24a Traverse moving circuit 34 Memory 34a Memory (for system) 37 Optical recording circuit 37a Time axis circuit 37b Optical recording unit 37c Optical output unit 37d Synthesizing unit 38a Clock reproduction circuit 40 Coil 40a Magnetic field modulation coil 40b Magnetic recording coil 40c Tap 40d Tap 40e Tap 41 Slider 42 Disk cassette 43 Printing base layer 44 Printing area 45 Printing 6 Pits 47 Substrate 48 Light Reflecting Layer 49 Printing Ink 50 Protective Layer 51 Arrow 52 Optical Recording Signal 54 Lens 57 Light Emitting Section 60 Adhesive Layer 61 Magnetic Recording Signal 65 Optical Track 66 Focus 67 Magnetic Track 67a Recording Magnetic Track 67b Reproducing Magnetic Track 67s Servo Magnetic track 67f Guard band 67g Guard band 67x Cleaning track 69 High μ magnetic layer 70 Head gap 70a Recording head gap 70b Reproducing head gap 81 Interference layer 84 Reflective film 85 Modulating magnetic field 85a Magnetic flux 85b Magnetic flux 150 Coupling portion 201 Discrimination step 202 Playback Step 203 Playback transfer step 204 Playback only step 205 Recording transfer step 206 Recording step 207 Transfer step 210 Degaussing area 210a Degaussing area 210b Degaussing area 01 Shutter 302 Head hole 303 Liner hole 304 Liner 305 Liner support 305a Movable part 305b Sub liner support 305c Liner lifting part 307 Groove 307a Liner drive groove 310 Liner pin 311 Liner pin guide 312 Pin drive lever 313 Recognition hole 314 Protective pin 315 Liner drive unit 316 Pin shaft 317 Spring 318 Connection unit 319 Pin shutter 320 Optical address 321a Center 321b Center 321c Center 322 Optical data string 323 Address 324 Data 325 Guard band 326 Track group 327 block 328 Track data 328 Sync signal 329 Address 330 Parity 331 Data 333 Separation circuit 334 Modulation circuit 335 Disk circuit angle detection unit 33 Eccentricity correction amount memory 337 No signal part 338 Traverse control part 339 Optical address magnetic address correspondence table 340 Head amplifier 341 Demodulator 342 Error check part 343 Data separation part 344 AND circuit 345 Recorded data 346 Non-light address area 347 Optical address area 348 Magnetic TOC area 349 Track locus 350 Head reproducing section 351 Memory data 352 Coating material pot 353 Coating material transfer roll 354 Intaglio drum 355 Etching section 356 Scriber 357 Soft transfer roll 358 Coating section 360 Magnetic shield 361 Resin section 362 Random magnetic field generator 363 Traverse rack 363b Magnetic head traverse shack 364 Position reference part 365 Disc lock part 366 Traverse connection part 367 Travers Gear 367c magnetic head traverse gear 368 reference table 369 synchronization part 370 recording format 371 track number part 372 data part 373 CRC part 374 gap part 375 connection part guide part 376 disk cleaning part 377 magnetic head cleaning part 378 noise canceller 380 disk cleaning Part connection part 381 Magnetic sensor 382 Optical reproduction clock signal 383 Magnetic clock signal 384 Magnetic recording signal 385 Discrimination window time 386 Optical sensor 387 Optical mark 387a Bar code 388 Translucent part 389 Upper lid 390 Cassette pig 391 Magnetic surface shutter 392 Shutter coupling Part 393 Cassette pig rotating shaft 394 Cassette insertion port 395 Tape 396 Label part 397 Buzzer 398 Magnetic Recording area 399 Screen printer 400 Bar code printer 401 High Hc part 402 Magnetic part 402a Spatial part 403 Magnetic part 404 Key management table 405 Flowchart step 406 Key release decoder 407 Voice expansion block 408 Personal computer 409 Hard disk 410 Installation step 411 Application 412 OS 413 BIOS 414 Drive 415 Interface 416 Flowchart step 421 Optical file 422 Magnetic file 436 Network BIOS 437 LAN network 447 Flowchart step 447a Flowchart step 448 Corrected data 449 Display 450 Keypad 451 Error correction step 452 Parity 453 C Parity 454 C2 Parity 455 Index 456 Subcode synchronization detection unit 457 Index detection unit 458 Frequency divider 459 Magnetic synchronization signal detection unit 460 Shortest / longest pulse detection unit 461 Pseudo optical synchronization signal generation unit 462 Pseudo magnetic synchronization signal generation unit 463 Optical synchronization Signal detector 464 