EP2062400B1 - Method and system for addressing and routing in encrypted communications links - Google Patents

Description

Future radios will have much more flexible applications than previous radios. This is achieved through the concept of "Software Defined Radios" (SDR). SDRs provide the ability to load wireless (waveform) software as software and to flexibly change the configuration of waveforms and radio through software control. Modern radio transmission methods can also support the transmission of data packets according to the Internet Protocol (IP) standard. This allows the use of standard IP applications and known concepts that are also used for the Internet.

Depending on the security requirements, sensitive information must be encrypted (communication security, COMSEC). This can be z. B. be achieved by the use of the standard IPsec, in Kent, K. Seo, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, IETF RFC 4301, December 2005 , is described.

This standard allows two different transmission methods for the encrypted information: transport mode and tunnel mode, as in Fig. 1 shown. In transport mode, only the payload of the IP packet is encrypted, while the IP header (including the IP addresses of sender and receiver) is not modified. In tunnel mode, the entire original IP packet is encrypted and a new header added. The new header contains as source address the address of the encryption device and not of the original source node. Likewise, the destination address in the new header is that of the decryption device and not that of the actual receiving device. In this way, it can be effectively prevented that a potential attacker can detect a communication taking place between the communication partners on the basis of the source and destination address. The potential attacker sees that only data is exchanged between the two encryption devices. The actual end users of the data traffic remain hidden from him.

The tunnel mode is used for safety-relevant and confidential communication. The tunneling mode creates two completely separate network levels. The red level is the confidential level. Only authorized persons have access to a red network. By contrast, the black network is a publicly accessible network, and is thus classified as unsafe. Confidential information from a red network may only be transmitted encrypted over a black network. Due to the strict use of tunnel mode, these networks initially have no information from each other. Tunnel mode from the perspective of the red network layer represents a transparent tunnel to another red network and conceals the black network layer existing behind it. Fig. 1 clarifies this situation. Subscribers A and D have no knowledge of possibly existing additional network subscribers X and Y, which are involved in the forwarding of the data between B and C.

US 2005/091482 Al discloses a routing method such that the network operator can configure a network as a physical or virtual network. In the first case, the routing is performed by the IP protocol; in the second case, the routing is based on IPSec and is performed with encrypted addresses in tunneling mode. There is the possibility of the network off US 2005/091482 Al to another network with a different routing protocol via a gateway.

However, this complete separation also adversely affects the entire network architecture. Information must be available in the encryption devices as to which red networks are connected to a black decryption device. This is necessary so that the matching black destination address can be entered in the newly generated IP headers in tunnel mode.

In a communication network several network subscribers are combined. As Fig. 2 shows, multiple terminals can use the same encryption device. Each encryption device has both a confidential red and a public black address. The terminals of a confidential subnet send data unencrypted to the encryption device. This encrypts the data in tunnel mode and forwards the data over an insecure communication link to the receiving encryption device. There they are decrypted and forwarded to the recipient.

The black addresses of a network's encryption devices are automatically determined by a protocol with address autoconfiguration. Routing in the black network hierarchy uses a traditional routing protocol. The exchange of signaling information ensures the consistency of the topology within the black network. For a connection of terminals, however, data must also be exchanged between the red network and the black network. This in turn requires the knowledge of the address mapping between black and red addresses of the encryption device. However, the IPsec tunnel mode used prevents a direct mapping of the known black addresses to the red addresses.

As a result, no shared and simultaneous routing in both networks is possible. In order to exchange the routing information of the red networks automatically between two encryption devices, for example, the IPSec discovery protocol can be used.

In order to better understand the solution proposed by the invention and the problems of the previous solution of the prior art, a brief introduction to the addressing of IP networks is given below.

In order to be able to send data between two subscribers in the global Internet, a clear identification of the end subscribers is necessary. The forwarding nodes can then determine the optimum path between sender and receiver based on the destination address, without the sender having to know the exact route. In order to clearly identify a subscriber, an address consists of a network identifier and a device identifier. The network identifier identifies the network in which the subscriber is located, while the device identifier determines the individual subscriber in a network. The total address is created by attaching the two address parts, which in Fig. 3 is illustrated.

