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EP2645294B1 - Système et procédé pour une attestation de plate-forme sécurisée - Google Patents

Système et procédé pour une attestation de plate-forme sécurisée Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2645294B1
EP2645294B1 EP13160032.2A EP13160032A EP2645294B1 EP 2645294 B1 EP2645294 B1 EP 2645294B1 EP 13160032 A EP13160032 A EP 13160032A EP 2645294 B1 EP2645294 B1 EP 2645294B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
measurement
bios
bmc
firmware
golden
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EP13160032.2A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP2645294A1 (fr
Inventor
William E. Jacobs
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Cisco Technology Inc
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Cisco Technology Inc
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/30—Arrangements for executing machine instructions, e.g. instruction decode
    • G06F9/30098—Register arrangements
    • G06F9/30101—Special purpose registers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]

Definitions

  • This disclosure relates in general to information system security, and more particularly, to a system and a method for trusted platform attestation.
  • BIOS Basic Input/Output System
  • the BIOS is generally configurable firmware, and it is a critical security component in computing platforms because of its unique and privileged position within the architecture. If the BIOS code or configuration is altered from the intended state, either maliciously or accidentally, the computing platform may experience losses of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including system instability, system failure, and information leakage. A platform may also be vulnerable to more elaborate attacks such as covert monitoring, where the platform could be used as a stepping-stone for attacking other systems. Thus, establishing a secure BIOS integrity measurement and reporting chain is a substantial concern for equipment manufacturers, developers, and operators.
  • WO 2011/146305 discloses method of extending an integrity measurement in a trusted device operating in an embedded trusted platform by using a set of policy commands to extend a list of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) for the device and the current values of the listed PCRs and an integrity value identifying the integrity measurement into a policy register, verify a signature over the integrity value extended into the policy register, and, if verification succeeds, extend a verification key of the trusted platform, plus an indication that it is a verification key, into the policy register, compare the integrity value extended into the policy register with a value stored in the trusted platform, and, if they are the same, extend the stored value, plus an indication that it is a stored value, into the policy register, and extend the integrity measurement in the trusted device if the value in the policy register matches a value stored with the integrity measurement.
  • PCRs Platform Configuration Registers
  • US 2004/073806 discloses a system for executing cryptographic services on a baseboard management controller separated from a main processor, with the baseboard management controller having isolated execution and memory with respect to the main processor. Aspects and examples of the present invention are set out in the appended claims.
  • a method is provided in one example embodiment that includes storing a reference measurement of an object in a trusted storage and retrieving the reference measurement from the trusted storage before an operating system is loaded.
  • the reference measurement can be compared (e.g., evaluated, analyzed, matched, etc.) with a golden measurement and a policy action can be applied if a variance is detected between the reference measurement and the golden measurement.
  • Any suitable policy action can be implemented in such a context.
  • the reference measurement is a measurement of firmware, such as a BIOS, and yet more particularly, the measurement can be a hash of the firmware.
  • such measurements can be any other suitable object, electronic element, or resultant associated with certain processing by a microcontroller.
  • the golden measurement is a stored locally such that it may be accessed without a network connection.
  • the golden measurement can be stored in a system manager accessible only through a local area network connection, such as in a datacenter environment.
  • the method may also include querying the system manager to determine the location of the golden measurement.
  • FIGURE 1 is a simplified block diagram of an example embodiment of a computing system 100 in which attestation of a trusted platform may be provided in accordance with this disclosure.
  • Computing system 100 generally includes an instance of the hardware 102 and a BIOS 104.
  • Computing system 100 may also include software, such as an operating system 106, and peripheral devices (not shown).
  • Hardware 102 may provide a trusted platform module (TPM) 110, a baseboard management controller (BMC) 112, a network interface 114, a data store 116, and other memory elements, such as memory 118.
  • TPM trusted platform module
  • BMC baseboard management controller
  • Computing system 100 may be representative of any type of server, desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet computer, or any other type of machine, apparatus, endpoint, end-user device, or system capable of performing logic operations on data. Such operations may, for example, be implemented with a processor (such as may be found in BMC 112) that executes instructions contained in (and read from) a memory element (e.g., memory 118). Such instructions may be read into the memory element from another medium, such as a removable storage medium. In another example, instructions may be read from a remote memory element through network interface 114.