Frequency divider / multiplier 465 Changeover switch 466 Waveform shaping section 467 Clock reproducing section 468 Media identifier 469 Optical address information 470 Data 514 Spring 514a Head elevation connecting means 514b Head elevation prohibiting means 514c Optical head traveling area 516 Loading motor 517 Loading gear 518 Tray moving gear 519 Head lifter 520 Tray 521 Open / close shaft of upper pig 522 Menu screen / selection number table 523 Playback control Information 524 Steps of Flowchart 525 List ID Offset Table 526 Optical Search Information 527 Magnetic Tratch Search Information 528 Master Data 529 Mastering Device 530 Data Placement 531 Zone 532 Physical Placement Table 533 Illegal Disk Check Circuit 534 Cryptographic Decoder 535 Matching Circuit 536 Output / Operation Stopping means 537 Cryptographic encoder 538 Cryptographic signal 539 Physical position 540 Magnetizing machine 541 Magnetizing part 542 Magnetic pole 543 Magnetic current generator 544 Current switch 545a Coil 546 ID number generator 547 Mixer 548 Separation key 549 Separator 550 ID Number 551 Flowchart step 552 Physical location signal 553 Angular position detector 554 Tracking amount detector 555 Pit depth detector 556 Measurement Fixed disk physical layout table 557 Disk center 558 Disk rotation center 559 Eccentric part 560 Pit 561 Copy pit 562 Pulse signal 563 Copy protection signal 564 Tracking modulation signal generation part 565 Copy protection signal generation part 566 Light output Modulation signal generation part 567 Light Output modulation unit 568 Pulse width modulation unit 569 Pulse width adjustment unit 570 Output address information unit 571 Time axis change unit 572 Master disc 573 Photosensitive layer 574 Photosensitive unit 575 Metal master disc 576 Molding disc 577 Second photosensitive unit 578 Communication interface unit 579 External code decoder 580 Pit group 581 Reproduced waveform 582 Random extractor 583 Random number generator 565 screen 566 steps (step virtual file flowchart) 567 window 568 folder 569 file File 570 CD-ROM icon 571 CD-ROM-RAM icon 572 HDD 573 Invisible file 574 Invisible Folder 575 display 576 Physical capacity display 577 Virtual capacity display 578 Password input section 579 File name input section 584 Low reflection section 585 6 Low standard reflection section 585 Low reflected light amount detection unit 587 Light amount level comparator 588 Light amount reference value 589 HPF 590 Waveform shaping circuit 590a AGC 591 Demodulation unit 592 EFM 593 Physical address output unit 594 Address output unit 595 Sync signal output unit 596 Low reflection unit address / clock number position Signal output unit 597 n-1 Address output unit 598 Clock counter 599 Low reflection portion start / end position detection unit 600 Low reflection portion position detection unit 601 Low reflection Part angular position signal output section 602 low-reflection section angular position detecting section 603 n-1 address signal 604 synchronizing signal 605 low-reflection section start point 606 low-reflection section end point 607 time delay correcting section 608 reference delay time T _D measuring unit 609 Low Reflection part / address table 610 Evaporation prevention part 611 Protective layer 612 Ink 613 Light shielding part 614 Adhesive part 615 First mask 616 Second mask 617 Printing part 618 CP light mark part 619 Cryptographic data recording part 620 Bar code 621 Bar code demodulation part 622 Character pattern 623 Heating unit 624 Heating head 625 Film 626 Disk physical ID 627 Stamper physical ID 628 Disk management ID 629 Master cipher 630 Writing layer 631 Error code-Address table 632 CP error code 633 Physical ID output unit 63 Error code list 635 Standard code 636 CPEFM conversion table 637 Original data 638 Decoded data 639 CP special code 640 CP special code detection unit 641 CP special code address output unit 642 CP special code-address table 643 Laser trimming device 644 Laser beam deflector 645 Off-track switching circuit 646 Track servo polarity reversing unit 647 Off-track signal reproducing unit 648 Optical sensor 649 Light beam spot 650 In-phase reproducing signal 651 In-phase reproducing signal 652 In-phase reproducing signal 