EP1606899A2 - Wlan session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff - Google Patents
Wlan session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoffInfo
- Publication number
- EP1606899A2 EP1606899A2 EP04719770A EP04719770A EP1606899A2 EP 1606899 A2 EP1606899 A2 EP 1606899A2 EP 04719770 A EP04719770 A EP 04719770A EP 04719770 A EP04719770 A EP 04719770A EP 1606899 A2 EP1606899 A2 EP 1606899A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- key
- secure
- mobile terminal
- session key
- session
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 66
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 72
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000737 periodic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
- H04W12/35—Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
Definitions
- the invention relates to an apparatus and a method for providing a secure communications session in a local area network, and in particular, to an apparatus and method for providing secure communications session with a mobile terminal in a WLAN with periodic key update and a secure logoff.
- WLAN wireless local area networks
- AP access point
- WLAN wireless local area network
- AP access point
- the WLAN When a user attempts to access service within a public WLAN coverage area, the WLAN first authenticates and authorizes user access, prior to granting network access. After authentication, the public WLAN opens a secure data channel to the mobile communications device to protect the privacy of data passing between the WLAN and the device.
- the IEEE 802. Ix protocol for deployed equipment. Hence, the predominant authentication mechanism for WLANs utilize this standard.
- the IEEE 802. Ix protocol was designed with private LAN access as its usage model. Hence, the IEEE 802. Ix protocol does not provide certain features that would improve the security in a public WLAN environment.
- HTTPS Protocol Secured Sockets
- a secure session key is established and shared by the user and the WLAN. All subsequent communication is encrypted using this session key.
- the session key needs to be updated periodically. Indeed, if the initial session key is used as a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) key, after a certain number of communication exchanges using the WEP key between the wireless user and the WLAN access point, a would be hacker may crack the key.
- WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
- IEEE 802. Ix the protocol used for secure access control in a WLAN, where the session key is updated relies on an authentication server. In essence, each time the key is updated, the user needs to go through the authentication steps similar to the initial authentication. This procedure can be inefficient and impossible in some applications.
- the WLAN technology can benefit from a method that once the user is authenticated and the session key is established, future key updates no longer require the participation of the authentication server.
- What is desired is a method for providing secure communications session between a terminal and a communications network by using a session key for encrypting the communications between the terminal and the communications network, wherein the session key may be derived from a set of keys, including a secure key that is stored in the terminal and an access point of the communications network.
- the secure key may also be used in providing a secure logoff mechanism.
- the invention herein provides a method for improving the security of a mobile terminal in a WLAN environment by instead of installing one shared secret referred to as the initial session key on both the wireless user machine and the WLAN AP, during the user authentication phase, installing two shared keys.
- One of the shared keys is used as the initial session key, and the other shared key is used as a secure seed. Since the initial authenticated communication is secure, once the two secured keys have been established it is virtually impossible for a would be hacker to crack this form of protection. And although the initial session key may eventually be cracked by the would be hacker, the secure seed always remains secure, as it is not used in any insecure communication.
- An embodiment of the present invention includes the process whereby during a key update, a new key is generated and exchanged between the WLAN access point and the mobile terminal. Instead of directly using this new key, the access point and the mobile terminal use this new key together with the secure seed to generate the new session key.
- the new session key may be generated by concatenating the secure seed with the new key, and then calculating a one way hash function such as the Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash algorithm to generate a fixed string. Since the would be hacker does not have the secure seed, even if it can crack the old session key, it would not succeed in obtaining the new session key.
- MD5 Message Digest 5
- An embodiment of the present invention also includes the process whereby during a session logoff the mobile terminal remains secure to prevent a would be hacker from logging off the authenticated mobile terminal.
- the IEEE 802. Ix based scheme does not provide a secure logoff because the logoff request is carried in an unencrypted frame.
- the mobile terminal sends an encrypted logoff request accompanied by the secure seed.
- An embodiment of the present invention also includes a method for providing a secure communications session between a mobile terminal and a wireless local access network (WLAN), the method comprising the steps of: generating first and second secure keys; transmitting the first and second secure keys to the mobile terminal using a secure communications method, the first and second secure keys being stored in the mobile terminal for use during the secure communications session; encrypting and transmitting data to the mobile terminal using a current session key, and receiving and decrypting data received from the mobile terminal using the current session key, the first secure key initially being used as the current session key; and periodically generating a subsequent session key using the second secure key and using the subsequent session key as the current session key during subsequent communications between the WLAN and the mobile terminal.
- WLAN wireless local access network
- the present invention also includes an apparatus for providing a secure communications session between a mobile terminal and a WLAN, comprising a means for generating a first and second secure key and a means for transmitting the first and second secure key to the mobile terminal.
- the mobile terminal stores the first and second secure keys for decryption of subsequently received data
- the WLAN a means encrypts and transmits data to the mobile terminal using a current session key.
