EP1627362A1 - Methode de generation d'une cle de securite - Google Patents
Methode de generation d'une cle de securiteInfo
- Publication number
- EP1627362A1 EP1627362A1 EP04735073A EP04735073A EP1627362A1 EP 1627362 A1 EP1627362 A1 EP 1627362A1 EP 04735073 A EP04735073 A EP 04735073A EP 04735073 A EP04735073 A EP 04735073A EP 1627362 A1 EP1627362 A1 EP 1627362A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- zone
- key
- data
- memory area
- verification
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of secure security modules comprising at least one central unit and two memory areas.
- This memory is of ROM type, that is to say that it is read only.
- this program will check the second memory area which is of the rewritable type, in general of the EEPROM, NVRAM or Flash type.
- This verification can be done in several ways such as the calculation of a footprint (CRC, Hash) and comparison of this footprint with a value stored in this same area.
- this first boot zone in addition to a read-only memory (ROM) part, includes a rewritable memory part which is subject to the same security conditions.
- ROM read-only memory
- the execution of the verification program can be carried out from the second zone.
- the latter is divided into a verification part and user part.
- the verification of the user program is carried out on the basis of the data of the first zone, namely on the basis of a first key which is generally stored in this first zone and which makes it possible to verify the fingerprint of the data of the second zone.
- the second zone contains data constituting the program and a signature which is encrypted by this first key.
- the verification program which can be either in the first zone or in a verification part of the second zone, calculates a unique fingerprint (Hash, CRC) on the data to be verified.
- CRC unique fingerprint
- the second zone contains the fingerprint encrypted by a key which is initially stored in the first zone.
- This key is used to decrypt the encrypted fingerprint and the result obtained is compared with the calculated fingerprint.
- This key can be in the first zone either in final form (ROM) or in programmed form (EEPROM or Flash).
- ROM final form
- EEPROM or Flash programmed form
- programming is done in the factory or in an authorized center, the program in the first zone accepts this programming provided that no key is already in this memory location.
- This key can be of symmetric type and therefore secret or can be of asymmetric type.
- this key can be in a memory zone other than the first zone because even if a third party were to discover this key, it would not be able to sign a set of modified data because it must necessarily do so using the corresponding private key. This key obviously does not come out of the management center which is in charge of preparing data updates.
- the data in the second memory area can represent either one or more programs, or important data such as rights or decryption keys, or a mixture of the two.
- this third party From knowledge of the content of the second memory area, this third party has the keys used to manage the various rights and access to the services that this processor controls.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a method for restoring the security of such a secure assembly after the content of the second memory area has been read by a third party.
- This object is achieved by a method of generating a security key carried out by a secure module comprising a central unit, a first memory area with conditional access and at least a second memory area containing all or part of the user program, characterized in that it comprises the following stages:
- this new key is generated without the data of the second zone being necessarily verified. If these data have been modified, the root key will simply be false and the future decryption of a transmission key with this key will not give the correct result.
- This root key therefore depends on the one hand on the download or content of the second memory (or data) and on a key stored in a region inaccessible to a third party.
- the factory key is replaced by a secret program stored in the first zone and which calculates, according to a secret algorithm, a fingerprint on all or part of the data of the second zone.
- a secret program stored in the first zone and which calculates, according to a secret algorithm, a fingerprint on all or part of the data of the second zone.
- the manipulation of data (mixture, multiplication, division, EXOR etc.) of the second zone according to a particular algorithm makes it possible to determine the root key.
- the MOD module is a secure processor module. As such, it has at least two memory zones, namely the first zone Z1 and the second zone 'Z2.
- the first zone consists of all or part of the ROM memory, therefore not rewritable.
- a part may include memory places in RAM or EEPROM for variables among others. It is said to be conditional access because it cannot be freely accessible, in particular during the execution of a program in the second zone.
- the second zone Z2 will contain the operating program and the data. This area is made up of non-volatile memory but with the possibility of writing such as EEPROM. Zone Z2 can also contain volatile memory such as RAM. In fact, this area is generally not homogeneous and can include several memories of the ROM, RAM, EEPROM, NVRAM or Flash type.
