CN118152725B - Killing chain closure evaluation method based on equipment system model - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to the field of a killing chain closure evaluation method based on an equipment system model, in particular to a killing chain closure evaluation method based on the equipment system model, which is characterized in that the interaction relation calculation efficiency of each link on a chain is required to calculate the killing chain closure probability according to known information, the reconnaissance probability, the communication probability, the command probability, the striking probability and the killing chain closure time are calculated, all initially generated killing chains are calculated according to the calculation results, then screening rules are designed, and screening is carried out according to a certain closure probability and closure time threshold value, the obtained screening result is an effective killing chain, and the collection of the effective killing chains forms a killing network of a combat network.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of a killing chain closure evaluation method, in particular to a killing chain closure evaluation method based on an equipment system model.
Background
The complex network modeling theory of the equipment system is a modeling theory for evaluating the fight force formed on an enemy target in a specific strategic mission task, wherein a network consisting of nodes and connected edges is formed by various interaction relations including reconnaissance, communication, command, attack and the like generated among entities in the equipment system of the my according to the range and the capability attribute, the nodes in the network represent the equipment entities of the enemy and the edges represent the interaction relation of the two nodes.
The killing chain is a combat loop established according to the OODA (Observation, orientation, decision, action) circulation theory in the combat network, so that effective combat force is formed for an enemy target. The premise of the formation of the killing chain is that the combat activity of the whole chain can be successfully closed, and a network formed by the aggregation of the successfully closed killing chains in the combat network is called a killing network. The quality of the closing performance of the killing chain is mainly reflected by the closing probability and closing time. Therefore, how to construct an evaluation method for the closure of the killing chain based on the combat activity and the killing chain model is very important, and can directly influence the deployment allocation problem of the follow-up my battlefield equipment. At present, a definite and effective model is lacking in calculation of the closure, meanwhile, a plurality of models are insufficiently considered for possible factors influencing the closure in combat activities, so that the closure calculation result is difficult to guide the optimization problem of subsequent deployment allocation, firstly, aiming at the evaluation method of a killing chain, the main stream idea at present is to aggregate various existing node basic indexes by adopting methods such as hierarchical analysis and the like to obtain corresponding evaluation results, wherein the analysis and construction method of the basic indexes is not clear, and the designed basic indexes cannot describe the characteristics of a killing chain comprehensively; in the aspect of closure analysis, at present, specific analysis is mainly adopted for each fight link, but each fight link is lacked to be connected in series as a whole to be considered, meanwhile, the performance calculation of each fight activity only considers the capability attribute of the equipment on the my side, and the calculation of the influence of the environment of the fight field and the equipment deployed by the enemy on the equipment on the my side is lacked.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a killing chain closure evaluation method based on an equipment system model, so as to solve the problems in the background technology.
In order to achieve the above object, a method for evaluating the closure of a killing chain based on an equipment system model comprises the following steps:
Step S1, calculating the closing probability of a killing chain according to known information, wherein the interaction relation of each link on the chain is required to be calculated, and the reconnaissance efficiency P (INV) is calculated firstly;
step S2, calculating communication efficiency P (COM);
Step S3, calculating command efficiency P (DEC);
step S4, calculating the striking efficiency P (ATT);
S5, calculating the closing time of the killing chain;
Step S6, calculating all initially generated killing chains according to the calculation results, designing screening rules, and screening according to a certain closing probability and a closing time threshold value, wherein the obtained screening result is the effective killing chain;
And S7, screening to obtain effective killing chains, wherein the collection of the effective killing chains forms a killing network of the combat network.
Preferably: the availability P (A) calculation method is as follows:
wherein t 1 is the average failure time, t 2 is the average repair time, and the reliability P (D) is calculated as follows:
Wherein t is the platform running time, and the efficiency P (C) calculating method is as follows: and calculating the efficiency between the equipment according to the combat activities (investigation, communication, control and striking) completed by two adjacent equipment in the killing chain, so as to obtain the efficiency of the killing chain.
Wherein P ability is the killing chain efficiency; n is the number of equipment in the killing chain; (P INV)i,i+1 is the scout performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P COM)i,i+1 is the communication performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P DEC)i,i+1 is the command performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment), and (P ATT)i,i+1 is the striking performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment).