All devices within a network use the same network ID, while the device ID is different. Therefore, it is necessary for an end user to change his network identity as soon as he makes a network change. This is necessary so that not every forwarding node in the Internet, the new connection of the terminal must be signaled, but can be closed directly to the network using the network identifier. The network ID of a terminal is required for routing within the global network.

The device identifier should be unique and unique to all devices participating in the global network. It is based for example on the MAC address of the network card, but can also be generated from another parameter. This allows a device to be clearly identified by the device ID. It is constant and does not change over time.

The encryption devices have through the routing protocol of the black network only the knowledge of the black addresses of all participants in the network participants. In order to be able to establish a secure connection between end users, who are each located in a red network, the clear and confidential association between the black address of the decryption device and the red networks connected to it must first take place. This assignment of the red and black addresses can be determined using the IPsec discovery protocol. The flowchart of the log is in Fig. 4 and describes authentication using certificates. However, this is also possible with the help of previously shared keys (pre shared keys, PSK), but will not be described here.

To obtain the confidential mapping between the black and red addresses of an encryption device, the encryption device A sends a "Hello Probe" message to a dedicated multicast address. This message will receive all the participants in the network. The message contains the security certificate of encryption device A with a valid signature of the certification authority. In addition, the certificate still contains the key of Encryption device A. After receiving the message, encryption device B checks the authenticity of the certificate using the root certificate of the certification authority and authenticates it using the signature or the key of encryption device A. After successful authentication, encryption device B sends a "Hello Reply" Message to encryption device A back. This contains the same information from encryption device B. After verification of this information by encryption device A, the negotiation of the security association (SA) starts, in which among other things the used cryptoalgorithm and validity periods for the authentication and the key are specified. Since the communication partners have so far not known the mutual red addresses, the SA negotiation can not be carried out in IPsec tunnel mode, but must be carried out in IPsec transport mode. In this case, the IP header of the data packets between the encryption devices is transmitted unencrypted, and only the actual content of the data packet is encrypted. After successful negotiation of the SA, the encryption devices can encrypt their red addresses in IPsec transport mode. Only then is it possible to establish a tunnel connection between the encryption devices.

In order to be able to communicate with a specific subscriber of another red network, a tamper-proof tunnel must first be established between these two red networks. This requires the knowledge of the responsible encryption device for the respective terminal and the connected red networks. Because the IPsec discovery protocol only sequentially exchanges the mapping information with each one Encryption device supports, pairwise tunnels must be established between all encryption devices in order to obtain full knowledge of the address assignments of all encryption devices in the network. Thus, the IPsec discovery protocol with all possible encryption devices must be used to establish a connection to a previously unknown red subscriber in the worst case. The effort for the encryption device of the source thus increases linearly with the number of encryption devices N: effort ~O ( N ). For the integration of new encryption devices and their connected networks into the overall network, therefore, the IPsec discovery protocol must be executed with every other encryption device. This increases the potential signaling overhead of the overall network with O ( N ² ).

In addition to the effort to identify the red terminals in their own network, the IPsec discovery protocol must also be executed when the network is changed. As described, the network identifier is changed when changing the network, whereby the overall address of the encryption device is changed. Thus, the devices connected to the encryption device terminals in the new network are no longer identifiable. Therefore, the IPsec discovery protocol must be executed again with each additional encryption device of the new network, so that mutually all know the respective secret address assignments and thus also the red networks to which the terminals are connected.

This behavior is particularly critical in radio networks. In an environment with limited radio resources, there is an increased signaling overhead through the IPsec discovery protocol Especially in a highly dynamic environment, in which the topology changes frequently, especially critical. In addition, especially in radio environments a frequent network change of individual devices, ie encryption devices together with terminals, occur. The number of iterations required by the IPsec discovery protocol can further burden the radio resources, as a result of which meaningful communication of applications in tunnel encryption mode in radio environments can no longer be possible because the signaling data traffic has greatly increased.

The invention is therefore based on the object to provide a method and a system for secure communication, which enables high data security and availability of the system with low signaling overhead.

The object is achieved with respect to the method by the features of claim 1 and with respect to the system by the features of claim 15. The subclaims contain advantageous developments of the method according to the invention or of the system according to the invention.

