EP1410128A1 - Data processing device - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a data processing device comprising a local file receiving system which is used to receive local files and which is associated with a local computer unit and used for the purpose of retrieval and storage, in addition to two-way transmission of volume files by the computer unit, and a user identification unit which is associated with the local computer unit and which is configured in such a way that it can react to positive ID only in order to enable access by said computer unit to volume files which are authorized for a user. The volume file is stored in the local file receiving system in an encrypted form which cannot be used for a user. A key administration system which is associated with a volume file transmission path between the local computer unit and local file receiving system is configured as part of and as a functionality of the local computer unit for the generation and allocation of a user-specific and volume-file-specific key data file for each volume file. The key management system is connected to a key data base which is part of the system for receiving local files and logically separated therefrom. The key management system links a key file which is stored in the key data base to a volume file stored in the local file receiving system in order to generate an electronic document so that a volume file can be produced for the local file receiving system. The key data base is provided locally in the data processing unit but is structurally or physically separated from the driver unit or mass storage unit which is associated with the local file receiving system.

Description

 DESCRIPTION

Datenverarbeitunqsvorrichtunq

5 The present invention relates to a data processing device according to the preamble of claim 1

Against the background of increasingly stricter data security requirements, protection against unauthorized data access by third parties and the unauthorized copying of entire data D and file structures or the unauthorized access and insight into / into these, the general problem of access protection to user files arises not only for mainframe systems or for company-wide networks, often single-user systems or small, local computer networks are also threatened

5 Access control and access protection has therefore found its way into practically all computer operating systems and user programs, from a password-protected computer start (which only makes it possible to start up an operating system if a correct password has been entered), to individual access security, for example with an application program, e.g. B a word processor, electronic documents created ("electronic document" should be understood in the following as any readable and outputable useful files, including executable programs, that are usable for a user, ie meaningfully assigned the intended content or communication purpose , in practical use these are, for example, texts, images, sound and / or image sequences, 3-D animations, interactive input masks, etc.)

Especially in the field of application of a local workstation or computer network, however, password-protected access or start routines usually offer insufficient protection. Even if, for example, password protection of a workstation computer as access protection for the computer offered via the relevant operating system cannot be started by an unauthorized user, there is a risk that either the mass storage device assigned to this workstation will be accessed via a detour, or that the entire contents of such a mass storage device, such as a hard disk, can be read out, for example by means of a backup routine, and then later with a other system is illegally analyzed and read 5

Even an individual document password protection promises insufficient protection against such unauthorized backups, because even on a hard disk password-encrypted useful files can often be accessed with little effort, using the content annuities, internal redundancy of images or language, to be restored to their original, open version Such a document-specific password protection, which is usually also understood as user-level cryptography, is sensitive to operating errors and cumbersome due to its strict document dependency There is a risk that a user may forget to encrypt individual files or not delete an originally unencrypted text file after the encrypted saving. The use is also not very convenient, since an associated password usually has to be entered several times during a user session (session) in particular in connection with file servers in a networked environment, it is also practically unavoidable that at least at certain times there is a clear, unencrypted user file on a storage medium and thus open access is possible via a network

As a further disadvantage of such a solution known from the prior art, as is known, for example, in connection with common word processing systems,

15 that a respective user must remember an associated password, the risk of document loss when the password is lost is therefore great, and beyond that, decryption is only program or application-specific, in particular access to a file encrypted in this way with other application programs and their further use is very difficult, if not impossible

E0

As already mentioned, the principle-related disadvantage of classic encryption using known cryptographic methods (symmetrical or asymmetrical encryption such as DES, IDEA, RSA, El-Gamal) is that it depends on the secrecy of a relatively short key, usually 56 or 128 bits If such

E5 keys can be calculated from a limited data context due to the mentioned internal redundancy of the language or the standard in which the electronic document in question was written, then the entire content in which this key was used is readable

3D Another problem is the so-called open systems, which are managed by multi-user operating systems and allow access to network mass storage devices. Such access is usually only insufficiently managed via the operating system, and in particular it is usually not possible to trace who, when and when From where data was written or read On the other hand, it is obvious that especially in a different

35 confidential context such information may be necessary, for example in the case of later evidence to improve source protection The object of the present invention is therefore to improve a generic data processing device with regard to the data security of locally stored useful or volume data, and in particular to reduce the risk of unauthorized data access by completely copying a mass storage content, for example by means of backup 5 to overcome the security disadvantages of known cryptography methods against decryption and to increase encryption security

The object is achieved by the device with the features of patent claims 1 and 10 and the method with the steps of patent claims 7 and 8, preferred further developments of the invention result from the jerk-related, dependent claims

In an advantageous manner according to the invention, there is a departure from the role-specific (ie related to user, for example administrator) password principle, which is customary in the single-user or local network area, and the security-sensitive user files are protected - in the further and within the scope of the invention also as Volume files called -

- Is carried out by the key management unit additionally provided according to the invention in cooperation with the key storage unit ("key file")

More precisely, an essential feature of the present invention is then any ED (or a selected one and / or determined by the operating system) for - access-protected -

- Storage and file intended for later retrieval before being stored in the local file storage system, which can particularly preferably be a conventional mass storage device, such as a hard drive, an optical drive, etc., by means of a file-specific and user-specific key is meant that each volume file to be backed up within the scope of the present invention, preferably the entirety of the files to be stored on the file storage system, is provided with an individual key which is stored separately (i.e. not in a manner directly associated with the file storage system), and a volume file can only be opened and used together with the associated, individualized key.

3 D fish property of a key that for different users of the data processing device according to the invention a respective access and authorization check takes place, ie a user (within the scope of the invention is to be understood as a "user" in this respect also a user type / ppe) can within the The present invention only access the volume files provided or authorized for it, and this is - in contrast to the prior art - achieved in particular also via the individualized key file or key data record of a database In the practical implementation of the invention, therefore, before each work session with access to volume files that cannot be used as such, at least one identification and authorization of a respective user must take place, and only by linking to a separately stored or generated key file can one be stored in the file storage system 5 preferably permanently saved volume files are saved or used in a usable form

This not only solves the main problem of existing, password-protected data processing systems from the prior art (also a complete copying of a fixed

10 disk with the file storage system does not allow access to the usable user data), by interposing the key management unit according to the invention in the bidirectional storage and calling path between the computer unit and the local file system, these security processes for an authorized user - after a single, successful identification - become invisible and unnoticed, offer, for example, the advantage of

15 Course of a work session on the data processing system (session) not having to enter an associated password each time a text file is opened

The further advantage of a user- and file-specific encryption according to the invention is that, if an individual key becomes known, the effort required for a key change or a change in access remains relatively low

According to a further development, it is provided within the scope of the invention to provide a further security level, which is realized in the form of an encrypted intermediate file (intermediate layer) and is not stored on a common back-up unit, which in particular the security of the access to The key is further increased. Such a self-encrypted, physically removed intermediate layer ensures that the actual key file is not directly accessible

