EP0986804B1 - Complex and device for guaranteeing the tamper-protection and authenticity of a document or goods - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to a complex and a device to guarantee the inviolability and authenticity of a document or of goods, in order to avoid their counterfeiting.

We already know devices intended to guarantee the authenticity of a document or a product, such as, for example, that described by US-A-5,267,756. These devices use relatively complex techniques, often combined between them.

However, these known devices do not give whole satisfaction, especially the fact that they are often copied, that they do not allow the authenticity of a product to be checked different stages of his life, nor to detect a fraudulent copy of an existing authentic product.

The present invention aims to eliminate these drawbacks by proposing a device which also makes it possible to guarantee the inviolability of a product.

The invention therefore makes it possible to exercise all of the controls achievable during the life of a product, i.e. before its sale, during its sale or its entry into service, during its life at a consumer and until the end of his life.

The invention applies generally to any object, the latter can for example be a paper document, a envelope, goods or its packaging.

• un support de base solidarisé de manière définitive à l'objet et sur lequel sont imprimés un code d'identification et au moins un code d'authentification,
• une feuille protectrice recouvrant partiellement le support de base pour protéger le code d'authentification et apte à être appliquée sur l'objet de manière à en assurer l'inviolabilité,
• des informations concernant l'objet lui-même portées sur la partie non recouverte du support de base.

The present invention firstly relates to a complex intended to guarantee the inviolability and authenticity of an object comprising:

• a basic support permanently attached to the object and on which an identification code and at least one authentication code are printed,
• a protective sheet partially covering the base support to protect the authentication code and suitable for being applied to the object so as to ensure its inviolability,
• information concerning the object itself carried on the part not covered with the basic support.

The basic support can consist of the packaging of the object or even a part of the object likely to receive a printing, or by a label stuck firmly on the object.

The label and protective sheet can be made of different materials such as paper, material plastic, fabric, wood, leather etc ...

The identification code can be printed by any process known printing on the base support. We can use this effect a fluorescent ink, invisible to the human eye and requiring a special reading device.

The authentication code printed on the basic support is preferably masked by an opaque layer of a scrapable material, that is, a material that can be scraped off to reveal the authentication code, such as the one we use to hide authentication codes on banknotes state lotteries.

In this case, the protective sheet can be transparent, which shows the consumer that he will have the means checking the authenticity of the product and that the manufacturer will monitor the product, which is a guarantee of the quality of this latest.

In the absence of a removable opaque layer on the code (s) authentication, the protective sheet must be opaque.

The protective sheet provides double protection of the object because it makes it inaccessible and possibly invisible the authentication code and that it constitutes a witness inviolability for the protected object, thus guaranteeing that the latter was neither opened nor used.

Information about the object itself is for example information carried on the basic support by the manufacturer of the object at the time of its manufacture. It can be the date and place of production, production team, type of product, etc ...

The complex according to the invention is intended to be used works in combination with files kept by the manufacturer of complexes and by the user of said complexes, who applies them on objects to be protected.

The present invention therefore also relates to a device intended to guarantee the inviolability and authenticity of a object, characterized in that it comprises complexes such as described above and at least one link file containing the code identification of each complex in relation to its code authentication, as well as an authentication file containing, in relation to the authentication code of each complex, the information concerning the protected object carried on the part not covered with the base support of said complex.

According to the invention, only the manufacturer of the complexes, which is generally a printer working in a secure environment, that is to say respecting different procedures guaranteeing the confidentiality of information, knows the file of links which links identification codes and authentication codes carried by the complexes.

Since at this point we don't know the destination complex, any fraudulent copy of the link file would be unsuccessful because it is impossible to know on which objects the complex will be applied.

1°) Le fabricant des complexes imprime sur chaque support de base un code d'identification et au moins un code d'authentification et met à jour son fichier de liens, mémorisant ainsi les n-uplets (code d'identification, codes d'authentification) qu'il crée sans connaítre la destination des complexes.

2°) Le fabricant recouvre ensuite avec une feuille protectrice la partie du support de base portant le ou les codes d'authentification, après avoir éventuellement masqué ces codes d'authentification avec une couche opaque d'un matériau grattable. La feuille protectrice dépasse éventuellement du support de base de manière à pouvoir être collée sur l'ouverture d'un objet à protéger pour en assurer l'inviolabilité.

