CN111752200A - Program operating method, computer device, and readable storage medium - Google Patents
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- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
- G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
- G05B19/0423—Input/output
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
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Abstract
The application relates to the technical field of chips, and particularly discloses a program running method. The program running method comprises the steps of judging whether an encrypted flag bit exists in an on-chip FLASH area at the initialization stage of the program; when the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH region, reading encrypted information from the on-chip FLASH region, wherein the encrypted information comprises information obtained by encrypting the identity identifier of a preset chip; decrypting the encrypted information to obtain the identity of the preset chip; reading the identity of the current chip; and comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip, and executing a preset defense step when the identity of the preset chip is inconsistent with the identity of the current chip. Therefore, hackers or other technicians can be prevented from copying the program to a chip other than the preset chip for running, and the effect of preventing the program from being copied is achieved.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of chip technologies, and in particular, to a program running method, a computer device, and a readable storage medium.
Background
With the increasing maturity and development of the single chip microcomputer technology, due to the prominent effects of intelligence and convenience in use, the single chip microcomputer is favored by engineers and is widely applied to various product design occasions. With the increasing requirements of various fields on information security, the requirements of the encryption technology of the single chip microcomputer are more and more strong, and particularly, in the fields of commercial confidentiality and national security, how to prevent hackers or enemies from decoding the programs of the single chip microcomputer is a problem which must be concerned by technical personnel in the field.
In the prior art, the encryption of the single chip microcomputer usually uses the self-carried code locking encryption function of each series of MCU, the locking encryption mode is usually short in key length and simple in algorithm, and hackers or other technicians can break the encryption without special means.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, it is necessary to provide a program running method, a computer device, and a readable storage medium for solving the problem that a program is easily copied.
A program execution method, the program being executed on a chip, the method comprising:
judging whether an encrypted flag bit exists in an on-chip FLASH area at the initialization stage of the program;
when the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH region, reading encrypted information from the on-chip FLASH region, wherein the encrypted information comprises information obtained by encrypting the identity identifier of a preset chip;
decrypting the encrypted information to obtain the identity of the preset chip;
reading the identity of the current chip;
and comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip, and executing a preset defense step when the identity of the preset chip is inconsistent with the identity of the current chip.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises:
controlling the program to run on the preset chip;
reading the identity of the preset chip at the initialization stage of the program;
encrypting the identity identification of the preset chip to obtain encryption information, and writing the encryption information into the on-chip FLASH area;
and writing the encrypted flag bit into the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH region.
In one embodiment, the step of determining whether the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH area at the initialization stage of the program includes:
accessing a fixed address of an on-chip FLASH region at the initialization stage of the program;
and judging whether the fixed address of the FLASH region on the chip has an encrypted flag bit.
In one embodiment, the step of comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip includes:
when the first comparison result does the identity of presetting the chip with the identity of current chip is different, the record is compared the failure number of times, and compares again, works as when comparing failure number of times more than or equal to and predetermine the threshold value, confirm the identity of presetting the chip with the identity of current chip is inconsistent.
In one embodiment, the preset defense step includes:
and controlling the equipment where the current chip is located to enter a downtime state.
In one embodiment, the preset defense step includes:
and starting a timer, and controlling the equipment where the current chip is located to enter an abnormal working state after the equipment works normally for a preset time.
In one embodiment, the preset defense step includes:
the program is cleared.
In one embodiment, the encryption information is obtained by encrypting the identity of the preset chip through a TEA secure encryption algorithm and/or an AES secure encryption algorithm.
A computer device comprising a memory storing a computer program and a processor implementing the steps of the above method when executing the computer program.
A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the above-mentioned method.
According to the program running method, whether an encrypted flag bit exists in an on-chip FLASH area is judged in the initialization stage of program running, if the encrypted flag bit exists, encrypted information is read from the on-chip FLASH area and is decrypted, the decrypted information is compared with the read identity of the current chip, the encrypted information is obtained after the identity of the preset chip is encrypted, if the current chip is not the preset chip, the identity of the preset chip and the identity of the preset chip are different inevitably, at the moment, the comparison fails, and the preset defense step is executed, so that the program can be prevented from normally running on the current chip. Therefore, hackers or other technicians can be prevented from copying the program to a chip other than the preset chip for running, and the effect of preventing the program from being copied is achieved.
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Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a program running method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of a program running method according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present application.
Description of reference numerals:
10. an encryption module; 20. a communication module; 30. a decryption module; 40. and updating the module.