The result of the present invention also shows that, in principle, the reading of the D-encrypted file storage system, for example for the purpose of backup, is permitted as such and is generally accessible and, in particular, is made independent of authorization (since the result of such a backup also remains encrypted ) Correspondingly, such backup processes, such as the backup process, are independent of a special, secure access status (usually supervisor or system administrator), since 5 the actual read right or the ability to access the electronic document in plain text (ie open and unencrypted), can be assigned independently of the backup function and thus by a supervisor or the like -O-

According to a preferred development of the invention, for which independent protection is also claimed, semantic, i.e. content- and / or meaning-distorting encryption methods are also used, the content of a volume file to be protected being given a correspondingly unusable version here and only by an associated file - 5 as well as customized key file, which then contains, for example, a sequence index for a correct arrangement of interchanged individual terms or sentences of a text in the combination of such an encrypted text

Such semantic encryption offers compared to classic cryptography

1Q ren, in particular in the present context of encryption at the level of the file system, a number of advantages. On the one hand, the security of encryption, in particular due to the possibility of inserting or exchanging any information components, is almost absolute, in particular any context or content-dependent - The key of the encrypted text is no longer available You can also use

15 this encryption method in a particularly simple way to relate to the respective user. With certain original data quantities, such as texts, according to a preferred development of the invention, encryption can also be carried out in such a way that a respective content is distorted and changed in relation to the original content, insofar So it is useless from the user's point of view, but nevertheless makes sense

EG and / or a technical readability and representability of the encrypted amount of data is retained (with the effect that it may not be recognized at all that encryption is present) .This is the case, for example, when certain words and terms of a text (which in this respect are used as information components be understood within the meaning of claim 8) against semantically and / or grammatically comparable

Ξ 5 terms that are to be understood differently, however, are replaced

In general, the present invention requires a metalanguage in the form of a linear concatenation of modules (information components) which each give meaning from themselves, which is broken down for the purpose of the present method and by the actions of exchanging 3G removal, addition and / or exchange into the form unusable for the user (Arrangement) is brought

Within the scope of the present invention, a device is created for handling an electronically stored original amount of data, which is particularly suitable and designed for implementing the semantic encryption described above In an advantageous manner according to the invention, the functionality of a key generation and administration unit is implemented by such a device, which is able to generate the semantically encrypted volume data together with key data 5 from an original document to be protected (namely the original data volume or user file), as well as to manage and further process the data quantities generated in this way. In particular, the analysis unit according to the invention is provided in order to create the prerequisites for subsequent content-related or meaning-related encryption within the given format structure and / or grammar of the original document, and that of the analysis unit downstream encryption unit IG then takes the core operations of semantic encryption, namely the exchange, removal, addition and exchange, on the information components of the original data set under Ber account the analyzed format structure and grammar, before

15 It is particularly suitable, for example, to carry out the swapping or exchanging operations in such a way that a relevant information component is replaced with or by content components that are structurally or grammatically equivalent, so that the result of the operation still seems to make sense envisaged Aquivalenzeunheit enables the scope of the present invention

EG identification or the selection of suitable equivalent information components for this or other operations

According to a further preferred development of the invention, an operation is also carried out by the encryption unit taking into account the grammar (the underlying

The natural, machine or human language), the format or the syntax of the original document instead of. By virtue of the preferably provided semantic control unit, the encryption unit provided according to the invention is able to generate an encryption result that corresponds to the original date grammatical, format and / or syntactic structure

3 G has, so that there is equivalence not only with regard to the respective individual information components (e.g. words in a text), but also with regard to the structures and / or format-based arrangements (e.g. the arrangement of terms in one Sentence according to the rules of grammar) is in conformity with the rules and insofar as it does not reveal without an examination of the content that an operation causing the encryption effect on 5 the information components has taken place Within the scope of the present invention, any elements of a language are to be understood that are meaningful in a meaningful sense WO 01/06341 _j_ PCT / EP00 / 06824

Are related to each other, that is to say to a certain extent belong to a common group of content, thematic and / or meaningful language elements (e.g. words). Typical examples of terms that are metaphorically equivalent within the scope of the present invention are, for example, "train station with" petrol station "or" airport ", as each directly 5 thematically related to the field of "traffic" and so far metaphorically interchangeable. Other examples are first names, place names or numerical information (such as dates, dates, etc.), which are each to be regarded as metaphorically equivalent

IG In accordance with a further preferred development, the encryption unit is assigned a control unit which randomizes the encryption operation (ie the application and effect of the individual encryption operations) by generating and taking into account a random component, for example a random number generated in an otherwise known manner and taking it into account making a dependent number

15 of encryption operations, it is ensured that encryption of the same original document always leads to a different result, that is to say the encryption never produces the same encryption result even under otherwise identical conditions. This measure can further increase the security of the present invention

EC

In general, it has also proven to be particularly preferred to give a user who uses the encryption the option of preselecting a predetermined encryption depth (and thus encryption security). In the described aspect of the invention of semantic encryption, the question of

Ξ 5 encryption depth with the number of the basic operations of exchanging, removing, adding or exchanging, which effects the encryption, and in this respect also determines the volume of the key file generated. By setting a corresponding parameter, the user can effectively determine a security level of the encryption operations to be carried out, although , in contrast to

3Q known, classic encryption method, in any case the result of the semantic encryption yields an apparently correct (i.e. apparently unencrypted) result, and the question of whether encryption has taken place at all is not possible without checking the content (or equipped with prior knowledge) This effect of the uncertainty achieved for the first time by the semantic encryption even achieves a certain protective effect without a single encryption operation being carried out in the sense described above WO 01/06341 _g_ PCT / EP00 / 06824

As a further, particularly preferred embodiment of the present invention, it has also been found to output the volume data as a document by means of the conversion unit provided for further training, while the key file as executable script data of a suitable structural or script language, e.g. XML, SGML, XSL, Visual Basic ( Script), javascript etc., can be generated and output, with the advantage that, in particular in connection with network or internet-based applications, the original data can then be restored in a particularly simple manner, in the simplest case by executing the script which directly brings about the restoration (which has been introduced via a suitable connection that takes the interest of the protection seeker into account) and which also offers starting points for further security mechanisms, e.g. data integrity or server contact

As a result, the infrastructure according to the invention can be used to create a highly secure and, at the same time, user-friendly protection architecture which not only protects the interests of the creator of an electronic document worthy of protection significantly better than is the case with conventional options, but also the potential users of the protected content enables easy, convenient access and handling of the document, and ultimately it must be borne in mind that only the existence of an effective protective instrument against unauthorized copying and redistribution can guarantee that electronic documents will continue to produce valuable content and with a high level of quality and generality in the future will be available

According to a preferred development of the method of semantic encryption, it is also provided that a key file (amount of data) generated according to the invention is encrypted separately (conventional or semantic) for third parties, at least twice, with a first person receiving the result of the first encryption and a second person the result of the subsequent second encryption is assigned. Such a procedure according to the invention then has the advantageous effect that even if the actual key data volume is lost, the user file can be restored by both recipients of the subsequent encryption results generating the underlying key data volume with one another by successive decryption , which in this respect corresponds to a four-eyes principle, the present invention was advantageously independent of the original key, namely ch the amount of key data generated first, and to prevent accidents, such as the loss of the original key, e.g. due to the death of a password holder, an additional, double encryption of the correct key file is provided, a first result of the additional locking is assigned to a first third party second result of the additional Encryption is assigned to a second third party and the correct key file can be restored by successively decrypting the first and second results