  • a processor such as may be found in BMC 112
  • a memory element e.g., memory 118
  • Such instructions may be read into the memory element from another medium, such as a removable storage medium.
  • instructions may be read from a remote memory element through network interface 114.
  • BIOS 104 provides a firmware interface between hardware 102 and other components of computing system 100, including software, peripheral devices, and other firmware.
  • BIOS 104 may execute a power-on self-test (POST), which can identify and initialize other components.
  • BIOS 104 can also locate and transfer execution to boot loader software, which can load an operating system (e.g., operating system 106).
  • BIOS 104 also may provide a library of basic input/output functions used to operate and control other components.
  • BMC 112 generally represents a component of an intelligent platform management interface, which provides an interface for managing and monitoring a computer system.
  • BMC 112 may be a microcontroller or application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) embedded on a motherboard of computer system 100.
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • BMC 112 may connect to satellite controllers or another BMC in another chassis via a bus or bridge, and it may be managed remotely. Physically, other components may interface with BMC 112 through busses, serial consoles, and/or data lines, for example.
  • Different types of sensors in computer system 100 can report to BMC 112 on parameters such as temperature, cooling fan speeds, power status, operating system (OS) status, etc.
  • OS operating system
  • BMC 112 can monitor the sensors and send alerts to a system administrator via network interface 114 or a console if any of the parameters do not stay within preset limits, indicating a potential failure of the system. An administrator can also remotely communicate with BMC 112 to take some corrective action such as resetting or power cycling the system.
  • a trusted platform module such as TPM 110 generally offers facilities for the secure generation of cryptographic keys, and limitation of their use, in addition to a hardware pseudo-random number generator. It can also provide capabilities such as trusted storage.
  • trusted storage is any isolated, protected, shielded, or sealed memory element, including write-once registers such as platform configuration registers (PCRs).
  • PCRs platform configuration registers
  • a trusted platform module may contain several PCRs that allow secure storage and reporting of security-relevant metrics.
  • TPM 110 may be implemented as a microcontroller according to published standards, such as the specification published by the Trusted Computing Group or the International Organization for Standards (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889), or implemented in any other suitable fashion.
  • ISO International Organization for Standards
  • IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
  • BIOS integrity measurement is a security mechanism that provides the ability to detect changes to platform firmware, software, or other objects through measurements, which may be used to ensure that objects in a computing system have not been accidentally or maliciously altered.
  • a "measurement" in this context may, for example, be a hash of an object, such as a firmware image.
  • a third-party attestation service may be provided with "golden” measurements of objects that can be compared with measurements taken by a BIOS, where the term “golden” generally implies that the measurements have some out-of-band guarantee of integrity. For example, measurements provided directly by a manufacturer may be acceptable as golden measurements.
  • An agent running under an operating system can capture measurements from a computing system, store them in a trusted platform module, and send them to the attestation service for comparison.
  • a difference or variance between a captured measurement and a corresponding golden measurement may be indicative of an altered object, and a platform policy may be applied accordingly.
  • a BIOS may enforce some remedial action, such as re-flashing, sequestering/quarantining, or prompting a service call.
  • an agent running under an operating system cannot completely eliminate the risk of running or accessing a compromised object, since the operating system should be loaded before the agent can capture the measurement or communicate with an attestation service.
  • computing system 100 can overcome these shortcomings (and others) by providing a system and method for real-time, out-of-band attestation of platform objects including firmware, software, configuration files, and/or any other data structure.
  • a trusted execution technology (TXT) compliant BIOS, operating system loader, or operating system may place reference measurements in trusted storage, such as registers (e.g., PCRs) of a trusted platform module, and a BIOS can retrieve the reference measurements during POST, as well as during operating system boot or run-time.
  • the BIOS can pass the measurements to an integrated circuit such as a BMC, for example, which can compare the reference measurements to golden measurements.
  • the golden measurements may be stored locally.
  • the golden measurements may additionally (or alternatively) be stored in a remote system manager or management module.
  • golden measurements may additionally (or alternatively) be stored in a third-party attestation server.
  • computing system 100 may have many applications, such as checking option read-only memory (OROM) code in peripheral component cards (e.g., Peripheral Component Interconnect Express cards), checking BIOS setup configuration remotely to confirm that setting have not been changed, and checking BIOS settings and the platform configuration to facilitate debugging, for example.