653 In-phase signal block 654 Frame Sync signal 655 Foreign material 656 Pulse width Modulation signal demodulation unit 657 Reproduction output detection unit 658 Reproduction output reference value 659 Reproduction output reduction unit 660 Offset voltage detection unit 661 Adjuster switching unit 662 2 Recovery Device 663 2 Personal computer 664 Network 665 CPU 666 Step (Install program) 667 Step (Regular disk collation routine) 668 Step (Machine ID collation creation / recording routine) 669 Step (Regular encryption decoder collation routine) 670 Step (Illegal copy software use termination routine) ) 671 step (program operation routine) 672 step (operation stop routine of the same ID number software) 673 step (program movement detection step) 674 step (machine ID verification step) 675 step (encryption / decryption verification step) 676 Personal computer 677 CD- ROM layer 678 Virtual ROM layer 679 Write-once layer 680 Recording layer 700 Master disc 701 Recording layer 702 703 Physical characteristic information measurement unit 704 Physical characteristic information transmitting unit 705 Physical characteristic information receiving unit 706 Plain text information output unit 707 First recording area 708 Second recording area 709 First recording line 710 Second recording line 711 Step (master disk recording flowchart) 712 Step (playback flowchart) 713 Step (stop routine) 714 Plaintext information output unit 715 Plaintext data collation unit 716 Plaintext data match detection unit 717 Program operation stop unit 718 Sub-encryption decoder 719 RAM unit 720 Sub-encryption decryption data 721 Plaintext data output unit 722 Program / playback operation stop Part 723 Recording signal output part 724 CPU

─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuation of the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁶ Identification number Office reference number FI technical display location G11B 19/04 501 G11B 19/04 501H 20/10 351 9463-5D 20/10 351B (31) Priority Patent claim number 7-15318 (32) Priority date Hei 7 (1995) February 1 (33) Priority claiming country Japan (JP) (31) Priority claim number Japanese patent application 7-16153 (32) Priority Day Hei 7 (1995) February 2 (33) Priority claiming countries Japan (JP)

Claims (77)

[Claims] 1. A means (17) for rotationally driving a disk-shaped optical recording medium (2) in which information is recorded as pits, and an optical head (6) for reading recorded information from the optical recording medium, In an information reproducing apparatus having a head moving means (23) movable in the radial direction of the optical recording medium and a signal processing means for processing information read by the optical head, at least pits of the optical recording medium are provided. A physical characteristic including a two-dimensional arrangement or a shape of a pit, which is recorded by the optical head or the magnetic head as first physical characteristic information (532) encrypted and recorded at the time of manufacturing the optical recording medium. First physical information detection means (743, 38, 665) for detecting from the read information, encryption / decryption means (534) for decoding the first physical characteristic information, and the optical recording medium Means (17a, 6, 38, 703a) for measuring the physical characteristics to obtain the second physical characteristic information, and the second physical characteristic information are collated with the first physical characteristic information, and a specific relationship between them is established. Collating means (535) for determining whether or not there is
When the second physical characteristic information is not in the specific relationship with the first physical characteristic information by the collating means,
Whether the operation of a specific program read from the optical recording medium is stopped, the subsequent reading of information from the optical recording medium is stopped, or a predetermined processing by the signal processing unit of information read from the optical recording medium is performed. And a control means (717, 665) for stopping the processing. 2. A public key cryptosystem function (695b, 698).
