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CN109919610A - Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and system based on P2P public key pond - Google Patents

Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and system based on P2P public key pond Download PDF

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Publication number
CN109919610A
CN109919610A CN201910032268.6A CN201910032268A CN109919610A CN 109919610 A CN109919610 A CN 109919610A CN 201910032268 A CN201910032268 A CN 201910032268A CN 109919610 A CN109919610 A CN 109919610A
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China
Prior art keywords
public key
key
random number
transaction
pond
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CN201910032268.6A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
富尧
钟一民
杨羽成
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Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
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Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
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Priority to CN201910032268.6A priority Critical patent/CN109919610A/en
Publication of CN109919610A publication Critical patent/CN109919610A/en
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Abstract

The present invention relates to the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and systems based on P2P public key pond, network is stored by the P2P of network connection including a plurality of clients and with each user terminal, each user terminal is furnished with key card, has private key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number in key card;The P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds;Transaction includes: to carry out operation generating function value to transaction of unsigning when initiating;It is signed by private key to the functional value and generates trading signature;It generates the first random number and generates first key using first random number and the functional value;The trading signature, which is encrypted, by the first key obtains ciphertext signature;The first random number of ciphertext is obtained by the first random number described in the private key encryption;Ciphertext signature, the first random number of the ciphertext and public key corresponding with private key pond number and public key pointer random number are stored in transaction and broadcasted in block chain network.

Description

Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and system based on P2P public key pond
Technical field
The present invention relates to block chain field more particularly to the method for commerce of block chain.
Background technique
Block chain is a kind of completely new distributed basis framework and calculation paradigm, is stored using orderly linked data structure Data ensure data safety using cryptological technique using common recognition algorithm more new data.In the transaction based on block chain, really The privacy of the data safety and client of protecting transaction is the necessary condition that block chain can further develop.For this purpose, cryptological technique Especially public-key cryptographic keys are widely used in block chain.
As most people is understood, quantum computer has great potential in password cracking.Mainstream is non-now Symmetrically (public key) Encryption Algorithm, such as RSA cryptographic algorithms, it is most of to be all based in factorization or the finite field of big integer The two difficult math questions of the calculating of discrete logarithm.Their difficulty that cracks also is dependent on the efficiency solved these problems.Tradition On computer, it is desirable that solve the two difficult math questions, the cost time is the exponential time (to crack the time with the growth of public key length Increased with exponential), this is unacceptable in practical applications.It and is that your elegant algorithm for making to measure of quantum computer can be with In polynomial time (time is cracked as the growth of public key length is increased with the speed of k power, wherein k is long with public key Spend unrelated constant) carry out integer factorization or discrete logarithm and calculate, thus for RSA, discrete logarithm Encryption Algorithm it is broken Solution provides may.
Problem of the existing technology:
(1) in the prior art, the equal unencryption of the transimission and storage of block chain.
(2) corresponding private key, existing block chain counterparty are obtained quickly through public key due to quantum calculation function Method is easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
(3) in the prior art, the outputting and inputting for digital signature based on public and private key can be known to enemy, in quantum meter In the presence of calculation machine, it may be derived private key, block catenary system is caused to be cracked by quantum computer.
(4) in the prior art, the disclosure for being transferred to wallet address and being transferred to the amount of money in the transaction of block chain may expose use Family privacy information.
Summary of the invention
Based on this, it is necessary in view of the above-mentioned problems, providing a kind of anti-quantum calculation block chain secrecy based on P2P public key pond Method of commerce and system.
The present invention is based on the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method in P2P public key pond, including a plurality of clients and Network is stored by the P2P of network connection with each user terminal, each user terminal is furnished with key card, has private in key card Key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number;
The P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, and user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer is random Number obtains public key corresponding with private key from corresponding public key pond;
Include: when transaction initiation
To unsigning, transaction carries out operation generating function value;
It is signed by private key to the functional value and generates trading signature;
It generates the first random number and generates first key using first random number and the functional value;
The trading signature, which is encrypted, by the first key obtains ciphertext signature;
The first random number of ciphertext is obtained by the first random number described in the private key encryption;
Ciphertext signature, the first random number of the ciphertext and public key corresponding with private key pond number and public key are referred to Needle random number is stored in transaction and broadcasts in block chain network.
Optionally, the public key in public key pond is encrypted using key, and the key is stored in the P2P with ciphertext form and stores In network.
Optionally, the public key encryption of each user is respectively adopted in the key.