5 It is not only in this specific example that it can be seen that, within the scope of the invention, the user file encrypted in this way is a volume file, that is to say that it has a comparable or at most little changed volume volume compared to the open content

An advantageous form of implementation of the present invention then lies in the

10 dimensions key storage unit (key database) to be provided locally, i.e. within the spatial limits of the data processing device (e.g. as an additional hard disk or other medium that is spatially separated from the file storage system, or else logically and structurally separated, for example in the form of another partition with its own drive identifier on one common hard disk unit)

15

In concrete terms, it is therefore possible, for example, to address the volume data (as the original amount of data) using a drive letter in the manner of a file system and then access the key database, and / or to address the key database in the manner of a hierarchical file system and, for example, by means of a drive

To label EQ letters accordingly, the key database is provided locally in the data processing device, but is structurally or physically separate from a drive or mass storage unit assigned to the local file storage system, and the key database is by means of its own drive letter, a drive object (connected to a database function) or the like addressable in the manner of a file system

E 5 bar

As a result, the present invention thus leads to a significantly increased level of data security, in particular with regard to a copy (backup) of the entire file which is otherwise possible with little effort by unauthorized or unlawful persons.

3Q systems or parts of these The bidirectional local encryption implemented by means of the present invention creates usable - and thus also valuable for third parties - data and information at the time of the query or only exists before being stored in the file storage system, so that the present Invention can also be understood as a fundamental modification of a conventionally open file handling system towards a system protected in both 5 directions (based on a locally assigned mass storage device) by encryption WO 01/06341 _ _{1 Q} _ PCT / EP00 / 06824

Another significant advantage of the encryption method according to the invention, also referred to in the present text as "semantic encryption", is that active data can be used for encryption in the form of any link function, so that this key gives direct properties of the encrypted or decrypted document (eg sequence or gaps) Again, on the other hand, classic encryption functions that - clearly and specifically - establish a relationship between the key and the document to be encrypted are rather passive, ie the encryption function or operation has no relationship to the document

A further, potentially usable aspect of the present invention lies in the fact that, in contrast to classic, known encryption methods, the result of the semantic encryption can be an electronic document, which for a viewer or user can have a character that at first glance seems appropriate applies to decryption, with the result that in principle every encryption or decryption

15 process can lead to an apparently sensible result (in contrast, it is clear, for example in conventional cryptography methods, whether successful decryption has taken place, because only then does a visibly meaningful result also arise). This applies in particular to the application of the invention that the key management unit is used to generate and assigning a plurality of user specific and volume file specific ones

E0 key files are designed for each volume file, the key management unit being connected to a key database provided as part of the local file storage system, logically separate therefrom and for linking a key file stored in the key database to a volume file stored in the local file storage system so that in the case using a correct one of the plurality

E 5, the correct electronic document is generated from generated and assigned key files, and in the event that an incorrect one of the stored key files is used, an electronic document that is apparently correct for a user is generated

Semantic encryption thus leads to potentially increased security when dealing with encrypted or decrypted documents, whereby there is also the need, for example, to indicate to a user after successful, successful decryption that he actually has the open, decrypted result , and not a document that is still encrypted (since a decryption process has been unsuccessful)

35

Such a display can be achieved, for example, by means of an additional originality signal, for example in the form of an optical indication (only) known to the user in this sense The semantic encryption used in the context of the present invention obtains an additional quality by not only using the information components manipulated according to the invention with the interchanging, removing, adding or exchanging operations for encryption purposes, but also an encryption effect being achieved in that the information about the exchanged, removed, added and / or exchanged information components present in the key data volume generated by semantic encryption itself is subjected to operations of exchanging or exchanging. In other words, the

IG Further training in semantic encryption lies in the semantic encryption of the linguistic / textual / structural meta-level on which a respective document is based (which itself can be understood as a way of describing the electronic document). In the concrete implementation, for example, the information (e.g. Commands or syntax elements) that complete the semantic encryption process

15 describe, in turn replaced by other, preferably non-speaking, information (with the result that such an amount of key data had to be restored before an actual decryption)

A specific example of such a metalanguage, which is also encodable according to the invention EG, are so-called TAG elements, such as formatting instructions for tables or the like. Also such format and / or structural elements of a document, which are to a certain extent superior to the actual content-giving words or Sentences exist, can be treated within the scope of the present invention by the basic operations of exchanging, removing, adding or exchanging, and can therefore be protected by ES

Further advantages, features and details of the invention result from the following description of preferred exemplary embodiments and from the drawings, which show in

30

1 shows a schematic block diagram of the data processing device according to a first, preferred embodiment of the invention and

FIG. 2 shows a schematic block diagram of a key generation and management unit within the scope of the invention 1 illustrates on the basis of a single-user computer system how the present invention can be implemented with assemblies and components of a commercially available PC.

A local computing unit 10, implemented by the PC mainboard with conventional processor, S memory and interface units, accesses a local file storage system 12, implemented as a hard disk, the connection between the computing unit and the file storage system being bidirectional, that is to say both writing processes of the computing unit can be performed on the file system, and vice versa files of the unit 12 are read (called up) and then open via suitable input / output units 14 (e.g. a screen, printer, G interfaces for connecting other computer systems, data lines, etc.) readable or usable.

The file storage system 12 can be a logically and structurally separate file storage system, which is specifically provided 5 as part of a larger file storage for the present purpose.

As shown in FIG. 1, a key management unit 16 is interposed between the computing unit 10 and the file storage system 12, which performs bidirectional encryption of user files — G text files, image files, etc. — that are to be stored and are directed toward the local file storage system 12. and which, in the opposite direction, also decrypts volume files stored in the local file storage system as unreadable (ie unusable) back into a usable user file.

For this purpose, the key management unit uses individual keys which are generated specifically for users (groups) and files and are stored in a key storage unit 18.

In the exemplary embodiment described, the key storage unit is physically contained on the same hard disk as the file storage system 12, but is logically and structurally separated from this by the key storage unit 18 (alternatively or additionally: the file storage system 12) being assigned its own drive identifier.

Only by means of the document-specific key is it possible for a user of the computing unit to output a volume file stored in the system 12 in a usable (readable) manner, or to store a currently processed file there.