Detailed Description
To facilitate an understanding of the invention, the invention will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. Preferred embodiments of the present invention are shown in the drawings. This invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete.
In the present invention, unless otherwise expressly stated or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," "secured," and the like are to be construed broadly and can, for example, be fixedly connected, detachably connected, or integrally formed; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be directly connected or indirectly connected through intervening media, or they may be connected internally or in any other suitable relationship, unless expressly stated otherwise. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood by those skilled in the art according to specific situations.
The terms "first", "second" and "first" are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one such feature. In the description of the present invention, "a plurality" means at least two, e.g., two, three, etc., unless specifically limited otherwise.
Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. The terminology used in the description of the invention herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. As used herein, the term "and/or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
In the prior art, the encryption of the program is generally realized through a code locking encryption function carried by a chip, but the locking encryption method has the advantages of short key length, simple algorithm and low difficulty of being cracked by other people. As long as other people obtain one or more same chips, the whole FLASH region containing the program can be completely copied, and then codes are written into the same chip, so that the phenomenon of copying is caused.
In order to solve the problem that the program is copied, an embodiment of the present application provides a program running method, where the program runs on a chip, and the program may be an APP program or the like. As shown in fig. 1, the program execution method includes the steps of:
step S20, during the initialization phase of the program, it is determined whether the on-chip FLASH area has an encrypted flag bit.
In this embodiment, during the program initialization stage, it is first determined whether an encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH area. Specifically, the encrypted flag bit indicates that the program is encrypted, decryption operation needs to be performed before the program continues to run, the encrypted flag bit can be set at a fixed address of the on-chip FLASH before the chip is put into use formally, and in an initialization stage of the program, the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH is directly read to judge whether the encrypted flag bit exists; the encrypted flag bit can also be randomly set at any position of the on-chip FLASH area, and during the initialization stage of the program, the addresses of the on-chip FLASH area are read one by one, and whether the encrypted flag bit exists or not is judged. Of course, the setting position of the encrypted flag bit may also be set in other manners, which is not limited herein.
Here, if another person attempts to copy the program, the firmware of the entire FLASH area is generally copied to another chip, and since the encrypted flag bit is present in the FLASH area, the encrypted flag bit is also copied with the program. When someone tries to run the program on another chip, it should be able to read the encrypted flag bit in the on-chip FLASH area.
And step S30, when the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH area, reading the encrypted information from the on-chip FLASH area, wherein the encrypted information comprises the information obtained by encrypting the identity identifier of the preset chip.
When the encrypted flag bit exists in the FLASH region on the chip, the program can be normally operated only after the encrypted information is acquired and then decrypted. At this time, it is necessary to read the encryption information from the on-chip FLASH area, where the encryption information may be pre-stored at the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area, and in step S30, the encryption information at the fixed address may be directly read; the encryption information can also be stored in any position of the on-chip FLASH area, as long as the encryption information is preset, and the specific position is not absolutely limited here. It should be noted that the encryption information is set in the on-chip FLASH area, as well as the encrypted flag bit, and when another person copies the entire FLASH area onto another chip, the encryption information in the FLASH area is also copied together.
Each chip has its unique identity, for example in the form of an ID value or a physical address. Before the chip is put into use, the identity mark of the chip can be obtained, the identity mark is encrypted to generate encryption information, and the encryption information of the identity mark is prestored in the on-chip FLASH area. That is, the on-chip FLASH area of each preset chip has unique encryption information corresponding to the chip.
And step S40, decrypting the encrypted information to obtain the identity of the preset chip. And after the encrypted information is obtained, decrypting the encrypted information to further obtain the identity of the preset chip.
And step S50, reading the identity of the current chip. As described above, each chip has a unique identity, which may be an ID value, a physical address, or an identity in other forms, that is, the identity of the current chip on which the program operates may be obtained.
It should be noted that the step of obtaining the identity of the current chip may be performed after the step of obtaining the encrypted information and decrypting the encrypted information to obtain the identity of the preset chip, or may be performed before the step of obtaining the identity of the preset chip, or both of them may be performed simultaneously, which does not affect the implementation of the scheme of the present application, and is covered in the protection scope of the present application.
And step S60, comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip, and executing a preset defense step when the identity of the preset chip is not consistent with the identity of the current chip.
When the identity of the preset chip and the identity of the current chip are obtained, the identity of the preset chip and the identity of the current chip can be compared. If the program is not copied and copied, the current chip is the preset chip, the identity identifications of the current chip and the preset chip are consistent, and the program can be controlled to continue to run. If the program is being copied to another chip by others to run, the identity of the current chip is necessarily different from the identity of the preset chip, and at this time, a preset defense step is taken to prevent the program from running normally on the current chip.