  • OROM read-only memory
  • FIGURE 2 is a simplified block diagram 200 illustrating additional details that may be associated with example embodiments of BIOS 104 and BMC 112.
  • BIOS 104 may include a processor 202a and a memory 204a
  • BMC 112 may be implemented as a microcontroller with a processor 202b and a memory 204b.
  • BIOS 104 may additionally include a BMC interface 206 and a TPM interface 208.
  • BMC 112 may include an attestation module 210.
  • BIOS 104 and BMC 112 may include additional hardware, firmware, and/or software elements to facilitate operations described herein, and can also be configured to store, aggregate, process, export, and/or otherwise maintain data in any appropriate format, where these activities can involve processors 202a-202b and/or memory element 204a-204b, for example.
  • FIGURE 3 is a simplified flow diagram 300 illustrating potential operations that may be associated with example embodiments of computing system 100. Such operations may, for example, be implemented in a BIOS and a BMC, such as BIOS 104 and BMC 112.
  • a golden measurement of an object may be stored locally in computing system 100, such as in data store 116.
  • the object is an image of firmware, such as may be associated with BIOS 104.
  • a run-time reference measurement of the firmware may be taken in computing system 100, such as by creating an SHA-1, RSA, or HMAC hash-key summary of the firmware.
  • the reference measurement may be stored at 304 in a trusted memory element or storage, such as PCRs of TPM 110 in computing system 100. In a pre-operating system environment, the reference measurement may be retrieved at 306.
  • BIOS 104 for example, may take the reference measurement from TPM 110 during POST.
  • the reference measurement may then be passed to a microcontroller or application specific integrated circuit at 308.
  • BIOS 104 may pass the measurement to BMC 112.
  • the reference measurement may then be compared with the local gold measure at 310.
  • a local gold measure is any gold measure that may be accessed without a network connection.
  • BMC 112 may compare a measurement against a gold measure in data store 116, for example. If a variance between the measurement and the gold measure is detected at 310, a remedial action or other policy action may be taken at 312.
  • FIGURE 4 is a simplified block diagram of an alternative example embodiment of computing system 100, which is being provisioned in a datacenter environment 400.
  • computing system 100 may be linked via network interface 114 and a local area network 401 to a system manager 402.
  • System manager 402 may include a processor 404 and a memory 406, as well as additional hardware, firmware, and/or software such as policy module 408, attestation module 410, and data store 412.
  • Datacenter environment 400 can offer a flexible architecture that can readily be adapted to accommodate higher expectations for growth, consolidation, and security.
  • a datacenter environment may include a core layer of high-end switches and high-speed cables such as fiber cables.
  • the core layer is generally responsible for fast and reliable transportation of data across an enterprise network.
  • a datacenter may also provide an aggregation layer of routers and layer 3 switches to ensure that packets are properly routed.
  • An access layer may include hubs and switches and may connect nodes (e.g., computing system 100) to a network (e.g., network 401).
  • Datacenter environment 400 may use redundant switches at each layer for device-level failover that creates a highly available transport between end nodes using the network.
  • Datacenter networks often require additional services beyond basic packet forwarding, such as server load balancing, firewall, or intrusion prevention. These services might be introduced as modules populating a slot of one of the switching nodes in the network, or as standalone appliance devices.
  • Each of these service approaches also supports the deployment of redundant hardware to preserve the high availability standards set by the network topology.
  • Datacenter environment 400 may include a configuration capable of Ethernet communications, and may also operation in conjunction with transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) communications for the transmission or reception of packets in a network flow.
  • TCP/IP transmission control protocol/Internet protocol
  • Datacenter environment 400 may also operate in conjunction with a user datagram protocol/IP (UDP/IP), Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCoE), or any other suitable protocol where appropriate and based on particular needs.
  • Input/output (I/O) may be consolidated in datacenter environment 400 so that the same physical infrastructure can carry different types of traffic, which typically have very different traffic characteristics and transmission requirements.