- zone 2 a first part of zone 2 called the Z2A work zone which will be used for operations relating to the generation of the root key.
- the Z2B user area is a schematic view of the part containing the operating program or programs. Depending on the implementation, it is possible to include variables such as security keys for example.
- the CPU processor is automatically directed to the first zone Zl during an engagement or a restart (reset). This is where the first security operations are carried out.
- the initialization program launched at startup calculates a fingerprint on the agreed part of the data to be checked. This part is defined by pointers which are contained in the second memory area. An illustration of the mechanism of portions of the Z2B user area is contained in Figure 2.
- the data forming the imprint can be taken into account on all or part of the user area. In practice, this imprint will preferably be calculated on the program part and not on the data part (viewing rights for example) because the latter may be modified during the use of the user program.
- the fingerprint determination program initialized at startup calculates this fingerprint on the agreed part of the data to be checked. This part is defined by pointers which are contained in the second memory area, in particular in the DES portion of FIG. 2.
- this imprint is produced by a unidirectional operation which is a mathematical application H from a source set to an object set, in which each element x of the source set is assigned an image H (x).
- H (x) H (x)
- the user area Z2B in Figure 1 is divided into several portions PA, PB and PC. These portions are not contiguous in this example and are separated by PI portions which are not involved in the calculation of the footprint.
- the information describing these different portions is contained in the DES portion which is also part of the user zone Z2B. It contains the indications of memory locations participating in the calculation of the control information. These indications can be either in the form 'start pointer' and 'length' or 'start pointer' and 'end pointer'.
- the I / O block illustrates the means of communication to the outside of the MOD module, means which are essential for using the cryptographic functions and the rights stored in the memory Z2B. It is also through this that data is accidentally extracted from the zone Z2 by a fault as described above.
- Figure 3 the step of generating the root key is shown schematically.
- the DTA data which, according to the example in FIG. 2, consist of the PA, PB and PC portions, are used to calculate by the processor the imprint which is in our case Hash control information.
- To calculate the root key RK we will use this control information H and a factory key MK2 to obtain this root key RK via an encryption module ENC.
- This secret key will be of symmetric type (or use symmetrically by the management center) because otherwise, the resulting root key would not be the same in the management center and in the MOD module.
- the factory key is replaced by a secret algorithm (RTN) which is stored in the first zone Z1. It can be copied from this first zone to the Z2A working zone during the initialization phase if necessary.
- RTN secret algorithm
- This algorithm mixes all or part of the DTA data in a particular mode in order to obtain a single result dependent on this data.
- This mixture can implement different arithmetic operations such as multiplication, Exor etc.
- the place of execution of these process steps is not decisive.
- the program in the boot area can simply copy the factory key to a temporary memory area and the program for generating the root key, called a system program, can be contained in the Z2A work area.
- the important thing is to store this factory key in the first zone Zl in order to make it inaccessible during normal execution of the user program.
- the management center which is in charge of security, is preparing new software in order to remedy a known defect such as a counterfeiter attack aimed at extracting data from the zone Z2.
- This new software is signed, that is to say that the Hash function is calculated on this data and the result is encrypted with the private key MK1.
- the program existing in the Z2B user area processes the incoming data and decrypts the messages using the system transmission key (s).
- the data is then stored in the locations provided for this purpose. Once this download is complete, the processor activates a restart function. This allows it to check all newly stored data.
- This verification generally relates to all of the stored programs and this verification is carried out according to the steps described above. If we consider the hypothesis that a third party has an insecure MOD module, the first memory area Z1 does not exist (or is blank) and the processor immediately starts in the second area Z2. The new program received from the management center is decrypted by the third party and the user area is therefore identical to that of a secure processor with dual memory areas.
- the root key is generated and is used to decrypt the new transmission key.
- the dummy module does not have this root key and cannot decrypt the transmission key. From this moment, the messages exchanged between the management center and the security module are no longer accessible to the fictitious module. If the latter tries to find the root key by an attack such as the one that allowed him to obtain the content of the second zone, this attack no longer works because the purpose of this new software is precisely to remedy this type of flaw .
- the secure module regains the level of security preceding the attack which allowed the data to be extracted.