The preset defense steps are not unique and can be set according to actual requirements, and the problem search direction of a thief is confused, so that the plagiarism period of the thief is prolonged as much as possible, time is won for searching plagiarism products appearing in the market, normal operation of a program can be directly prevented, and the like.
According to the program running method, whether an encrypted flag bit exists in an on-chip FLASH area is judged in the initialization stage of program running, if the encrypted flag bit exists, encrypted information is read from the on-chip FLASH area and is decrypted, the decrypted information is compared with the read identity of the current chip, the encrypted information is obtained after the identity of the preset chip is encrypted, if the current chip is not the preset chip, the identity of the preset chip and the identity of the preset chip are different inevitably, at the moment, the comparison fails, and the preset defense step is executed, so that the program can be prevented from normally running on the current chip. Therefore, hackers or other technicians can be prevented from copying the program to a chip other than the preset chip for running, and the effect of preventing the program from being copied is achieved.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, the program running method provided in this embodiment further includes the following steps:
step S10, the control program runs on the default chip. Before the program is put into use, the control program is firstly run on a preset chip. The preset chip is a specified chip which needs to be encrypted.
Step S11, reading the id of the preset chip during the initialization phase of the program.
And step S12, encrypting the identity of the preset chip to obtain encryption information, and writing the encryption information into the on-chip FLASH area. Specifically, the encryption information may be written into a fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area, or may be written into an arbitrary position of the on-chip FLASH area. In this embodiment, the encryption information is preferably written into the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area, so that the encryption information is directly read from the fixed address every time the program is executed subsequently, and the operation speed is increased.
And step S13, writing the encrypted flag bit into the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area.
After the encryption information is written, an encrypted flag bit is written in the fixed address of the FLASH area on the chip to identify that the encryption information is encrypted.
The above steps are performed before step S20.
In a preferred embodiment, before step S11, the method further includes a step of determining whether an encrypted flag bit exists at the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area, and if the encrypted flag bit does not exist, it indicates that the FLASH area is not encrypted, and then step S11 is executed to finally write the encrypted flag bit. When the encrypted flag already exists, it indicates that the flag is already encrypted, and the steps S11-S13 do not need to be executed again. Therefore, on one hand, the phenomenon of repeated encryption can be avoided, on the other hand, each chip can be ensured to be encrypted, and each chip is ensured to have unique encryption information and encryption flag bits.
In one embodiment, the step S20 of determining whether the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH area in the initialization stage of the program includes the following steps:
step S201, accessing a fixed address of an on-chip FLASH area in the initialization stage of a program;
step S202, judging whether the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH area has an encrypted flag bit.
Namely, the encrypted flag bit is set in the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH region, the fixed address can be directly accessed in the initialization stage of the program, and whether the encrypted flag bit exists at the fixed address or not is judged, so that the operation time is saved.
In one embodiment, the step S60 of comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip includes the following steps:
and when the primary comparison result shows that the identity of the preset chip is different from the identity of the current chip, recording the comparison failure times, performing re-comparison, and when the comparison failure times are greater than or equal to a preset threshold value, determining that the identity of the preset chip is inconsistent with the identity of the current chip.
Specifically, if the initial comparison result is inconsistent, the preset defense step is not directly executed, but a certain fault-tolerant number is reserved, the encrypted information is read again, the encrypted information is decrypted and then compared again, if the number of times of continuous comparison failure is greater than or equal to the preset threshold value, the fact that the identity of the preset chip is inconsistent with the identity of the current chip can be determined, namely, the program is determined to be copied and copied, and the preset defense step is executed. The preset threshold is not unique and is set according to actual requirements, for example, 5 times, 6 times, 7 times and the like, and is not limited herein.
Therefore, the influence of misjudgment on the normal operation of the program on the preset chip can be avoided.
In one embodiment, the preset defense step includes: and controlling the equipment where the current chip is positioned to enter a downtime state.
As an alternative embodiment, the preset defensive step includes; and starting a timer, and controlling the equipment where the current chip is located to enter an abnormal working state after the equipment works normally for a preset time.
As another alternative, the preset defensive step includes: and (5) clearing the program.