Preferably: the (P INV)i,i+1 represents the scout efficiency between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment in a killing chain, represents the unidirectional interaction relation of the scout equipment i+1 to the enemy equipment i, is the process that the enemy equipment acquires the enemy equipment information, and the specific calculation mode is as follows:
(1) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a common target, and the radar detection adopts the Neman-Pearson criterion: the false alarm probability is constrained to a specified constant, so that the reconnaissance efficiency reaches the maximum, and when square law detection is adopted, the single reconnaissance efficiency P i calculation method is as follows:
Wherein BWA is radar beam width; AZR is radar scanning frequency; PRF is pulse repetition frequency; n is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; psi is the signal-to-noise ratio average of the N samples; i (·, ·) is a Pelson form of an incomplete gamma function, the radar maximum range can be expressed as R m;δ1 as the target node anti-radar coefficient, α as the environmental factor, and the selection manner is as follows:
because single scout is difficult to meet the combat requirement, multiple scouts are required, and the corresponding scout efficiency P (INV) calculation method is as follows:
Wherein N inv is the number of times of reconnaissance; p is a radar class reconnaissance efficiency reference value;
(2) The radar type reconnaissance node detects the stealth target, when the reconnaissance target is the stealth target, the reconnaissance efficiency model can be obviously influenced, and the specific calculation method of P i is as follows:
Wherein N is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; s N is the signal to noise ratio; Θ is the radar cross-sectional area of the target; epsilon is the stealth coefficient of the target node;
(3) The radar-type scout node detects a target with a mask, and when the target has a mask, the radar maximum detection distance is affected as follows:
Wherein phi is a target node shading coefficient; epsilon k is the radar shielding angle; h g is the target height;
(4) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a target under the condition of being interfered, when the radar is interfered, taking the most commonly used interference foil strip in passive interference as an example, the maximum detection distance of the radar is affected as follows:
wherein lambda is the radar wavelength; The interference intensity is the target node; r 0 is the maximum detection distance of the radar without interference;
(5) The satellite type scout node detects the target, and when the scout equipment is a satellite, the scout efficiency calculation method is as follows,
Wherein k is the total number of target lots found by the scout satellites; n t is the total number of local attack targets; d i is the detection distance of the ith batch of targets; ID is the radius of the detection range of the satellite to the ground; h i is the height of the ith batch of target nodes; IH is the average value of the heights of the attack targets; p 1 is single detection probability, and p 0 is satellite type reconnaissance efficiency reference value; n s is the number of probing; delta 2 is the target node anti-satellite.
Preferably: the P (COM) represents the success probability of communication, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
wherein n com is the number of communications, For the communication efficiency between the two nodes at the c-th time, the communication efficiency is represented by a communication transmission capability p ij.
Preferably: the specific calculation method of the communication transmission capability p ij is as follows,
Assuming that the front node and the rear node are S 1 and S 2 respectively, the communication interaction relationship of the two nodes can be according to the coverage d node, the transmission rate v node, the communication quality e node, the communication capacity Ca node and the information delay De node in the node communication modeling; the communication transmission capacity P (COM) consisting of five war technical indexes related to the communication capacity is calculated to obtain:
Wherein dis represents the relative distance between two nodes, wherein the communication quality between the two nodes can be calculated by the link budget P RX, and the specific algorithm is as follows:
Wherein P TX is the transmitting power of the transmitting antenna; g TX is the transmit gain of the transmit antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l FSPL is a signal free propagation loss model; c T is a correction factor under different environments; r is the distance between the receiving and transmitting antennas; f is the operating frequency of the transmitting antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l atm is the loss of antenna power in the atmosphere; l m is the loss of other various factors, and the communication capacity Ca is calculated as follows:
wherein m represents the number of channels, and B is the channel bandwidth; ρ i is the signal to noise ratio of the ith sub-channel; lambda i is the power gain of the ith sub-channel, and according to the definition of the self-information quantity, the modeling expression of the information transmission capacity P (COM) of the side representing the information sharing relation is as follows:
Where w i is the weight of each communication capability; r i (i=1, 2,3,4, 5) are membership functions of p i, respectively, and since p i is a quantitative indicator, it can be expressed as the following function of efficacy,
Therefore, the information transmission capability of the S-S side is:
Preferably: the P (DEC) represents the success probability of decision-making type command node command, the specific calculation method is as follows,
Assuming that the command node is D 1 and the commanded node is S 1, the interaction relationship is represented by a command capability P (DEC), and a specific calculation method is as follows:
The information processing capability of D 1 is denoted as E 1, which is modeled with the self-information content:
Wherein R i is three indexes of information processing capacity: the modeling expression of the response time T com, the throughput T hr, the membership functions (i=1, 2, 3) of the accuracy Acc, and the information transmission capability E 2 of the interaction relationship is:
Wherein,
The expression for such interaction modeling follows:
preferably: p (ATT) represents striking efficiency, and is classified into fire striking and electronic interference according to the striking equipment i and the target equipment j of the chain, according to the striking type, by the following calculation method,
(1) The calculation process of the fire striking relation comprises the following steps: let the missile guidance error obey a circular distribution law (σ x＝σy =σ), its scattering center is not at the location of the target j, i.e. its probability density of off-target quantity distribution is as follows:
the target damage probability is as follows:
Then:
The approximate expression is as follows:
Where R 0 is the distance between the center of spread and the target location, σ is the covariance of the guidance error, R 0 is the weapon's damage radius, and P W is the threat level. R 0 is the self attribute of weapon equipment, sigma is a fixed value for a single weapon, R 0 is related to the distance between red and blue and the speed of blue equipment, and the calculation mode of R 0 is established as follows:
r0＝rh·rv·rb (1-34)
Where r h、rv is a component of r 0 related distance and speed, r b is a radius of guidance error, and gives an upper and lower boundary h min≤reff≤hmax of the striking distance, and the target node maneuvering speed v tar is equal to the weapon maneuvering speed v node of the my striking node:
Where μ is the target node destruction coefficient, k is the tuning parameter, P W in (1-33) is related to the blue party threat ring, if the red party strike device is within multiple blue party device threat rings:
N W is the number of blue-side pieces of equipment that pose a threat to the current red-side batting equipment deployment location, The threat degree of the equipment for striking the red party for the ith blue party equipment is calculated as follows:
wherein alpha is an environmental factor; beta epsilon [1,10] is an integer weight coefficient to represent the importance degree of the target node; w is threat degree weight of the target node; r max is the maximum threat range of blue party equipment; r is the distance between blue equipment and red equipment;
(2) The electronic interference relation calculation process is to consider whether the enemy target T is in the interference range of the my striking node A:
Wherein D rat is interference power of an interference type striking node; mu is the survivability coefficient of the target node; p Accept and accept is the received power of the target node; v wea2 is the maneuvering speed of the interference type striking node; τ is the early warning time of the target node; v tar is the maneuver speed of the target node; d r is the interference radius of the interference type hit node.
Preferably: the kill chain closure time represents a measure of the time that all kill chains (kill nets) are closed, closure time calculation method:
T＝T1+T2+T3 (2-1)
Wherein T 1 is a scout time; t 2 is decision time; t 3 is the striking time, and the reconnaissance time calculating method comprises the following steps:
T1＝tXF+n*tscan (2-2)
Wherein t XF is the maximum reaction time of the system equipment; n is the number of radar sweeps; t scan is radar scanning interval, and the decision time calculation method comprises the following steps:
Wherein t c is the time taken for the finger control decision; n is the number of equipment on the killing chain; t i is the time spent for communication between adjacent equipment of the killing chain, when the decision time is calculated, the decision time required by each level of command needs to be preset to be t i (i=1, 2,..once, S), S is the number of command posts, and the decision time calculation method is as follows
In calculating the striking time, it is necessary to consider the striking equipment preparation start time t 1 ', the time t' 2 when the striking equipment is maneuvered to the striking position, the striking equipment firing time t '3, and the flight time t' 4, in whichR m is the distance between the percussion device deployment location and the target, v wea1 is the velocity of movement of the percussion device firing weapon.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
The invention provides a clear and detailed basic index calculation model on the closure analysis of the killing chain, analyzes the efficiency calculation method corresponding to the interaction relation of various nodes, and compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that the calculation of the closure is more focused on the integral calculation of the killing chain, the closing time and the closing probability of the killing chain are comprehensively considered, each node in the killing chain to each killing chain in the killing network to the killing network in the combat network are integrally considered from the bottom layer to the top layer, the possible condition of each combat link is fully considered from the bottom layer, and the difference of the efficiency of different friend-of-the-friend nodes in the investigation process and the influence of repeated investigation on the closing probability are analyzed in detail in the investigation link; the link budget is used for representing the communication quality in the communication link, and the influence of different battlefield environments on the communication efficiency can be distinguished through a loss model; in the striking link, a calculation model of hard-fire (fire striking) and soft-fire (electronic interference) is respectively constructed, the influence of enemy deployment distribution condition and capability attribute on the striking efficiency of my fire is also analyzed in the calculation process, a threat circle calculation model is provided, the influence of a joint threat circle formed by a plurality of enemy equipment is considered, and from the top, the influence of battlefield environment, such as reconnaissance links, environmental factors in the striking links, loss correction parameters of a signal loss model in the communication links under different shielding conditions, and the like, are considered in the calculation of each interaction relation of the killing link.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a graph of a complex network killing chain closure analysis model of an equipment system according to the invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the complex network killing chain closure analysis of the equipment system of the invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and fully with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is evident that the embodiments described are only some, but not all embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Examples
Referring to fig. 1-2, a method for evaluating the closure of a killing chain based on an equipment system model according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention comprises the following steps:
Step S1, calculating the closing probability of a killing chain according to known information, wherein the interaction relation of each link on the chain is required to be calculated, and the reconnaissance efficiency P (INV) is calculated firstly;
step S2, calculating communication efficiency P (COM);
Step S3, calculating command efficiency P (DEC);
step S4, calculating the striking efficiency P (ATT);
S5, calculating the closing time of the killing chain;
Step S6, calculating all initially generated killing chains according to the calculation results, designing screening rules, and screening according to a certain closing probability and a closing time threshold value, wherein the obtained screening result is the effective killing chain;
And S7, screening to obtain effective killing chains, wherein the collection of the effective killing chains forms a killing network of the combat network.