- the WLAN a means to periodically generate a subsequent session keys uses the second secure key and uses subsequent session keys as the current session key during communications between the WLAN and the mobile terminal.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a communications system for practicing the method of the present principles for authenticating a mobile wireless communications device.
- FIG. 2 is a flow diagram of the method of establishing two secure keys of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of the method of establishing a secured log off procedure on the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an apparatus for implementing the present invention.
- circuits and associated blocks and arrows represent functions of the process according to the present invention which may be implemented as electrical circuits and associated wires or data busses, which transport electrical signals.
- one or more associated arrows may represent communication (e.g., data flow) between software routines, particularly when the present method or apparatus of the present invention is implemented as a digital process.
- one or more mobile terminals represented by 140 ⁇ through 140 n communicate through an access point 130 n , local computer 120, in association with firewalls 122 and one or more virtual operators 150 1-n , such as authentication server 150 n.
- Communication from terminals 140 1-n typically require accessing a secured data base or other resources, utilizing the Internet 110 and associated communication paths 154 and 152 that require a high degree of security from unauthorized entities, such as would be hackers.
- the IEEE 802. Ix architecture encompasses several components and services that interact to provide station mobility transparent to the higher layers of a network stack.
- the IEEE 802. Ix network defines stations such as access points 130 1-n and mobile terminals 140 ⁇ -n; as the components communication in the wireless medium 124 and contain the functionality of the IEEE 802. Ix protocols, that being MAC (Medium Access Control) 138 1-n , and corresponding PHY (Physical Layer) (not shown), and a connection 127 to the wireless medium.
- the IEEE 802. Ix functions are implemented in the hardware and software of a wireless modem or a network access or interface card.
- This invention proposes a method for implementing an identification means in the communication stream such that an access point 130 1-n compatible with the IEEE 802. Ix WLAN MAC layers for downlink traffic (i.e. from the an authentication server to the mobile terminal such as a laptop) may participate in the authentication of one or more wireless mobile devices 140 1-n ,, a local or back end server 120 and an authentication server 150.
- the access 160 enables each mobile terminals 140 1-n ⁇ to securely access the WLAN 115 by authenticating both the mobile terminal itself, as well as its communication stream in accordance with the IEEE 802. Ix protocol.
- the manner in which the access 160 enables such secure access can best be understood by reference to FIG. 1 in conjunction with FIG. 2.
- the sequence of interactions that occurs over time among a mobile wireless communication device, say mobile terminal 140 n> the public WLAN 115, the local web server 120, and the authentication server 150 is described under the convention of an IEEE 802. Ix protocol, wherein the access point 130 n of FIG. 1 maintains a controlled port and an uncontrolled port, through which the access point exchanges information, with the mobile terminals 140 1-n .
- the controlled port maintained by the access point 130 n serves as the entryway for non-authentication information, such as data traffic to pass through the access point 130 n as it flows between the local server 120 and the mobile terminals 140 ⁇ -n .
- the access points 130 1-n keep the respective controlled port closed in accordance with the IEEE 802. Ix protocol, until the authentication of the pertinent mobile terminal 140 1-n communicates.
- the access points 130 1-n always maintain the respective uncontrolled port open to permit the mobile terminals 140 1-n to exchange authentication data with an authentication server 150.
- a method in accordance with the present invention for improving the security of a mobile terminal in 140 asthma in a WLAN environment installs two shared secrets instead of one shared secret, on both the mobile terminal 140 n and the WLAN access point 130 n during the user authentication phase.
- One of the shared secrets is used as the initial session key and the other is used as a secure seed. Since the initial authentication is secure, these two keys would not be known to a would be hacker.
- the keys may be generated and distributed to the mobile terminal and the WLAN, access point, using known methods, for example using an authentication server, for generating and distributing such keys. Although the initial session key may eventually be cracked by the would be hacker, the secure seed remains secure as it is not used in any insecure communication. More 1 particularly, the method of the present invention processes, through the access point 130 n, web requests from the mobile terminal 140 nj so as to embed a session id 215.
- a method in accordance with the present invention improves the security of a mobile terminal in 140 n in a WLAN environment by comprising the steps of installing at least two shared secrets on both the mobile terminal 140 n and the WLAN access point 130 n during the user authentication phase, whereby a first secret is the initial session key and subsequent keys are utilized as secure seeds.
- each mobile communication device such as each of devices 140 ⁇ -140 n
- the authentication technique utilized in FIG. 2 depicts the sequence of communications that occurs over time among the mobile terminal 140 n , the access point 130 n , and the authentication server 150.
- the mobile terminal 140 n transmits a request for access to the access point 130 n , during step 200 of FIG. 2.
