CN114697038B - A quantum attack-resistant electronic signature method and system - Google Patents
A quantum attack-resistant electronic signature method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN114697038B CN114697038B CN202011636196.5A CN202011636196A CN114697038B CN 114697038 B CN114697038 B CN 114697038B CN 202011636196 A CN202011636196 A CN 202011636196A CN 114697038 B CN114697038 B CN 114697038B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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Abstract
The invention provides an electronic signature method and a system for resisting quantum attack, which are used for acquiring a signature application, carrying out identity verification on an application signer, receiving through electronic seal information and a document to be signed, generating electronic signature document information, calculating ciphertext and a message authentication code of the electronic signature document information by using a shared key, feeding back the corresponding ciphertext and the message authentication code to the application signer for decryption to obtain a document, calculating a message abstract of the electronic signature document information, calculating the authentication code of the message abstract by using another shared key, delivering the message abstract and the authentication code to a third party for verification, waiting for a verification result of the third party, and comparing the document and the message abstract by the third party, and obtaining the electronic signature information after symmetric key digital signature by the third party by the application signer when the verification result and the comparison result are passed.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of encryption communication of quantum cryptography networks, and particularly relates to an electronic signature method and an electronic signature system for resisting quantum attack.
Background
The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present disclosure and may not necessarily constitute prior art.
With the rapid development of information technology, electronic signature has been developed to improve the reliability and convenience of information on the internet. The electronic signature is not a digital image of the written signature seal, it exists in the form of an electronic code. By utilizing the electronic signature, a receiver can transmit a file through a network, can easily verify the identity and signature of a sender, and can verify whether the original text of the file changes in the transmission process. The electronic signature is beneficial to identifying the identity of a signer of the electronic file, guaranteeing the integrity of the file and guaranteeing the authenticity, reliability and non-repudiation of the file.
At present, the electronic signature is mainly PKI technology, but the asymmetric key encryption algorithm adopted by the PKI technology is computationally secure. In the face of research and construction of foreseeable quantum computers, a cryptographic system based on computational complexity is unsafe, and has high potential safety hazards.
According to the inventor, some researchers want to improve the above problems, but in the current improvement method, more complex signature or encryption methods are adopted, for example, patent literature of CN109560935A provides a signature method and a signature system for quantum-resistant computation based on a public asymmetric key pool, a public quantum-resistant computation public key generated by combining a public seal key with an asymmetric key pool in a key fob is utilized, the public seal key is hidden by disclosing the public quantum-resistant computation public key, so as to realize quantum-resistant computation characteristics of electronic signature, but in the signature encryption method provided by the public seal public key, RSA signature is used for 1 time, symmetric encryption is used for 1 time, and RSA encryption is used for 1 time, and the computation amount is about 2 times of that of a common RSA signature method. Similarly, the calculation amount during decryption and signature verification is about 2 times that of a common verification mode, and the calculation amount involved in signature and verification is large, so that the communication data amount and efficiency are affected.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the problems, the invention provides an electronic signature method and an electronic signature system for resisting quantum attack.
According to some embodiments, the present invention employs the following technical solutions:
An electronic signature method for resisting quantum attack, comprising the following steps:
Acquiring a signature application, and carrying out identity verification on a person applying the signature;
Receiving the electronic seal ID information of the applicant passing the identity verification and the encrypted document to be signed, checking the authority of the applicant signer, generating electronic seal document information matched with the authority, calculating ciphertext and a message authentication code of the electronic seal document information by using a shared key, and feeding back the corresponding ciphertext and the message authentication code to the applicant for decryption to obtain the document;
And calculating a message digest of the electronic signature document information, calculating an authentication code of the message digest by using another shared key, transmitting the message digest and the authentication code to a third party for verification, waiting for a verification result of the third party and a comparison result of the third party on the document and the message digest, and when the verification result and the comparison result are passed, enabling a signer to obtain the electronic signature information after the third party performs symmetric key digital signature.