(b, 735h) is used for a decryption operation (698b, 735s), and the encryption / decryption means (534) for obtaining the plaintext including the first physical characteristic information is provided for decrypting the encryption. apparatus. 3. A second physical characteristic information detecting means for obtaining second physical characteristic information by detecting the coordinate position of the optical recording signal on the optical recording medium by the coordinate position detecting means (335). The playback device according to claim 2. 4. A coordinate position detecting means for obtaining second physical characteristic information by an angular position detecting means (17a) for detecting an angular position of a specific recording signal on a recording medium. Playback device. 5. The reproduction according to claim 4, further comprising a coordinate detecting means using a rotation detecting means (17) for detecting rotation of a motor as a detecting means for detecting an arrangement angle of a recording signal as the coordinate position detecting means. apparatus. 6. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 5, further comprising a motor rotation pulse detecting means (17a) as the rotation detecting means. 7. A rotation detecting means for detecting rotation by obtaining a rotation pulse signal larger in number than the rotation pulses by time-dividing the rotation pulse signal of the motor by the time division means (737). The reproducing apparatus according to claim 6. 8. An FG (17) attached to a motor
6. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 5, further comprising rotation detecting means for detecting rotation from the rotation pulse signal of. 9. Tracking displacement amount detecting means (554)
By detecting the tracking displacement amount,
3. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 2, further comprising a second physical characteristic information detecting means for detecting physical characteristic information. 10. A track displacement amount (554) of two or more specific recording signals which are on adjacent tracks and are arranged at the same angle, and an arrangement angle of each of the recording signals (angle position detecting means). The reproduction apparatus according to claim 9, wherein the second physical characteristic information is obtained by performing detection according to 553). 11. A track displacement amount is detected by a tracking amount detection means (554) which detects reflected light from an optical recording layer by a plurality of light receiving portions (24b, 24c) divided in a tracking direction and obtains a tracking error signal. 10. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 9, further comprising track displacement amount detecting means (24a) for detecting. 12. A pit depth detecting means (555) for detecting the second physical characteristic information by detecting the pit depth of a specific recording signal is provided in the second physical characteristic information detecting means. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the reproducing apparatus is characterized in that: 13. A pit depth detecting means (555) for detecting a pit area having a shallow pit depth by using a multilevel slicer (555b) having a slice level of two or more levels.
13. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 12, further comprising: 14. A second pit group (56) having a shallower pit depth than the first pit group recorded after the first pit group (561a) of a specific recording signal consisting of pits of normal depth.
14. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 13, further comprising pit depth detecting means (555) for detecting 0c). 15. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 14, wherein a frame synchronization signal (738) is used as the specific recording signal. 16. A learning pit group (5
60a) to detect the first offset voltage (746) of the first slice level, set the first slice level with the first offset voltage, and reproduce the second put group (560b). 14. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 13, further comprising a detecting unit. 17. A pit depth detecting means (555) for obtaining second physical characteristic information by measuring a pit length of a pit group satisfying a first slice level and a pit length of a pit group satisfying a second slice level. 14. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 13, further comprising: 18. A slice level having a lower light quantity is set to a first slice level.