- the mobile terminal 140 n initiates the access request by way of a HTTPS access demand launched by a browser software program (not shown) executed by the mobile terminal 140 n .
- the access point 130 n redirects the browser software in the mobile terminal 140 n to a local welcome page on the access point 130 n during step 202.
- the mobile terminal 140 n initiates an authentication sequence by querying the access point 130 n for the identity of the appropriate authentication server during step 204.
- the access point 130 n determines the identity of appropriate authentication server (e.g., server 150) during step 206 and then directs the browser software in the mobile terminal 140 incident to that server via an HTTP command during step 208.
- mobile terminal 140 n Having now received the identity of the authentication server 150 during step 208, mobile terminal 140 n then sends its user credentials to the server during step 210 of FIG. 2.
- the authentication server 150 Upon receipt of the user credentials from the mobile terminal 140 n , the authentication server 150 makes a determination whether the mobile terminal 140 n constitutes a valid user during step 212. If so, then the authentication server 150 replies to the mobile terminal 140 n during step 214 using a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption key, which the device invokes via an ActiveX command of an ActiveX control though the device browser software.
- WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
- the ActiveX control is essentially an executable program that can be embedded inside a web page.
- Many software browser programs such Microsoft Internet Explorer have the capability of displaying such web pages and invoking the embedded ActiveX controls, which can be downloaded from a remote server (e.g., the authentication server 150).
- a remote server e.g., the authentication server 150.
- ActiveX controls are restricted by the security mechanisms built into the browser software. In practice, most browser programs have several different selectable security levels. At the lowest level, any ActiveX control from the web can be invoked without restriction. In the highest level, no ActiveX control can be invoked from the browser software.
- a method in accordance with the present invention comprises the step of, after authentication and authorization, generating a first key in step 217 and distributing the new key to the access point 130 n and the mobile terminal 140 n .
- hi step 221 second key referenced to as secure seed 123 is distributed to the mobile terminal 140 n and the access point 130 n .
- the mobile terminal and the access point communicate using the first key as the session to encrypt the data.
- the access point 130 n and the mobile terminal 140 n employ the key 119 and the secure seed 123 to periodically generate 225a new session key 121, whereby the new session key is then used for subsequent communications between the mobile terminal and the access point.
- the second key is always stored and kept as a secret in the mobile terminal and the access point during the communication session so that a would be hacker is unable to determine the second key.
- Several techniques may be employed to further facilitate the management of the combined keys such as generating the new session key and concatenating the new session key to the secure seed prior to using it for security. Once having concatenated the combined session key and secure seed, the process may calculate a hash algorithm on the concatenated new session key and secure seed and generate a fixed string for further transmission.
- a method for improving the security of a mobile terminal in a WLAN environment further comprises the steps of the mobile terminal 140 n sending during session logoff an encrypted logoff request accompanied by the secure seed such that the secure seed appears in the logoff request.
- the mobile terminal 140 n remains secure to prevent a would be hacker from logging off an authenticated mobile terminal 140 n .
- the IEEE 802. Ix based scheme cannot provide secure logoff because the logoff request is carried in an unencrypted frame.
- the mobile terminal 140 n sends an encrypted logoff request 228 accompanied by the secure seed 123.
- the access point 130 n comprises a means for generating a first and second secure key 410 and a means for transmitting 420 the first secure key 119 and the second secure key 123 to the mobile terminal 140 n .
- the mobile terminal 140 n receives the first secure key 119 and second secure key 123 and stores the keys in a register 430 for use during the secure communications session.
- the access point 130 n includes a means to encrypt 415 data and a means to transmit 420 data to the mobile terminal 140 n via the WLAN 115 using a current session key.
- the mobile terminal 140 n includes a means to receive 450 and a means to decrypt data 435 received from the access point 130 n using the current session key 119, the first secure key initially being used as the current session key 119.