Furthermore, the embodiment of the invention shown in FIG. 1 provides that, connected to the computing unit, a user identification unit is present, for example can be implemented by a suitable software module within the framework of the computer operating system or a correct application program

Such user identification makes it possible to assign the key files stored in the key storage unit 18 in a user-specific manner and to make them available, so that in this way a particular user can only access volume files authorized for him in the file storage system 12 in the exemplary embodiment shown, the drive provided for the key storage unit is subdivided into invisible for the user for each intended key file, so that the security of access to the file storage system is further increased

In addition to common encryption methods for volume files that are illegible (and therefore unusable as such) in the file storage system, the available

15 to the invention, in particular, so-called semantic encryption, that is to say the planned modification of the content of a volume file by, for example, rearranging the order of content components of content that is only meaningful and (completely) usable in this specific sequence (that is to say rearrangement of words or sentences) within an overall text), the generated and stored in the key storage unit 18

E 0 stored key receives correct sequence information Other possibilities of such a semantic encryption were the exchange, omission or replacement of predetermined or randomly selected keywords, the creation of gaps or the insertion of meaning-changing additions

ES In the manner described, unauthorized access to the file storage system, for example by means of a full backup, was therefore only left to the accessing party with incomplete and, as a result, useless data, which even in the course of common decryption processes, without the separately stored key information, was not readable Form can be produced

30

Due to the effect of the key management in the background (once the user has been identified by the unit 20), these security-enhancing processes also go unnoticed by the user, and especially if - for example by using specially configured hardware modules for the key management unit 16 - the Shipping and

If the decision-making steps are carried out quickly enough, the procedure according to the invention does not have a disadvantage even with regard to the specific operating speed of the data processing system It is also within the scope of the present invention to modify the one-to-one relationship of volume file and key file in such a way that in particular a (for example particularly extensive) volume file can also be assigned a plurality of key files, in which case the term " volume file specific "with regard to the respective file sections or areas for an associated key file

It will be described below how the embodiment according to FIG. 1 can be accessed by an - authorized or unauthorized - user in the manner of a file system, so that the type of access itself becomes part of the security structure of the present invention

The key task of the key management unit 16 is to establish a logical relationship between volume data 12 and respective (user- and document-specific) key data 18. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the combination of key management unit 16 and key storage unit 18 can be used as a special form of representation that can be solved in terms of programming understand that, for example in the manner of the Explorer for the Windows operating system, is able to display individual (ie user-specific, depending on the respective authorization) views of electronic documents in a hierarchical arrangement, such as the file order and the respective authorization In other words, through the action of the unit 16, the user receives a hierarchical arrangement of documents authorized for him as a view (and also for access), ideally in such a way that he detects the circumstance of a V Encryption of the respective documents shown (or a non-encryption) not noticed He can therefore act within this individual, user-specific view determined by an autonegotiation process as if no protective mechanisms existed

Nevertheless, such a user-friendly (still comfortable) possibility of working with the present invention is based on a superordinate, secure assignment and document or key management, as is the actual task of the unit 16, with the help of typically a database system, in the simplest case In a concordance table, which assigns different people the volume files, key files, associated attributes, etc. authorized for them, the display unit contained in unit 16 is able to create the user-specific view individually and then, if necessary, encrypt it within the scope of this user-specific view Correctly merging documents with associated key files and thus reconstructing them. A database system of this type, which determines the function of the unit 16 (table example), typically contains the relevant key and volume files. In addition to and / or alternatively, path information, in particular, reconstruction instructions as components of key files can also be directly contained in such a table for access (which is particularly useful if such a table is generated dynamically and the advantage obtained is exploited that the whole 5 file system is not additionally loaded) In this respect, a "key file" in the context of the present invention should be understood in particular as an entry in such a database (table) in such a way that this entry enables correct reconstruction within the scope of the invention. This approach also offers intervention - or approaches for the preferred protection method of semantic encryption not

10 only the structure, field content and / or sequence position of an entry within the database (table) can be semantically manipulated, the provision of intermediate tables (for example in the form of so-called NM assignments) is also possible in order to reduce the complexity and thus the reliability of the device's decision making To further increase security, it is also analogous to the idea of the majority of key files for a volume document.

15 ment, possible to work with a plurality of (preferably equivalent) concordance tables, which, through the task of volume file, key and person assignment, allow a plurality of possible views or editing areas (for each person or for several people)

E 0 is part of the user-specific views or the processing environments provided by it, regulated by the fiiesystem, the possibility of an update or an update for contents of a respective electronic document that have been changed by user intervention, in particular regarding the updating of the encryption mechanism between the volume file (in units 12) and key file (in

E S unit 18), so that the document component added by the user and / or the change thereof also contains encryption accordingly, so that synchronization mechanisms are created within the scope of the present embodiment

In this way, interception of abusive attempts to access the data processing device of the present invention is particularly possible. For example, there is abusive access to the authorized data stock for a person (recognized, for example, by the fact that an abusive user authorizes one person, however enters the wrong password), this accessing person is given a view of files by the action of the key management unit 16, but is neither able to access the actual, complete content of these files nor is it possible for him to make changes to this data content the system is designed in such a way that it responds to inputs by the accessing party, so that there are corresponding changes, but these do not affect the protected Oπ- -1 - original data again, but only in the virtual view of the illegally accessing person managed by the unit 16.So, through the intervention of a illegally accessing person, encrypted volume data can be changed (whereupon the key data is adjusted accordingly), the underlying, original document remains 5 however unaffected by these manipulations

In the manner described above, the key database or the key management unit is therefore a component of the data processing device according to the invention, the logical and thus virtual, hierarchically ordered and individual

10 zerspecific views (and thus user access areas on the local computer unit), which, however, equally ensures maximum access protection against unauthorized access by naming, in particular with the instrument of semantic encryption, an actual relationship between key files (with Reconstruction instructions) and an underlying volume file invisible and intraπspa-

15 rent remains

In the practical implementation of the present invention, it also appears advisable in particular to adapt operations of the file access provided by the operating system to the procedure according to the invention, not least to ensure proper

EG to differentiate between files to be backed up according to the invention and otherwise open freely accessible files of a local computer system that is typically used for different applications without security gaps occurring (or that encrypted volume data are misinterpreted by unauthorized access persons as unencrypted original data, which is due to the character of the semantic encryption

ES encryption could easily be given) However, since such interventions in an operating system could be problematic, it would alternatively be possible, within the scope of the present invention, to provide any files affected with a header which automatically and automatically triggers a check as to whether they are concerned a file to be encrypted as intended or to be treated within the scope of the present invention

30 delt, or a basically unencrypted one

Accordingly, a further possible development of the present invention lies in using the database and system design of the present data processing device to delimit the boundaries between users individually, selectively to display (and access) electronic documents and those documents that do not have any access rules at all subject to blurring (i.e. not to separate the views of the directories and the documents then contained) and insofar insecurity about whether the electronic documents presented within a user-specific view are protected against access at all.

In addition, an advantageous further development of the present invention consists in generating the user-specific views of the files in the file system dynamically and in particular in connection with a respective beginning of a user session of a user, so that a fixed one , There is no invariable schema of user-specific views at all (correspondingly not controllable at a monitoring or supervisor level, 10 bar can even be disconnected explicitly), and the security character of the overall solution is thus further strengthened.

For a supplementary explanation of the encryption method according to independent claim 8 (hereinafter also referred to as "semantic decryption"), 15 details and properties of this method are described in more detail below, which are the subject of the present invention.

Semantic encryption, i.e. the encryption of the meaning, consists of the division of original data (OD) into volume data (VD) and work instructions or recon

E Q structuring instructions (RA). It is in the underlying concept of the method that the volume data can be distributed freely and without additional protection. The RA must be kept separate from the VD. The use of the OD and the access to the OD is only possible if the access to the RA is subject to regulations and the RAs are stored with appropriate protection and can only be accessed in a regulated manner

It can.