When the slice level is set, a multi-level slicer (555b) receives a pit detection signal that satisfies only the first slice level and does not satisfy the second slice level, and the counter (555c) receives the number (739) of the detection signals. 14. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 13, further comprising a pit depth detecting unit (555) for obtaining the second physical characteristic information by measuring. 19. The reproducing means detects a first low reflection portion (740) having a small amount of reflected light due to the internal pressure of the pit and a high reflection portion (741) having a higher reflectance than the first reflection portion due to the non-pit portion. A second low reflection portion (584) provided in the optical recording signal area (742) of the device for reproducing the first optical recording signal and having a reflectance lower than that of the first low reflection portion. Second low-reflectance portion detection means (586) for detecting the second low-reflectance portion whose reflected light quantity is lower than that of the reflection portion
2. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising second physical characteristic information detecting means for obtaining the second physical characteristic information based on the detection signal of. 20. A level slicer having a binary slice level or more is used, and the first optical recording signal is sliced at the first slice level in the first level slicer (386) to obtain a first digital signal from the first optical reproduction signal. A second level slicer (586) for detecting the second low reflection part by slicing the reproduction signal at a second slice level corresponding to the reproduction signal having a light quantity value lower than the first slice level in the second level slicer (586); 20. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 19, further comprising: 2 low reflection portion detecting means. 21. Based on the information of the second low reflection part detection signal of the second low reflection part detection means (586) and the first light reproduction signal detected by the reproduction means (590), 21. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 20, further comprising a second low reflection portion position detecting means (696) for detecting the position and / or the length in the circumferential direction and / or the interval in the circumferential direction. 22. When the mark signal detection unit (593) detects a specific mark signal of the first optical reproduction signal, the position and / or the circumferential direction of the second low reflection unit is detected based on the output mark detection signal. 22. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 21, further comprising a second low reflection portion position detecting means (596) for detecting a length and / or an interval. 23. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 22, further comprising a mark signal detecting section (593) for detecting an address signal as the mark signal. 24. A counter (59) for the reproduced clock signal.
8) A second low reflection portion position position detection means (596) for detecting the position or / and the length in the circumferential direction of the second low reflection portion based on the count number counted in 8) and the address signal. 24. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 23. 25. Address signal and counter means (59)
25. The second low reflection part position detection means (596) for detecting the position of the second low reflection part based on the number of counts of the frame synchronization signal and the reproduction clock signal counted in 8) is provided. Playback device. 26. A second low reflection part position detection means (596) for detecting the position of the second low reflection part based on the address signal of the first optical reproduction signal and the frame synchronization signal. 23. A reproducing apparatus according to item 23. 27. A counter (598) for counting the number of reproduction clocks of the synchronizing signal reproduction means (38a) based on the first optical reproduction signal.
And a second low reflection portion position detection means (596) for detecting the position of the second low reflection portion and / or the length in the circumferential direction or / and the interval information in the circumferential direction by counting with. 24. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 23, which is characterized in that. 28. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 27, further comprising a synchronizing signal reproducing means for detecting a clock signal of the synchronizing clock reproducing means (38a) of the EFM demodulating means (592) as a synchronizing signal. 29. A mark signal detection unit (59) for detecting a specific signal in a subcode signal of a CD as a mark signal.
23. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 22, further comprising 3). 30. The reference mark detection signal detected by the mark signal detection means (593) and the second low reflection portion detection portion (58).
The time correction unit (607) measures the time interval with the reference second reflection unit detection signal detected by 6) to obtain the reference correction time,
A second position detecting unit detects the position of the second reflection unit detection signal by correcting the time interval between the specific mark signal detection signal and the second reflection unit detection signal by the time correction unit (607) with the reference correction time. 22. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 21, further comprising low-reflecting portion position detecting means (596). 31. A second low-reflectance portion detecting means (586) for detecting only a second low-reflection portion whose length in the track direction is longer than that of the first low-reflection portion.
The playback device described. 32. The second low reflection portion is detected by the first detection signal of the second low reflection portion detected by the second low reflection portion detecting means (586) and the second detection signal of the angle detecting means (355) of the rotating means. 20. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 19, further comprising second physical characteristic information detecting means for obtaining second physical characteristic information by detecting an angular position where the unit is arranged on the recording medium. 33. A second low reflection part detection signal detected by a second low reflection part detection means (586) and a light regenerating means (59).
