CN102664739A - PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) implementation method based on safety certificate - Google Patents
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) implementation method based on safety certificate Download PDFInfo
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- CN102664739A CN102664739A CN2012101240817A CN201210124081A CN102664739A CN 102664739 A CN102664739 A CN 102664739A CN 2012101240817 A CN2012101240817 A CN 2012101240817A CN 201210124081 A CN201210124081 A CN 201210124081A CN 102664739 A CN102664739 A CN 102664739A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) implementation method based on a safety certificate. The method comprises the following steps of: deploying an encryption card or encryption equipment hardware equipment on the end part of a CA (Certificate Authority); encrypting all final entity CA certificates in the CA into a cipher text for storing; storing each middle-class CA certificate and root CA certificate in a CA encryption card or a chip of the encryption equipment; generating a key in a safety protocol of the PKI and calling the key to encrypt or decrypt the certificate in the chip; establishing a 'chip-class' PKI safety protocol between a user terminal and a CA terminal; establishing a certificate safety detection protocol in the CA; and detecting the CA certificate in a full trusted link in the CA timely to prevent an attacker from tampering the CA certificate to establish a PKI system based on the safety certificate.
Description
Technical field:
The present invention relates to filed of network information security.
Background technology:
At present, the domestic network safety system all adopts PKI/CA, and the PKI/CA technology is to adopt asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and symmetric cryptographic algorithm; Set up authenticating user identification, data integrity checking and Data Encrypting Transmission System jointly; But at the ca authentication center of PKI, user's various certificates all are to leave in the certificate database with the plaintext form; The certificate stored in clear receives spying upon of outside assault or internal control personnel easily; The assailant can come " formula of fastening one person's story upon another person attack " carried out at the ca authentication center, in a word through obtaining and replace all final entity CA certificate, each the intermediate CA certificate and the root ca certificate at ca authentication center; All there is potential safety hazard in existing P KI product, can not satisfy the demand of market to the network information security.
Summary of the invention:
A kind of PKI implementation method based on safety certificate is under the PKI of standard condition, uses the hardware device of smart card as the client encrypt system; In the chip of smart card, adopt asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and symmetric cryptographic algorithm to set up the client encrypt system, and write symmetric cryptographic algorithm, digest algorithm, client identity authentication protocol, digital signature protocol, signature verification agreement, enciphering/deciphering agreement; And the ssl protocol of client, and storage user's one group of private key and final entity CA certificate, set up the ca authentication center at the network application server end; The ca authentication center is made up of multiple servers or minicomputer, uses asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and symmetric cryptographic algorithm to set up authentication center's end encryption system at the ca authentication center, in server or minicomputer; Be prestored into symmetric cryptographic algorithm, digest algorithm, authentication center's end authentication agreement, digital signature protocol, signature verification agreement, enciphering/deciphering agreement, and the ssl protocol of authentication center's end, and store final entity CA certificate, each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate of all users; Authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol of PKI; All comprise in the certificate database at ca authentication center, the final entity CA certificate that finds corresponding client user expressly after, on ca authentication central server hard disk; Call the authenticate password that PKI deciphering client transmissions is come; Obtain the final entity CA certificate of user of client, and in internal memory, the final entity CA certificate of the user of client and ca authentication center-side is compared authentication; Equally in internal memory; Digital signature to file is carried out signature verification, and each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain of cert verify, thereby; In ca authentication central server internal memory, accomplish the whole process of authentication agreement, signature verification agreement and the ssl protocol of ca authentication center-side;
The present invention adopts encrypted card or encryption equipment hardware device in the ca authentication center-side; Between user side and ca authentication center-side, set up the PKI security protocol of " chip-scale "; Wherein: the security protocol of PKI comprises: authenticating user identification, data integrity checking and data encryption transmission, and the technical characterictic of its method is:
In the PCI groove of the server at ca authentication center or minicomputer; Insert the polylith encrypted card; Or server or the minicomputer of many encryption equipments with the ca authentication center linked; And in the chip of encrypted card or encryption equipment, storage key K that the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that prestores, symmetric cryptographic algorithm, one group are fixing, and various security protocol is like authentication agreement, signature verification agreement and server end ssl protocol etc.In the chip of the USB-KEY of client, deposit symmetric cryptographic algorithm, asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, user's private key, authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and client-side ssl protocol, and the user certificate of corresponding USB-KEY equipment promptly: final entity CA certificate;