The killing chain is composed of a plurality of links such as investigation, communication, command, strike and the like, each link is completed by one or more equipment, but each link of the killing chain cannot guarantee hundred percent success, for example, an enemy target appears in the maximum investigation range of the my investigation equipment, the radar discovers the target with a certain probability, and multiple detection is possibly needed to improve the probability of successful investigation, which is related to the functional attribute of the investigation equipment, the distance of the target and the like. If all links of the killing chain successfully realize the partial functions (namely, the scout node scouts the target, the communication node successfully transmits the scout information to the command node, the command node successfully processes the scout information to determine the node for executing the hitting task, and the communication node successfully transmits the command information to the hitting node, and the hitting node hits the target), the killing chain is closed. The killing chain closure probability index P, P=P (A), P (D), P (C) can be established based on the ADC ring model, namely the availability, reliability and efficiency.
The method for calculating the availability P (A) comprises the following steps:
Where t 1 is the average downtime and t 2 is the average repair time.
Further, the reliability P (D) calculation method is as follows:
where t is the platform runtime.
In this embodiment, the method for calculating the performance P (C) is as follows: calculating the efficiency between the devices according to the combat activities (investigation, communication, command and striking) completed by two adjacent devices in the killing chain, thereby obtaining the efficiency of the killing chain,
Wherein P ability is the killing chain efficiency; n is the number of equipment in the killing chain; (P INV)i,i+1 is the scout performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P COM)i,i+1 is the communication performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P DEC)i,i+1 is the command performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment), and (P ATT)i,i+1 is the striking performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment).
Further, (P INV)i,i+1 represents the scout efficiency between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment in a killing chain, represents the unidirectional interaction relation of the scout equipment i+1 to the enemy equipment i, is the process of acquiring the enemy equipment information by the enemy equipment, and the specific calculation mode is as follows:
(1) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a common target, and the radar detection adopts the Neman-Pearson criterion: the false alarm probability is constrained to a specified constant, so that the reconnaissance efficiency reaches the maximum, and when square law detection is adopted, the single reconnaissance efficiency P i calculation method is as follows:
Wherein BWA is radar beam width; AZR is radar scanning frequency; PRF is pulse repetition frequency; n is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; psi is the signal-to-noise ratio average of the N samples; i (·, ·) is a Pelson form of an incomplete gamma function, the radar maximum range can be expressed as R m;δ1 as the target node anti-radar coefficient, α as the environmental factor, and the selection manner is as follows:
because single scout is difficult to meet the combat requirement, multiple scouts are required, and the corresponding scout efficiency P (INV) calculation method is as follows:
Wherein N inv is the number of times of reconnaissance; p is a radar-like reconnaissance efficacy reference value.
(2) The radar type reconnaissance node detects the stealth target, when the reconnaissance target is the stealth target, the reconnaissance efficiency model can be obviously influenced, and the specific calculation method of P i is as follows:
Wherein N is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; s N is the signal to noise ratio; Θ is the radar cross-sectional area of the target; epsilon is the target node stealth coefficient.
(3) The radar-type scout node detects a target with a mask, and when the target has a mask, the radar maximum detection distance is affected as follows:
Wherein phi is a target node shading coefficient; epsilon k is the radar shielding angle; h g is the target height.
(4) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a target under the condition of being interfered, when the radar is interfered, taking the most commonly used interference foil strip in passive interference as an example, the maximum detection distance of the radar is affected as follows:
wherein lambda is the radar wavelength; The interference intensity is the target node; r 0 is the maximum detection distance of the radar without interference.
(5) The satellite type scout node detects the target, and when the scout equipment is a satellite, the scout efficiency calculation method is as follows.
Wherein k is the total number of target lots found by the scout satellites; n t is the total number of local attack targets; d i is the detection distance of the ith batch of targets; ID is the radius of the detection range of the satellite to the ground; h i is the height of the ith batch of target nodes; IH is the average value of the heights of the attack targets; p 1 is single detection probability, and p 0 is satellite type reconnaissance efficiency reference value; n s is the number of probing; delta 2 is the target node anti-satellite coefficient.
In this embodiment, P (COM) represents the success probability of communication, and a specific calculation method is as follows:
wherein n com is the number of communications, For the communication efficiency between the two nodes at the c-th time, the communication efficiency is represented by a communication transmission capacity p ij, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
Assuming that the front node and the rear node are S 1 and S 2 respectively, the communication interaction relationship of the two nodes can be according to the coverage d node, the transmission rate v node, the communication quality e node, the communication capacity Ca node and the information delay De node in the node communication modeling; the communication transmission capacity P (COM) consisting of five war technical indexes related to the communication capacity is calculated to obtain:
Wherein dis represents the relative distance between two nodes, wherein the communication quality between the two nodes can be calculated by the link budget P RX, and the specific algorithm is as follows:
Wherein P TX is the transmitting power of the transmitting antenna; g TX is the transmit gain of the transmit antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l FSPL is a signal free propagation loss model; c T is a correction factor under different environments; r is the distance between the receiving and transmitting antennas; f is the operating frequency of the transmitting antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l atm is the loss of antenna power in the atmosphere; l m is the loss of other various factors.