Cette feuille comporte également des découpes délimitant une ou plusieurs fenêtres qui donnent accès chacune à un code d'authentification du complexe. Chaque fenêtre ne peut être ouverte que d'une manière définitive, ce qui permet de déceler tout accès non autorisé à un code d'authentification.The implementation of the complexes is carried out as follows:

1 °) The manufacturer of the complexes prints on each basic support an identification code and at least one authentication code and updates its file of links, thus memorizing the tuples (identification code, codes of authentication) that it creates without knowing the destination of the complexes.

2 °) The manufacturer then covers with a protective sheet the part of the base support carrying the authentication code (s), after having possibly masked these authentication codes with an opaque layer of removable material. The protective sheet possibly protrudes from the base support so that it can be glued to the opening of an object to be protected to ensure inviolability.

This sheet also includes cutouts delimiting one or more windows which each give access to an authentication code of the complex. Each window can only be opened in a definitive manner, which makes it possible to detect any unauthorized access to an authentication code.

3°) L'utilisateur des complexes, qui est en général un fabricant d'objets à protéger, reçoit du fabricant des complexes une copie du fichier de liens et un lot de complexes correspondant.

4°) L'utilisateur applique sur chaque objet qu'il souhaite protéger un complexe qu'il personnalise en imprimant sur ce dernier des informations concernant l'objet, comme par exemple un code produit, une date de fabrication, un numéro de lot etc...

5°) Simultanément, l'utilisateur met à jour un fichier central construit sur la base du fichier de liens, en y reportant toutes les informations concernant l'objet, en relation avec le code d'authentification.

6°) L'utilisateur scinde ensuite ce fichier central en deux fichiers distincts, à savoir un fichier d'authentification qui contient les codes d'authentification et les informations concernant les objets préalablement mises à jour et un fichier de gestion qui ne contient que les codes d'identification et des informations destinées à organiser la distribution des objets par des moyens logistiques traditionnels.

In a variant, an authentication code can be printed with magnetic ink, which makes it possible to read this code through the sheet and possibly the opaque layer which covers it. A magnetic reader is used for this purpose.

3 °) The user of the complexes, who is generally a manufacturer of objects to be protected, receives from the manufacturer of the complexes a copy of the link file and a corresponding batch of complexes.

4 °) The user applies to each object that he wishes to protect a complex that he personalizes by printing on it information relating to the object, such as for example a product code, a date of manufacture, a batch number, etc. ...

5 °) Simultaneously, the user updates a central file constructed on the basis of the file of links, by reporting there all the information concerning the object, in relation to the authentication code.

6 °) The user then splits this central file into two separate files, namely an authentication file which contains the authentication codes and the information concerning the previously updated objects and a management file which contains only the identification codes and information intended to organize the distribution of objects by traditional logistical means.

The whole system allows you to check the authenticity of the object at different stages of its life.

First, at a distributor, a sworn inspector by the manufacturer retrieves an authentication code carried by the complex by opening the window intended for it or by reading, through the protective sheet and using a magnetic reader, the authentication code intended for him, if the latter is printed with magnetic ink.

The inspector sends the recovered authentication code to manufacturer of objects, which consults its authentication file and indicates to the inspector on the one hand, if the object belongs to all the objects put into circulation by the manufacturer and other part, the information concerning the object contained by the file, information that the inspector can compare to that printed in clear on the complex.

This exchange of data can of course be automated by telematic means.

If the authentication code does not exist in the Manufacturer-maintained authentication or mismatch file between the information brought in clear on the complex and that contained in the file, an infringement is presumed and a control procedure can be triggered.

To prevent this check from being carried out by a person not authorized, the transmission of the authentication code is accompanied by a password known only to the inspector. AT defect of correct password, manufacturer detects an attempt fraudulent and does not provide the expected response.

During each inspection, the manufacturer records in the authentication file the trace of the control carried out, by example by memorizing the date and the nature of the control.

When the object is sold, the distributor does the same using the authentication code intended for it and the password assigned to him.

The manufacturer checks on this occasion that the object is indeed saved in its authentication file as being in condition to be sold. If the item has already been sold, an anomaly is detected.

The trace of the control is also recorded in the authentication file, with other information related to the sale such as its date, place and information relating to on the consumer and enabling subsequent statistics.

In the case of a capital good or more generally of a guaranteed product, once the check has been carried out, the merchant send the manufacturer the preprinted warranty card number or an after-sales service slip, issues this voucher or slip, then prints on it a new authentication code which is provided in response by the manufacturer to link the number of the voucher or slip to the protected object. The new code authentication is simultaneously saved in the file authentication required by the manufacturer.