As an alternative embodiment, before acquiring the signature application and authenticating the signer of the application, the signer of the application needs to perform registration authentication, and after the authentication is passed, the shared key is distributed to the signer of the application for subsequent encrypted communication.
As an alternative embodiment, the specific process of acquiring the signature application and performing identity verification on the application signer includes:
sending a random number r1 to a signer of the application;
receiving a message authentication code which is calculated by a signer applying for the signature and uses an unused shared secret key K with the sequence number n and is related to the signer applying for the signature ID, the random number r1, the sequence number n and the shared secret key K, and receiving the sequence number n and the random number r2;
Reading a shared secret key K with a serial number n shared with a signer, verifying the correctness of the message authentication code, if the message authentication code is correct, calculating the message authentication code related to r1, r2, the serial number n and the secret key K, sending the message authentication code to the signer, waiting for a verification result, and if the verification is passed, marking the shared secret key with the serial number n as used.
In an alternative embodiment, the process of generating the electronic signature document information matched with the authority comprises the steps of packaging the electronic signature information and the application signer information into electronic signature data, and capping the electronic signature data to a document to generate the electronic signature document information.
Alternatively, the specific process of the third party performing the symmetric key digital signature includes calculating a message authentication code of signature information using an unused key as a symmetric key digital signature of the electronic signature document information, the symmetric key digital signature being related to the electronic signature document information, the time at that time, the sequence number of the used signature key, and the key used for the digital signature.
As an alternative embodiment, multiple keys are distributed once according to the length of the shared key used each time, and the shared key is divided and numbered in a synchronous sequence;
When the shared key is almost used, the two sides of the shared key use unused shared keys to carry out identity authentication, the shared keys are redistributed by utilizing the quantum cryptography network, the newly distributed shared keys use the same unused shared keys distributed last time to encrypt one by one, the serial numbers are stored in a resynchronization mode, and all the shared keys distributed last time are deleted.
An electronic signature system resistant to quantum attack, comprising:
The client device is configured to issue a signature application of a signer, acquire a verification identity result, perform identity verification on the electronic signature server, send an electronic seal ID and encrypt a document to be signed, verify the identity of the electronic signature server by using a message authentication code, decrypt the electronic signature information sent by the electronic signature server and verify the correctness if the electronic signature information is correct, calculate a ciphertext and an authentication code of the electronic signature document information by using a shared key with a trusted center if the electronic signature information is correct, send the ciphertext and the authentication code to the trusted center, and receive a final signature document;
The electronic signature server is configured to verify the identity of the application signer, audit the authority of the application signer, package the received application signer information and the electronic seal information to generate electronic signature data, cover the electronic signature data on a document to generate electronic signature document information, send ciphertext and authentication code of the electronic signature document information to the client device, calculate a message abstract and authentication code of the electronic signature document information and send the message abstract and authentication code to the trusted center;
And the trusted center is configured to verify the identity of the electronic signature server by using the authentication code of the electronic signature document information, if the authentication is correct, save the message digest, receive the electronic signature document information of a correct application signer, calculate the message digest of the electronic signature document information, compare the message digest with the stored message digest, digitally sign the electronic signature document information by using a symmetric key if the message digest is the same, generate the electronic signature information, encrypt and send the electronic signature information to corresponding client equipment.
As an alternative implementation manner, the trusted center is a third party organization and is located at the quantum cryptography network terminal, and is provided with a true random number digital signature key library, wherein keys in the true random number digital signature key library are divided according to the length used by each digital signature and have different numbers.
As an alternative embodiment, the electronic signature server stores electronic seal file information, electronic seals, and user authority information of the electronic seals.
As an alternative implementation mode, the process of comparing the document and the message digest by the trusted center comprises the steps of calculating the message digest of the electronic signature document information sent by the client device, comparing the message digest with the received message digest of the electronic signature document information sent by the electronic signature server, and carrying out symmetric digital signature on the electronic signature document information if the message digest is consistent with the received message digest of the electronic signature document information.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention has less integral encryption times and can reduce the calculation complexity in the whole signing process.