The invention proposes an efficient method for obtaining up-to-date routing information based on unique associations between red network addresses and black device identifiers. These assignments can, for. B. be described by unique functions or a look-up table. This method avoids the tedious and resource-intensive exchange of signaling and routing messages to obtain the current red network topology and the corresponding routing information. This information can be derived directly from the familiar black network topology using the unique mapping of black device identifiers to red network addresses. If a device with its black device identifier is known in the black network, the assignment can be immediately concluded with the red network connected to this device.

The concept of look-up tables uses an initially configured and stored in the encryption device table for the assignment between black device identifiers and red networks. By using the method according to the invention, the use of the IPsec discovery protocol can be dispensed with and the necessary signaling traffic for exchanging routing information between the red networks of the subscribers can be avoided. In particular, in radio environments with limited radio resources, the usability of the radio network can be significantly increased by dispensing with the IPsec discovery protocol.

Fig. 1

den Transport- und Tunnelmodus bei IPsec;

Fig. 2

die Topologie eines Netzes bei Nutzung des IPsec-Tunnelmodus;

Fig. 3

das Adressierungsschema in IP-Netzen;

Fig. 4

das Ablaufdiagramm des IPsec-Discovery-Protokolls;

Fig. 5

die Look-up-Tabelle im Verschlüsselungsgerät für das Mapping zwischen schwarzen und roten Adressen;

Fig. 6

den internen Aufbau des Verschlüsselungsgerätes mit der Look-up-Tabelle;

Fig. 7

den Tunnelmodus innerhalb eines vertraulichen Netzes und

Fig. 8

ein Ausführungsbeispiel des erfindungsgemäßen Systems für die Adressierung und für das Routing in verschlüsselten Kommunikationsbeziehungen.

An embodiment of the invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. In the drawing show:

Fig. 1

the transport and tunnel mode at IPsec;

Fig. 2

the topology of a network using the IPsec tunnel mode;

Fig. 3

the addressing scheme in IP networks;

Fig. 4

the flowchart of the IPsec discovery protocol;

Fig. 5

the look-up table in the encryption device for mapping between black and red addresses;

Fig. 6

the internal structure of the encryption device with the look-up table;

Fig. 7

the tunnel mode within a confidential network and

Fig. 8

An embodiment of the inventive system for addressing and for routing in encrypted communication relationships.

Due to the separation of the confidential red network level (hereinafter referred to as red network level) of the black public network level (hereinafter referred to as black network level) by the encryption device 4 must first in both network levels independently of each other, the network topology in the routing tables 17 of the corresponding router be imaged. Since the black routing table 17 basically contains all the information about the subscribers of the black, public network 2, by using this information signaling messages can also be reduced on the red, confidential side. This can be achieved by introducing a unique association that describes a relationship between black, public device identifier and red, confidential network addresses 8. This figure describes which red networks are connected via an encryption device to the black side with a specific black device identifier. The knowledge about the accessibility of devices with an individual black device identifier thus allows statements about the connected red networks.

This concept can, for example, by preconfigured tables in all participating encryption devices 4 or by a unique mapping, z. As a mathematical function can be realized. The basis for the mapping rule is a unique black identifier of a device. Examples of such device identifiers are MAC addresses or host IDs according to the IPv6 protocol.

The black public addresses give a different picture. Within a black public network 2, all subscribers must use the same network ID. Changing the network changes this network identifier. Thus, the black public network identifier is not suitable for identifying an encryption device 4. However, a unique device identifier, e.g. the IPv6 interface ID based on the 48-bit MAC address, an identification of the encryption device 4 in any network environment.

The connected network on the red side 3 can thus be identified using the black device identifier. Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between the black non-confidential and red confidential address parts 8 by way of example. Because of the security requirements of the cryptographic device 4, the information of the look-up table 6 or the routing table 17 must never be in the black public network 2, but may only be evaluated within the encryption device 4.

As a result, the information for the construction of the table in each encryption device 4 must be preconfigured prior to startup. By a mobility of the encryption devices 4 together with their attached networks, e.g. in a radio network, and integration into different regional networks, the number of table entries can be large. Therefore, sufficient memory must be provided in the encryption device 4 in order to be able to record the tables.

With an additional entry in the look-up table 6, further red, confidential networks 3 connected to an encryption device 4 can be identified and made known. This is in Fig. 5 z. B. the network w to router R6.

