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CN113109844B - Deception signal detection method and device based on linear antenna array - Google Patents

Deception signal detection method and device based on linear antenna array Download PDF

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CN113109844B
CN113109844B CN202110405312.0A CN202110405312A CN113109844B CN 113109844 B CN113109844 B CN 113109844B CN 202110405312 A CN202110405312 A CN 202110405312A CN 113109844 B CN113109844 B CN 113109844B
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carrier phase
single difference
phase single
signal
deception
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CN113109844A (en
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肖岭
李向
廖振宇
杨力
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Hunan Snr Information Technology Co ltd
No63812 Unit Of Pla
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing

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  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention relates to a deception signal detection method and a deception signal detection device based on a linear antenna array. Therefore, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.

Description

Deception signal detection method and device based on linear antenna array
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of satellite navigation, in particular to a deception signal detection method and a deception signal detection device based on a linear antenna array.
Background
GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) is a space-based radio Navigation positioning System that can provide users with all-weather 3-dimensional coordinates and velocity and time information at any location on the earth's surface or in near-earth space, using observations of a set of satellites, such as pseudoranges, ephemeris, and Satellite transmission times. The GNSS time service has the advantages of all weather, high precision and the like, so the GNSS time service is widely applied to important infrastructures needing precise time synchronization, such as power transmission, digital communication networks, banks or stock trading places and the like.
However, GNSS signals arriving at the receiver are weak and therefore easily interfered with. The deception jamming harm is the largest, and such jamming can control a system carrying a GNSS receiver by controlling the receiver to output an erroneous position time result, such as: controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle to deviate from a specified flight path; and controlling the time service receiver of the intelligent power grid system to cause power transmission interruption and the like.
Therefore, a number of anti-spoofing methods have been proposed for spoofing interference. Most anti-spoofing methods are based on the assumption that spoofed signals come from the same source, and such algorithms will not be effective in detecting spoofed interference when the spoofed signals are transmitted separately by multiple antennas. Although the method for detecting the spoofed signals of the double receivers based on the signal space characteristics can detect the spoofed interference from different radiation sources, the detection system generally requires that the length of a base line between the two receivers is more than 10 meters, so that the method is only suitable for application scenes with larger carrier sizes.
It follows that the above disadvantages exist with conventional anti-spoofing methods.
Disclosure of Invention
Based on this, it is necessary to provide a spoofing signal detecting method and apparatus based on the linear antenna array to overcome the disadvantages of the conventional spoofing-resistant method.
A deception signal detection method based on a linear antenna array comprises the following steps:
acquiring a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
obtaining a deception signal detection quantity according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
and when the detection quantity of the deception signal is higher than the detection threshold of the deception signal, judging that deception interference exists.
According to the deception signal detection method based on the linear antenna array, after the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value are obtained, the deception signal detection amount is obtained according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally, when the deception signal detection amount is higher than the deception signal detection threshold, the deception interference is judged to exist. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
In one embodiment, the process of obtaining a carrier phase single difference measurement comprises the steps of:
estimating the whole-cycle fuzzy number corresponding to the single-difference measurement value of the carrier phase;
estimating a carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2;
and estimating the carrier phase single difference measurement value between other array elements and the array element 1 according to the fixed geometric relation among the array elements of the antenna array, the whole cycle fuzzy number and the carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2.
In one embodiment, before the process of obtaining the detection amount of the spoofed signal according to the measured value of the carrier phase single difference and the expected value of the carrier phase single difference, the method further includes the steps of:
and taking an arithmetic mean value of the obtained carrier phase single difference measurement values to update the carrier phase single difference measurement values.
In one embodiment, the process of obtaining the expected value of the single carrier phase difference includes the following steps:
acquiring an expected incidence direction of a real satellite signal;
estimating a first row vector of a transformation matrix;
and obtaining the expected value of the single difference of the carrier phase according to the expected incidence direction and the first row vector of the transformation matrix.
In one embodiment, the process of obtaining the detection amount of the spoofed signal according to the measured value of the carrier phase single difference and the expected value of the carrier phase single difference includes the following steps:
obtaining a difference vector of a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
performing eigenvalue decomposition on a matrix contained in the difference vector to obtain a decomposition result;
obtaining a right multiplication vector according to the right multiplication decomposition result of the difference vector;
and obtaining the detection quantity of the deception signal according to the right multiplication vector and the covariance matrix of the right multiplication vector.