- the access point 130 n includes a means to periodically generate 425 a subsequent session key using the second secure key and using the subsequent session key as the current session key during subsequent communications between the WLAN 115 and the mobile terminal 140chy.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US45454203P | 2003-03-14 | 2003-03-14 | |
US454542P | 2003-03-14 | ||
PCT/US2004/007403 WO2004084458A2 (en) | 2003-03-14 | 2004-03-11 | Wlan session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1606899A2 true EP1606899A2 (en) | 2005-12-21 |
EP1606899A4 EP1606899A4 (en) | 2011-11-02 |
Family
ID=33029889
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04719770A Withdrawn EP1606899A4 (en) | 2003-03-14 | 2004-03-11 | Wlan session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1606899A4 (en) |
JP (2) | JP2006520571A (en) |
KR (2) | KR20060053003A (en) |
CN (2) | CN1759550A (en) |
MX (1) | MXPA05009804A (en) |
MY (1) | MY135833A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2004084458A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1759550A (en) * | 2003-03-14 | 2006-04-12 | 汤姆森特许公司 | WLAN session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff |
US7142851B2 (en) * | 2003-04-28 | 2006-11-28 | Thomson Licensing | Technique for secure wireless LAN access |
CN102752309A (en) * | 2005-04-22 | 2012-10-24 | 汤姆森特许公司 | Method for performing safety anonymous accessing on wireless local area network by mobile equipment |
EP1875703B1 (en) * | 2005-04-22 | 2016-04-13 | Thomson Licensing | Method and apparatus for secure, anonymous wireless lan (wlan) access |
US7788703B2 (en) * | 2006-04-24 | 2010-08-31 | Ruckus Wireless, Inc. | Dynamic authentication in secured wireless networks |
CN101454767B (en) * | 2006-04-24 | 2013-08-14 | 鲁库斯无线公司 | Dynamic authentication in secured wireless networks |
US8099468B2 (en) | 2006-06-30 | 2012-01-17 | Nikon Corporation | Digital camera with communication unit for sending and receiving electronic mail |
EP2168303B1 (en) | 2007-06-11 | 2016-03-16 | Nxp B.V. | Method of authentication and electronic device for performing the authentication |
KR101016277B1 (en) * | 2007-12-20 | 2011-02-22 | 건국대학교 산학협력단 | Method and apparatus for sip registering and establishing sip session with enhanced security |
US8756668B2 (en) | 2012-02-09 | 2014-06-17 | Ruckus Wireless, Inc. | Dynamic PSK for hotspots |
US10576256B2 (en) | 2016-12-13 | 2020-03-03 | Becton, Dickinson And Company | Antiseptic applicator |
US11689925B2 (en) * | 2017-09-29 | 2023-06-27 | Plume Design, Inc. | Controlled guest access to Wi-Fi networks |
US11496902B2 (en) | 2017-09-29 | 2022-11-08 | Plume Design, Inc. | Access to Wi-Fi networks via two-step and two-party control |
CN111404666B (en) * | 2019-01-02 | 2024-07-05 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | Key generation method, terminal equipment and network equipment |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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JP2002508892A (en) * | 1997-03-10 | 2002-03-19 | ガイ・エル・フィールダー | Two-way authentication and encryption system |
FI113119B (en) * | 1997-09-15 | 2004-02-27 | Nokia Corp | A method for securing communications over telecommunications networks |
US6304658B1 (en) * | 1998-01-02 | 2001-10-16 | Cryptography Research, Inc. | Leak-resistant cryptographic method and apparatus |
US6151677A (en) * | 1998-10-06 | 2000-11-21 | L-3 Communications Corporation | Programmable telecommunications security module for key encryption adaptable for tokenless use |
US7028186B1 (en) * | 2000-02-11 | 2006-04-11 | Nokia, Inc. | Key management methods for wireless LANs |
JP2002077129A (en) * | 2000-08-24 | 2002-03-15 | Nissin Electric Co Ltd | Method of communicating encryption |
CN1759550A (en) * | 2003-03-14 | 2006-04-12 | 汤姆森特许公司 | WLAN session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff |
-
2004
- 2004-03-11 CN CNA2004800063151A patent/CN1759550A/en active Pending
- 2004-03-11 KR KR1020067005624A patent/KR20060053003A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2004-03-11 KR KR1020057017159A patent/KR20050116821A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2004-03-11 MX MXPA05009804A patent/MXPA05009804A/en active IP Right Grant
- 2004-03-11 CN CNA2006100925525A patent/CN1874222A/en active Pending
- 2004-03-11 EP EP04719770A patent/EP1606899A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2004-03-11 WO PCT/US2004/007403 patent/WO2004084458A2/en active Search and Examination
- 2004-03-11 JP JP2006507069A patent/JP2006520571A/en active Pending
- 2004-03-13 MY MYPI20040889A patent/MY135833A/en unknown
-
2006
- 2006-03-20 JP JP2006077107A patent/JP2006180561A/en active Pending
Non-Patent Citations (3)
Title |
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"An initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1X Standard", , 1 January 2002 (2002-01-01), XP55007968, Retrieved from the Internet: URL:http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/1x.pdf [retrieved on 2011-09-23] * |
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See also references of WO2004084458A2 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR20060053003A (en) | 2006-05-19 |
WO2004084458A2 (en) | 2004-09-30 |
CN1874222A (en) | 2006-12-06 |
JP2006180561A (en) | 2006-07-06 |
CN1759550A (en) | 2006-04-12 |
MXPA05009804A (en) | 2006-05-19 |
JP2006520571A (en) | 2006-09-07 |
EP1606899A4 (en) | 2011-11-02 |
KR20050116821A (en) | 2005-12-13 |
WO2004084458A3 (en) | 2004-11-18 |
MY135833A (en) | 2008-07-31 |
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