The administration of the RA or the key data and the access to this RA is done by a database, hereinafter also referred to as the key database or key unit. Since access to this central key unit also takes place with a key and / or with 3G a password and since this data is particularly sensitive and therefore represents the first target for attacks on the confidentiality and confidentiality of the data contained therein, security must be ensured unauthorized access can be ensured by additional encryption.

5 This key unit allows access data or access data (ZD) to be saved and thus offers access to the data as part of an access control. When accessing a user wants a subject to access an OD object. The access control decides whether the rights for the intended access operation exist at all.

5 The access control decides whether the requested RA can be activated for an identified subject or whether the transfer of the RA to this subject must be blocked.

The access protection to the document thus consists of semantic encryption of the document on a mass storage device and of a classically or semantically encrypted access to the RA, which belongs to the semantically encrypted VD.

The data in the key unit can also be saved during a backup. Access to the data within this key unit can be made more difficult if the key with which the key server can be accessed is not S unique. If more than one key for the decryption is plausible or even only theoretically possible, then additional criteria are required to convince yourself and others that the key is correct.

The disadvantage of classic cryptography is that the natural redundancy of the O language can be used to calculate the keys used, or that the keys, if they exist, can be used to easily prove that they can be used once are correct. It is easier to prove that the given key is unique using statistical methods for larger amounts of data. The larger the amount of data, the easier the decryption. S

The advantage of semantic encryption is also that particularly large amounts of data can be protected more reliably and securely. Semantic encryption provides a very large number of possible keys that, when applied to volume data, provide meaningful and possibly also useful data. Even an amateur attacker could come up with a whole class of keys that, when applied to the encrypted data, seem to provide correct content. Proof of originality can also be provided later, regardless of the encryption and decryption.

The sentence can serve as an example: Pick up Mr. Manfred Schmidt tomorrow (date) at 5 12:17 from the train station in Munich. Although the location, the time and the action have been precisely specified, no statement can be made about what the original content represents with semantic encryption. Anyone can develop reconstruction instructions that can change the meaning of this sentence. So the date, the time, WO 01/06341 _ _{1 Q} _ PCT / EP00 / 06824

the place, the names of the people or the action, for example, can be turned into the exact opposite by the word "not" before the word "ab"

The proof of originality can consist, for example, in the fact that a criterion can be agreed between the creator and the user of this encrypted data, that both were accepted as proof of originality. This criterion, unlike classical cryptography, cannot be mathematical and / or be of a statistical nature If the producer and user are one and the same person, for example, the signing of the correct decryption can be shown in the display of an image previously only known to him as correct. An attacker would also always see an image, but he could not know which one and whether it is correct

A mathematical criterion managed in the key unit, such as that of a digital signature, applied to a part of the inventory that was not visible in the context, could increase the I S reliability of the overall system for the user without being able to obtain information about an attack on the key

The advantages of an access control based on a database model and encryption are the creation of the security of the data and the provision of evidence as to whether access to

EO data has been taken, the tracing and checking of the responsibility whether access can be taken and whether the data can be changed. In addition, the life cycle of a document, ie the publication of a document as well as making a document inaccessible, can access protection to the RA is established

E S

The backup data can also be accessed via the key unit that is also saved.The key data can be managed in such a way that reading out this data and management in another key unit can be prevented by comparing the stored relative or absolute data position within the mass storage device of

30 of the key unit, the access control within the key unit can determine whether access is from a backup or from the original key unit

Various levels of secrecy can be implemented via the access control. As the documents can be regarded as almost equivalent protected, regardless of the type of semantic encryption used, the secrecy of the data and its access can only be designed using the key unit For an intersection of user groups, a subscriber can be enabled to use an additional key only contained in the database which then releases the decrypted access to the document-specific and user group-specific encrypted data

The use of semantic encryption for transmission security in the context of 5 communication consists in the exchange of encrypted data between at least 2 participants A and B. The protection of a backup or a long-term archive is a transmission process that is considered in terms of duration as an extreme example of the Application of the transmission security view, since when the backup is stolen, all unprotected data become known to an unauthorized participant

A distinction must therefore be made between the transmission of data and a synchronous use of data at subscriber B and a later, that is, asynchronous (partial) use of transmitted data. A backup assumes that the data is used asynchronously and is also stored in this way should ensure that access to the encrypted data is available at any time and several times, even without knowledge of the participant.

15 mer A can be performed

When establishing transmission security, there must have been at least one contact between A and B so that identification and authentication (I & A) can be carried out. The transmission of the VD takes place in one or more data transmissions.

EG tragungsschntte The transmission of the RA can be done before / after / during the I & A and or the transmission of the VD. Within the scope of the invention, the one or more times transmission of the RA can be adapted to the transmission security and the situation. The key unit also stored during the backup is managed via the Access control access to the backup

E 5

If, due to the application, no time delay in the transmission can be accepted, the VD and RA must be transmitted with the correct timing. If the application is to work asynchronously to the transmission with the OD, the RA can also be transmitted without correction and, if necessary, also semantically with the VD or classic

3G encrypted

Transmission security can generally be understood to mean the protection of confidentiality or the protection against changes in the transmission of data. With semantic encryption, the protection of confidentiality is immediately given at VD. The use of additional classic encryption is based on a small number of data, eg limited to session-wise, individually encrypted RA The unnoticed change in the decrypted data to be output can only occur when the VD is changed below a resolution that is not recognizable by the attacker, if, for example, the reconstruction only consisted in restoring the correct order of sentences. For example, semantic encryption only in the If there was a change in the order of the sentences, the change of words within a sentence cannot be determined. For the registration of a change, the visual inspection is not sufficient.Therefore, an additional procedure for the digital preservation of evidence for the detection of changes in the volume data and with the semantic Encryption can be combined

10

If the volume data is compressed during communication as a whole or as usable partial data, then the data can be transferred faster and more reliably.The security of the data transferred in this way results from the non-linear link between the compressed data. The downloaded compressed file, on the other hand, can be downloaded the local computer can be changed in the manner described above so that classic methods of preserving evidence can also be used to prevent these manipulations

In the case of a use in the preservation of evidence, the focus is on whether the data EO is genuine, i.e. in the sense that it is original, unchanged or intact a certain date has been created. The context of the data may have to be displayed for the preservation of evidence. The context may also include the access data. For the preservation of evidence it must be possible to understand that the volume data, the RA and the database on which the access data are stored are, have not been changed or cannot be changed without leaving traces

So far, the preservation of evidence could only be produced with one of the following means: storing the value of a one-way function, i.e. using a digital signature

30 or the storage of the data on a storage medium that can no longer be changed (laser disc, WORM) on the elements to be protected (VD, RA, ZD and data storage device) As an additional advantage of semantic encryption, the separation of the OD into VD and RA has an additional effect Improving the security of existing procedures for securing evidence from The securing of evidence is within the scope of the semantic

35 Encryption an independent add-on, which can also be dispensed with depending on the application and can be regarded as part of the key unit, in which each additional encryption is added relative to the existing data context Since the positioning of data can change relative to a set of changing orientation marks within a data context, in addition to decrypting the data, the change log can also be stored semantically encrypted as relative activation data.A manipulation in the stored past 5 of this data was thus registered immediately can, since the context can be destroyed either by the entire file or by a subset of data