Other networks can usually be reached via network transitions NÜ within their own network. The addresses of the network transitions are announced with the help of a protocol in the network. This allows each participant to directly detect the gateways based on their black, non-confidential addresses. However, if a gateway is positioned within the red, confidential network 3 of an encryption device 4, a simple signaling of the address is not possible. Additional information within the look-up table 6 via the responsible encryption device 4 of the gateway avoids this problem. Additional signaling for the detection of the gateway is thus superfluous. The construction of a tunnel to these important network subscribers is thus easily possible.

In addition to avoiding high signaling traffic within the network, the concept allows for use Look-up tables 6 also maintain a near-term consistency of the black, public and red, confidential networks 2, 3. Once the black routing protocol recognizes the unavailability of a subscriber in the black network 2, this can be signaled to the encryption device 4 , This in turn can close the red, confidential address 8 of the unreachable participant with the aid of the table. Thus, the routing table 17 of the red terminals can be updated directly. Thus, data packets can be rejected directly in the red router. An exchange of routing information between the red, connected to the different encryption devices networks can thus be completely dispensed with. The red, confidential network 3 recognizes automatically and after a short time the basic topology of the black public network 2.

After the basic structure of the look-up table 6 has been described, the rough sequence of the data processing and the information acquisition with the help of the look-up table 6 will be clarified below.

Fig. 6 shows the schematic structure of the encryption device 4. The black public page 2 of the encryption device 4 continuously receives routing information, ie network information 18, from the black, public level 2 of the network. With the aid of the exchanged black, public device identifications of the other encryption devices 4, the management process 19 in the look-up table can identify the respectively connected red, confidential networks 3. This network information 18 forwards the management process 19 to the red, confidential level 3. This preserves that Encryption device 4 Information about the accessibility of other connected red networks 3.

The red, confidential routers 17 are thereby immediately able to recognize all potentially reachable red networks 3. The topology of the black, public level 2 is timely mapped to the topology of the red network 3. This can be saved on the one hand much signaling overhead. On the other hand, unavailability of a special encryption device and its connected terminals is immediately recognizable and, where appropriate, responsive to it. An encryption process 20 within the encryption device ensures that the data packets are decrypted towards the red, confidential level 3 and encrypted towards the black level 2.

The second advantage of this method is the encryption of red, confidential data from the red, confidential level. The encryption process 20 can use the look-up table 6 immediately close to the appropriate decryption device of the destination terminal. A time-consuming process of the IPsec discovery protocol can be omitted. If the decryption device is listed in look-up table 6 and connected to the network, the data stream can be encrypted and forwarded with virtually no delay.

In order to minimize the size of the look-up tables 6, the red, confidential networks 3 connected to the encryption device 4 can use hierarchical addressing. This means that the addresses of all terminals come from the same address range, even if additional routers separate the individual networks. This can avoided that multiple table entries for an encryption device, as in Fig. 5 shown, needed. Due to the hierarchical addressing, all connected terminals of an encryption device 4 can be combined under an address entry 8 and entered into the look-up table 6.

In addition, a periodic exchange of look-up tables 6 between encryption devices 4 is possible. For this purpose, an encryption device 4 with another encryption device 4 build a secure tunnel. About this table 6 can then be adjusted. This has the advantage that changes to the configuration of the table 6 can still be made during the runtime of the encryption devices 4. This can z. B. the encryption device 4 at the gateway 21 additional red, confidential network addresses, distribute in the network. In addition, the configuration effort required before startup can be minimized because the information of the look-up table 6 can also be made accessible during operation.

The necessary signaling at the expiration of the IPsec discovery protocol is significant. Especially in radio environments with limited data rates, this additionally reduces the available transmission capacity. By using preconfigured look-up tables 6 in the encryption devices 4, the use of the IPsec discovery protocol can be completely dispensed with. The tethered red, confidential networks 3 can be derived after a short time from the topology of the black, non-confidential network 2 using the look-up table 6. This additionally reduces the waste of network resources because the unreachability of decryption devices and it connected red networks already in the transmitter or in the encryption device 4 is detected.

If a hierarchical addressing of the red, confidential networks 10 is furthermore used, the sizes of the necessary look-up tables 6 can be further reduced. With the exchange of tables 6 between individual encryption devices 4 is also an adjustment during operation possible. Thus, the configuration effort before commissioning can be significantly reduced, because not all entries must be preconfigured.