The invention establishes the electronic signature server, the electronic signature server manages the electronic seal information of the electronic signature user, the electronic signer firstly generates the electronic signature file information through the electronic signature server, and the electronic signature file information is returned to the electronic signer, so that the electronic signer can conveniently check whether the electronic signature file has errors or problems.
The invention sets the trusted center, configures the message abstract of the electronic signature file sent by the electronic signature server by the trusted center, and simultaneously receives the electronic signature file generated by the electronic signature server and sent by the electronic signer, and ensures that the electronic signature file to be signed is a real electronic signature file processed by the electronic signature server by comparing the hash operation result of the electronic signature file with the hash operation result of the electronic signature file, thereby ensuring the authenticity and the reliability of the file.
The trusted center provided by the invention has the characteristic of quantum attack resistance based on a symmetric key algorithm in signing, fundamentally eliminates the defect that the security of the traditional electronic signature algorithm based on PKI is based on computational security, has lower computational complexity, and can realize unconditional security.
The operation of the key related message authentication code realizes the message binding of the signature document, the electronic seal and the signer ID, and ensures the non-repudiation of the electronic signature message.
In order to make the above objects, features and advantages of the present invention more comprehensible, preferred embodiments accompanied with figures are described in detail below.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the invention.
FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram of a first embodiment;
fig. 2 is a flow chart of a second embodiment.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further described with reference to the drawings and examples.
It should be noted that the following detailed description is illustrative and is intended to provide further explanation of the invention. Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs.
It is noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of exemplary embodiments according to the present invention. As used herein, the singular is also intended to include the plural unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, and furthermore, it is to be understood that the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising" when used in this specification are taken to specify the presence of stated features, steps, operations, devices, components, and/or combinations thereof.
Embodiment one:
the embodiment provides an electronic signature system for resisting quantum attack, which relies on a quantum cryptography network to enrich symmetric key resources, and is particularly shown in fig. 1.
The whole system comprises a trusted center, an electronic signature server and a signature applying person (terminal equipment), and the functions of the components of the system are detailed as follows:
The trusted center is a trusted third party organization and is positioned at the quantum cryptography network terminal, and the trusted center is provided with a true random digital signature key library (hereinafter referred to as a signature key library) for digital signature of the electronic signature data. Dividing the keys of the key library according to the length used by each digital signature, and numbering the divided keys sequentially. The trust center saves each key used for signing and its number until the signing validity period of that key expires. The trusted center can increase the number of signing keys of the key store according to the signing requirements.
The electronic signature server is arranged at the quantum cryptography network terminal and is used for storing the electronic seal, auditing the authority of the application signer, generating signature information, sending the signature information to the trusted center for digital signature and storing the signature record of the application signer. The electronic signature server registers with a trusted center, and after the trusted center verifies the identity of the electronic signature server, a certain number of shared keys are distributed to the electronic signature server through a quantum cryptography network. The trusted center and the electronic signature server divide the shared secret key according to the length of each secret key used and synchronize sequence numbers, the shared secret key is safely stored by the trusted center and the electronic signature server, and the shared secret key is used for identity authentication when the electronic signature server communicates with the trusted center and encrypted communication with the trusted center.
The electronic signature server stores electronic seal information including electronic seal file information, user of the electronic seal and authority information of the user, and the electronic seal information can be stored in the electronic signature server database.
The signer applying for the signature is a person with the authority of the electronic signature and can realize the electronic signature on the electronic document through the electronic signature server. In the specific implementation, the implementation is performed by the terminal device, and in order to make it clear to those skilled in the art, in this embodiment, the application signer is used for description.
The signer registers with the electronic signature server, the electronic signature server is permitted to register after verifying the identity of the signer, the registration information of the signer is saved, and a certain number of shared secret keys are distributed to the signer through the quantum cryptography network. The signer and the electronic signature server respectively divide the shared secret key according to the length of the secret key used each time and synchronize sequence numbers, the signer and the electronic signature server respectively store the shared secret key safely, and the shared secret key is used for identity authentication and encrypted communication with a trusted center when the signer and the electronic signature server are applied for communication.