0) The second physical characteristic for obtaining the second physical characteristic information by measuring the start position and the end position of the second low reflection part based on the clock signal and / or the frame synchronization signal of the first optical reproduction signal. 20. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 19, further comprising information detecting means. 34. The second physical characteristic information is detected by using an error signal detecting means (633) as the physical characteristic information detecting means and detecting the presence or absence of an error signal (632) of a specific recording signal at a specific address. The second physical feature detecting means (635) for
The playback device described. 35. A collating means (535) for issuing a stop command when the number of error signals of a specific recording signal indicated in the first physical characteristic information does not exceed a predetermined number (535b). The reproducing apparatus according to claim 34. 36. A special code detecting means (640) is used as the physical characteristic information detecting means, and a special code (639) which is not in the regular first code decoding table in the code decoding means exists in a specific recording signal area. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising a second physical characteristic information detecting unit that obtains the second physical characteristic information by detecting the fact. 37. When the special code (639) does not exist in the specific recording signal area indicated by the first physical characteristic information,
37. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 36, further comprising a collating means (535) for outputting a stop command. 38. The second physical characteristic detection means includes a pit arrangement detection means (747) for detecting the pit arrangement of two or more adjacent tracks in a specific area indicated by the first physical characteristic information of the recording medium. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:
The playback device described. 39. A pit array detection means (747) for detecting an area in which the pit arrays of two adjacent tracks are in phase or in phase is provided.
8. The playback device according to item 8. 40. A pit array detection means (747) for obtaining second physical characteristic information by detecting position information of an in-phase pit area in which pits having the longest pit length of a recording signal are arrayed in phase. 40. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 39, which is characterized in that. 41. An in-phase / anti-phase signal position detecting means (748) for detecting the position of the in-phase pit area by using the address information and the reproduction clock signal and obtaining a part of the second physical characteristic information (734) is provided. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 40, characterized in that: 42. A specific in-phase signal detection section (749) for detecting a specific in-phase signal (654a) corresponding to a specific pit length from the detection signal of the in-phase / negative-phase signal detection means (747).
40. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 39, further comprising: 43. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 42, further comprising a specific in-phase signal detection section (749) for detecting an in-phase signal (654a) of the frame synchronization signal as the specific in-phase signal. 44. In-phase signals (654a, 654b) corresponding to an in-phase pit array of three or more adjacent tracks.
40. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 39, further comprising an in-phase / negative-phase signal detecting means (747) for detecting the. 45. In-phase / reverse-phase detecting means (747) for detecting a specific in-phase signal (654a, 654b) in which the pit having the longest pit length is arranged in-phase on three adjacent tracks as an in-phase signal. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 44, further comprising: 46. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 45, further comprising a specific in-phase signal detection section (749) for detecting an in-phase signal (654a) of the frame synchronization signal as the specific in-phase signal. 47. An off-tracking means (646) provided in the tracking means (24) for tracking between two tracks is used to generate an in-phase signal or a reverse-phase signal of pits of two tracks. The in-phase / anti-phase signal detection means (747) for detecting the in-phase area or the anti-phase area of the pit arrangement of both two tracks by reproducing and obtaining the second physical characteristic information is provided. 39. A reproducing device according to item 39. 48. Off-tracking control means (64) according to an off-track switching signal from the control means (10).
According to 6), the state in which the light beam travels on one track is switched to the state where the light beam travels on the intermediate portion of the two tracks, and the in-phase signal or the in-phase signal of the two tracks is reproduced, and the in-phase signal or the in-phase signal 48. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 47, further comprising in-phase / negative-phase signal detecting means (747) for detecting a phase signal. 49. Off-tracking control means (24a, 24a, for inverting the polarity of the tracking servo of the tracking means by an off-tracking switching signal, and switching from the on-track state to the off-track state in which the light beam travels in the middle of two tracks. 49. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 48, further comprising: 50. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 38, further comprising pit array detection means for detecting a region where the pit arrays of two adjacent tracks are in phase. 51. First optical recording by detecting a high reflection portion (741) having a small amount of reflected light due to the presence of pits and a high reflectance (741) higher than the first reflection portion due to the non-pit portion by the reproducing means. A second low reflection portion for detecting a second low reflection portion having a second low reflection light amount, which is provided in the optical recording signal area (742) in the device for reproducing a signal and has a reflectance lower than that of the first low reflection portion. Second of the part detection means (586)
The reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising demodulation means (621) for demodulating the low reflection part detection signal into a first digital signal. 52. A first digital signal from a first optical reproduction signal is obtained by slicing a first optical recording signal at a first level in a second level slicer (386) using a level slicer having a binary slice level or more. And a second level slicer (586) corresponding to a reproduction signal having a light quantity value lower than the first slice level.