Fig. 7 shows the tunnel mode between two confidential red networks 3, wherein the inventive method for addressing and routing in encrypted communication relationships 1 comes into play. The communication relationships or the connections between two end users extend to two different network levels 2, 3 separated from one another, wherein the routing levels associated with the network levels 2, 3 also differ from one another. The delimitation of these two network levels 2, 3 with their routing levels via an encryption device 4, which is both the first network level 2, which is a publicly available and insecure black network, as well as the second network level 3, a non-public red net is tethered.

In each of the two routing planes, a current network topology is determined, wherein the determination of the network topology of the one network level 2, 3 independently of the determination of the network topology of the second network level 3, 2, for externally shielded confidential communication is applied, and stored in the corresponding routing tables 17. An interface 7 within the encryption network 4 present in the overall network is provided with a one-to-one assignment of addresses 8 of the second routing plane to addresses 8 of the first routing plane, so that pathfinding is also possible beyond the boundary of the two network levels 2, 3. This is also in Fig. 2 clarified.

The first network level 2 is a public area, such as the landline, or a part of a globally operated mobile radio network, such as the UMTS or GSM network, and the second network level 3 is a confidential area, such as outwardly shielded corporate networks or the like in which the respective addresses 8 on the routing levels are likewise subdivided into public addresses 8 and into confidential addresses 8.

In the encryption device 4 itself, an updatable look-up table 6 is provided during the network operation, which is preconfigured. The interface 7 acts as a controlled transition between the public and confidential network levels 2, 3 and thus as a boundary between public and confidential routing level.

Fig. 8 shows an embodiment of the inventive system 11 for addressing and for routing in encrypted communication relationships 1 within an overall network with at least two separate, different network levels 2, 3. The black network level 2 is delimited via at least one encryption device 4 against a second network levels 3 , The network topologies of both network levels become stored in the separate areas 12, 13 of the system 11 according to the invention in the routing tables of the router 17.

A protocol entity 14 is provided as intermediate region 15 between these regions 12, 13, the protocol entity 14 each having a bidirectional communication path 16 to one of the two regions 12, 13 and being implemented, for example, according to the IPsec standard. The first network level 2 is defined as a public area 2 within an overall network and corresponds to a publicly accessible network 2, e.g. a landline or mobile network. The second network level 3 within an overall network is provided as a confidential area and corresponds, for example, to a non-public, screened network 3, e.g. a corporate network or a logistics network. The addresses in the respective network levels 2, 3 or the associated routing levels are distinguishable from one another as public addresses and confidential addresses 8.

A router 17, in the exemplary embodiment according to the IPv6 standard, is connected to the protocol entity 14 both on the unencrypted page 12 and on the encrypted page 13, the router 17 also comprising a routing table.

The router 17 on the encrypted side 12 of the system 11 according to the invention is connected to a public network 2 via a defined transmission method, so that a communication connection can be made therewith, since the implemented transmission method is compatible with the transmission method of the public network 2.

Furthermore, in the exemplary embodiment, a MANET protocol is implemented on the encrypted page 13, and an IGP protocol on the unencrypted page 12 for updating the associated routing tables 6, an IGP being provided as an OSPF algorithm. Via the IPv6 router 17 of the unencrypted page of the system 11 according to the invention an unencrypted transmission of IP user data such as digitized voice or images in a confidential, non-publicly accessible network 3 is provided.

The invention is not limited to the embodiment described. All described or drawn features can be combined with each other in the invention.

Claims (26)