The signer applies for registration to the trusted center according to the same registration information (including registration ID) registered to the electronic signature server, applies for the same registration ID, and after the trusted center verifies the identity, the signer is permitted to register, the registration information is saved, and a certain number of shared keys are distributed to the signer through the quantum cryptography network. The signer and the trusted center respectively divide the shared secret key according to the length of each used secret key and synchronize sequence numbers, the signer and the trusted center respectively store the shared secret key safely, and the shared secret key is used for identity authentication and encrypted communication with the trusted center when the signer and the trusted center are applied for communication.
The electronic signature process is divided into three parts of signature making, signature and signature checking.
The seal making process of the embodiment is assisted by the electronic signature server. The electronic signature server can configure an administrator to put electronic seal information, application signer information and authority information to be used for electronic signature into a database of the electronic signature server in advance.
The electronic seal information mainly comprises an electronic seal ID and electronic file information of the electronic seal. The signer information mainly comprises the ID of the signer applying for each electronic seal with signature authority and the signature timeliness of each ID. When the identity information of the signer is confirmed and has the signing authority, the electronic signature server packages the electronic seal information and the signer information into electronic signature data, and adds the electronic signature data to a document needing electronic signature to generate electronic signature document information.
Embodiment two:
based on the system of the first embodiment, a signature process shown in fig. 2 is provided, which is described in detail as follows:
the signer initiates a signature application to the electronic signature server by using the registration ID, and the electronic signature server and the signer perform identity verification by using the shared secret key.
The authentication process is as follows:
After receiving the signature application request, the electronic signature server sends a random number r1 to a signer applying for signature;
The signer of the application receives r1, unused shares with sequence number n the key K calculates HMAC (r1||sid||n; K), wherein SID is the application signer ID, ||represents data connection operation;
The signer selects a random number r2, and sends r2, n and HMAC (r 1I SID I n; K) to the electronic signature server;
the electronic signature server reads a shared secret key K with a serial number n shared with a signer, verifies the correctness of the HMAC (r1|SID|n; K), calculates the HMAC (r1|r2|n; K) if the HMAC is correct, and sends the HMAC to the signer;
The signer verifies the correctness of the HMAC (r1|r2|n; K), if the HMAC is correct, the identity verification of the two parties is successful, and the two parties label the shared secret key with the sequence number n as used.
After verification is successful, the signer sends the electronic seal ID to be used by the signature to the electronic signature server, and simultaneously sends the electronic document needing the electronic signature to the electronic signature server by using the shared key encryption. The electronic signature server examines the signature authority of the signer, if the authority is satisfied, the electronic signature server decrypts the electronic document needing the electronic signature, packages the electronic seal information and the signer information into electronic signature data, and adds the electronic signature data to the document to generate electronic signature document information.
The electronic signature server encrypts the electronic signature document information by using an unused shared key of the electronic signature server and an application signer, and simultaneously generates a hash operation message authentication code related to a key of the electronic signature document information ciphertext by using the shared key, and sends the ciphertext and the message authentication code thereof to the application signer. The specific calculation mode of the message authentication code is as follows:
HMAC(E(I,Kn1)||n1||n2;Kn2),
Wherein I is electronic signature document information, i=i f||Is||SID(If is electronic document information requiring electronic signature, I s is electronic seal information, SID is electronic signer ID), K n1 and K n2 are keys shared by the electronic signature servers with sequence numbers n1 and n2 and the signer, E (I, K n1) represents ciphertext generated by encrypting I using key K n1, HMAC (E (I, K n1)||n1||n2;Kn2) represents a key-dependent hash message authentication code of E (I, K n1) n1 n2 generated using key K n2. The electronic signature server sends E (I, K n1), n1, n2, and HMAC (E (I, K n1)||n1||n2;Kn2) to the applicant signer.