By slicing the playback signal at the slice level,
Second low reflection part detection means (58) for detecting the second low reflection part
52. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 51, further comprising 6). 53. Based on the information of the second low reflection part detection signal of the second low reflection part detection means (586) and the first optical reproduction signal detected by the reproduction means (590), A second low reflection portion pulse width detection means (621e) for detecting the length in the circumferential direction and / or a second low reflection portion interval detection means (621b) for detecting the distance in the circumferential direction based on the detection signal. 53. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 52, further comprising demodulation means (621) for demodulating a signal. 54. A counter (598) for the reproduced clock signal.
The second low reflection portion pulse width detection means (621e) for detecting the pulse width of the detection signal of the second low reflection portion and / or the signal interval of the second low reflection portion detection signal based on the count number counted in c). The second low reflection part pulse interval detecting means (621b) for detecting is provided.
3. The playback device according to item 3. 55. An encryption / decryption means (534) for obtaining at least first physical characteristic information by obtaining a first encryption from the first digital signal and decrypting the first encryption. 52. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 51. 56. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 55, further comprising an encryption / decryption means (534) for decrypting the first cipher and at least decrypting the first physical characteristic information and the ID number (750). . 57. The plaintext I of the first digital signal
The reproducing apparatus according to claim 55, further comprising an ID output unit (750) for obtaining and outputting a D number. 58. A demodulation means for outputting a plaintext or cipher ID number from the first digital signal, and outputting a first secret key when the communication is one-way function mathematically independent of the ID number. (621), and at least the secret information is encrypted to the external computer (633) via the communication unit (664) by the public key encryption such as the RSA function using the first secret key. 56. A reproducing apparatus according to claim 55, further comprising an arithmetic unit (10) for transmitting to an external computer. 59. An encryption / decryption means (534) for decrypting the first cipher encrypted by the public key cryptosystem function to obtain a plaintext including the first physical characteristic information is provided. The playback device described. 60. In the encryption means, d ≧ as a secret key
The encryption / decryption means is provided which uses the integer d of 256 bits and uses the integer n of 256 ≧ bit as a public key, which is an encrypted first cipher, as a public key. 59. A reproducing device according to 59. 61. The encryption / decryption means using an RSA function as a public encryption function is provided.
The playback device described. 62. C for encryption, M for plaintext, integer n ≧ 256
When bit is a public key and an integer of 256 bits or more is a secret key d, the first cipher C encrypted by the encryption means is a public integer of 3 or more by the calculation formula of C = Md mod n. And using the above public key n, M = C
The reproducing apparatus according to claim 61, further comprising an encryption / decryption unit that decrypts the plaintext M by an operation of mod n to obtain the first physical feature information. 63. An encryption / decryption means using an elliptic function as a public key encryption function is provided.