  • FIGURE 5 is a simplified flow diagram 500 illustrating potential operations that may be associated with example embodiments of computing system 100 and datacenter environment 400. Such operations may, for example, be implemented in a BIOS and a BMC, such as BIOS 104 and BMC 112 in computing system 100, and a system manager, such as in policy module 408, attestation module 410, and data store 412 of system manager 402.
  • BIOS and a BMC such as BIOS 104 and BMC 112 in computing system 100
  • system manager such as in policy module 408, attestation module 410, and data store 412 of system manager 402.
  • a golden measurement of an object may be stored locally in computing system 100, such as in data store 116, or locally in system manager 402, such as in data store 412.
  • a reference measurement of the firmware may be taken in computing system 100, such as by creating an SHA-1, RSA, or HMAC hash-key summary of the firmware.
  • the reference measurement may be stored at 504, in PCRs of TPM 110 for example.
  • the reference measurement may be retrieved at 506.
  • BIOS 104 for example, may take the reference measurement from TPM 110 during POST.
  • the reference measurement may then be passed to a microcontroller or application specific integrated circuit at 508.
  • BIOS 104 may pass the reference measurement to BMC 112.
  • the microcontroller may query a system manager to locate a local gold measure.
  • a local gold measure is any gold measure that may be accessed in a datacenter environment without an external network connection. In some embodiments, it may be accessed over a local area network connection, such as network 401.
  • BMC 112 may contact system manager 402, and policy module 408 may determine that gold measures are stored in data store 412 and an encrypted copy of the reference measurement may be passed to attestation module 410. In another example, policy module 408 may determine that local gold measures are stored in data store 116.
  • the reference measurement may be compared with the local gold measure at 512.
  • BMC 112 may compare the reference measurement against a gold measure in data store 116, while in embodiments attestation module 410 may compare the reference measurement against a gold measure in data store 412, depending upon policy applied by policy module 408, for example. If a difference between the measurement and the gold measure is detected at 512, a remedial action or other policy action may be taken at 514.
  • FIGURE 6 is a simplified block diagram of yet another alternative example embodiment of computing system 100 in a network environment 600.
  • computing system 100 may be linked via network interface 114 and network 601 to an attestation server 602 and/or system manager 402.
  • Attestation server 602 may include a processor 604 and a memory 606, as well as additional hardware, firmware, and/or software such as attestation module 608, and data store 610.
  • Network environment 600 may include a configuration capable of Ethernet communications, and may also operation in conjunction with transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) communications for the transmission or reception of packets in a network flow.
  • TCP/IP transmission control protocol/Internet protocol
  • Network environment 600 may also operate in conjunction with a user datagram protocol/IP (UDP/IP), Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCoE), or any other suitable protocol where appropriate and based on particular needs.
  • UDP/IP user datagram protocol/IP
  • FCoE Fibre Channel over Ethernet
  • FIGURE 7 is a simplified flow diagram 700 illustrating potential operations that may be associated with example embodiments of computing system 100 and network environment 600.
  • Such operations may, for example, be implemented in a BIOS and a BMC, such as BIOS 104 and BMC 112 in computing system 100, in a system manager, such as in policy module 408, attestation module 410, and data store 412 in system manager 402, and in an attestation server, such as in attestation module 608 and data store 610 of attestation server 602.
  • a golden measurement of firmware may be stored remotely in attestation server 602, such as in data store 610, locally in computing system 100, such as in data store 116, or locally in system manager 402, such as in data store 412.
  • a reference measurement of the firmware may be taken in computing system 100, such as by creating an SHA-1, RSA, or HMAC hash-key summary of the firmware.
  • the reference measurement may be stored at 704, in PCRs of TPM 110 for example.
  • the reference measurement may be retrieved at 706.
  • BIOS 104 for example, may take the reference measurement from TPM 110 during POST.
  • the reference measurement may then be passed to a microcontroller or application specific integrated circuit at 708.
  • BIOS 104 may pass the measurement to BMC 112.
  • the microcontroller may query a system manager to locate a gold measure.
  • BMC 112 may contact system manager 402, and policy module 408 may determine that gold measures are stored in data store 412.
  • policy module 408 may determine that gold measures are stored in data store 116.
  • policy module 408 may determine that gold measures are stored in data store 610.
  • microcontroller may be configured with an a priori location for gold measures, and may accordingly omit or bypass a query to a system manager.