In one embodiment, when the received signal is a real signal, the detection quantity of the deception signal follows the central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom of N-3;
when the deception signal exists in the received signal, the detection quantity of the deception signal obeys the non-central chi-square distribution of the non-central parameter rho with the degree of freedom rho, wherein
Figure BDA0003022043080000031
In one embodiment, the spoofed signal detection threshold satisfies the following equation:
Figure BDA0003022043080000032
wherein, alpha is the false alarm probability; f (x | H)0) Denotes T is in H0A probability density function under the condition; th is the determined spoofed signal detection threshold.
A spoof signal detecting device comprising:
the detection value acquisition module is used for acquiring a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
the detection quantity calculation module is used for obtaining the detection quantity of the deception signal according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
and the signal judgment module is used for judging that the deception jamming exists when the detection quantity of the deception signals is higher than the detection threshold of the deception signals.
According to the detection device for the deceptive signals, after the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value are obtained, the deceptive signal detection amount is obtained according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally, when the deceptive signal detection amount is higher than the deceptive signal detection threshold, the deceptive interference is judged to exist. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
A computer storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, the computer instructions when executed by a processor implementing the spoof signal detection method based on a linear antenna array of any of the above embodiments.
After the computer storage medium obtains the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, the computer storage medium obtains the deception signal detection amount according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally judges that deception interference exists when the deception signal detection amount is higher than a deception signal detection threshold. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the spoof signal detecting method based on the linear antenna array according to any of the embodiments described above.
After the computer device obtains the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, the computer device obtains the detection amount of the deceptive signal according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally judges that the deceptive interference exists when the detection amount of the deceptive signal is higher than the deceptive signal detection threshold. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a linear array spoofing detection system and the spatial distribution of incident signals;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a spoofed signal detection method based on a linear antenna array according to an embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a spoofed signal detection method based on a linear antenna array according to another embodiment;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a spoofed signal detection method based on a linear antenna array according to yet another embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a spoofed signal detecting means according to an embodiment;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an internal structure of a computer according to an embodiment.
Detailed Description
For better understanding of the objects, technical solutions and effects of the present invention, the present invention will be further explained with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples. Meanwhile, the following described examples are only for explaining the present invention, and are not intended to limit the present invention.
The embodiment of the invention provides a deception signal detection method based on a linear antenna array.
The spoofed signal detection method based on the linear antenna array of the embodiment is mainly applied to the linear antenna array. Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of spatial distribution of a linear antenna array spoofing detection system and an incident signal, as shown in fig. 1, M array elements of the linear antenna array are on the same straight line, and the length of a base line between adjacent array elements is a half wavelength. Based on this, fig. 2 is a flowchart of a spoof signal detecting method based on a linear antenna array according to an embodiment, and as shown in fig. 2, the spoof signal detecting method based on the linear antenna array according to an embodiment includes steps S100 to S102:
s100, obtaining a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement
Figure BDA0003022043080000061
The original measurement value, i.e. the carrier phase single difference original measurement value, is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0003022043080000062
wherein,
Figure BDA0003022043080000063
for signal i in array element jA carrier phase measurement of (d); λ is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal;
Figure BDA0003022043080000064
for detecting the unit direction vector between the array element 1 and the array element 2 in the body coordinate system where the system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system, and because all the array elements are on the same straight line, the unit direction vectors between all the array elements 1 and other different array elements are the same; aTRepresenting a vector transpose; gamma raye,iThe unit incident direction vector from a signal i to a detection system under the geocentric coordinate system is marked with 'e' to represent the geocentric coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric coordinate system;
Figure BDA0003022043080000065
is an integer and represents the fuzzy number of the whole cycle of the carrier;
Figure BDA0003022043080000066
to measure noise, a zero mean gaussian distribution is followed.
Defining the x-axis of the coordinate system of the detection system as the direction from array element 1 to array element 2 in the linear antenna array
Figure BDA0003022043080000067
Therefore, the single phase difference of the fuzzy carrier wave including the whole period of the carrier wave can be further simplified as follows:
Figure BDA0003022043080000068
wherein r is1Representing the first row vector of the change matrix R. The carrier phase single difference raw measurement is inaccurate due to the presence of the full cycle ambiguity, and therefore needs to be estimated.
Based on this, in one embodiment, fig. 3 is a flowchart of a spoofed signal detection method based on a linear antenna array according to another embodiment, as shown in fig. 3, the process of acquiring a carrier phase single difference measurement value in step S100 includes steps S200 to S202:
s200, estimating carrier phase single difference measurementNumber of whole cycle ambiguities corresponding to magnitude
Figure BDA0003022043080000071
The estimation method in step S200 is as follows:
Figure BDA0003022043080000072
wherein sign (·) represents taking a symbol;
Figure BDA0003022043080000073
represents rounding down; i- | denotes taking the absolute value.