- access to the first zone Z1 is made when the microprocessor is started or after a verification mechanism.
- the memory area Z1 with conditional access can only be used to provide the secret information necessary for the formation of the root key.
- the program of the use zone Z2 only opens access to the first zone Zl to read the information for the calculation of the root key. During these operations, the duration of visibility of the first zone will be limited to the time necessary to reading then this area will be made inaccessible.
- the factory key is in fact a set of keys. Each time a root key is generated, a factory key is deactivated.
- the selection of the key to be used can be done in different ways, namely: [66] - on command from the management center, that is to say by a descriptor in the DES definition data, [67] - in using the last n bits of the fingerprint (for example 3 bits) which allow to choose among the keys (eg the 8 keys) stored.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CH9532003 | 2003-05-23 | ||
PCT/IB2004/050794 WO2004107283A1 (fr) | 2003-05-23 | 2004-05-27 | Methode de generation d’une cle de securite |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1627362A1 true EP1627362A1 (fr) | 2006-02-22 |
Family
ID=33438115
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04735073A Ceased EP1627362A1 (fr) | 2003-05-23 | 2004-05-27 | Methode de generation d'une cle de securite |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7725740B2 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP1627362A1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN1795471B (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2004107283A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (25)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7177429B2 (en) | 2000-12-07 | 2007-02-13 | Blue Spike, Inc. | System and methods for permitting open access to data objects and for securing data within the data objects |
US7664264B2 (en) | 1999-03-24 | 2010-02-16 | Blue Spike, Inc. | Utilizing data reduction in steganographic and cryptographic systems |
WO2001018628A2 (fr) | 1999-08-04 | 2001-03-15 | Blue Spike, Inc. | Serveur de contenu personnel securise |
US7162035B1 (en) | 2000-05-24 | 2007-01-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
US7287275B2 (en) | 2002-04-17 | 2007-10-23 | Moskowitz Scott A | Methods, systems and devices for packet watermarking and efficient provisioning of bandwidth |
US8171567B1 (en) | 2002-09-04 | 2012-05-01 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
GB0329039D0 (en) * | 2003-12-15 | 2004-01-14 | Ncipher Corp Ltd | Cryptographic security module method and apparatus |
US9641902B2 (en) | 2007-06-26 | 2017-05-02 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | Dynamic adjustment of electronic program guide displays based on viewer preferences for minimizing navigation in VOD program selection |
US7590997B2 (en) | 2004-07-30 | 2009-09-15 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | System and method for managing, converting and displaying video content on a video-on-demand platform, including ads used for drill-down navigation and consumer-generated classified ads |
US11259059B2 (en) | 2004-07-30 | 2022-02-22 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | System for addressing on-demand TV program content on TV services platform of a digital TV services provider |
US9584868B2 (en) | 2004-07-30 | 2017-02-28 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | Dynamic adjustment of electronic program guide displays based on viewer preferences for minimizing navigation in VOD program selection |
US7631336B2 (en) | 2004-07-30 | 2009-12-08 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | Method for converting, navigating and displaying video content uploaded from the internet to a digital TV video-on-demand platform |
US20060265736A1 (en) * | 2005-05-19 | 2006-11-23 | Gilbarco Inc. | Encryption system and method for legacy devices in a retail environment |
US8234506B2 (en) * | 2006-10-08 | 2012-07-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Switching between unsecure system software and secure system software |
US11570521B2 (en) | 2007-06-26 | 2023-01-31 | Broadband Itv, Inc. | Dynamic adjustment of electronic program guide displays based on viewer preferences for minimizing navigation in VOD program selection |