  • An encrypted copy of the reference measurement may be passed to an attestation service and compared with a remote or local gold measure at 712.
  • a local gold measure is any gold measure that may be accessed over a local area network connection or without network connection
  • a remote gold measure includes any gold measure that may be accessed through an external network connection (e.g., a wide area network such as network 601 or the Internet).
  • BMC 112 may compare a reference measurement against a local gold measure in data store 116 in implementations not belonging to the invention, while in other embodiments attestation module 410 may compare a reference measurement with a local gold measure in data store 412.
  • attestation module 608 may compare the reference measurement with a remote gold measure in data store 610, depending upon policy applied by policy module 408, for example. If a difference between the measurement and the gold measure is detected at 712, a remedial action or other policy action may be taken at 714.
  • Computing system 100, datacenter environment 400 and/or network environment 600 may include suitable network elements or nodes to facilitate communications and operations, including network appliances, servers, routers, switches, gateways, bridges, load balancers, modules, or any other device, component, element, or object operable to exchange information in such environments.
  • Network elements may include any suitable hardware, software, components, modules, or objects that facilitate the operations thereof, as well as suitable interfaces for receiving, transmitting, and/or otherwise communicating data or information in a network environment. This may be inclusive of appropriate algorithms and communication protocols that allow for the effective exchange of data or information.
  • each can include memory elements for storing information to be used in the operations outlined herein.
  • each element may include one or more interfaces, such as network interface 114, and such interfaces may also include appropriate memory elements.
  • Each element may keep information in any suitable memory element (e.g., random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), etc.), software, hardware, or in any other suitable component, device, element, or object where appropriate and based on particular needs.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read-only memory
  • EPROM erasable programmable ROM
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable ROM
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • any of the memory elements discussed herein should be construed as being encompassed within the broad term “memory element” or “memory.”
  • Information being used, tracked, sent, or received could be provided in any database, register, queue, table, cache, control list, or other storage structure, all of which can be referenced at any suitable timeframe. Any such storage options may be included within the broad term “memory element” or “memory” as used herein.
  • the functions outlined herein may be implemented by logic encoded in one or more tangible media (e.g., embedded logic provided in an ASIC, digital signal processor (DSP) instructions, software (potentially inclusive of object code and source code) to be executed by a processor, or other similar machine, etc.), which may be inclusive of non-transitory media.
  • memory elements can store data used for the operations described herein. This includes the memory elements being able to store software, logic, code, or processor instructions that are executed to carry out the activities described herein.
  • computing system 100, system manager 402, attestation server 602, and others may include firmware and/or software modules (e.g., attestation module 210, attestation module 410, policy module 408, etc.) to achieve, or to foster, operations as outlined herein.
  • firmware and/or software modules e.g., attestation module 210, attestation module 410, policy module 408, etc.
  • such operations may be carried out by hardware, implemented externally to these elements, or included in some other network device to achieve the intended functionality.
  • these elements may include software (or reciprocating software) that can coordinate in order to achieve the operations, as outlined herein.
  • one or all of these devices may include any suitable algorithms, hardware, firmware, software, components, modules, interfaces, or objects that facilitate the operations thereof.
  • each of computing system 100, system manager 402, attestation server 602, and others may include one or more processors (or virtual processors) that can execute software or an algorithm to perform activities as discussed herein.
  • processors or virtual processors
  • a processor, virtual processor, logic unit, or other processing unit can execute any type of instructions associated with the data to achieve the operations detailed herein.
  • a processor could transform an element or an article (e.g., data) from one state or thing to another state or thing.
  • the activities outlined herein may be implemented with fixed logic or programmable logic (e.g., software/computer instructions executed by a processor) and the elements identified herein could be some type of a programmable processor, programmable digital logic (e.g., a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an EPROM, an EEPROM) or an ASIC that includes digital logic, software, code, electronic instructions, or any suitable combination thereof.
  • programmable logic e.g., a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an EPROM, an EEPROM
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • EPROM programmable read only memory
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • computing system 100 can provide self-contained, out-of-band, and "real-time" firmware attestation for a platform in a managed environment without an agent running in an operating system on the platform or a remote third-party attestation server.