The consumer who bought the object can also verify authenticity. To this end, when opening the object, it permanently destroys the protective sheet which testified to the inviolability of the object and discovered the code authentication intended for him. The consumer can also read this code before opening the object, opening a window in the opaque sheet and scraping the layer scratchable which masks its code of authenticity. Knowing this code, the consumer can question the manufacturer either by telephone, either by telematic means. The manufacturer can thus verify that the object is registered as having been sold and refers to the consumer of general information about the object, information that the consumer can compare to those shown in clear on the complex associated with the object.

Later, after using the object, the consumer can call the manufacturer's after-sales service. The warranty card or the after-sales service slip then provides a code authentication which allows the same checks to be carried out with the manufacturer, who can also update their authentication file by recording the trace of after-sales service intervention.

In a particular embodiment, the complex includes, in the part of the base support not covered by the protective sheet, a control key generated by an algorithm based on part of the complex's authentication code, on the other hand, information specific to the object protected, by example its date and time of manufacture. This information specific must appear legibly on the base support.

In this embodiment, a code is used authentication printed with magnetic ink so that ability to read it through the protective sheet using a magnetic reader.

The magnetic reader is supplied to each participant in the distribution network, for example to the merchant who sells the object.

A microprocessor running the same algorithm as that which was used to generate the control key is integrated in the reader magnetic. This microprocessor is enclosed in a capsule inviolable so as to destroy itself in the event of an attempt to read the algorithm.

The merchant can thus verify the authenticity of the object by having the authentication code read by the magnetic reader and entering the information specific to the object it reads on the visible part of the base support. The microprocessor included in the magnetic reader again generates a control key to from the authentication code read and specific information foreclosures.

The merchant only has to compare the control key as well generated with that printed in plain text on the base support for verify the authenticity of the object.

This embodiment allows, without degrading the complex, to verify the authenticity of almost an entire stock of objects. This verification does not guarantee the same reliability as that consisting in interrogating the manufacturer's authentication file but it can complement it. Indeed, we can limit querying the manufacturer's file for a sample relatively small stock and check the rest of the stock with control keys.

In order to be able to use the same magnetic reader for 5 carry out a check on objects from manufacturers different, the microprocessor can be mounted on a smart card can be plugged into the reader. Each manufacturer then provides its own smart card to the merchant.

In a variant, the control key is masked by a removable layer of opaque material, possibly protected by a window of the protective sheet.

In a preferred variant of this embodiment, the key control is generated by the algorithm based on the code of authentication of the complex and the identification code of the protected object.

The control key thus obtained is printed in the section the base support covered by the protective sheet, preferably by being drowned in the authentication code.

During the check, the authentication codes and are read again and the control key is regenerated then compared to that printed under the protective sheet and the microprocessor provides a positive or negative response depending on whether the regenerated key is identical to the one embedded in the code authentication.

As already stated, the microprocessor is preferably integrated in a smart card, also called smart card memory, pluggable into a reading device. The microprocessor has a memory which contains the algorithm of generation of the control key and the positions of the key control to read on the base medium between characters constituting the authentication code.

For example the authentication code can be found at positions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 of a sequence of 9 characters including the positions 2, 4, 8 correspond to the control key.

This variant makes it possible to provide a presumption authentication and then carry out a check complete product by consulting the central file, in grouping together several complete controls in a single transaction regular time intervals, for example every two or three hours.

This variant can in particular be used in professional applications in the fields of pharmacy, spare parts for motor vehicles or the distribution of State lottery tickets, where the systematic establishment of communications for consultation of the central file risks posing practical problems.

The device according to the invention therefore makes it possible to fight effectively against counterfeits of marketed objects and follow the evolution of protected objects since their manufacture until they are used by a consumer.

• la figure 1 représente un complexe destiné à être appliqué sur un flacon,
• la figure 2 représente le goulot du flacon recouvert par le complexe de la figure 1,
• les figures 3 à 8 sont des organigrammes retraçant les différentes étapes des opérations de contrôle d'authenticité.

In order to better understand the invention, we will now describe an embodiment given by way of non-limiting example, with reference to the accompanying drawing in which:

• FIG. 1 represents a complex intended to be applied to a bottle,
• FIG. 2 represents the neck of the bottle covered by the complex of FIG. 1,
• Figures 3 to 8 are flowcharts showing the different stages of the authenticity control operations.