US20090262926A1 (en) * | 2008-04-16 | 2009-10-22 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Method and apparatus for generating a cryptographic key |
US7995196B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2011-08-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
US8438401B2 (en) * | 2009-09-22 | 2013-05-07 | Raytheon BBN Technologies, Corp. | Device and method for securely storing data |
US11083344B2 (en) | 2012-10-11 | 2021-08-10 | Roman Tsibulevskiy | Partition technologies |
JP6265783B2 (ja) * | 2014-03-06 | 2018-01-24 | キヤノン株式会社 | 暗号化/復号化システム及びその制御方法、並びにプログラム |
CN104579644A (zh) * | 2015-01-12 | 2015-04-29 | 浪潮软件集团有限公司 | 一种密钥生成与恢复方法 |
CN106454435B (zh) * | 2015-08-07 | 2020-01-24 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | 一种条件接收方法及相关设备与系统 |
JP6961845B2 (ja) | 2018-05-29 | 2021-11-05 | キュリアサー プロダクツ インコーポレイテッド | 対話型トレーニング及びデモンストレーション用の反射ビデオディスプレイ機器及びその使用方法 |
EP4143809A1 (fr) | 2020-04-30 | 2023-03-08 | Curiouser Products Inc. | Appareil d'affichage vidéo réfléchissant permettant un apprentissage et une démonstration interactifs et ses procédés d'utilisation |
US11167172B1 (en) | 2020-09-04 | 2021-11-09 | Curiouser Products Inc. | Video rebroadcasting with multiplexed communications and display via smart mirrors |
Family Cites Families (24)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3705736A1 (de) | 1987-02-23 | 1988-09-01 | Nixdorf Computer Ag | Verfahren zum sichern von programmen und zur integritaetskontrolle gesicherter programme |
DE3877984D1 (de) * | 1987-03-04 | 1993-03-18 | Siemens Nixdorf Inf Syst | Datenaustauschsystem. |
DE59004066D1 (de) * | 1989-03-08 | 1994-02-17 | Siemens Nixdorf Inf Syst | Verfahren zur Generierung einer Zufallszahl für die verschlüsselte Übertragung von Daten, unter Verwendung eines variablen Startwertes. |
FR2656125B1 (fr) * | 1989-12-19 | 1994-07-08 | Bull Cp8 | Procede de generation d'un nombre aleatoire dans un systeme de traitement de donnees, et systeme mettant en óoeuvre un tel procede. |
FR2666671B1 (fr) * | 1990-09-12 | 1994-08-05 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de gestion d'un programme d'application charge dans un support a microcircuit. |
US5201000A (en) * | 1991-09-27 | 1993-04-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method for generating public and private key pairs without using a passphrase |
US5774058A (en) * | 1995-07-20 | 1998-06-30 | Vindicator Corporation | Remote access system for a programmable electronic lock |
US5944821A (en) * | 1996-07-11 | 1999-08-31 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Secure software registration and integrity assessment in a computer system |
US6141756A (en) * | 1998-04-27 | 2000-10-31 | Motorola, Inc. | Apparatus and method of reading a program into a processor |
US6327652B1 (en) * | 1998-10-26 | 2001-12-04 | Microsoft Corporation | Loading and identifying a digital rights management operating system |
JP2000250817A (ja) * | 1999-03-02 | 2000-09-14 | Tokyo Electron Ltd | 記憶システム、記憶装置及び記憶データ保護方法 |
US6684326B1 (en) * | 1999-03-31 | 2004-01-27 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and system for authenticated boot operations in a computer system of a networked computing environment |
US6625729B1 (en) * | 2000-03-31 | 2003-09-23 | Hewlett-Packard Company, L.P. | Computer system having security features for authenticating different components |
FR2808947B1 (fr) | 2000-05-09 | 2002-10-18 | Bull Cp8 | Procede pour authentifier un objet portatif, objet portatif correspondant, et appareil pour mettre en oeuvre le procede |
US6986052B1 (en) * | 2000-06-30 | 2006-01-10 | Intel Corporation | Method and apparatus for secure execution using a secure memory partition |
US6938164B1 (en) * | 2000-11-22 | 2005-08-30 | Microsoft Corporation | Method and system for allowing code to be securely initialized in a computer |
US7117376B2 (en) * | 2000-12-28 | 2006-10-03 | Intel Corporation | Platform and method of creating a secure boot that enforces proper user authentication and enforces hardware configurations |
US7036023B2 (en) * | 2001-01-19 | 2006-04-25 | Microsoft Corporation | Systems and methods for detecting tampering of a computer system by calculating a boot signature |
FR2829645A1 (fr) | 2001-09-10 | 2003-03-14 | St Microelectronics Sa | Protocole d'authentification a verification d'integrite de memoire |
US7069445B2 (en) * | 2001-11-30 | 2006-06-27 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd | System and method for migration of a version of a bootable program |