  • computing system 100 can substantially eliminate or reduce the transmission of measurements across a network, particularly an external network. This out-of-band attestation can provide faster responses and detection of issues, and be used independently or can augment a platform's security stance without affecting in-band or agent-based attestation.
  • computing system 100, datacenter environment 400, and/or network environment 600 are readily scalable and can accommodate a large number of components, as well as more complicated/sophisticated arrangements and configurations. Accordingly, the examples provided should not limit the scope or inhibit the broad teachings of computing system 100, datacenter environment 400, and/or network environment 600 as potentially applied to a myriad of other architectures. Additionally, although described with reference to particular scenarios, where a particular module is provided within a network element, these modules can be provided externally, or consolidated and/or combined in any suitable fashion. In certain instances, such modules may be provided in a single proprietary unit.
  • computing system 100 datacenter environment 400, and/or network environment 600.
  • some operations may be deleted or removed where appropriate, or these operations may be modified or changed considerably without departing from the scope of teachings provided herein.
  • a number of these operations have been described as being executed concurrently with, or in parallel to, one or more additional operations.
  • the timing of these operations may be altered considerably.
  • the preceding operational flows have been offered for purposes of example and discussion. Substantial flexibility is provided by computing system 100, datacenter environment 400, and/or network environment 600 in that any suitable arrangements, chronologies, configurations, and timing mechanisms may be provided without departing from the teachings provided herein.

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Claims (6)

  1. Procédé mis en œuvre par ordinateur réalisé par un contrôleur de gestion de carte mère, BMC (112), pour vérifier l'intégrité du microprogramme d'un système informatique (100), comprenant de :
    recevoir (306) une mesure de référence d'exécution du microprogramme à partir d'un système d'entrée-sortie de base, BIOS (104), pendant un autotest de démarrage, POST, du BIOS avant qu'un système d'exploitation (106) ne soit chargé, dans lequel le mesure de référence d'exécution est stockée dans un stockage de confiance (110) ;
    accéder à une mesure dorée du microprogramme lors du POST du BIOS (104) sans connexion de réseau externe, dans lequel la mesure dorée est stockée localement par rapport au stockage de confiance et est associée au microprogramme dans un état de confiance garanti, dans lequel la mesure dorée est stockée dans un élément de stockage (412) d'un gestionnaire de système (402) qui comprend le stockage de confiance, le gestionnaire de système (402) étant relié au système informatique (100) via une connexion de réseau local (601), de telle sorte que le BMC (112) accède à la mesure dorée sur la connexion de réseau local;
    comparer (310) la mesure de référence d'exécution à la mesure dorée avant que le système d'exploitation (106) ne soit chargé; et
    appliquer (312) une action de politique si un écart est détecté entre la mesure de référence d'exécution et la mesure dorée.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant en outre de :
    interroger (510) le gestionnaire de système pour accéder à la mesure dorée.
  3. Support lisible par ordinateur comportant des instructions exécutables qui, lorsqu'elles sont exécutées dans un ou plusieurs processeurs, amènent les un ou plusieurs processeurs à exécuter le procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes.
  4. Appareil à base d'ordinateur (100), comprenant :
    un contrôleur de gestion de carte mère (112), BMC, configuré pour communiquer avec un système d'entrée-sortie de base, BIOS (104), pour vérifier l'intégrité du microprogramme, dans lequel le BMC est configuré pour effectuer toutes les étapes d'un procédé selon l'une quelconque de la revendication 1 ou de la revendication 2.
  5. Appareil selon la revendication 4, comprenant en outre un élément de stockage comportant le stockage de confiance (110).
  6. Système comprenant l'appareil de la revendication 4 ou la revendication 5, le système comprenant en outre :
    le gestionnaire de système (402) couplé au contrôleur de gestion de carte mère sur la connexion de réseau local (601).
EP13160032.2A 2012-03-29 2013-03-19 Système et procédé pour une attestation de plate-forme sécurisée Active EP2645294B1 (fr)

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US13/434,535 US9262637B2 (en) 2012-03-29 2012-03-29 System and method for verifying integrity of platform object using locally stored measurement

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CN103366113A (zh) 2013-10-23
US20130263205A1 (en) 2013-10-03
US9262637B2 (en) 2016-02-16
EP2645294A1 (fr) 2013-10-02
CN103366113B (zh) 2017-06-13

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