In the certificate initialization procedure, all final entity CA certificate with the ca authentication center is encrypted to the ciphertext storage earlier, in the encrypted card or encryption equipment chip of ca authentication center-side; Use randomizer to produce the random number of one time one change, as symmetric key promptly: the key K i of encrypted certificate (i=1～n, n are all users' sum); One group key Ki encrypts one group of final entity CAi certificate; One-time pad, and all final entity CAi certificates are encrypted to ciphertext, be stored in the certificate database of ca authentication center-side; With each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate, leave in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment equipment;
The security protocol of PKI as: in authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol, key produces, call key pair certificate encrypts or deciphers, and all in chip, accomplishes;
Set up the certificate security detecting protocol at the ca authentication center; Regularly the CA certificate in all trust chains at ca authentication center is detected, prevent that the assailant from distorting CA certificate, guarantee the safe, credible of all final entity CA certificate; Thereby; Between user side and ca authentication center-side, set up the PKI security protocol of " chip-scale ", all with the realization of software and hardware combination, concrete grammar is following based on the PKI system of safety certificate:
1, sets up safe PKI framework; In the PCI groove of the server at ca authentication center or minicomputer; Insert the polylith encrypted card, or server or the minicomputer of many encryption equipments with the ca authentication center linked, and in the chip of encrypted card or encryption equipment; The fixing storage key K of asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, symmetric cryptographic algorithm, one group that prestores, and various security protocol is like authentication agreement, signature verification agreement and server end ssl protocol etc.
2, in the chip of the USB-KEY of client, deposit symmetric cryptographic algorithm, asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, user's private key, authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and client-side ssl protocol, and the user certificate of corresponding USB-KEY equipment promptly: final entity CA certificate.
3, set up the safety certificate system, in the certificate initialization procedure, all final entity CA certificate with the ca authentication center is encrypted to the ciphertext storage earlier; Because certificate format and content are X.500 (or X.509) of standard, if use one group of fixing symmetric key to encrypt whole users' certificate; Then can cause and repeat newspaper (being the essential condition of decoding), if encrypt with asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, then the speed of service is slower; The asymmetric cryptographic algorithm encryption/decryption speed is if move in computer, and slow 100 times than symmetrical cryptographic algorithm encryption/decryption speed, if in chip hardware, move; Than symmetrical cryptographic algorithm encryption/decryption speed slow 1000 times, this can influence the speed of various security protocols.For this reason; Encrypted card or the randomizer in the encryption equipment chip in the ca authentication center-side produce the random number of one time one change, and as symmetric key promptly: the key of encrypted certificate, a group key are encrypted one group of final entity CA certificate; One-time pad; And all final entity CA certificates are encrypted to ciphertext, and be stored in the certificate database of ca authentication center-side, each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate are left in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment equipment.
4, certificate encryption and key management method are following:
(1) at first; Through calling the randomizer in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip, in chip, produce one group of random number, with this random number as storage key K; Wherein: storage key is changeless, and storage key K is used for the key of all encrypted certificates is encrypted.
(2) call randomizer in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip, in chip, produce one group of random number L
1, and with this random number L
1As key K
1, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
1In the input chip, in chip, use key K
1With final entity CA certificate CA
1Be encrypted to ciphertext; In chip, produce one group of random number L
2, and with this random number L
2As key K
2, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
2In the input chip, in chip, use key K
2With final entity CA certificate CA
2Be encrypted to ciphertext; In chip, produce one group of random number L
n, and with this random number n as key K
n, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
nIn the input chip, in chip, use key K
nWith final entity CA certificate CA
nBe encrypted to ciphertext, wherein: the sequence number of each final entity CA certificate (sign of certificate) Li, (i=1～n) do not encrypt, certificate serial number Li are used for the final entity CA certificate CAi ciphertext of search and positioning certificate database, key K
i(i=1～n), for encrypting the key of final entity CA certificate, n is all in the heart finally sums of entity CA certificate in the ca authentication.
(3) with certificate CA
1, certificate CA
2... certificate CA
nCiphertext in chip, export, leave in the ca authentication center certificate database, in chip, re-use storage key K respectively with K
1, K
2... K
nBe encrypted to ciphertext, generate K respectively
1', K
2' ... K
n', again with K
1', K
2' ... K
n', leave the corresponding final entity CA certificate CA of ca authentication center certificate database respectively in
1, CA
2..., CA
nLast field of ciphertext record in.