1. Method for addressing and routing in the case of coded communications relationships (1) in at least two different network levels (2, 3) with different routing levels, which are separated from one another within a network,
   wherein, in each case, a first network level (2) with the associated first routing level is demarcated from a second network level (3) with a second routing level via at least one coding device (4),
   wherein a network topology of both network levels (2, 3) is determined and stored independently from one another in the at least two routing levels in respective routing tables (17), and (7)
   wherein an interface with an unambiguous allocation of addresses (8) of the second routing level to addresses (8) of the first routing level is provided in the at least one coding device (4).
2. Method according to claim 1,
   characterised in that
   the first network level (2) is a publicly-accessible and non-secure network (9).
3. Method according to claim 1 or 2,
   characterised in that
   the second network level (3) is a non-publicly-accessible network screened from the outside for confidential communication.
4. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
   characterised in that
   the first network level (2) is a public domain, and the second network level (3) is a confidential domain, and the addresses (8) of the first routing level are marked as public addresses, and the addresses (8) of the second routing level are marked as confidential addresses.
5. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4,
   characterised in that
   the interface (7) between a public and a confidential network level (2, 3) or respectively between a public and a confidential routing level is stored in look-up tables (6) in the coding device (4) before its start-up.
6. Method according to claim 5,
   characterised in that
   the look-up tables (6) in the coding device (4) are amended during a network operation.
7. Method according to claim 5 or 6,
   characterised in that
   an updating of a confidential routing table is obtained from locally-available, time-variable information of the first, public network level (2) using the look-up tables (6) in the coding device (4).
8. Method according to claim 7,
   characterised in that
   the mapping specification for an allocation of the confidential addresses (8) to the public addresses (8) is generated in an overall network independently of the classification of the coding device (4).
9. Method according to any one of claims 5 to 7,
   characterised in that,
   as a realisation of a function which describes the relationship between public and confidential addresses (8), the look-up tables (6) are pre-configured in all coding devices (4) to be used.
10. Method according to any one of claims 5 to 7,
    characterised in that,
    as a realisation of a function which describes the relationship between public and confidential addresses (8), the look-up tables (6) are updated dynamically during network operation in all coding devices (4) to be used.
11. Method according to any one of claims 5 to 7,
    characterised in that,
    as a realisation of a function, which describes the relationship between public and confidential addresses (8), the contents of the look-up tables (6) are distributed exclusively within the confidential domain (3) .
12. Method according to any one of claims 5 to 7 or 9 to 11,
    characterised in that
    an additional entry, which indicates further confidential networks connected to a coding device (4), is optionally implemented in the look-up tables (6).
13. Method according to claim 7 or 8,
    characterised in that
    a basis for the mapping specification is an unambiguous device identifier of a device connected to the network.
14. Method according to claim 13,
    characterised in that
    the device identifier is conceived as a MAC-address or as host-identifiers according to the IPv6 protocol.
15. System (11) for addressing and routing in the case of coded communications relationships (1) within a network with at least two different, mutually-separated network levels (2, 3) and the associated routing levels,
    wherein, in each case, a first network level (2) with the associated first routing level is demarcated from a second network level (3) with a second routing level via at least one coding device (4),
    wherein the network topology of both network levels (2, 3) is stored in separate domains (12, 13) of the system (11), and
    wherein an intermediate domain (15), which is disposed between the separate domains (12, 13) as a protocol instance (14) with two bi-directional communication routes (16), is provided.
16. System according to claim 15,
    characterised in that
    a publicly-accessible, partial network is provided as a first network level (2) and defined as a public domain.
17. System according to claim 15 or 16,
    characterised in that
    a non-public, screened, partial network is provided as the second network level (3) and defined as the confidential domain.
18. System according to any one of claims 15 to 17,
    characterised in that
    the addresses (8) of the first routing level, as public addresses, and the addresses (8) of the second routing level, as confidential addresses, are distinguishable from one another.
19. System according to any one of claims 15 to 18,
    characterised in that
    the protocol instance (14) is implemented in the intermediate domain according to the IPsec standard or another coding method.
20. System according to any one of claims 15 to 19,
    characterised in that
    a router (17) including a routing table (17) is connected respectively to the protocol instance (14) both on an un-coded side in a first domain (12) and also on a coded side in a second domain (13).
21. System according to any one of claims 15 to 20,
    characterised in that
    the router (17) creates a communications connection with a public network (2) on the coded side (13) via a defined transmission method.
22. System according to claim 21,
    characterised in that
    the transmission method is compatible with a public network (2).
23. System according to any one of claims 15 to 22,
    characterised in that
    a MANET protocol is implemented on the coded side (13) in order to update the associated routing tables (17).
24. System according to any one of claims 15 to 23,
    characterised in that
    an interior gateway protocol (IGP) is implemented on the un-coded side (12).
25. System according to claim 24,
    characterised in that
    an open-shortest-path-first (OSPF) algorithm is implemented in the IGP protocol for the updating of the associated routing tables (6).
26. System according to claim 20,
    characterised in that
    an un-coded transmission of payload data into a confidential, non-publicly-accessible network (3) is provided via the router (17) on the un-coded side (12).

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