S201, estimating a carrier phase single difference measurement value between an array element 1 and an array element 2;
wherein, the single difference measurement value of the carrier phase between the array element 1 and the array element 2
Figure BDA0003022043080000074
Due to the fact that
Figure BDA0003022043080000075
Thus, it is possible to provide
Figure BDA0003022043080000076
S202, estimating the carrier phase single difference measurement value between other array elements and the array element 1 according to the fixed geometric relation among the array elements of the antenna array, the whole cycle fuzzy number and the carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2.
Wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement between other array elements and array element 1
Figure BDA0003022043080000077
According to the fixed geometrical relationship between the array elements,
Figure BDA0003022043080000078
can be calculated according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0003022043080000079
wherein,
Figure BDA00030220430800000710
in one embodiment, fig. 4 is a flowchart of a spoofed signal detecting method based on a linear antenna array according to yet another embodiment, and as shown in fig. 4, before the process of obtaining a spoofed signal detection amount according to a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value in step S101, the method further includes step S300:
and S300, taking an arithmetic mean value of the obtained carrier phase single difference measurement values to update the carrier phase single difference measurement values.
Wherein carrier phase single difference measurement is obtained for the estimation
Figure BDA00030220430800000711
Taking the arithmetic average sum, we can get:
Figure BDA0003022043080000081
wherein,
Figure BDA0003022043080000082
assuming that N satellite signals are received, the N carrier phase single difference measurements are made
Figure BDA0003022043080000083
Written as a vector form:
Figure BDA0003022043080000084
wherein
Figure BDA0003022043080000085
Figure BDA0003022043080000086
ε＝[ε1,ε2,…,εN]The noise vector epsilon follows a zero mean gaussian joint distribution with a covariance matrix of Q.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 3, the expected carrier phase single difference value is obtained in step S100
Figure BDA0003022043080000087
Includes steps S203 to S205:
s203, acquiring the expected incidence direction of the real satellite signal
Figure BDA0003022043080000088
Wherein, the expected incident direction of the ith satellite signal under the geocentric geostationary coordinate system is calculated
Figure BDA0003022043080000089
Recording the trusted position of the receiver as
Figure BDA00030220430800000810
The ith satellite position is pe,i＝[xi,yi,zi]TThen, then
Figure BDA00030220430800000811
I | · | | represents the calculation of the euler distance.
S204, estimating a first row vector of the transformation matrix
Figure BDA00030220430800000812
Wherein, note
Figure BDA00030220430800000813
When the number of received signals N > 3, then
Figure BDA00030220430800000814
Wherein (·)-1Representing the matrix inversion.
S205, obtaining the expected value of the single difference of the carrier phase according to the expected incidence direction and the first row vector of the transformation matrix
Figure BDA00030220430800000815
Wherein, an expected signal incidence direction matrix is obtained according to calculation
Figure BDA00030220430800000816
Estimation of the first row vector of the variation matrix
Figure BDA00030220430800000817
Carrier phase single difference expected value can be obtained
Figure BDA00030220430800000818
S101, obtaining detection quantity of deception signals according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
and calculating the detection quantity of the deception signal according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value after determining the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value of the linear antenna array.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 3, the process of obtaining the detection amount of the spoofed signal according to the measured value of the carrier phase single difference and the expected value of the carrier phase single difference in step S101 includes steps S206 to S209:
s206, obtaining a difference vector e of the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
wherein, the difference vector e of the carrier phase single difference measured value and the carrier phase single difference expected value satisfies:
Figure BDA0003022043080000091
wherein
Figure BDA0003022043080000092
InRepresenting an n-order identity matrix; easy-to-know matrix psi⊥Is N-3, so that the covariance matrix of the difference vector e
Figure BDA0003022043080000093
Non-reversible。
S207, performing eigenvalue decomposition on a matrix contained in the difference vector to obtain a decomposition result;
wherein the matrix psi is contained in the difference vector⊥The characteristic value decomposition process is as follows: due to the fact that
Figure BDA0003022043080000094
Figure BDA0003022043080000095
Thus matrix psi⊥Is 1 or 0, i.e. matrix psi⊥Can be decomposed into: psi⊥＝GΣGT＝HHT(ii) a Wherein the matrix is an eigenvector matrix, Σ is an eigenvalue matrix,
Figure BDA0003022043080000096
0m×nrepresenting an m x N dimensional zero matrix, H is composed of the first N-3 columns of elements of matrix G, which is an N x (N-3) dimensional column full rank matrix.