In the present embodiment, the communication capacity Ca is calculated as follows:
wherein m represents the number of channels, and B is the channel bandwidth; ρ i is the signal to noise ratio of the ith sub-channel; lambda i is the power gain of the ith sub-channel, and according to the definition of the self-information quantity, the modeling expression of the information transmission capacity P (COM) of the side representing the information sharing relation is as follows:
Where w i is the weight of each communication capability; r i (i=1, 2,3,4, 5) are membership functions of p i, respectively, and since p i is a quantitative indicator, it can be expressed as the following efficacy function:
Therefore, the information transmission capability of the S-S side is:
in this embodiment, P (DEC) represents the probability of success of the decision-making type finger control node finger control, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
Assuming that the command node is D 1 and the commanded node is S 1, the interaction relationship is represented by a command capability P (DEC), and a specific calculation method is as follows:
the information processing capability of D 1 is denoted as E 1, which is modeled with the self-information content:
Wherein R i is three indexes of information processing capacity: the modeling expression of the information transmission capability E 2 of the interaction relationship based on the modeling of the information transmission capability described above is that the response time T com, the throughput T hr, and the membership functions (i=1, 2, 3) of the accuracy Acc are:
Wherein,
An expression for such interaction modeling can be derived:
In this embodiment, P (ATT) represents the striking efficiency, and the striking equipment i and the target equipment j of the chain are classified into fire striking and electronic interference according to the striking type, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
(1) Fire hit relation, which mainly refers to the process of attacking enemy target T by destructive nodes in the network of our combat to make it completely or partially lose military or economic value. In general, the attacked enemy targets include enemy weapons such as airplanes, warships and tanks, and infrastructure such as work, shelter, airports, ports and transportation hubs, and the firepower striking is sometimes implemented on enemy army personnel, and the interactive relationship is characterized by the damage probability, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
first assume that the missile guidance error obeys a circular distribution law (σ x＝σy =σ).
The probability density of its scattering center not at the location of target j, i.e. its off-target quantity distribution, is as follows:
the target damage probability is as follows:
Then:
Through certain mathematical deductions, the approximate expression is as follows:
Where R 0 is the distance between the scattering center and the target position, σ is the covariance of the guidance error, R 0 is the weapon damage radius, P W is the threat level, R 0 is the self attribute of the weapon equipment, σ is a fixed value for a single weapon, R 0 is related to the distance between red and blue and the speed of the blue equipment, and the calculation mode of R 0 is established as follows:
r0＝rh·rv·rb (1-34)
r h、rv is a component of r 0 related to distance and speed, and r b is a radius of the guidance error. Given the upper and lower bounds h min≤reff≤hmax of the strike distance, the target node maneuver speed v tar is then compared to the weapon maneuver speed v node of the my strike node:
Where μ is the target node destruction coefficient, k is the tuning parameter, P W in (1-33) is related to the blue party threat ring, if the red party strike device is within multiple blue party device threat rings:
N W is the number of blue-side pieces of equipment that pose a threat to the current red-side batting equipment deployment location, The threat degree of the equipment for striking the red party for the ith blue party equipment is calculated as follows:
wherein alpha is an environmental factor; beta epsilon [1,10] is an integer weight coefficient to represent the importance degree of the target node; w is threat degree weight of the target node; r max is the maximum threat range of blue party equipment; r is the distance between blue equipment and red equipment.
(2) The electronic interference relationship mainly refers to the capability of effectively reducing or destroying the enemy target T by utilizing electronic equipment and performing battlefield reconnaissance, battle command, communication and other battle activities by utilizing various electronic equipment. Electronic interference can be divided into radar interference and communication interference. The radar interference related indexes mainly comprise: suppressing (interference rate) to enemy radar, effective suppressing (interference) time, enemy early warning reconnaissance distance drop ratio and the like. The technical indexes comprise antenna gain, interference power and the like. The main indicator related to communication interference is the error rate, and the factor of the main influence P (ATT) for calculating the error rate is the signal-to-noise ratio (inside the input end of the communication receiver and outside the input end of the communication receiver). The communication interference capability may also be measured in terms of a suppression rate (suppression coefficient). Modeling of the electronic interference capability possessed by the hit node abstracted from the electronic interference relationship considers, on the one hand, the suppression rate and, on the other hand, whether the enemy target T is within the interference range of the my hit node a:
Wherein D rat is interference power of an interference type striking node; mu is the survivability coefficient of the target node; p Accept and accept is the received power of the target node; v wea2 is the maneuvering speed of the interference type striking node; τ is the early warning time of the target node; v tar is the maneuver speed of the target node; d r is the interference radius of the interference type hit node.