5, set up " chip-scale " security protocol at ca authentication center; The security protocol of PKI as: in authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol; When the ca authentication center-side need be obtained the final entity CA certificate of respective user; According to the sequence number (sign) of the next final entity CA certificate of client transmissions, the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate record in the certificate database of location, and be input in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment; In chip, with the storage key K key ciphertext K that final entity CA certificate is corresponding
i' (i=1～n) be decrypted into expressly promptly: K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(i=1～n) decipher this final entity CA certificate to obtain it expressly; Afterwards; In chip, carry out other operations of security protocol again; Other operations as in the authentication agreement comprise: ca authentication center-side encryption system, in chip, call the PKI of the final entity CA certificate of respective user, and the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate of user that client is transmitted is deciphered and is obtained expressly; And with the authentication of expressly comparing of the final entity CA certificate of the respective user of ca authentication center-side storage, judge whether the user of client credible; Other operations in digital signature protocol comprise: ca authentication center-side encryption system; In chip, call the PKI of the final entity CA certificate of respective user; Client is transmitted file digital signature deciphers; The summary info that obtains file is promptly: " digital finger-print 1 ", again with calling digest algorithm, to file make a summary obtain file summary info promptly: " digital finger-print 2 " of file; Whether whether identical with " digital finger-print 2 " through contrast " digital finger-print 1 ", it is credible to differentiate the user that file is signed; Whether other operations in ssl protocol comprise: identical with the final entity CA certificate of the user of ca authentication center-side through the contrast client; After accomplishing two-way authentication, consult symmetric cryptographic algorithm and the version and the symmetric key of client and ca authentication center-side again, that is: accomplish the sub-protocol of shaking hands of ssl protocol; At last; Carry out the record sub-protocol of ssl protocol, thereby, PKI security protocol set up based on " chip-scale ".
6, set up ca authentication center certificate safety detecting system
Set up the certificate security detecting protocol at the ca authentication center, regularly the CA certificate in all trust chains at ca authentication center is detected.Its testing process is, with all final entity CA certificates in the ca authentication center certificate database, that is: CA1, CA2 ..., CAn recorded content (comprising: the ciphertext of CAi, certificates identified and key ciphertext K
i'), import successively in the chip of encrypted card or encryption equipment, in chip, call storage key K, will encrypt final entity CA certificate CAi (the key ciphertext K of i=1～n) respectively
i' (i=1～n), be decrypted into expressly promptly: K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(i=1～n) deciphers corresponding final entity CA certificate CAi, and (ciphertext of i=1～n) obtains it expressly, afterwards; In chip, call the PKI of next stage middle rank CA certificate, this has been decrypted into final entity CA certificate CAi expressly, and (i=1～n) carries out signature verification; If final entity CA certificate not through signature verification; Then this final entity CA certificate CAi (i=1～n) be regarded as being distorted, if through signature verification, this final entity CA certificate CAi (i=1～n) do not distorted then.Thereby, prevent that the assailant from distorting CA certificate, guarantee the safe, credible of all final entity CA certificate.
7, the whole users' in ca authentication center final entity CA certificate all be with the ciphertext stored in form in certificate database; Each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate leave in the chip hardware on the certificate trust chain; Can guarantee the storage security of each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on all final entity CA certificates of authentication center, the trust chains; Simultaneously, the various certificates of assurance ca authentication center-side are believable; Even the assailant wants to distort user's final entity CA certificate; But; Under the situation of the key that can't obtain encrypted certificate, also can't the final entity CA certificate after distorting be encrypted to the ciphertext that the assailant can use, thereby; Prevent that the assailant from through distorting final entity CA certificate, attacking the various security protocols at ca authentication center.
8, leave all intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip in, receive the protection of chip hardware, when setting up each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate trust chain for the first time; In chip, each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain are verified, no longer each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain are verified later on; Just; When ca authentication center security of operation agreement, during like: authentication, signature verification and ssl protocol, various security protocols not cert trust chain are verified; That is: never call subordinate middle rank CA certificate final entity CA certificate is carried out signature verification; Also never call upper level middle rank CA certificate next stage middle rank CA certificate is carried out signature verification, also need not call root ca certificate upper level middle rank CA certificate is carried out signature verification, thereby; Reduce the part link of various security protocols, improve the operational efficiency of each security protocol.