S208, obtaining a right multiplication vector according to the right multiplication decomposition result of the difference vector;
wherein the difference vector e is right-multiplied by a matrix H (H)TH)-1Obtaining a right-hand product vector
Figure BDA0003022043080000097
Thus the mean of the right-hand multiplied vector x
Figure BDA0003022043080000098
Covariance matrix of
Figure BDA0003022043080000099
Since the matrix H is a column full rank matrix, the matrix H is a column full rank matrix
Figure BDA00030220430800000910
Is reversible.
And S209, acquiring the detection quantity of the deception signal according to the right multiplication vector and the covariance matrix of the right multiplication vector.
Wherein the difference vector e is right-multiplied by a matrix H (H)TH)-1Obtaining a right-hand product vector
Figure BDA0003022043080000101
Thus the mean of the right-hand multiplied vector x
Figure BDA0003022043080000102
The covariance matrix of the right-hand vector is
Figure BDA0003022043080000103
Since the matrix H is a column full rank matrix, the matrix H is a column full rank matrix
Figure BDA0003022043080000104
Is reversible.
Based on the vector x, the detection quantity of the deception signal is constructed as
Figure BDA0003022043080000105
Introduction of
Figure BDA0003022043080000106
To normalize the vector x and eliminate the correlation between elements in the vector x.
In one embodiment, when the received signal is a real signal, the detection quantity of the deception signal follows the central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom of N-3; when the deception signal exists in the received signal, the detection quantity of the deception signal obeys the non-central chi-square distribution of the non-central parameter rho with the degree of freedom rho, wherein
Figure BDA0003022043080000107
Specifically, when the received signals are all true signals, the signal incidence direction difference matrix Δ ψeThe mean value mu of the vector x is 0, so x follows 0-mean joint gaussian distribution, so the detection quantity T follows central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom N-3; when a deception signal exists in a received signal, the mean value mu is not equal to 0, at the moment, x obeys non-zero mean value combined Gaussian distribution, so that the detection quantity T obeys non-central chi-square distribution with the freedom degree of N-4 and the non-central parameter of rho, wherein
Figure BDA0003022043080000108
The hypothesis test based on the detection quantity T is therefore:
Figure BDA0003022043080000109
and S102, judging that the deception jamming exists when the detection quantity of the deception signal is higher than the detection threshold of the deception signal.
In one embodiment, the fraud signal detection threshold th is determined according to the new man-Pearson (Neyman-Pearson) criterion, which satisfies the formula:
Figure BDA00030220430800001010
wherein α is the false alarm probability; f (x | H)0) Denotes T is in H0A probability density function under the condition; th is the determined detection threshold.
And when the detection quantity of the deception signal is lower than the deception signal detection threshold, judging that no deception interference exists.
In the spoofed signal detecting method based on the linear antenna array according to any of the embodiments, after the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value are obtained, a spoofed signal detection amount is obtained according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally, when the spoofed signal detection amount is higher than a spoofed signal detection threshold, it is determined that spoofed interference exists. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a deception signal detection device.
Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a spoof signal detecting apparatus according to an embodiment, and as shown in fig. 5, the spoof signal detecting apparatus according to an embodiment includes a block 100, a block 101, and a block 102:
a detection value obtaining module 100, configured to obtain a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
the detection quantity calculation module 101 is configured to obtain a detection quantity of a spoofed signal according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
the signal determination module 102 is configured to determine that spoofing interference exists when the detection amount of the spoofing signal is higher than the detection threshold of the spoofing signal.
According to the detection device for the deceptive signals, after the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value are obtained, the deceptive signal detection amount is obtained according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally, when the deceptive signal detection amount is higher than the deceptive signal detection threshold, the deceptive interference is judged to exist. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a computer storage medium, wherein computer instructions are stored on the computer storage medium, and when the instructions are executed by a processor, the deception signal detection method based on the linear antenna array of any one of the embodiments is realized.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by hardware instructions of a computer program, which can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, storage, database, or other medium used in the embodiments provided herein may include non-volatile and/or volatile memory, among others. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms such as Static RAM (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), Rambus Direct RAM (RDRAM), direct bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).