The electronic signature server calculates a message digest of the electronic signature document information, calculates a hash operation message authentication code related to a key of the message digest of the electronic signature document information by using an unused shared key of the electronic signature server and the trusted center, and sends the message digest and the message authentication code thereof to the trusted center. The message digest and the message authentication code calculation method are as follows:
message digest md=hash (I), I is electronic signature document information;
Message authentication code mac=hmac (md|sid; K n),Kn is a shared key with unused sequence number n of the electronic signature server and the trusted center, SID is the application signer ID. electronic signature server sending SID, MD and MAC to the trusted center.
After receiving the data E (I, K n1), n1, n2 and HMAC (E (I, K n1)||n1||n2;Kn2) sent by the electronic signature server, the signer first reads the secret key K n2 shared by the signer with the serial number n2 and the electronic signature server, if K n2 is used, the authentication fails, the data sent by the electronic signature server is refused to be accepted, otherwise, K n2 is used for verifying the correctness of the HMAC (E (I, K n1)||n1||n2;Kn2), if verification is correct, the secret key K n2 is marked as used, the secret key K n1 with the serial number n1 is read, if K n1 is used, the secret key E (I, K n1) is refused to be accepted, otherwise, the secret key E (I, K n1) is decrypted by using K n1, the electronic signature document information I is obtained, and K n1 is marked as used.
The signer verifies the correctness of the I, if the I has errors, the electronic signature server is reapplied with the electronic signature, otherwise, the signer encrypts the electronic signature document information by using a secret key shared with the trusted center and calculates a hash operation message authentication code related to the secret key of the ciphertext of the electronic signature document information by using the shared secret key, and the signer sends the ciphertext and the message authentication code thereof to the trusted center. The message authentication code is calculated as follows:
HMAC(E(I,Km1)||SID||m1||m2;Km2),
where I is electronic signature document information, i=i f||Is||SID(If is electronic document information requiring electronic signature, I s is electronic seal information, SID is electronic signer ID), K n1 and K n2 are unused keys shared by the signers with sequence numbers m1 and m2 and the trusted center, respectively, E (I, K m1) represents ciphertext generated by encrypting I using key K m1, and HMAC (E (I, K m1)||SID||m1||m2;Km2) represents a hash message authentication code related to a key generated by using key K m2, E (I, K m1) SID m 1m 2. The application signer sends E (I, K m1), SIDs, m1, m2, and HMAC (E (I, K m1)||SID||m1||m2;Km2) to the trust center.
After receiving the message digest of the electronic signature document information sent by the electronic signature server and the message authentication code MD and MAC (HMAC (MD|SID; K n)), the trusted center reads a secret key K n with a serial number n shared by an application signer with the ID of SID and the trusted center, if K n is used, the data sent by the electronic signature server is refused to be accepted, otherwise, K n is used for verifying the correctness of the MAC (HMAC (MD|SID; K n)), if the message digest of the electronic signature document information is correct, and if the message digest of the electronic signature document information is correct, the trusted center temporarily saves the message digest MD, otherwise, refuses to accept and save the MD.
The trusted center receives the data E (I, K m1), SID, m1, and the like sent by the signer, After m2 and HMAC (E (I, K m1)||SID||m1||m2;Km2), first, the secret key K m2 shared by the trusted center with serial number m2 and the application signer with ID SID is read, if K m2 is used, the authentication fails, the data sent by the application signer is refused to be accepted, otherwise, K m2 is used to verify the correctness of HMAC (E (I, K m1)||SID||m1||m2;Km2). If the verification is correct, the key K m2 is marked as used, the key K m1 with the sequence number of m1 is read, if K m1 is used, the ciphertext E (I, K m1) is refused to be accepted, otherwise, the ciphertext E (I, K m1) is decrypted by using K m1, the electronic signature document information I is obtained, and K m1 is marked as used. The trusted center calculates a message abstract of the electronic signature document information I, the MD sent by the electronic signature server performs data comparison, if the MD is inconsistent, the electronic signature document information I is refused to be digitally signed, otherwise, the trusted center reads a key K SN with the unused sequence number SN in a signature key library, calculates an HMAC code of the electronic signature document information I as a symmetric key digital signature of the electronic signature document information by using the key K SN, and the calculation formula is as follows:
Ds=HMAC(I||T||SN,KSN),
wherein I is electronic signature document information, T is time at that time, SN is sequence number of a used signature key, K SN is a key for digital signature, and I represents data connection operation.