The downtime state refers to a state that the initialization fails and the equipment cannot be normally started; the control equipment enters the abnormal working state after working for the preset time length in the normal way, specifically, after the equipment works for the preset time length in the normal way, a program automatically modifies certain key system parameters to enable the corresponding functions of the system to be limited or out of order, and the purpose is to confuse the problem searching direction of a thief so as to prolong the plagiarism period of the thief as much as possible and strive for time for finding plagiarism products in the market. The clearing program is a program self-destruction program, and the programs in the FLASH area are all erased, so that the system cannot run.
In practical application, other defense steps can be set according to actual requirements.
In one embodiment, the encryption information is obtained by encrypting the id of the preset chip through a TEA secure encryption algorithm and/or an AES secure encryption algorithm. The TEA secure encryption algorithm and the AES secure encryption algorithm are high in safety and efficiency, occupy a small storage space and are suitable for encrypting the identity of the preset chip in the embodiment.
The embodiment of the present application provides a computer device, as shown in fig. 3, including a memory 200 and a processor 300, where the memory 200 and the processor 300 are communicatively connected to each other, and may be connected by a bus or in other manners, and fig. 3 takes the example of connection by a bus as an example.
The memory 200, which is a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, can be used to store non-transitory software programs, non-transitory computer executable programs, and modules, such as program instructions corresponding to the program execution method in the embodiment of the present invention. The processor 300 executes various functional applications and data processing of the processor 300, i.e., a program execution method, by executing non-transitory software programs, instructions, and modules stored in the memory 200.
The memory 200 may include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area may store an operating system, an application program required for at least one function; the storage data area may store data created by the processor 300, and the like. Further, the memory 200 may include high speed random access memory, and may also include non-transitory memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-transitory solid state storage device. In some embodiments, memory 200 optionally includes memory located remotely from processor 300, which may be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by a computer program, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. The storage medium may be a magnetic Disk, an optical Disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a Flash Memory (Flash Memory), a Hard Disk (Hard Disk Drive, abbreviated as HDD) or a Solid State Drive (SSD), etc.; the storage medium may also comprise a combination of memories of the kind described above.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not described, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the inventive concept, which falls within the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. A program execution method, wherein the program is executed on a chip, the method comprising:
judging whether an encrypted flag bit exists in an on-chip FLASH area at the initialization stage of the program;
when the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH region, reading encrypted information from the on-chip FLASH region, wherein the encrypted information comprises information obtained by encrypting the identity identifier of a preset chip;
decrypting the encrypted information to obtain the identity of the preset chip;
reading the identity of the current chip;
and comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip, and executing a preset defense step when the identity of the preset chip is inconsistent with the identity of the current chip.
2. The program execution method according to claim 1, further comprising:
controlling the program to run on the preset chip;
reading the identity of the preset chip at the initialization stage of the program;
encrypting the identity identification of the preset chip to obtain encryption information, and writing the encryption information into the on-chip FLASH area;
and writing the encrypted flag bit into the fixed address of the on-chip FLASH region.
3. The program operating method according to claim 2, wherein the step of determining whether the encrypted flag bit exists in the on-chip FLASH area at the initialization stage of the program comprises:
accessing a fixed address of an on-chip FLASH region at the initialization stage of the program;
and judging whether the fixed address of the FLASH region on the chip has an encrypted flag bit.
4. The program operating method according to claim 1, wherein the step of comparing the identity of the preset chip with the identity of the current chip comprises:
when the first comparison result does the identity of presetting the chip with the identity of current chip is different, the record is compared the failure number of times, and compares again, works as when comparing failure number of times more than or equal to and predetermine the threshold value, confirm the identity of presetting the chip with the identity of current chip is inconsistent.
5. The program execution method according to claim 1, wherein the preset defense step includes:
and controlling the equipment where the current chip is located to enter a downtime state.
6. The program execution method according to claim 1, wherein the preset defense step includes: and starting a timer, and controlling the equipment where the current chip is located to enter an abnormal working state after the equipment works normally for a preset time.
7. The program execution method according to claim 1, wherein the preset defense step includes: the program is cleared.
8. The program running method according to claim 1, wherein the encryption information is information obtained by encrypting the id of the preset chip by a TEA security encryption algorithm and/or an AES security encryption algorithm.
9. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, wherein the processor implements the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 8 when executing the computer program.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 8.
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| CN111026419A (en) * | 2019-11-08 | 2020-04-17 | 深圳市有方科技股份有限公司 | Application program upgrading method, device and system of single chip microcomputer |
| CN111191196A (en) * | 2020-01-02 | 2020-05-22 | 日立楼宇技术（广州）有限公司 | Embedded program running method and device, computer equipment and storage medium |
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