Alternatively, the integrated unit of the present invention may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium if it is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as a separate product. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a terminal, or a network device) to execute all or part of the methods of the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a removable storage device, a RAM, a ROM, a magnetic or optical disk, or various other media that can store program code.
Corresponding to the computer storage medium, in one embodiment, a computer device is further provided, where the computer device includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and the processor executes the computer program to implement any one of the spoof signal detection methods based on a linear antenna array as described in the embodiments above.
The computer device may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in fig. 6. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen, and an input device connected by a system bus. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device comprises a nonvolatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used for communicating with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement a spoof signal detection method based on a linear antenna array. The display screen of the computer equipment can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer equipment can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, a key, a track ball or a touch pad arranged on the shell of the computer equipment, an external keyboard, a touch pad or a mouse and the like
After the computer equipment obtains the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, the computer equipment obtains the detection amount of the deceptive signal according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and finally judges that the deceptive interference exists when the detection amount of the deceptive signal is higher than the deceptive signal detection threshold. Based on the carrier phase single difference detection method, deception signal detection can be completed through the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value, and the calculated amount is small. Meanwhile, the requirement on the size of the carrier is small, the deception interference that all deception signals come from the same radiation source can be detected, the deception interference that the deception signals come from different radiation sources can also be detected, and the application range of deception detection is effectively enlarged.
The technical features of the above embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described, but should be considered as the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above examples only show some embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that various changes and modifications can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit of the invention, and these changes and modifications are all within the scope of the invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (9)

1. A deception signal detection method based on a linear antenna array is characterized by comprising the following steps:
acquiring a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement
Figure FDA0003601955500000011
The original measurement value, i.e. the carrier phase single difference original measurement value, is expressed as follows:
Figure FDA0003601955500000012
wherein,
Figure FDA0003601955500000013
a carrier phase measurement value of the signal i at the array element j is obtained; λ is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal;
Figure FDA0003601955500000014
for detecting the unit direction vector between the array element 1 and the array element 2 in the body coordinate system where the system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system, and because all the array elements are on the same straight line, the unit direction vectors between all the array elements 1 and other different array elements are the same; aTRepresenting a vector transpose; gamma raye,iThe unit incident direction vector from a signal i to a detection system under the geocentric coordinate system is marked with 'e' to represent the geocentric coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric coordinate system;
Figure FDA0003601955500000015
is an integer and represents the fuzzy number of the whole cycle of the carrier;
Figure FDA0003601955500000016
for measuring noise, zero mean Gaussian distribution is obeyed;
a process for obtaining a carrier phase single difference measurement, comprising the steps of:
estimating the integer ambiguity number corresponding to the single difference measurement value of the carrier phase
Figure FDA0003601955500000017
Wherein the fuzzy number of the whole week
Figure FDA0003601955500000018
The estimation method of (2) is as follows:
Figure FDA0003601955500000019
wherein sign (·) represents taking a symbol;
Figure FDA00036019555000000110
represents rounding down; | represents taking an absolute value;
estimating a carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2; wherein, the single difference measurement value of the carrier phase between the array element 1 and the array element 2
Figure FDA00036019555000000111
Due to the fact that
Figure FDA00036019555000000112
Thus, it is possible to provide
Figure FDA00036019555000000113
Wherein,
Figure FDA00036019555000000114
representing a carrier phase single difference measurement containing an integer ambiguity,
Figure FDA00036019555000000115
a single difference measurement representing carrier phase that does not contain integer ambiguity; r is1A first row vector representing a variation matrix R;
estimating the carrier phase single difference measurement values between other array elements and the array element 1 according to a fixed geometric relationship among the array elements of the antenna array, the whole cycle fuzzy number and the carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2;
wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement between other array elements and array element 1
Figure FDA0003601955500000021
According to the fixed geometrical relationship between the array elements,
Figure FDA0003601955500000022
can be calculated according to the following formula:
Figure FDA0003601955500000023
wherein,
Figure FDA0003601955500000024
obtaining a deception signal detection quantity according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
and when the detection quantity of the deception signal is higher than a deception signal detection threshold, judging that deception interference exists.
2. The linear antenna array-based spoof signal detecting method of claim 1 further comprising the step of, prior to the step of obtaining a spoof signal detection value based on said carrier phase single difference measurement value and said carrier phase single difference expected value:
and taking an arithmetic mean value of the obtained carrier phase single difference measurement values to update the carrier phase single difference measurement values.