The trusted center encrypts and sends the I & lt & gtT & lt & gtDs & lt & gt SN as electronic signature information of the document to an application signer, and marks the encryption key as used. The signer applies for decrypting the electronic signature information of the obtained document, and marks the decryption key as used.
The distribution of the shared key can distribute a plurality of keys at a time according to the length of the shared key used each time, and the shared key is divided and numbered in a synchronous sequence. When the shared key is almost used, the two sides of the shared key use unused shared keys to carry out identity authentication, the shared keys are redistributed by utilizing the quantum cryptography network, the newly distributed shared keys use the same unused shared keys distributed last time to encrypt one by one, the serial numbers are stored in a resynchronization mode, and all the shared keys distributed last time are deleted. Encrypting the new key using the old key facilitates transferring the identity message carried by the old key to the new encryption key.
Any recipient who has the electronic signature information of the document can encrypt and send the electronic signature information to a trusted center to verify the legitimacy of the electronic signature. The trusted center extracts a key K SN with the sequence number of SN from the key store, calculates HMAC (I T SN, K SN), compares whether the value of the key is equal to Ds, and if so, the electronic signature is correct, otherwise, the electronic signature is incorrect.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, but various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
While the foregoing description of the embodiments of the present invention has been presented in conjunction with the drawings, it should be understood that it is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, but rather, it is intended to cover all modifications or variations within the scope of the invention as defined by the claims of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. An electronic signature method for resisting quantum attack is characterized by comprising the following steps:
The electronic signature server acquires a signature application and performs identity verification on a person applying the signature;
Receiving electronic seal ID information of an application signer passing identity verification and an encrypted document to be signed, checking authority of the application signer, generating electronic seal document information matched with the authority, generating ciphertext and a message authentication code of the electronic seal document information by using a shared key of the application signer, and feeding back the corresponding ciphertext and the message authentication code to the application signer for decryption to obtain the document;
And the authentication code of the message digest is calculated by using another shared key with the trusted center, the trusted center is a third party organization, the message digest and the authentication code are submitted to the third party organization for verification, the verification result of the third party organization is waited, the ciphertext of the electronic signature document information sent by a signer is decrypted by the third party organization to obtain the electronic signature document information, the message digest of the electronic signature document information is calculated, and a comparison result obtained by data comparison is carried out on the message digest sent by the electronic signature server, and when the verification result and the comparison result are passed, the signer can obtain the electronic signature information after the third party organization carries out symmetric key digital signature.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the signer needs to register and verify before obtaining the signature application and verifying the identity of the applicant, and the signer distributes the shared key to the signer for subsequent encrypted communication after the verification.
3. The electronic signature method for resisting quantum attack as set forth in claim 1, wherein the electronic signature server obtains a signature application, and the specific process of authenticating the applicant comprises the following steps:
the electronic signature server sends a random number r1 to a signer;
Receiving a message authentication code which is calculated by a signer applying for the signature and uses an unused shared secret key K with the sequence number n and is related to the signer applying for the signature ID, the random number r1, the sequence number n and the shared secret key K, and receiving the sequence number n and the random number r2; specifically, the signer receives the random number r1, HMAC (r1||sid|||n is calculated using the unused shared key K with sequence number n; K), wherein SID is an application signer ID, and I represents data connection operation, the application signer selects a random number r2, and r2, n and HMAC (r1I SID I n; K) are sent to an electronic signature server;
Reading a shared secret key K with a serial number n shared with a signer, verifying the correctness of the message authentication code, if the message authentication code is correct, calculating the message authentication code related to r1, r2, the serial number n and the secret key K, sending the message authentication code to the signer, waiting for a verification result, and if the verification is passed, marking the shared secret key with the serial number n as used.