US7013384B2 (en) * | 2002-01-15 | 2006-03-14 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. | Computer system with selectively available immutable boot block code |
US7069442B2 (en) * | 2002-03-29 | 2006-06-27 | Intel Corporation | System and method for execution of a secured environment initialization instruction |
US6907522B2 (en) * | 2002-06-07 | 2005-06-14 | Microsoft Corporation | Use of hashing in a secure boot loader |
US6920566B2 (en) * | 2002-07-12 | 2005-07-19 | Phoenix Technologies Ltd. | Secure system firmware by disabling read access to firmware ROM |
-
2004
- 2004-05-19 US US10/848,014 patent/US7725740B2/en active Active
- 2004-05-27 EP EP04735073A patent/EP1627362A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2004-05-27 CN CN2004800147231A patent/CN1795471B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-05-27 WO PCT/IB2004/050794 patent/WO2004107283A1/fr active Application Filing
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
None * |
See also references of WO2004107283A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US7725740B2 (en) | 2010-05-25 |
US20040236959A1 (en) | 2004-11-25 |
CN1795471A (zh) | 2006-06-28 |
WO2004107283A1 (fr) | 2004-12-09 |
CN1795471B (zh) | 2010-10-13 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP1627362A1 (fr) | Methode de generation d'une cle de securite | |
EP1570648B1 (fr) | Méthode de sécurisation des mises à jour de logiciels | |
CA2121410C (fr) | Dispositif de protection des cles d'une carte a puce | |
EP2688010B1 (fr) | Mise à jour d'un système d'exploitation pour élément sécurisé | |
EP1964307B1 (fr) | Procédé pour la réalisation d'un compteur sécurisé sur un système informatique embarqué disposant d'une carte a puce. | |
EP1072124B1 (fr) | Procede de verification de l'usage de cles publiques engendrees par un systeme embarque | |
EP0089876B1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif de protection d'un logiciel livré par un fournisseur à un utilisateur | |
CA2051365C (fr) | Procede de gestion d'un programme d'application charge dans un support a microcircuit | |
EP1494460A1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif d'authentification de données numériques par module d'extension d'authentification | |
EP0720098B1 (fr) | Dispositif de sécurisation de systèmes d'information organisés autour de microprocesseurs | |
EP2166696A1 (fr) | Protection de l'intégrité de données chiffrées en utilisant un état intermédiare de chiffrement pour générer une signature | |
EP3327607B1 (fr) | Procede de verification de donnees | |
EP1761835B1 (fr) | Module de sécurité et méthode de personnalisation d'un tel module de sécurité | |
EP2131300B1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif de sécurisation pour entité électronique portable | |
EP1436792B1 (fr) | Protocole d'authentification a verification d'integrite de memoire | |
EP3757842A1 (fr) | Modification d'une mémoire d'un microprocesseur sécurisé | |
FR3121524A1 (fr) | Procédé et système informatique de stockage decentralisé et de partage de fichiers numériques certifiés | |
WO2008084154A2 (fr) | Traitement de donnee relative a un service numerique | |
EP1756696A1 (fr) | Methode de mise a jour securisee de logiciel embarque dans un module de securite | |
CH716293A2 (fr) | Procédé de signature décentralisée, sous contrôle biométrique et sous condition d'identification personnelle, d'une transaction destinée à une blockchain. | |
EP1494461B1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif d'authentification de données numériques à partir d'un module d'extension d'authentification | |
WO2024083849A1 (fr) | Encodage en boite blanche | |
EP4338079A1 (fr) | Procédé pour sécuriser l'utilisation d'un logiciel | |
FR3073998A1 (fr) | Procede numerique de controle d'acces a un objet, une ressource ou service par un utilisateur | |
WO2022238636A1 (fr) | Procédé pour l'exécution d'un programme charge dans la mémoire non volatile d'un microcontrôleur en circuit intégré |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20051117 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LI LU MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR |
|
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20061106 |
|
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: NAGRAVISION S.A. |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R003 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN REFUSED |
|
18R | Application refused |
Effective date: 20190310 |