9, set up " chip-scale " various PKI security protocols (as: authentication, signature verification and ssl protocol) in the ca authentication center-side, the various links of various PKI security protocols are all accomplished in chip, that is: in chip, with storage key K decruption key K
i' (i=1～n), generate key K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(after i=1～n) becomes final entity CA certificate decrypt ciphertext expressly, carry out other operations of security protocol again, thereby, the safe class of the various security protocols of PKI improved.
10, set up the certificate safety detecting system at the ca authentication center; Regularly all final entity CA certificates in ca authentication center are carried out signature verification; Whether detect the final entity CA certificate at ca authentication center is distorted; So that in time the final entity CA certificate to the ca authentication center recovers, the various security protocols in assurance ca authentication center can normally be moved.
11, storage key K produces in chip, be used for to all encrypted certificates key K i (i=1～n) encrypt, storage key K is stored in the chip, and not outside the pio chip, guarantees storage and the security of operation of storage key K; (i=1～n) is in chip to the key K i of encrypted certificate, is produced by randomizer, in chip; Final entity CA certificate is carried out cryptographic operation, and guarantee that (i=1～n) encrypts one group of final entity CA certificate, one-time pad for the key K i of a group encryption certificate; Do not reuse; (i=1～n) does not go out chip to the key K i of encrypted certificate, and after being stored key K in the chip and being encrypted to ciphertext, exports in the chip to be stored in the certificate database; Thereby, the storage security and the security of operation of assurance encrypted certificate key.
12, with the final entity CA certificate data of magnanimity form with ciphertext; Leave in the certificate database at ca authentication center, simultaneously, with whole intermediate CA certificate and the root ca certificate on the certificate trust chain; With the plaintext stored in form in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment; Not only, can guarantee the final entity CA certificate of magnanimity, and the storage security of the important data of the whole intermediate CA certificate on the certificate trust chain and root ca certificate; And, can significantly reduce the construction cost that encryption device hardware is purchased at the ca authentication center.
Description of drawings:
Accompanying drawing 1: between client and ca authentication center-side, set up the procedure chart of " chip-scale " digital signature protocol,
Accompanying drawing 2: between client and ca authentication center-side, set up the procedure chart of " chip-scale " authentication agreement,
Embodiment:
Between client and ca authentication center-side, set up the performing step of " chip-scale " digital signature protocol below in conjunction with accompanying drawing 1 explanation:
At first, will intend in the file 1 input intelligent card chip of signature client encrypt system call digest algorithm in chip in client; File 1 to intending signature is made a summary; The summary info that obtains file 1 is promptly: " digital finger-print " of file 1, the client encrypt system is the private key of invoke user again, the ciphertext that " digital finger-print 1 " of file 1 encrypted " digital finger-print 1 " that obtain file 1 promptly: digital signature; Digital signature with sign, file 1 and the file of user's final entity CA certificate; Send to the ca authentication center in the lump, the sign of the final entity CA certificate that ca authentication center basis is received, the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate of the user CAi of search and positioning correspondence in certificate database; In chip, with storage key K deciphering K
i' obtain Ki; With Ki (this final entity CA certificate ciphertext of i=1～n) deciphering correspondence; Obtain the plaintext of this final entity CA certificate, again with the ciphertext of " digital finger-print 1 " of the PKI declassified document 1 in this final entity CA certificate promptly: digital signature obtains the plaintext of " digital finger-print 1 " of file; Calling digest algorithm again makes a summary to file 1; The summary info that obtains file 1 is promptly: " digital finger-print 2 ", whether whether identical with " digital finger-print 2 " through contrast " digital finger-print 1 ", it is credible to differentiate the user that file 1 is signed.