In this embodiment, the kill chain closing time represents a measure of the time that all kill chains (kill nets) are closed. The closing time calculating method comprises the following steps:
T＝T1+T2+T3 (2-1)
Wherein T 1 is a scout time; t 2 is decision time; t 3 is the striking time.
The reconnaissance time calculation method comprises the following steps: t 1＝tXF+n*tscan (2-2)
Wherein t XF is the maximum reaction time of the system equipment; n is the number of radar sweeps; t scan is the radar scan interval. Generally, the scout time is mainly information processing fusion time, and in practical application, the scout time is directly given.
Further, the decision time calculation method comprises the following steps:
Wherein t c is the time taken for the finger control decision; n is the number of equipment on the killing chain; t i is the time taken to kill communication between the chain' S neighboring equipment, and in calculating the decision time, the decision time required for each level of command needs to be preset to be t i (i=1, 2, S), S is the number of command posts. So the decision time calculation method is
In calculating the striking time, it is necessary to consider the striking equipment preparation start time t 1 ', the time t' 2 when the striking equipment is maneuvered to the striking position, the striking equipment firing time t '3, and the flight time t' 4, in whichR m is the distance between the percussion device deployment location and the target, v wea1 is the velocity of movement of the percussion device firing weapon.
In this embodiment, firstly, according to the above known information, the interaction relation calculation efficiency of each link on the chain is needed to calculate the closing probability of the killing chain, firstly, the scout efficiency P (INV) is calculated, and firstly, the types of the target node and the scout node are determined, for example: the method comprises the steps of calculating single scout efficiency according to a scout equipment carrying equipment capability attribute parameter (such as BWA radar beam width, AZR radar scanning frequency, PRF pulse repetition frequency and the like) brought into a formula (1-4), calculating probability corresponding to multiple scouts according to a calculation result and an actual condition considered formula (1-5), and respectively bringing the scout equipment carrying equipment capability attribute parameter into formulas (1-6) to (1-9) when different conditions exist between the scout equipment and a target node, wherein the number of times of repeated scout of each chain after calculation is finished so as to facilitate calculation of the closing time of a killing chain.
Further, the communication efficiency P (COM) is calculated, the basic communication capacity of the node is calculated according to the formulas (1-11) to (1-15), if the communication quality and the communication capacity cannot be provided by the known data, the communication quality and the communication capacity are calculated according to the formulas (1-16) and (1-17), and then the calculated basic communication capacity is aggregated according to the formulas (1-18) to (1-20) to obtain the communication efficiency.
Still further, the command efficiency P (DEC) is calculated, and is calculated according to formulas (1-21) to (1-29), and the precondition of this calculation is that the battlefield environment is considered as a multi-level command environment, that is, a plurality of command nodes exist, and the command nodes are divided into a plurality of levels, each level is connected according to a command relationship, and if the multi-level command structure is not considered in the modeling process, the probability can be set optionally.
Further, the striking efficiency P (ATT) is calculated, firstly, the type of the striking node is judged, and if the striking node is electronic interference type, the striking node is directly calculated according to formulas (1-39) to (1-41); if the node is a fire striking type node, traversing the enemy node according to the formulas (1-37) and (1-38), calculating the threat degree of the striking node, carrying the result into the formulas (1-30) to (1-36) to calculate the striking efficiency, finally, combining the calculation results, carrying the calculation results into the formulas (1-1) to (1-3) to obtain the closing probability of the killing chain, calculating the closing time of the killing chain, taking the number of times of reconnaissance into consideration, carrying the basic capability information of each node on the killing chain into the formulas (2-1) to (2-5), calculating all the initially generated killing chains according to the calculation steps, designing a screening rule, screening according to a certain closing probability and a closing time threshold, obtaining the screening result which is an effective killing chain, if the screening result does not meet the requirement, indicating that the battlefield deployment condition is poor, the target cannot form the effective fight force, and the closing performance cannot be calculated, and the deployment condition needs to be considered to be optimized, and the screening condition is required to obtain the result, and the result is obtained after the effective killing chain is screened, the effective killing chain is obtained, the initial killing chain, and the initial killing chain is generated.