Optionally, include: when transaction verification
Using from the public key pond number and public key pointer random number for initiating user terminal, requested simultaneously from P2P storage network Obtain the public key of the key of corresponding ciphertext form and the initiation user terminal of key encryption;
The key is obtained using the decryption of one's own side's private key, the key decryption is recycled to obtain the public key for initiating user terminal;
The first random number of ciphertext described in public key decryptions using first user terminal obtains first random number;
Generation, which is unsigned, trades and carries out operation generating function value to transaction of unsigning, and the functional value is random with described first Number combines generation first key;
The ciphertext is decrypted using the first key of generation to sign to obtain the trading signature, and utilizes initiation user terminal Trading signature described in public key verifications.
Optionally, carrying out operation generating function value to transaction of unsigning includes: to carry out the internal data for transaction of unsigning Adjustment carries out Hash operation to transaction adjusted of unsigning and obtains the functional value.
Optionally, the transaction after being verified is verifying transaction, and verifying transaction includes: when block is added
The second random number is generated, and generates the second key using second random number and the cryptographic Hash of transaction;
The wallet address in trading is verified using second key pair and amount of the fund is encrypted respectively Wallet address and amount of the fund;
The second random number of ciphertext is obtained with the second random number of private key encryption;
By the wallet address of the second key encryption and amount of the fund, the second random number of the ciphertext and corresponding with private key Public key pond number and the deposit verifying of public key pointer random number are traded and are added in block.
Optionally, further includes:
It generates and digs mine transaction;
Third random number is generated, and generates third key using the cryptographic Hash of the third random number and digging mine transaction;
The wallet address and amount of the fund dug in mine transaction using the third key pair are encrypted respectively The wallet address of encryption and amount of the fund;
Ciphertext third random number is obtained with private key encryption third random number;
The wallet address that third key is encrypted and amount of the fund, the ciphertext third random number and corresponding with private key Public key pond number and public key pointer random number, which are added, digs mine transaction and in storage block;
The block is received after verified to the digging mine transaction in storage block chain.
The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on P2P public key pond that the present invention also provides a kind of, including it is multiple User terminal and the P2P for passing through network connection with each user terminal store network, and each user terminal is furnished with key card, key card In have private key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number;
The P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, and user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer is random Number obtains public key corresponding with private key from corresponding public key pond;
User terminal includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond is realized when program.
Public key pointer random number is used in the present embodiment, is stored in key card.Key card is that independent hardware isolated is set Standby, a possibility that stealing key by Malware or malicious operation, substantially reduces.Since quantum computer is unable to get user's public affairs Key is then also unable to get corresponding private key.In addition, the digital signature based on public and private key is also further by key in the present invention Encryption.Even if in the presence of quantum computer, it is also difficult to be derived private key.Therefore the program is not easy by quantum meter Calculation machine cracks.Being transferred to wallet address and being transferred to the amount of money in the transaction of block chain is also encrypted in the present invention, prevents its public affairs Convince cause exposure user privacy information by patient analysis.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is communication system architecture figure provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is that P2P stores network structure;
Fig. 3 is the flow diagram for obtaining public key in public key pond;
Fig. 4 is the structural schematic diagram of transaction of unsigning;
Fig. 5 is structure of deal schematic diagram in the m times signature process;
Fig. 6 is the structural schematic diagram of the transaction of having signed of encryption;
Fig. 7 is the relationship of block and transaction;
Fig. 8 is the structure of deal schematic diagram for being stored into block;
Fig. 9 is the transaction of original digging mine;
Figure 10 is digging mine transaction after encryption.
Specific embodiment
The present embodiment processing block chain in process of exchange, general thought be to block chain transaction in digital signature, Public key is transferred to wallet address and is transferred to the amount of money and encrypted, while public key pond being stored in P2P storage network.
This system structure has corresponding block chain to answer as shown in Figure 1, a node of each user as block chain With, and it is furnished with key card, u key card is shared, has private key SK, public key pond number KID and public key in each key card and refers to Needle random number R PK;Key card is called by the application of block chain, and key does not go out key card.
For P2P storage network structure as shown in Fig. 2, there being z public key pond, ID is KID=Ki (i=1~z).Public key pond It is encrypted respectively using z symmetric key KKi (i=1~z), is true random number, preferably quantum random number.
Each KKi (i=1~z) is encrypted by u PKi (i=1~u).U is user or key card indicia, and PK is phase Using the public key at family.
P2P stores all data in network and is uploaded by public key pond issuer, and P2P storage network can not be decrypted.