The advantage of semantic encryption is that there is no inherent protection against integration and that it can be brought in through additional methods with redundancy or with information that creates other context

The verifiability of data integrity, i.e. the detection of a change in data that may have been manipulated either at the source (server), during transmission or on the local computer, is important for the trustworthiness of the semantically encrypted data 15 Recognition of data by the user important For this purpose, a mathematical evidence procedure, such as the use of a one-way function together with a local file or an unchanged characteristic on a server can be used with the corresponding evidence

EG When checking the data integrity, this check either takes place on the local machine or on the server, depending on how the interests are distributed during this check. The data can be changed at any time using the mathematical evidence-based methods, i.e. also before the user immediately uses it be performed

E 5

A semantic check of the data integrity can be carried out flexibly by means of a metalanguage, in which the semantic encryption and decryption has a flexible effect on the reconstructed result by means of a minimally changed metalanguage, so that the correctness of the key is relatively simple when the data thus reconstructed is viewed

3 G can be recognized by visual inspection

For the preservation of evidence and data integrity, authenticity is important and not the secrecy of the data checked in this way. The secrecy results from the additional encryption of the data. Whether the data integrity is checked before or after encryption 35 depends on the specific application

When managing keys, a distinction must be made with regard to the key as a password for identification and authentication, hereinafter referred to as password, and key as Reconstruction instructions for the electronic documents The keys themselves can contain instructions which in turn can trigger more complex encryption operations and which can be converted into a set of keys

5 The keys can also only be used temporarily for communication or for a number of communication steps, e.g. for a user session. The storage of the RA in the database can also be encrypted. The use of keys (hereinafter referred to as RA key) can be used Thereby, for a quantity formation within the data encrypted in this way, IQ can then be used to encrypt, for example, all RAs for a document or all RAs for a chapter with all version changes contained therein

An original data source is always encrypted, which is built up with a defined vocabulary. All languages, in particular natural human languages, consist of a set of words that can be listed in a lexicon. The use of context-related sentences can still conjugate words and be declined

The use of incorrect grammatical forms is common within the written and EO oral language and is usually interpreted correctly by people unless it is clearly above a stimulus threshold and or is related to misunderstandings, ambiguities or contextual conflicts and meaningful irritations leads

The encryption of a backup has an additional problem that has no equivalent meaning when transferring data. Since backup bands and their illegally made copies can be kept for a very long time, there is the problem of having an access password, even after Years can be remembered and used again, on the other hand there is the problem that the final camouflage of the password has far-reaching consequences for data security If the passwords are too difficult to remember, then there is a 3Q risk of forgetting If, on the other hand, the password for the manufacturer of the backup or If a user whose data is stored is very easy to remember, then traditional encryption methods are no longer protection. Semantic encryption of the key unit, on the other hand, would not provide any evidence or evidence that the simple key is actually the correct key

35

The use of a local key unit saves the user from having to take extensive failure measures in the event that the key server fails. The more flexible distribution the key enables online access to an external, if necessary, centrally managed key server, in the event of an additional comparison to ensure that it is up to date

Another advance is the encounter of the danger that a central database can also be penetrated and that knowing all the keys can lead to a correspondingly large amount of damage. Furthermore, the problem is a possible overload due to too many requests to a central database, which can lead to problems in the efficient economic use of resources

10 In the case of a key distribution, it must be taken into account whether the key must be fetched or delivered in encrypted form, or is already available locally due to the password.A distinction can also be made as to whether the keys or passwords are entered in plain text in the key unit or from the key unit to Verification must be requested. The RA keys can be stored centrally, locally or distributed

15 The type of key distribution results from whether the key is symmetrical or asymmetrical and whether the key should only be used once and therefore always has to be retrieved. In addition, the problem of key distribution arises from the need to change and periodically change keys and passwords

EO Another advantage of semantic encryption is that when the key is changed, no reliable statement can be made as to whether the encryption is changed or whether the data stock is deliberately changed. The difference then is that with classic Encryption and, if the decrypted text is known by plain text, also the new key

E S can be unmasked There is no danger of a plaintext attack with the semantic encryption, since there is no proof for a key found in this way that it is correct and that this entails a further loss of confidentiality

The security of the password administration results on the one hand from the one-way 3G function used and on the other hand from the selection of the password by the user. The specification of a length and a selection from the largest possible character set improves the quality of a password in order to guess passwords difficult to exclude are formed. Password management is like key management. In contrast to RA keys, passwords are usually set by the user. They can also be entered 3 seconds by the user or changed if necessary

In order to make access to the backup more difficult, the activation of the key unit that was retrieved from the backup can only work correctly if additional information is tion is fetched by a trustworthy and computer, who may only collect information for this purpose, but only release answers after overcoming several individual steps, possibly also of an organizational nature

The key unit is an important target due to its importance for the security of the data within the overall solution. If a user reveals his password to this key unit during identification, then the security of the overall system is at risk. For this reason, the password entry must protect itself from so-called Trojan horses that pretend to be the user, they were actually the key unit, but in reality they are only programs that are intended to induce the user to enter the password. This spying out of the password is also called spoofing. In one embodiment, the key unit can also be equipped with additional methods for preventing spoofing, e.g. the generation of a plurality of access passwords for each user (advantageously only one correct one), so that an insecurity component in one unauthorized access is created

Access control to a backup can also be implemented as a copy protection method

In the case of symmetrical encryption, the key for encryption can be used immediately to identify the key for decryption. In this sense, exchanging and replacing data can be understood as a symmetrical encryption procedure. The associated decryption RA can be obtained immediately through the work instruction for decryption. In the same way, after decryption, it is known how the encryption was carried out. In order to separate these two processes more strongly, a semantic intermediate layer must be introduced

The instructions for swapping or deleting etc. consist of a vocabulary or at least of tokens to which a defined task has been assigned. The vocabulary is linked to an action by the interpretation of the reconstruction unit. The interpretation of this vocabulary can be realized by the implementation of the operations of a metalanguage. If the assignment of the vocabulary to operations can in turn be changed by a metalanguage, an additional key can be used to interpret the operation of the first key in a more complex manner. This additional key can then be added to either the sender or the recipient of the RA Additional assignments between vocabulary and operations can interact with one another in such a functional way that back-counting from one key to the other fails due to the complexity and uniqueness of the problem. One-way functions can be used to support this process From this link, semantic encryption can also be used in such a way that asymmetric encryption can be made possible with all of its applications known from the prior art. 5

Message digits (MD) result from the use of one-way functions. The application can be restricted to a class of entities specified by the semantic encryption or to their complementary quantity. In this way, several independent part message digits can be created, each one for itself Provide protection against random and deliberate changes Since MD are used at the byte level and are therefore relatively time-consuming to create for very large amounts of data, a semantic MD can be used at the semantic level whether it is a change in the volume data or the key data or key unit

15 With reference to FIG. 2, a practical implementation form of the aspect of the present invention relating to the infrastructure for semantic encryption is described below