The foregoing is a further elaboration of the present invention in connection with the detailed description, and it is not intended that the invention be limited to the specific embodiments shown, but rather that a number of simple deductions or substitutions be made by one of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the spirit of the invention, should be considered as falling within the scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1. The killing chain closure evaluation method based on the equipment system model is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
Step S1, calculating the closing probability of a killing chain according to known information, wherein the interaction relation of each link on the chain is required to be calculated, and the reconnaissance efficiency P (INV) is calculated firstly;
step S2, calculating communication efficiency P (COM);
Step S3, calculating command efficiency P (DEC);
step S4, calculating the striking efficiency P (ATT);
S5, calculating the closing time of the killing chain;
Step S6, calculating all initially generated killing chains according to the calculation results, designing screening rules, and screening according to a certain closing probability and a closing time threshold value, wherein the obtained screening result is the effective killing chain;
Step S7, after screening to obtain effective killing chains, the collection of the effective killing chains forms a killing network of the combat network;
Each link of the killing chain successfully realizes the function of the part, which is called closing of the killing chain; establishing a killing chain closure probability index P, wherein P=P (A) & P (D) & P (C) based on an ADC ring model; wherein the method comprises the steps of
The availability P (A) calculation method is as follows:
wherein t 1 is the average failure time, t 2 is the average repair time, and the reliability P (D) is calculated as follows:
Wherein t is the platform running time, and the efficiency P (C) calculating method is as follows: calculating the efficiency between the equipment according to the combat activities completed by two adjacent equipment in the killing chain, thereby obtaining the efficiency of the killing chain,
Wherein n is the number of devices in the killing chain; (P INV)i,i+1 is the scout performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P COM)i,i+1 is the communication performance between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, (P DEC)i,i+1 is the finger control performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment, and (P ATT)i,i+1) is the striking performance between the (i) th equipment and the (i+1) th equipment;
The (P INV)i,i+1 represents the scout efficiency between the ith equipment and the (i+1) th equipment in a killing chain, represents the unidirectional interaction relation of the scout equipment i+1 to the enemy equipment i, is the process that the enemy equipment acquires the enemy equipment information, and the specific calculation mode is as follows:
(1) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a common target, and the radar detection adopts the Neman-Pearson criterion: the false alarm probability is constrained to a specified constant, so that the reconnaissance efficiency reaches the maximum, and when square law detection is adopted, the single reconnaissance efficiency P i calculation method is as follows:
Wherein BWA is radar beam width; AZR is radar scanning frequency; PRF is pulse repetition frequency; n is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; psi is the signal-to-noise ratio average of the N samples; i (·, ·) is a Pelson form of an incomplete gamma function, the radar maximum range can be expressed as R max;δ1 as the target node anti-radar coefficient, α as the environmental factor, and the selection manner is as follows:
because single scout is difficult to meet the combat requirement, multiple scouts are required, and the corresponding scout efficiency P (INV) calculation method is as follows:
Wherein N inv is the number of times of reconnaissance; p is a radar class reconnaissance efficiency reference value;
(2) The radar type reconnaissance node detects the stealth target, when the reconnaissance target is the stealth target, the reconnaissance efficiency model can be obviously influenced, and the specific calculation method of P i is as follows:
Wherein N is the radar pulse accumulation number; thr is the detection threshold; s N is the signal to noise ratio; Θ is the radar cross-sectional area of the target; epsilon is the stealth coefficient of the target node;
(3) The radar-type scout node detects a target with a mask, and when the target has a mask, the radar maximum detection distance is affected as follows:
Wherein phi is a target node shading coefficient; epsilon k is the radar shielding angle; h g is the target height;
(4) The radar type reconnaissance node detects a target under the condition of being interfered, when the radar is interfered, taking the most commonly used interference foil strip in passive interference as an example, the maximum detection distance of the radar is affected as follows:
wherein lambda is the radar wavelength; The interference intensity is the target node; r 0 is the maximum detection distance of the radar without interference;
(5) The satellite type scout node detects the target, and when the scout equipment is a satellite, the scout efficiency calculation method is as follows,
Wherein k is the total number of target lots found by the scout satellites; n t is the total number of local attack targets; d i is the detection distance of the ith batch of targets; ID is the radius of the detection range of the satellite to the ground; h i is the height of the ith batch of target nodes; IH is the average value of the heights of the attack targets; p 1 is single detection probability, and p 0 is satellite type reconnaissance efficiency reference value; n s is the number of probing; delta 2 is the target node anti-satellite system;
the P (COM) represents the success probability of communication, and the specific calculation method is as follows:
wherein n com is the number of communications, For the communication efficiency between the two nodes at the c-th time, the communication efficiency is represented by a communication transmission capacity p ij;
The specific calculation method of the communication transmission capability p ij is as follows,
Assuming that the front and rear nodes are S 1 and S 2 respectively, the communication interaction relationship of the two nodes can be calculated according to a coverage d node, a transmission rate v c node, a communication quality e c node, a communication capacity Ca c node and an information delay De c node in node communication modeling, where the communication transmission capacity P (COM) is formed by war indexes related to five communication capacities:
Wherein dis represents the relative distance between two nodes, wherein the communication quality between the two nodes can be calculated by the link budget P RX, and the specific algorithm is as follows:
Wherein P TX is the transmitting power of the transmitting antenna; g TX is the transmit gain of the transmit antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l FSPL is a signal free propagation loss model; c T is a correction factor under different environments; r is the distance between the receiving and transmitting antennas; f is the operating frequency of the transmitting antenna; g RX is the reception gain of the reception antenna; l atm is the loss of antenna power in the atmosphere; l m is the loss of other various factors, and the communication capacity Ca c is calculated as follows:
wherein m represents the number of channels, and B is the channel bandwidth; ρ i is the signal to noise ratio of the ith sub-channel; lambda i is the power gain of the ith sub-channel, and according to the definition of the self-information quantity, the modeling expression of the information transmission capacity P (COM) of the side representing the information sharing relation is as follows:
Where w i is the weight of each communication capability; r i (i=1, 2,3,4, 5) are membership functions of p i, respectively, and since p i is a quantitative indicator, it can be expressed as the following function of efficacy,
Therefore, the information transmission capability of the S-S side is:
the P (DEC) represents the success probability of decision-making type command node command, the specific calculation method is as follows,
Assuming that the command node is D 1 and the commanded node is S 1, the interaction relationship is represented by a command capability P (DEC), and a specific calculation method is as follows:
The information processing capability of D 1 is denoted as E 1, which is modeled with the self-information content:
Wherein R i is three indexes of information processing capacity: the modeling expression of the response time T com, the throughput T hr, the membership functions (i=1, 2, 3) of the accuracy Acc, and the information transmission capability E 2 of the interaction relationship is:
Wherein,
The expression for such interaction modeling follows:
p (ATT) represents striking efficiency, and is classified into fire striking and electronic interference according to the striking equipment i and the target equipment j of the chain, according to the striking type, by the following calculation method,
(1) The calculation process of the fire striking relation comprises the following steps: let the missile guidance error obey a circular distribution law (σ x＝σy =σ), its scattering center is not at the location of the target j, i.e. its probability density of off-target quantity distribution is as follows:
the target damage probability is as follows:
Then:
The approximate expression is as follows:
Where R 0 is the distance between the scattering center and the target position, σ is the covariance of the guidance error, R 0 is the weapon damage radius, P W is the threat level, R 0 is the attribute of the weapon equipment, σ is a fixed value for a single weapon, R 0 itself is related to the distance between red and blue and the speed of the blue equipment, and the calculation mode of R 0 is established as follows:
r0＝rh·rv·rb (1-34)
Where r h、rv is a component of r 0 relative distance and velocity, r b is a radius of the guidance error, giving an upper and lower bound h min≤reff≤hmax of the strike distance, the target node maneuver velocity v tar is equal to the weapon maneuver velocity v node of the my strike node,
Where μ is the target node destruction coefficient, k is the tuning parameter, P W in (1-33) is related to the blue party threat ring, if the red party strike device is within multiple blue party device threat rings:
N W is the number of blue-side pieces of equipment that pose a threat to the current red-side batting equipment deployment location, The threat degree of the equipment for striking the red party for the ith blue party equipment is calculated as follows:
Wherein alpha is an environmental factor; beta epsilon [1,10] is an integer weight coefficient to represent the importance degree of the target node; w is threat degree weight of the target node; r' max is the maximum threat range of blue party equipment; r' is the distance between blue equipment and red equipment;
(2) The electronic interference relation calculation process is to consider whether the enemy target T is in the interference range of the my striking node A:
Wherein D rat is interference power of an interference type striking node; mu is the survivability coefficient of the target node; p Accept and accept is the received power of the target node; v wea2 is the maneuvering speed of the interference type striking node; τ is the early warning time of the target node; v tar is the maneuver speed of the target node; d r is the interference radius of the interference type hit node.
2. The method for estimating the closure of a killing chain based on an equipment system model according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the kill chain closure time represents a measure of time for all kill chains to close, closure time calculation method:
T＝T1+T2+T3 (2-1)
Wherein T 1 is a scout time; t 2 is decision time; t 3 is the striking time, and the reconnaissance time calculating method comprises the following steps:
T1＝tXF+np*tscan (2-2)
Wherein t XF is the maximum reaction time of the system equipment; n p is the number of radar scans; t scan is radar scanning interval, and the decision time calculation method comprises the following steps:
Wherein t c is the time taken for the finger control decision; n is the number of equipment on the killing chain; t i is the time spent for communication between adjacent equipment of the killing chain, when the decision time is calculated, the decision time required by each level of command needs to be preset to be t i (i=1, 2,..once, S), S is the number of command posts, and the decision time calculation method is as follows
In calculating the striking time, it is necessary to consider the striking equipment preparation start time t '1, the time t' 2 when the striking equipment is maneuvered to the striking position, the striking equipment firing time t '3, and the flight time t' 4, whereinR m is the distance between the percussion device deployment position and the target, v wea is the velocity of movement of the percussion device firing weapon.
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