Between client and ca authentication center-side, set up the performing step of " chip-scale " authentication agreement below in conjunction with accompanying drawing 2 explanations:
At first, in the intelligent card chip of client, produce one group of random number S1, client encrypt system call user's private key; User's final entity CA certificate and random number S1 are encrypted to ciphertext promptly: authenticate password 1, client sends to the ca authentication center in the lump with sign, random number S1 and the authenticate password 1 of user's final entity CA certificate; The ca authentication center is according to the sign of the final entity CA certificate of receiving, the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate of the user CAi of search and positioning correspondence in certificate database is in chip; Ki ' obtains Ki with storage key K deciphering, and (i=1～n) decipher this corresponding final entity CA certificate ciphertext obtains the plaintext of this final entity CA certificate with Ki; With the PKI decrypted authentication password 1 in this final entity CA certificate, obtain the final entity CA certificate of user of client and the random number S1 after the deciphering again, be made as: random number S2; With the final entity CA certificate of user after the client deciphering, compare with the final entity CA certificate of respective user of ca authentication center-side storage, contrast whether the two identical; Simultaneously, random number S1 and random number S2 with receiving that client transmissions is come compare; Contrast whether the two identical, if above twice contrast is all identical, then client is a validated user; Otherwise client is the disabled user, returns client " disabled user "; If the user of client is a validated user, then again by producing one group of random number S3 in ca authentication center-side encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip, in chip; By the PKI among the final entity CA certificate CAi after the deciphering, random number S3 and this final entity CA certificate CAi are encrypted to ciphertext promptly with the ca authentication center-side: authenticate password 2, the ca authentication center-side should organize random number S3 and authenticate password 2 sends to client in the lump; Client is called private key authenticate password 2 is deciphered in intelligent card chip, obtains the final entity CA certificate of the user CAi of ca authentication center-side storage and the random number S3 after the deciphering; Be made as: random number S4, with this final entity CA certificate CAi, compare with user's CA certificate of storing in the custom end intelligent card; Simultaneously, with the random number S3 that receives that the transmission of ca authentication center-side comes, S4 compares with random number; If above twice contrast is all identical, then is legal ca authentication center, otherwise is illegal ca authentication center; Thereby, accomplish two-way authentication.
Claims (8)
1. the PKI implementation method based on safety certificate is under the PKI of standard condition, under the PKI of standard condition; Use the hardware device of smart card, in the chip of smart card, adopt asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and symmetric cryptographic algorithm to set up the client encrypt system as the client encrypt system; And write symmetric cryptographic algorithm, digest algorithm, client identity authentication protocol, digital signature protocol, signature verification agreement, enciphering/deciphering agreement, and the ssl protocol of client, and storage user's one group of private key and final entity CA certificate; Set up the ca authentication center at the network application server end, the ca authentication center is made up of multiple servers or minicomputer, uses asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and symmetric cryptographic algorithm to set up authentication center's end encryption system at the ca authentication center; In server or minicomputer; Be prestored into symmetric cryptographic algorithm, digest algorithm, authentication center's end authentication agreement, digital signature protocol, signature verification agreement, enciphering/deciphering agreement, and the ssl protocol of authentication center's end, and store final entity CA certificate, each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate of all users; Authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol of PKI; All comprise in the certificate database at ca authentication center, the final entity CA certificate that finds corresponding client user expressly after, on ca authentication central server hard disk; Call the authenticate password that PKI deciphering client transmissions is come; Obtain the final entity CA certificate of user of client, and in internal memory, the final entity CA certificate of the user of client and ca authentication center-side is compared authentication; Equally in internal memory; Digital signature to file is carried out signature verification, and each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain of cert verify, thereby; In ca authentication central server internal memory, accomplish the whole process of authentication agreement, signature verification agreement and the ssl protocol of ca authentication center-side;
The present invention adopts encrypted card or encryption equipment hardware device in the ca authentication center-side; Between user side and ca authentication center-side, set up the PKI security protocol of " chip-scale "; Wherein: the security protocol of PKI comprises: authenticating user identification, data integrity checking and data encryption transmission, and the technical characterictic of its method is:
In the PCI groove of the server at ca authentication center or minicomputer; Insert the polylith encrypted card; Or server or the minicomputer of many encryption equipments with the ca authentication center linked; And in the chip of encrypted card or encryption equipment, storage key K that the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that prestores, symmetric cryptographic algorithm, one group are fixing, and various security protocol is like authentication agreement, signature verification agreement and server end ssl protocol etc.In the chip of the USB-KEY of client, deposit symmetric cryptographic algorithm, asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, user's private key, authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and client-side ssl protocol, and the user certificate of corresponding USB-KEY equipment promptly: final entity CA certificate;
In the certificate initialization procedure, all final entity CA certificate with the ca authentication center is encrypted to the ciphertext storage earlier, in the encrypted card or encryption equipment chip of ca authentication center-side; Use randomizer to produce the random number of one time one change, as symmetric key promptly: the key K i of encrypted certificate (i=1～n, n are all users' sum); One group key Ki encrypts one group of final entity CAi certificate; One-time pad, and all final entity CAi certificates are encrypted to ciphertext, be stored in the certificate database of ca authentication center-side; With each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate, leave in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment equipment;
The security protocol of PKI as: in authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol, key produces, call key pair certificate encrypts or deciphers, and all in chip, accomplishes;
Set up the certificate security detecting protocol at the ca authentication center; Regularly the CA certificate in all trust chains at ca authentication center is detected; Prevent that the assailant from distorting CA certificate; Guarantee the safe, credible of all final entity CA certificate, thereby, the PKI security protocol of foundation " chip-scale " between user side and ca authentication center-side.
2. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
Certificate encryption and key management method are following:
(1) at first; Through calling the randomizer in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip, in chip, produce one group of random number, with this random number as storage key K; Wherein: storage key is changeless, and storage key K is used for the key of all encrypted certificates is encrypted;
(2) call randomizer in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip, in chip, produce one group of random number L
1, and with this random number L
1As key K
1, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
1In the input chip, in chip, use key K
1With final entity CA certificate CA
1Be encrypted to ciphertext; In chip, produce one group of random number L
2, and with this random number L
2As key K
2, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
2In the input chip, in chip, use key K
2With final entity CA certificate CA
2Be encrypted to ciphertext; In chip, produce one group of random number L
n, and with this random number n as key K
n, with the final entity CA certificate CA in the ca authentication center certificate database
nIn the input chip, in chip, use key K
nWith final entity CA certificate CA
nBe encrypted to ciphertext, wherein: the sequence number of each final entity CA certificate (sign of certificate) Li, (i=1～n) do not encrypt, certificate serial number Li are used for the final entity CA certificate CAi ciphertext of search and positioning certificate database, key K
i(i=1～n), for encrypting the key of final entity CA certificate, n is all in the heart finally sums of entity CA certificate in the ca authentication;
(3) with certificate CA
1, certificate CA
2... certificate CA
nCiphertext in chip, export, leave in the ca authentication center certificate database, in chip, re-use storage key K respectively with K
1, K
2... K
nBe encrypted to ciphertext, generate K respectively
1', K
2' ... K
n', again with K
1', K
2' ... K
n', leave the corresponding final entity CA certificate CA of ca authentication center certificate database respectively in
1, CA
2..., CA
nLast field of ciphertext record in.
3. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
The security protocol of PKI as: in authentication agreement, digital signature protocol and the ssl protocol; When the ca authentication center-side need be obtained the final entity CA certificate of respective user; According to the sequence number (sign) of the next final entity CA certificate of client transmissions, the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate record in the certificate database of location, and be input in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment; In chip, with the storage key K key ciphertext K that final entity CA certificate is corresponding
i' (i=1～n) be decrypted into expressly promptly: K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(i=1～n) decipher this final entity CA certificate to obtain it expressly; Afterwards; In chip, carry out other operations of security protocol again; Other operations as in the authentication agreement comprise: ca authentication center-side encryption system, in chip, call the PKI of the final entity CA certificate of respective user, and the ciphertext of the final entity CA certificate of user that client is transmitted is deciphered and is obtained expressly; And with the authentication of expressly comparing of the final entity CA certificate of the respective user of ca authentication center-side storage, judge whether the user of client credible; Other operations in digital signature protocol comprise: ca authentication center-side encryption system; In chip, call the PKI of the final entity CA certificate of respective user; Client is transmitted file digital signature deciphers; The summary info that obtains file is promptly: " digital finger-print 1 ", again with calling digest algorithm, to file make a summary obtain file summary info promptly: " digital finger-print 2 " of file; Whether whether identical with " digital finger-print 2 " through contrast " digital finger-print 1 ", it is credible to differentiate the user that file is signed; Whether other operations in ssl protocol comprise: identical with the final entity CA certificate of the user of ca authentication center-side through the contrast client; After accomplishing two-way authentication, consult symmetric cryptographic algorithm and the version and the symmetric key of client and ca authentication center-side again, that is: accomplish the sub-protocol of shaking hands of ssl protocol; At last; Carry out the record sub-protocol of ssl protocol, thereby, PKI security protocol set up based on " chip-scale ".
4. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
Set up the certificate security detecting protocol at the ca authentication center, regularly the CA certificate in all trust chains at ca authentication center is detected.Its testing process is, with all final entity CA certificates in the ca authentication center certificate database, that is: CA1, CA2 ..., CAn recorded content (comprising: the ciphertext of CAi, certificates identified and key ciphertext K
i'), import successively in the chip of encrypted card or encryption equipment, in chip, call storage key K, will encrypt final entity CA certificate CAi (the key ciphertext K of i=1～n) respectively
i' (i=1～n), be decrypted into expressly promptly: K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(i=1～n) deciphers corresponding final entity CA certificate CAi, and (ciphertext of i=1～n) obtains it expressly, afterwards; In chip, call the PKI of next stage middle rank CA certificate, this has been decrypted into final entity CA certificate CAi expressly, and (i=1～n) carries out signature verification; If final entity CA certificate not through signature verification; Then this final entity CA certificate CAi (i=1～n) be regarded as being distorted, if through signature verification, this final entity CA certificate CAi (i=1～n) do not distorted then.Thereby, prevent that the assailant from distorting CA certificate, guarantee the safe, credible of all final entity CA certificate.
5. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
(1) the whole users' in ca authentication center final entity CA certificate all be with the ciphertext stored in form in certificate database; Each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate leave in the chip hardware on the certificate trust chain; Can guarantee the storage security of each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on all final entity CA certificates of authentication center, the trust chains; Simultaneously, the various certificates of assurance ca authentication center-side are believable; Even the assailant wants to distort user's final entity CA certificate; But; Under the situation of the key that can't obtain encrypted certificate, also can't the final entity CA certificate after distorting be encrypted to the ciphertext that the assailant can use, thereby; Prevent that the assailant from through distorting final entity CA certificate, attacking the various security protocols at ca authentication center;
(2) set up " chip-scale " various PKI security protocols (as: authentication, signature verification and ssl protocol) in the ca authentication center-side, the various links of various PKI security protocols are all accomplished in chip, that is: in chip, with storage key K decruption key K
i' (i=1～n), generate key K
i(i=1～n), use K again
i(after i=1～n) becomes final entity CA certificate decrypt ciphertext expressly, carry out other operations of security protocol again, thereby, the safe class of the various security protocols of PKI improved;
(3) with the final entity CA certificate data of magnanimity form with ciphertext; Leave in the certificate database at ca authentication center, simultaneously, with whole intermediate CA certificate and the root ca certificate on the certificate trust chain; With the plaintext stored in form in the chip of ca authentication center encrypted card or encryption equipment; Not only, can guarantee the final entity CA certificate of magnanimity, and the storage security of the important data of the whole intermediate CA certificate on the certificate trust chain and root ca certificate; And, can significantly reduce the construction cost that encryption device hardware is purchased at the ca authentication center.
6. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
Leave all intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate in ca authentication center encrypted card or the encryption equipment chip in, receive the protection of chip hardware, when setting up each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate trust chain for the first time; In chip, each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain are verified, no longer each intermediate CA certificate and root ca certificate on the trust chain are verified later on; Just; When ca authentication center security of operation agreement, during like: authentication, signature verification and ssl protocol, various security protocols not cert trust chain are verified; That is: never call subordinate middle rank CA certificate final entity CA certificate is carried out signature verification; Also never call upper level middle rank CA certificate next stage middle rank CA certificate is carried out signature verification, also need not call root ca certificate upper level middle rank CA certificate is carried out signature verification, thereby; Reduce the part link of various security protocols, improve the operational efficiency of each security protocol.
7. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that:
Set up the certificate safety detecting system at the ca authentication center; Regularly all final entity CA certificates in ca authentication center are carried out signature verification; Whether detect the final entity CA certificate at ca authentication center is distorted; So that in time the final entity CA certificate to the ca authentication center recovers, the various security protocols in assurance ca authentication center can normally be moved.
8. according to the method for claim 2, it is characterized in that:
Storage key K produces in chip, be used for to all encrypted certificates key K i (i=1～n) encrypt, storage key K is stored in the chip, and not outside the pio chip, guarantees storage and the security of operation of storage key K; (i=1～n) is in chip to the key K i of encrypted certificate, is produced by randomizer, in chip; Final entity CA certificate is carried out cryptographic operation, and guarantee that (i=1～n) encrypts one group of final entity CA certificate, one-time pad for the key K i of a group encryption certificate; Do not reuse; (i=1～n) does not go out chip to the key K i of encrypted certificate, and after being stored key K in the chip and being encrypted to ciphertext, exports in the chip to be stored in the certificate database; Thereby, the storage security and the security of operation of assurance encrypted certificate key.
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