2 shows a schematic block diagram representation of the structure of an EG key generation and management unit with the associated functional components in the context of the present invention, which can be used to convert electronic documents to be protected by the semantic encryption technology according to the invention into protected volume files and To implement associated key files, the embodiment described in connection with FIG. 2, in particular ES, also enables not only to generate a key data set (which leads to the original, correct data set when restoring), but also a plurality of key data sets, so that this aspect of the Having a plurality of possible keys (of which in turn only one leads to the result which is also correct in terms of content and not only apparently correct) can further increase the security of the present invention

2 is to be described using the example of an electronic text document which is in a conventional format (eg Microsoft WORD) and was created using suitable text editors. The text document consists of the sentence

35

Peter goes to the train station at 8:00 p.m. The train is on time is stored in a memory 52 according to FIG. 2 and is to be semantically encoded in the manner to be described below by the action of the further functional components shown in FIG. 2

5 A reading / access unit 54 connected downstream of the document storage unit 52, which interacts with a format data unit 56, determines that the above document stored in the storage unit 52 follows the format structure MS-WORD (ideally, the format data unit 56 contains all format and structure information common data formats) and uses this (file-related) format information to access the text document in the

IG document storage unit 52 for the analysis unit 58 downstream of the reading / access unit 54 is now able to analyze and evaluate this on the basis of the document information read by the reading unit 54, the analysis unit 58 firstly the electronic document into its individual information components disassembled and stores this in an information component storage unit 60 (in the present example

15 these were the individual words), and additionally recognizes the document structure as a structure of two sentences delimited by dots and stores this document structure in the document structure storage unit 62, so far the content of the unit 62 is given the character of a document-specific metafile, to which later encryption processes (also only selectively if necessary

EO

Specifically, the content of the document structure storage unit after the analysis of the source document by the analysis unit could look as follows

Theorem 1 (1, 2 3, 4) Theorem 2 (1, 2 3), E 5 while the information component storage unit 60 contains information components corresponding to this structural analysis, that is to say words

(1 1) Peter 30 (1 2) leaves

(1 3) at 8 p.m.

(1 4) to the train station

(2 1) the train

5 (2 3) on time

With this preparation, which is important for the subsequent implementation of the encryption operations, it is now possible to focus on both the individual information components (in the present example the individual words), as well as to carry out the basic operations of the semantic encryption on the sequences of information components or structures, namely the exchange, removal, addition or exchange. An essential protective effect of the semantic encryption according to the invention is that these operations are not carried out arbitrarily, but rather that the grammatical, syntactic and / or format-related rules are maintained, so that the encryption result also results in what appears to be ( that is, without a content check) appears to be correct, in other words, one does not see that it is indeed an encrypted result.

I G

In the present exemplary embodiment, the following text is made from the electronic document specified above with the aid of the encryption unit:

Thomas comes from the cemetery at 4 p.m. The train is on time.

I S

Without knowing the true content, this sentence appears to be an open, unencrypted result, so that an essential, protective foundation of the present invention is that an attacker may not even get the impression that this text is encryption , and thus refrains from attacking this text from the beginning of the EC.

Specifically, in the present exemplary embodiment, the following was carried out by the action of an equivalent unit 70 (which in its simplest version can be understood as a table or database of equivalent, i.e. corresponding and interchangeable, terms):

ES The content component "Peter" of the original document was replaced by the grammatically equivalent content component "Thomas", whereby sentence structure and grammar were retained, but the meaning of the original document has already been destroyed. Accordingly, the content component "goes" of the original document was replaced by the equivalent component "comes", the content component "at 8:00 p.m." was replaced by "at 4:00 p.m."

3Q o'clock "(it was determined here by the effect of the equivalence unit that it was a numerical date in the form of a time, so that manipulation was possible within the permissible times), and the content component" to the station was replaced by the content component "of In addition, a semantic control unit 72, which is also connected to the encryption unit 64 and influences the described encryption operation, 5 ensured that the encryption result "... comes ... from the cemetery is grammatically and syntactically correct, so that it is not manipulated can be identified. (The additional "to" would also be correct here). Also using the encryption unit 64 and the cooperating equivalence unit WO 01/06341 _2 _Q _ PCT / EP00 / 06824

70 or semantic control unit 72 found that the content component "the train" of the following sentence is related in terms of content to the content component "graveyard" newly introduced in the previous sentence, so that even without encryption of the second sentence a completely different meaning (and thus an encryption effect)

The result of these simple encryption operations described is thus the encryption result

"Thomas comes from the cemetery at 4:00 p.m. The train is on time"

10 is output as volume data and stored in a volume data storage unit, while a key that enables reconstruction (in the present exemplary embodiment, information about the words interchanged in each case with their position in the sentence and in respective content terms) is stored in a key data storage unit 74, corresponding to FIG. 15 the associated key file for storage unit 74 could look like this (in the following example, the reconstruction unit interprets the EXCHANGE command in order to carry out the swap specified in the argument)

EXCHANGE (1 1, Thomas) S O EXCHANGE (1 2, coming)

etc

In a further development of this embodiment, the vocabulary of the command language itself is dynamic and can be changed by functions of a script language, the EXCHANGE command itself could thus be replaced by any other expression

According to a further preferred embodiment of the invention, it is provided to generate a 3G majority of key files, of which, however, only one key file 2 that generated the correct reconstruction result could begin accordingly as follows EXCHANGE (1.1; Rüdiger) (rest as above key file);

Key file starts with:

EXCHANGE (1.1; Claus)

etc.

IQ

In the exemplary embodiment in FIG. 2, these two storage units are additionally followed by an output unit 78, which in a particularly simple manner prepares the key data 74 in the form of a script and can output it as an executable script file 84; this is done with the aid of a conversion unit 80 which is otherwise known from the

15 volume data of the storage unit 76 generates a volume document 82 corresponding to the encrypted version, and from the index or reconstruction data of the storage unit 74 a structure description, script, e.g. as Javascript, XML, VB-Script or the like, and which then automatically processes the volume document 82 when it runs and transfers it to the original

ED before unencrypted form.

The four-eyes principle described as a further development of the present invention - in addition, two third parties can decrypt the encrypted document by successively using their respective individual key - can be implemented in that, using the example described above in the E 5, a third party can decrypt all names and all times / numbers that second, the other content components of the document (including the sequences).

In particular in the context of an Internet environment, where the volume document is already available locally or has been brought to a user in another way, 3Q can then be secured (and in particular also to carry out a suitable identification that authorizes proper access to the document). and / or payment process), the script file 84 is transmitted to the authorized user, who can then easily (and ideally without being confronted with the encrypted volume document) restore the open original version.