Specific step is as follows for the storage mode of public key: public key pointer random number R PK is taken at random to some user, in conjunction with specified Public key pointer function FPPK obtain public key pointer PPK and from the corresponding position deposit in corresponding public key pond using corresponding The encrypted public key PK of KKi.
It can be stored in network from P2P by public key pond number KID and public key pointer random number R PK and obtain public key PK, Specific steps are as shown in figure 3, verbal description is as follows:
Public key pointer random number R PK combines specified public key pointer function FPPK to obtain public key pointer PPK and from corresponding Corresponding position in public key pond takes out the PK of encryption, decrypts to obtain KK using corresponding SK according to KID, reuses KK and decrypt to obtain Public key PK.
The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond that the present embodiment provides a kind of, including it is multiple User terminal and the P2P for passing through network connection with each user terminal store network, and each user terminal is furnished with key card, key card In have private key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number;
The P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, and user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer is random Number obtains public key corresponding with private key from corresponding public key pond.
Trading, specific step is as follows (in no specified otherwise, when referring to using private key, is interpreted as currently using One's own side's private key at family):
Step 1.1 generates the RTx that trades that unsigns;
Before initiating transaction, trade initiator, which initiates user terminal A, need to generate the RTx that trades that unsigns, structure such as Fig. 4 institute Show.In Fig. 4, InN indicates serial number of certain the input fund in this Tx;TxID indicates certain input fund where its source The ID of Tx.Generally desirable TxID=Hash (Tx);N indicates certain input fund in the Tx where its source as finance of export Serial number;OutN indicates serial number of certain finance of export in this Tx;Dest indicates the address that is transferred to of certain finance of export, generally It is the form of wallet;Value indicates the number of certain finance of export.
Step 1.2 generates trading signature Txs;
By taking the m times signature as an example, change as shown in Figure 5 is made to RTx and obtains RTxm.When the m times signature, acquisition m is defeated Enter the amount of money corresponding Dest value in the Tx where its source.
Acquisition modes are shown in step 1.7.
Such as RTx is added as PreDestm in the Dest value and obtains RTxm.Hash is carried out to RTxm, obtains hash value Txhm;It is signed using private key SKm to Txhm, obtains m-th of signature Txsm.Obtain all Txs with identical method, i.e., it is raw At trading signature.
Certainly according to the design needs, initiate user terminal and specified operation generating function is carried out to generated transaction of unsigning Value, the functional value generate trading signature in conjunction with party B private key, wherein the method initiated user terminal and generate the functional value Include: will unsign trade internal data adjustment after carry out specified function operation obtain the functional value, the specified operation is not It is limited to this, as long as the trading signature can be generated.
Step 1.3 encrypts the digital signature Txs for taking certain input fund, while being stored in public key pond number KID With public key pointer random number R PK;
For every input fund, digital signature Txs is encrypted with respective first key sk respectively, the acquisition modes of sk It is as follows:
First random number rs is generated by the randomizer in the matched key card of the user terminal, to Txh (for Txs's Hash value) and rs sk, i.e. sk=fsk (Txh, rs) be calculated by fsk algorithm.
Then private key SK corresponding with public key pointer random number R PK is used to be encrypted to obtain ciphertext first at random to rs Number is stored in Tx together.Transaction is as shown in Figure 6 at this time.
Step 1.4 sends Tx;
It will sign and broadcasted the transaction Tx of encrypted signature to all nodes of block chain network.
Step 1.5 verifies Tx: each node in block chain network verifies the transaction.
When transaction verification, is unsigned using verifying user terminal generation and trade and the transaction of unsigning is specified Operation generating function value finds corresponding public key according to public-key cryptographic keys random number in transaction, goes out the random number by public key decryptions, should Functional value is combined with the random number generates key (such as sk in step 1.3 and hereinafter), and the key is for decrypting The encryption trading signature is realized and is handed over after the trading signature of the encryption described in the public key decryptions compared with shown functional value Easily verifying.Certainly according to the design needs, verifying user terminal unsigns to verifying user terminal generation and trades and to the friendship of unsigning Specified operation generating function value is easily carried out, wherein the method that the verifying user terminal generates the functional value includes: that will unsign Specified function operation is carried out after transaction internal data adjustment and obtains the functional value, and the specified operation described in the present embodiment is to breathe out Uncommon algorithm, certain algorithm is without being limited thereto, as long as transaction verification can be completed.