The complex shown in Figure 1 has a label 1 as a base support and an opaque protective sheet 2.

The label is rectangular, it is made in paper covered on its back with a layer of strong glue.

The opaque sheet has the shape of a T. It is produced PVC.

The opaque sheet 2 partially covers the label 1 in the central part of the latter.

In accordance with the invention, the label comprises, in its part not covered by the opaque sheet, a code identification 3 as well as information 4 concerning the object to which the complex is to be pasted.

In its central part, the label also includes three identification codes 5,6,7 masked each by a layer of opaque scrapable material 8,9,10.

These three identification codes and their removable layer are covered by the part of the opaque sheet 2 which is glued on the label.

Windows 11,12,13 are cut from the opaque sheet opposite each removable layer 8,9,10.

Full-flesh cutouts 14 of the opaque sheet 2 allow to reveal that the latter was detached from the object, if applicable.

In the part of the opaque sheet covering the label, these cuts are found in correspondence with other full cuts flesh produced in the label to reveal any attempt to peeling off the opaque sheet and / or the label.

Identification signs 15 are also placed on horseback on opaque sheet 2 and on label 1. These signs identification are destroyed when the opaque sheet is separated of the label, for example when opening the protected object.

Other authentication signs (not shown) may be provided such as an intaglio, an impression iridescent or security threads.

The complex of Figure 1 is intended to be glued on a bottle, for example a perfume bottle as shown in the figure 2.

The bottle 16 of FIG. 2 has a stopper 17 which covers his neck. The large front face 18 of the bottle 16 is flat and is lies in the same plane as a flat 19 of the plug 17. The complex is glued on the one hand to the large front face 18 of the bottle, which receives the label 1 and the vertical part of the T of the sheet opaque 2, while the cap receives the horizontal part of the T glued to its side surface and glued to itself at its end.

We understand that the complex can thus constitute a witness inviolability of the bottle because any action exerted on the cap would destroy the various signs of authentication provided on the opaque sheet and on the label, or even the destruction of the latter.

We will now explain, with reference to FIGS. 3 to 8, the implementation of the complex described above.

Figure 3 is a flowchart of the different stages of the manufacturing of complexes.

During a step 30, the graphics of the complexes are determined by drawing on the one hand the labels, and on the other hand, the opaque sheets.

During a step 31, the code is printed on the label 3 and authentication codes 5,6,7 prepared by computer means during a step 32.

In step 33, an opaque material is coated on the codes authentication to hide them, then we shape the label and the opaque sheet and they are combined in step 34. A control of quality is performed in step 35 to remove the complexes showing a defect.

In addition to manufacturing the complexes, the means computer generated a link file 36 which establishes the relationship between each identification code and the codes corresponding identification.

In step 35 of quality control, the means are informed computerization of the elimination of defective labels with a view to deletion of the corresponding records in the file links 36.

The link file 36 and the stock of complexes obtained are delivered in step 37 to a user who is here a manufacturer of bottles.

The flowchart in Figure 4 shows the steps implemented work by the manufacturer to personalize the complexes.

From 40 bottles manufactured by the manufacturer and 1 + 2 complexes received from the printer, the manufacturer prints on parts not covered by the label 1 of the information 4 concerning the bottles it wishes to protect.

This complex customization information is simultaneously updated in a central file 42 built on the base of the link file 36 and of which each record includes personalization information 4.

The manufacturer then splits the central file 42 into one authentication file 43 and a management file 44.

The authentication file 43 contains, for each bottle, the three authentication codes of the corresponding complex and personalization information 4, as well as fields free for further information.

The management file 44 contains the identification code 3 as well as other information allowing the organization of the commercial distribution of vials.

Management file 44 is entrusted to logistics teams 45 while the authentication file 43 remains between the only hands of the manufacturer.

By splitting the central file 42 into two separate files, the manufacturer loses all possibility of establishing a link between the information about a bottle and the identification code worn by this bottle.

The authenticity of a bottle is checked according to the flowchart shown in Figure 5.

During a step 50, a sworn inspector responsible for check the authenticity of a bottle, tear off window 15 of the opaque sheet 2 and scrapes the opaque layer 10 to discover the authentication code 7 intended for him, then sends this code 7 with its password 51 to the manufacturer.

During step 52, the manufacturer queries his file 43 and returns its response 53, thus indicating to the inspector whether or not the bottle is authentic.