35

In addition, the embodiment shown schematically in FIG. 2 is suitable not only for generating a key file for the storage unit 74 (or as an executable script file 84), but also a plurality, of which, however, ideally only one content the result is actually correct, while other key files than scripts trigger a decryption process, which also leads to a meaningful (and thus apparently correct) result, but does not match the original version in terms of content. This increases the security of the encryption 5 it is immediately apparent that even slight deviations in content completely destroy the meaning of the original document (which actually creates value for a user), so that it may only require minor modifications or a small number of encryption operations (with the result of a correspondingly short script file as key data), in order to achieve the intended protective purpose, up to the non-encryption of the original file already mentioned, which derives its protective purpose only from the fact that an unauthorized accessor has the uncertainty as to whether he is m it has to do with an open (ie corresponding to the original file) content, or with an encrypted content, ie one that does not match the original file

15 The present invention is not limited to the exemplary example of text files. In particular, it also makes sense to encrypt any further electronic documents in the manner described in principle, as long as these electronic documents are suitable for the basic operations of exchanging, removing, adding or exchanging Structure from content components have typical others

EO application cases were, in particular, music files, which are usually available in the so-called MP3 format and, where it is possible within the scope of the present invention, the data structures (so-called frames) specified by the MP3 format individually or in blocks (ideally also clockwise or section by section, based on the respective piece of music) to be removed or exchanged The same applies to image and / or video

ES files, because the well-known document formats that are common there are based on a sequence of frames as content components (for images or electronic videos, these are the respective individual images), which can be manipulated in the manner according to the invention Standards-related) semantic control unit (FIG. 2), starting points for a within such complex data structures

Finding effective manipulation The same applies to color, contrast, contrast or other values which are used in the context of a representation or flow logic of the document in question and which can be changed using the basic operations of the semantic encryption

Claims

1 data processing device with

5 - a local file storage system (12) assigned to a local computer unit (10) for retrieving and storing as well as for bidirectional data transmission of volume files by means of the computer unit (10) and a user identification unit (20) assigned to the local computer unit, which enable access through the computing unit for one

Authorized volume files for 10 users is designed only as a reaction to its positive identification, the volume file being stored in the local file storage system (12) in an encrypted form which is not usable for a user, characterized by

15 - a data transfer path of volume files between the local

Computer unit (10) and the key management unit (16) assigned to the local file storage system (12) as part and functionality of the local computer unit (10), which are used to generate and assign at least one user-specific and volume file-specific key file for each volume file

E G is configured, the key management unit (16) is connected to a key database (18), which is provided as part of the local file storage system and is logically separate from it, and to link one stored in the key database (18)

E 5 key file with one saved in the local file storage system (12)

Volume file for generating an electronic document usable for a user, the key database being local in the data processing device, but logically or structurally or physically separate from the local one

3G file storage system associated drive or mass storage unit is provided

2 Device according to claim 1, characterized in that the encrypted form has the encryption by means of a symmetrical key. 5 3. The device according to claim 1, characterized in that the encrypted form has a content and / or meaning-swapping, removal and / or addition of file components based on an electronic document as the basis for a volume file

5

4. Device according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the local file storage system (12) is a database and the volume files are database entries or data records of the database

10 5 Device according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the local file storage system (12) is a workstation mass storage unit for preferably a plurality of users

6 Device according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the volume files 15 have digital text, program, image, audio and video files and combinations of these

7 method for storing and calling up electronic files, in particular for operating a data processing device according to one of claims 1 to 6

EG characterized by the steps

Identification of a user active on a computer unit for accessing volume files stored or to be stored in a file storage system assigned to the computer unit, enabling authorized access to user-specific volume files

E S in response to positive identification,

Generation of a volume file and user-specific key file for an electronic document to be stored in the file storage system and subsequent linking of the electronic document with the key file for generating and storing a volume which is not usable for a user.

3 Q file,

Storing the generated key file in a key storage unit, reading out a volume file and user-specific key file in response to an access command from a user, linking the read key file with a key file from the file storage system.

35 stem read volume file that is not usable for a user to generate a usable electronic document 8. A method for encrypting an electronically stored original data set, in particular as a method for generating a volume file and user-specific key file according to claim 7 and / or for operating the key management unit in the device according to one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the 5 electronically stored original data set a sequence of information components of a metalanguage in the form of a written language, a number system or of information components consists of data elements arranged in a predetermined, uniform format structure, in particular image, sound or program information, and is stored in a plurality of electronically addressable IQ memory areas, with the steps

Exchanging and / or removing an information component in the data set and / or adding an information component to a predetermined position in the sequence of information components and / or exchanging an information component for an information component that is preferably not contained in the original data set by computer access to a respective one the memory areas for generating an encrypted amount of data,

Generating a key data set with information about the exchanged removed, added and / or exchanged information components Ξ Q which is designed in such a way that it allows the original amount of data to be restored and

Storage of the encrypted data volume and storage of the key data volume in a separate, customized key file of a common file system E S

9. The method as claimed in claim 8, characterized by the successive, at least two-fold encryption of the key data set in each case by the step of exchanging, removing, adding and / or exchanging, a first key data record generated thereby being used by a first user and a second,

30 subsequently generated key data record is assigned to a second user

10 device for handling an electronically stored original amount of data, in particular for performing the method according to one of claims 7 or 8 and / or as part of the key management unit in the device 5 according to one of claims 1 to 6 with an analysis unit (54, 56), the for accessing the original amount of data stored in a document storage unit (52) and for electronically recording at least one sequence of information components of the origin - Chen amount of data in response to predetermined and / or determined format and / or structure data of the original amount of data is formed, an encryption unit (64) downstream of the analysis unit, which for

5 Exchange and / or removal of an information component in the original amount of data and / or addition of an information component to a predetermined position in the sequence of information components and / or exchange of an information component for an information component which is preferably not contained in the original amount of data and for

Generating a key data set with information about the exchanged, removed, added and / or exchanged information components, which is formed in such a way that it allows the original 15 data set to be restored,

is trained,

a key data storage unit (74) designed for storing the key data quantity and a volume data storage unit (76) designed for storing the encrypted data quantity

11. The device as claimed in claim 10, characterized in that the encryption ES unit (64) is assigned an equivalence unit (70) which, for at least one information component in the original amount of data, has at least one equivalence information component stored electronically, the equivalence information component thus is formed with the associated information component grammatically, format-wise, metaphorically and / or syntactically

30 matches

12 Device according to claim 1 1 or 12, characterized in that the encryption unit is designed to interact with a semantic control unit (72) which is set up in such a way that the exchange, removal, addition

35 or exchange within the grammar, format, metaphonk and / or

Syntax takes place, which is determined by the format and / or structure data 13. Device according to one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that the encryption unit is assigned a random control unit (68), which the exchange, removal, addition and / or exchange by the encryption unit regarding individual information components and / or sequence (s) of

5 controls information components randomly, in particular not reproducibly.

14. Device according to one of claims 10 to 13, characterized by an encryption parameter unit (66) assigned to the encryption unit

10 for storing and / or setting predetermined parameters for swapping,

Removing, adding and / or exchanging is formed by the encryption unit, in particular with regard to an encryption depth achieved by a number of exchanging, removing, adding and / or exchanging.

15 15. Device according to one of claims 10 to 14, characterized by one of the

Encryption unit downstream conversion unit (80), which is designed to generate an electronically transferable volume file from the encrypted data set and a preferably actively executable program and / or script file from the key data set.

S O

16. Device according to one of claims 10 to 15, characterized in that the encryption unit is designed to generate a plurality of key data sets, at least one of which, when combined with the encrypted data set, does not restore the original one

Ξ 5 amount of data allowed, but after merging leads to a amount of data that matches the original amount of data syntactically, format-wise and / or grammatically.

17. Device according to one of claims 10 to 16, characterized in that the encryption unit connected downstream of the analysis unit is designed in the key data set for exchanging or exchanging the information about the exchanged, removed, added and / or exchanged information components.