3. The method of detecting spoofed signals based on a linear antenna array as claimed in claim 1, wherein said step of obtaining expected values of single differences of carrier phases comprises the steps of:
acquiring an expected incidence direction of a real satellite signal;
estimating a first row vector of a transformation matrix;
and obtaining a single difference expected value of the carrier phase according to the expected incidence direction and the first row vector of the transformation matrix.
4. The linear antenna array-based spoof signal detecting method of claim 1 wherein said step of obtaining a spoof signal detected value based on said carrier phase single difference measured value and said carrier phase single difference expected value comprises the steps of:
obtaining a difference vector of the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
performing eigenvalue decomposition on a matrix contained in the difference vector to obtain a decomposition result;
right-multiplying the decomposition result according to the difference vector to obtain a right-multiplied vector;
and obtaining the detection quantity of the deception signal according to the right multiplication vector and the covariance matrix of the right multiplication vector.
5. The spoof signal detecting method based on the linear antenna array as claimed in claim 1 or 4, wherein when the received signal is a true signal, the detecting amount of the spoof signal follows a central chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom of N-3;
when the received signal has a deception signal, the detection quantity of the deception signal obeys the non-central chi-square distribution of a non-central parameter rho with the degree of freedom rho, wherein
Figure FDA0003601955500000031
6. The line antenna array based spoof signal detection method of claim 1 wherein the spoof signal detection threshold satisfies the following equation:
Figure FDA0003601955500000032
wherein, alpha is the false alarm probability; f (x | H)0) Denotes that T is at H0A probability density function under the condition; th is the determined spoofed signal detection threshold.
7. A spoof signal detecting device comprising:
the detection value acquisition module is used for acquiring a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value;
wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement
Figure FDA0003601955500000033
The original measurement value, i.e. the carrier phase single difference original measurement value, is expressed as follows:
Figure FDA0003601955500000034
wherein,
Figure FDA0003601955500000035
a carrier phase measurement value of the signal i at the array element j is obtained; λ is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal;
Figure FDA0003601955500000036
for detecting the unit direction vector between the array element 1 and the array element 2 in the body coordinate system where the system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system, and because all the array elements are on the same straight line, the unit direction vectors between all the array elements 1 and other different array elements are the same; aTRepresenting a vector transpose; gamma raye,iIs the earth coreA unit incident direction vector from a signal i to a detection system under a fixed coordinate system is marked with 'e' to represent a geocentric coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric coordinate system;
Figure FDA0003601955500000041
is an integer and represents the fuzzy number of the whole cycle of the carrier;
Figure FDA0003601955500000042
for measuring noise, zero mean Gaussian distribution is obeyed;
a process for obtaining a carrier phase single difference measurement, comprising the steps of:
estimating the integer ambiguity number corresponding to the single difference measurement value of the carrier phase
Figure FDA0003601955500000043
Wherein the fuzzy number of the whole week
Figure FDA0003601955500000044
The estimation method of (2) is as follows:
Figure FDA0003601955500000045
wherein sign (·) represents taking a symbol;
Figure FDA0003601955500000046
represents rounding down; | represents taking an absolute value;
estimating a carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2;
wherein, the single difference measurement value of the carrier phase between the array element 1 and the array element 2
Figure FDA0003601955500000047
Due to the fact that
Figure FDA0003601955500000048
Thus, it is possible to provide
Figure FDA0003601955500000049
Wherein,
Figure FDA00036019555000000410
representing a carrier phase single difference measurement containing an integer ambiguity,
Figure FDA00036019555000000411
a single difference measurement representing carrier phase that does not contain integer ambiguity; r is1A first row vector representing a variation matrix R;
estimating the carrier phase single difference measurement values between other array elements and the array element 1 according to a fixed geometric relationship among the array elements of the antenna array, the whole cycle fuzzy number and the carrier phase single difference measurement value between the array element 1 and the array element 2;
wherein the carrier phase single difference measurement between other array elements and array element 1
Figure FDA00036019555000000412
According to the fixed geometrical relationship between the array elements,
Figure FDA00036019555000000413
can be calculated according to the following formula:
Figure FDA00036019555000000414
wherein,
Figure FDA0003601955500000051
the detection quantity calculation module is used for obtaining detection quantity of deception signals according to the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value;
and the signal judgment module is used for judging that the deception jamming exists when the detection quantity of the deception signals is higher than a deception signal detection threshold.
8. A computer storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, wherein the computer instructions, when executed by a processor, implement the line antenna array based spoof signal detection method of any one of claims 1 through 6.
9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor when executing the program implements the method for spoof signal detection based on a linear antenna array of any of claims 1 through 6.
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