4. The method for electronic signature against quantum attack as set forth in claim 1, wherein the step of generating the electronic signature document information matching the authority comprises packaging the electronic signature information and the application signer information into electronic signature data, and capping the electronic signature data to the document to generate the electronic signature document information.
5. A quantum attack resistant electronic signature method as set forth in claim 1 wherein the specific process of the third party authority performing the symmetric key digital signature includes calculating a message authentication code of signature information as a symmetric key digital signature of the electronic signature document information using an unused key, the symmetric key digital signature being related to the electronic signature document information, the time at that time, the sequence number of the signing key used and the key used for the digital signature.
6. The electronic signature method for resisting quantum attack as set forth in claim 1, wherein the two of the signer, the electronic signature server and the trusted center distribute a plurality of keys at a time according to the length of the shared key used each time, respectively, and divide and synchronize the sequence numbering of the shared keys;
When the shared key is almost used, the two sides of the shared key use unused shared keys to carry out identity authentication, the shared keys are redistributed by utilizing the quantum cryptography network, the newly distributed shared keys use the same unused shared keys distributed last time to encrypt one by one, the serial numbers are stored in a resynchronization mode, and all the shared keys distributed last time are deleted.
7. An electronic signature system for resisting quantum attack is characterized by comprising:
The client device is configured to issue a signature application of a signer, acquire a signature application identity verification result, perform identity verification on the electronic signature server, send an electronic seal ID and encrypt a document to be signed, verify the identity of the electronic signature server by using a message authentication code, decrypt the electronic signature document information sent by the electronic signature server and verify the correctness if the electronic signature document information is correct, calculate a ciphertext and an authentication code of the electronic signature document information by using a shared key with a trusted center if the electronic signature document information is correct, send the ciphertext and the authentication code to the trusted center, and receive the encrypted electronic signature information;
The electronic signature server is configured to verify the identity of the application signer, audit the authority of the application signer, package the received application signer information and the electronic seal information to generate electronic signature data, cover the electronic signature data on a document to generate electronic signature document information, send ciphertext and authentication code of the electronic signature document information to the client device, calculate a message abstract and authentication code of the electronic signature document information and send the message abstract and authentication code to the trusted center;
And the trusted center is configured to verify the identity of the electronic signature server by using the authentication code of the electronic signature document information, if the authentication is correct, save the message digest, receive the electronic signature document information of a correct application signer, calculate the message digest of the electronic signature document information, compare the message digest with the stored message digest, digitally sign the electronic signature document information by using a symmetric key if the message digest is the same, generate the electronic signature information, encrypt and send the electronic signature information to corresponding client equipment.
8. The electronic signature system for resisting quantum attack according to claim 7, wherein the trusted center is a third party mechanism and is positioned at a quantum cryptography network terminal, and a true random number digital signature key library is arranged, wherein keys in the true random number digital signature key library are divided according to the length used by each digital signature and have different numbers.
9. The electronic signature system as recited in claim 7, wherein the electronic signature server stores electronic seal file information, electronic seals and user rights information for the electronic seals.
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| CN115915118B (en) * | 2022-11-10 | 2024-01-23 | 中邮通建设咨询有限公司 | Wireless data processing method of anti-interference switch based on broadcast transmission |
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| CN105119941A (en) * | 2015-09-16 | 2015-12-02 | 浙江神州量子网络科技有限公司 | Quantum seal stamping and verifying system, and configuration, stamping process and verifying method thereof |
| CN109586918A (en) * | 2018-10-31 | 2019-04-05 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | The signature method and sealing system of anti-quantum calculation based on pool of symmetric keys |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105119941A (en) * | 2015-09-16 | 2015-12-02 | 浙江神州量子网络科技有限公司 | Quantum seal stamping and verifying system, and configuration, stamping process and verifying method thereof |
| CN109586918A (en) * | 2018-10-31 | 2019-04-05 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | The signature method and sealing system of anti-quantum calculation based on pool of symmetric keys |
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