During transaction verification, each node in block chain network can be used as verifying node.Verify node with it is upper The identical mode of text forms the RTx of an authentication, carries out Hash to RTx and obtains hash value Txh.According to KID and RPK in P2P Storage network finds PK (PK public key i.e. corresponding with above SK), and process is as shown in figure 3, verbal description is same as above:
It decrypts to obtain rs using PK, calculates sk further according to rs, KID and Txh.Txs is decrypted using sk.It is solved using public key PK Close signature compares obtained Txh ' and Txh, completes verifying.Different the amount of money is produced if producing amount information and including more Source then produces the corresponding encryption of the amount of money to more using same procedure and produces signature and verifies.
After verifying to each signature, verifying node is according to the TxID of each input amount of money in the historical record of block chain It finds and produces the amount of money, to prove the existence of this each input amount of money of trading.It is obtained after the verifying node taking-up input amount of money defeated Enter amount of money total value, compares, check whether equal with this output amount of money total value;It is verified if equal;If no Equal then authentication failed.
Block is added in the transaction by step 1.6: block and the relationship of transaction are as shown in Figure 7.
Step 1.6.1 miner encrypts Dest and Value;
Before block is added in Tx, first wallet address D est and amount of the fund Value is encrypted to obtain with the second key tk The wallet address of encryption and amount of the fund.The acquisition modes of tk are as follows:
Take the Hash of this importation Tx as Th, it is raw by the randomizer in the matched key card of the user terminal At the second random number rt, tk, i.e. tk=ftk (Th, rt) are calculated by ftk algorithm to Th and rt.
Tx ' is obtained after encrypting Dest and Value using respective tk, rt encrypts to obtain with the SK, that is, SKminer for going out block side {rt}SKminer。
Tx "={ KID+RPKminer+ { rt } SKminer+Tx ' } is put into the structure after transaction as shown in figure 8, and conduct Block is added in the final form of transaction, and obtains the TxID=Hash (Tx ") of this transaction.
Step 1.6.2 miner forms digging mine and trades and encrypt;
Miner forms a digging mine transaction as shown in Figure 9, importation fill the affiliated mine pond of some miners or other Necessary information, output par, c is identical as general transaction, and output amount of money total amount is identical as the amount of money award of block is generated.It generates and digs mine After transaction, each third random number rt for generating at random simultaneously obtains each third key tk by mode same as above, makes Encrypt Dest and Value with tk, while encrypting each rt using SKminer, and public key corresponding with SKminer pond number and RPKminer, which is added, digs mine transaction, obtains encrypted digging mine transaction as shown in Figure 10.
Step 1.6.3 miner, which calculates, digs mine random number;
Miner calculates the random number for meeting rule, that is, obtains this book keeping operation power, the digging that oneself is generated and is encrypted Mine transaction is added in block.
Step 1.6.4 miner broadcasts successfully digging mining area block: after miner obtains successfully digging mining area block, which broadcasted, Remaining node verifies block.Mainly verifying digs whether mine random number meets rule, the correctness of each transaction, and The correctness of Merkle root.It is such as proved to be successful, then receiving the block is new block.
Step 1.7 decrypts Dest and Value: finding Tx ", and the PK encrypted with RPK according to TxID, is looked for according to KID It is decrypted to corresponding encryption kk and using private key SK, then decrypts to obtain PK using kk.Tk is decrypted using PK, reuses tk decryption Dest and Value.Wherein Dest is for constructing new Tx, and verifying of the Dest and Value for Txs in step 1.5.
In one embodiment, a kind of computer equipment, i.e., a kind of anti-quantum calculation area based on P2P public key pond are provided Block chain secure transactions system, the computer equipment can be terminal, and internal structure may include being connected by system bus Processor, memory, network interface, display screen and input unit.Wherein, the processor of the computer equipment is for providing calculating And control ability.The memory of the computer equipment includes non-volatile memory medium, built-in storage.The non-volatile memories are situated between Matter is stored with operating system and computer program.The built-in storage is operating system and computer in non-volatile memory medium The operation of program provides environment.The network interface of the computer equipment is used to communicate with external terminal by network connection.It should To realize the above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on public key pond when computer program is executed by processor.It should The display screen of computer equipment can be liquid crystal display or electric ink display screen, and the input unit of the computer equipment can To be the touch layer covered on display screen, it is also possible to the key being arranged on computer equipment shell, trace ball or Trackpad, also It can be external keyboard, Trackpad or mouse etc..