The playback device described. 64. An encryption / decryption means is provided for reproducing the plain culture function of the encryption / decryption means recorded on the recording medium, and for decrypting the reproduced cipher by the plain culture function. The playback device described. 65. Non-volatile RAM or ROM of the device
The encryption / decryption means for decrypting the cipher reproduced from the recording medium by using the encryption / decryption function stored in the memory section of the storage medium to obtain the first physical characteristic information. Item 59. The reproducing apparatus according to Item 59. 66. A plain culture function group consisting of a plurality of plain culture functions is stored in a memory section of the recording / reproducing apparatus, and the reproduced cipher is subjected to a plain culture using a plurality of specific functions of the above plain culture function group, 66. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 65, wherein a plurality of plaintext groups are obtained and a stop command is output unless all the plaintext groups have been normally plaintext. 67. The first physical characteristic information is obtained by performing the plaintext of the cipher reproduced from the recording medium by using the plaintext function stored in the memory unit of the information processing apparatus connected to the recording / playback apparatus. 33. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 32, wherein: 68. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 40, further comprising an encryption / decryption unit that plainly decrypts the first encryption by an encryption / decryption function stored in the OS. 69. The reproducing apparatus according to claim 32, wherein an RSA function is used as the one-way encryption function. 70. An encryption means for encrypting first physical feature information (532) representing a physical feature including at least a two-dimensional arrangement of pits or a pit shape of a disc-shaped optical recording medium by using a one-way function. (537) and recording means (37, 6) for recording the encrypted first physical feature information on the optical recording medium or its master in a manner that can be discriminated from the main information to be recorded on the optical recording medium. , 23, 24, 17, 2
6, 10) and a recording device. 71. An information recording apparatus according to claim 70, wherein said encryption means is configured to use a public key cryptosystem function as said one-way function. 72. A step of recognizing first physical characteristic information (532) representing a physical characteristic including at least a two-dimensional arrangement of pits or a shape of pits of a disc-shaped optical recording medium,
Encrypting the first physical feature information using a one-way function, the encrypted first physical feature information being distinguishable from main information to be recorded on the optical recording medium, A method for manufacturing a disc-shaped optical recording medium, which comprises a step of recording on an optical recording medium or a master thereof. 73. The method for manufacturing a disc-shaped optical recording medium according to claim 72, wherein the step of encrypting uses a public key cryptosystem function as the one-way function. 74. First physical characteristic information (532) representing a physical characteristic including at least a two-dimensional arrangement of pits or a pit shape of a disc-shaped optical recording medium is recognized, and the first physical characteristic information is unidirectional. Through the process of recording the encrypted first physical characteristic information on the optical recording medium or the master thereof in a manner that allows the main information to be recorded on the optical recording medium to be discriminated using a function. The manufactured disc-shaped optical recording medium. 75. The disc-shaped optical recording medium according to claim 74, wherein a public key cryptosystem function is used as the one-way function. 76. A physical characteristic including at least a two-dimensional arrangement of pits or the shape of pits of a disc-shaped optical recording medium, which is encrypted by using a one-way function when manufacturing the optical recording medium. Detecting the recorded first physical characteristic information (532) from the information read from the optical recording medium, a decryption step for decrypting the first physical characteristic information, and a physical recording of the optical recording medium. Of measuring physical characteristics to obtain second physical characteristic information, and collating step of collating the second physical characteristic information with the first physical characteristic information to determine whether or not there is a specific relationship between them. When,
When the second physical characteristic information is not in the specific relationship with the first physical characteristic information in the collating step,
Whether the operation of a specific program read from the optical recording medium is stopped, the subsequent reading of information from the optical recording medium is stopped, or a predetermined processing by the signal processing unit of information read from the optical recording medium is performed. And a method for preventing illegal installation of information on a disc-shaped optical recording medium, or a step of stopping processing. 77. First physical characteristic information (532) representing at least a two-dimensional arrangement of pits on a disc-shaped optical recording medium or a physical characteristic including a pit shape is recognized, and the first physical characteristic information is unidirectional. Manufactured by encrypting the encrypted first physical feature information on the optical recording medium or its master in a manner that allows the main information to be recorded on the optical recording medium to be identified. Detecting the first physical characteristic information (532) from the recorded optical recording medium, decrypting the first physical characteristic information, and decrypting the first physical characteristic information; In the collating step, a step of obtaining physical characteristic information, a collating step of collating the second physical characteristic information with the first physical characteristic information, and determining whether or not there is a specific function therebetween, The second physics When the characteristic information is not in the specific relationship with the first physical characteristic information, the operation of the specific program read from the optical recording medium is stopped, or
An illegal copy of the optical recording medium, or an optical recording, which has the step of stopping the subsequent reading of information from the optical recording medium or stopping the predetermined processing of the information read from the optical recording medium by the signal processing means. How to prevent illegal installation of media information.