At the same time, the information about the bottle is sent to the inspector for comparison with those on label 1.

In step 54, the inspector decides whether it is necessary to initiate a control procedure based on the response received from the manufacturer.

In step 55, the manufacturer enriches his file authentication 43 by recording the trace of the control performed, if the latter was positive.

In Figure 6, there is shown a flowchart of the control authenticity implemented by a distributor at the time of sale of the bottle.

In step 60, the dispenser tears off window 14, scrapes the opaque layer 9 and discovers the authentication code 6 which it sends to the manufacturer together with his personal password.

This can be done through a connection 61 connected to the manufacturer.

The latter interrogates its authentication file 43 and in step 62, checks the authenticity of the bottle. Answer 63 of manufacturer returned to distributor with new code authentication that the distributor enters in step 64.

Simultaneously, the manufacturer enriches his file in step 65 by registering the name of the sales and general consumer information.

In step 65, the distributor issues a guarantee voucher numbered 66 on which he prints the new authentication code received from the manufacturer.

Figure 7 illustrates an authenticity check operation made by a consumer 70 who bought the bottle.

After seeing window 13 torn off and discovering the code authentication 5 masked by the removable layer 8, the consumer questions the manufacturer either by telephone or by telematic means.

Depending on the authentication code provided to the manufacturer, the latter interrogates his authentication file 43 and confirms to the consumer the authenticity of the bottle.

Subsequently, if the bottle turns out to be defective, the consumer can exercise the guarantee by implementing the steps illustrated in Figure 8.

In step 80, the consumer sends the manufacturer the code on his warranty card and his own authentication code.

Manufacturer queries authentication file 43 at step 81 and verifies that the guarantee bond thus identified is the one linked to the bottle in the consumer's possession.

The manufacturer's response is addressed to the consumer at step 82.

This authenticity check operation after the sale of the product can also be executed by an after-sales service or by the distributor.

In step 83, the manufacturer enriches his file authentication by recording, for example, the date of of the warranty.

It is understood that the embodiment which comes to be described has no limiting nature and that it may receive all desirable modifications without leaving the part of the invention.

Claims (9)

1. Complex intended to guarantee the tamper-resistance and authenticity of an object comprising:

   a base support (1) solidly secured to the object (16) and on which are printed an identification code (3) and at least one authentication code (5, 6, 7), characterized in that it furthermore comprises:

   a protective foil (2), possibly opaque, partially covering the base support (1) so as to protect the authentication code (5, 6, 7) and able to be applied to the object (16) in such a way as to ensure the tamper-resistance thereof, and

   information (4) which relates to the object (16) itself and which is carried on the uncovered part of the base support (1).
2. Complex according to Claim 1, characterized in that the authentication code (5, 6, 7) printed on the base support is masked by an opaque layer of a scratch-off material (8, 9, 10).
3. Complex according to either of Claims 1 and 2, characterized in that the protective foil (2) constitutes proof of tamper-resistance of the protected object (16), guaranteeing that the latter has been neither opened nor used.
4. Complex according to any one of Claims 1 to 3, characterized in that it comprises an authentication code printed with a magnetic ink readable through the protective foil.
5. Complex according to Claim 4, characterized in that it comprises, in that part of the base support (1) not covered by the protective foil (2), a checking key generated by an algorithm on the basis, on the one hand, of the authentication code (5, 6, 7) of the complex, and, on the other hand, of an item of information specific to the protected object (16) appearing in a readable manner on the base support (1).
6. Device intended to guarantee the tamper-resistance and authenticity of an object, characterized in that it comprises complexes (1, 2) according to any one of Claims 1 to 5 and at least one file of links (36) containing the identification code or codes (3) of each complex in conjunction with its authentication code (5, 6, 7), as well as an authentication file (42) containing, in conjunction with the authentication code (5, 6, 7) of each complex, the information (4) which relates to the protected object (16) and is carried on the uncovered part of the base support (1) of the said complex.
7. Device intended to guarantee the tamper-resistance and authenticity of an object, characterized in that it comprises a complex (1, 2) according to Claim 5, and a magnetic reader built into which is a microprocessor executing the same algorithm as that which served to generate the checking key printed on the complex.
8. Device according to Claim 7, characterized in that the microprocessor is supported by a chip card which plugs into the magnetic reader.
9. Device according to either of Claims 7 and 8, characterized in that the microprocessor is enclosed in a tamper-resistant capsule.

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