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on P2P public key pond is provided, is wrapped It including a plurality of clients and network is stored by the P2P of network connection with each user terminal, each user terminal is furnished with key card, There are private key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number in key card;
The P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, and user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer is random Number obtains public key corresponding with private key from corresponding public key pond;
User terminal includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond is realized when program.
Each technical characteristic of embodiment described above can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-mentioned reality It applies all possible combination of each technical characteristic in example to be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics is not deposited In contradiction, all should be considered as described in this specification.
The embodiments described above only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously It cannot therefore be construed as limiting the scope of the patent.It should be pointed out that coming for those of ordinary skill in the art It says, without departing from the inventive concept of the premise, various modifications and improvements can be made, these belong to protection of the invention Range.Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the invention shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (8)

1. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond, which is characterized in that including a plurality of clients with And network is stored by the P2P of network connection with each user terminal, each user terminal is furnished with key card, has private in key card Key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number;
P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer random number from Public key corresponding with private key is obtained in corresponding public key pond;
Include: when transaction initiation
To unsigning, transaction carries out operation generating function value;
It is signed by private key to the functional value and generates trading signature;
It generates the first random number and generates first key using first random number and the functional value;
The trading signature, which is encrypted, by the first key obtains ciphertext signature;
The first random number of ciphertext is obtained by the first random number described in the private key encryption;
By the ciphertext signature, the first random number of the ciphertext and public key corresponding with private key pond number and public key pointer with Machine number is stored in transaction and broadcasts in block chain network.
2. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that Public key in public key pond is encrypted using key, and the key is stored in the P2P storage network with ciphertext form.
3. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on P2P public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that The public key encryption of each user is respectively adopted in the key.
4. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on public key pond as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that hand over Include: when easily verifying
Using from the public key pond number and public key pointer random number for initiating user terminal, requests and obtain from P2P storage network The public key of the initiation user terminal of the key and key encryption of corresponding ciphertext form;
The key is obtained using the decryption of one's own side's private key, the key decryption is recycled to obtain the public key for initiating user terminal;
The first random number of ciphertext described in public key decryptions using first user terminal obtains first random number;
Generation, which is unsigned, trades and carries out operation generating function value, the functional value and the first random number phase to transaction of unsigning In conjunction with generation first key;
The ciphertext is decrypted using the first key of generation to sign to obtain the trading signature, and utilizes the public key for initiating user terminal Verify the trading signature.
5. such as claim 4 or the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on public key pond, which is characterized in that Carrying out operation generating function value to transaction of unsigning includes: to be adjusted the internal data for transaction of unsigning, to adjusted Transaction of unsigning carries out Hash operation and obtains the functional value.
6. such as claim 5 or the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on public key pond, which is characterized in that Transaction after being verified is verifying transaction, and verifying transaction includes: when block is added
The second random number is generated, and generates the second key using second random number and the cryptographic Hash of transaction;
Using in second key pair verifying transaction wallet address and the money that is encrypted respectively of amount of the fund Packet address and amount of the fund;
The second random number of ciphertext is obtained with the second random number of private key encryption;
By the wallet address of the second key encryption and amount of the fund, the second random number of the ciphertext and public key corresponding with private key Pond number and the deposit verifying of public key pointer random number are traded and are added in block.
7. such as claim 6 or the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on public key pond, which is characterized in that Further include:
It generates and digs mine transaction;
Third random number is generated, and generates third key using the cryptographic Hash of the third random number and digging mine transaction;
The wallet address and amount of the fund dug in mine transaction using the third key pair are encrypted to obtain encrypting respectively Wallet address and amount of the fund;
Ciphertext third random number is obtained with private key encryption third random number;
The wallet address that third key is encrypted and amount of the fund, the ciphertext third random number and public key corresponding with private key Pond number and public key pointer random number, which are added, digs mine transaction and in storage block;
The block is received after verified to the digging mine transaction in storage block chain.
8. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on P2P public key pond, which is characterized in that including a plurality of clients with And network is stored by the P2P of network connection with each user terminal, each user terminal is furnished with key card, has private in key card Key, public key pond number and public key pointer random number;
P2P storage network configuration has multiple public key ponds, user terminal can be numbered according to public key pond and public key pointer random number from Public key corresponding with private key is obtained in corresponding public key pond;
User terminal includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer program The described in any item anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions methods based on P2P public key pond of Shi Shixian claim 1~7.
CN201910032268.6A 2019-01-14 2019-01-14 Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and system based on P2P public key pond Pending CN109919610A (en)

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