CN109918907A - Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method, controller and medium - Google Patents
Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method, controller and medium Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method, controller and media to read the Memory Mapping File of all processes the method includes traversing all processes of linux system；One of the corresponding all memory fragment datas of the process, program file routing information and dynamic library file path information or a variety of are obtained based on each proceeding internal memory mapped file, according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information, or, the dynamic library file path information for including in all memory fragment datas and Memory Mapping File, alternatively, the malicious code of the program file corresponding dynamic library file path infomation detection process.The present invention utilizes the proceeding internal memory mapped file of (SuSE) Linux OS, determine the memory address layout of process, the complete memory of each process in accurate acquisition system, malicious code effectively in discovery linux system memory, the safety of system Linux is improved, deposit has versatility and stability inside on evidence collecting method.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of network security more particularly to a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code to collect evidence
Method, controller and medium.
Background technique
Linux system is a widely applied computer operating system, national important mechanism, bank, operator, interconnection
The various fields such as net industry have a large amount of deployment and use.Hacker's tissue payes attention to always the infiltration to linux system for a long time
And control, Linux server are also the important goal that advanced persistence threatens (APT).It is taken at present in linux system malicious code
Card aspect, be primarily present two bottlenecks: the first, rogue program utilize advanced concealing technology and coding techniques so that its be difficult to by
It was found that and analysis, and these rogue programs threaten entire information system bring and endanger and can not estimate；The second, at present
Still immature for the attack forensic technologies of Linux server system, mature tool or system can not help business
Personnel carry out efficient forensics analysis work to suspicious server.In face of the Linux server attacked, in its system process
The efficient security forensics of row are deposited into, crucial malicious code is therefrom extracted, is one of the pith in security incident response.
The existing linux system progress safety detection method that is directed to includes: virus scan detection, general rootkit detection
Class, Host-based intrusion detection, log analysis detection and particular detection etc., but the above method detected both for system file feature or
The detection (such as hidden process, hide connection) of part specific content, lack complete set for linux system proceeding internal memory
Malicious Code Detection technology.And in actually evidence obtaining, the malicious code operated in linux system memory is entire malicious attack
In core therefore how effectively to find the malicious code in linux system memory, block malicious attack in time, reduce
Bring loss is attacked, security of system is improved, becomes technical problem urgently to be resolved.
Summary of the invention
Technical problem to be solved by the present invention lies in provide a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence obtaining side
Method, controller and medium determine the memory address layout of process using the proceeding internal memory mapped file of (SuSE) Linux OS, from
And the complete memory of each process in system is accurately obtained, it effectively finds the malicious code in linux system memory, improves
The safety of system Linux, deposit has versatility and stability inside on evidence collecting method.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence obtaining sides
Method, comprising:
All processes of linux system are traversed, the Memory Mapping File of all processes is read；
The corresponding all memory fragment datas of the process, program file are obtained based on each proceeding internal memory mapped file
One of routing information and dynamic library file path information are a variety of, and the dynamic library file path information includes memory mapping
The corresponding dynamic library file path information of the program file for including in file and the corresponding dynamic library file path letter of program file
Breath；
According to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information, alternatively, all Memory slices
The dynamic library file path information for including in segment data and Memory Mapping File, alternatively, the corresponding dynamic library file of program file
Routing information detects the malicious code of the process.
Further, all processes of the traversal linux system, read the Memory Mapping File of all processes, comprising:
Obtain linux system process number maximum value；
It is starting point with process number 1, using the process number maximum value as terminal, traverses process under process catalogue/proc
Catalogue/proc/pid/ obtains all processes of system；
For each process subdirectory/proc/pid/, the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process is obtained.
Further, during process subdirectory/proc/pid/ under the traversal process catalogue/proc, if traversal is extremely
Default process, then directly skip, and continues to traverse next process, the default process includes kernel thread and memory evidence obtaining process.
Further, all internal storage datas of each process are obtained based on the proceeding internal memory mapped file, comprising:
Using the process for currently carrying out obtaining memory information as target process, the corresponding memory mapping of the target process is read
File parses wherein full memory piece segment information, obtains initial address and the end address of each memory segment；
Calling system debugging function ptrace reads memory of each memory segment between initial address to end address
Data；
Calling system file manipulation function open/write stores the corresponding memory number of each memory segment read
According to until all memory segments reading of the target process finishes, the internal storage data of the target process individually stores one
Catalogue.
It further, should be into according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and the detection of program file routing information
The malicious code of journey, comprising:
The pre-set code section in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process；
According to described program file path information acquiring program file；
The corresponding program header structure of described program file is analyzed, the corresponding pre-set code section of the program file is obtained；
By in the proceeding internal memory pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section of program file compare, if it exists
It is different, then it represents that there are malicious code, to export the program file and corresponding memory fragment data.
Further, according to the dynamic for including in the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and Memory Mapping File
Library file routing information detects the malicious code of the process, comprising:
The pre-set code section in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process；
According to the dynamic library file path acquisition of information dynamic library file for including in Memory Mapping File；
The corresponding program header file of the dynamic library file is analyzed, the corresponding pre-set code section of the dynamic library file is obtained；
By in the proceeding internal memory pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section of dynamic library file compare, if depositing
In difference, then it represents that there are malicious codes, export dynamic library file and corresponding memory fragment data.
Further, the pre-set code section is .text segment data.
Further, according to the corresponding dynamic library file path infomation detection process of the corresponding program file of each process
Malicious code, comprising:
According to the corresponding dynamic library file path information of the corresponding program file of each process, it is corresponding dynamic to obtain the process
State library file list；
Obtain the dynamic library file information for including in the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process；
The living document information for including in the Memory Mapping File and the dynamic library file list are compared；
If in the Memory Mapping File including one or more not living documents in the dynamic library file list,
It then indicates to export the dynamic library file path and corresponding memory fragment data there are malicious code.
Another aspect according to the present invention provides a kind of controller comprising memory and processor, the memory storage
There is the step of computer program, described program can be realized the method when being executed by the processor.
Another aspect according to the present invention provides a kind of computer readable storage medium, described for storing computer instruction
The step of instruction realizes the method when by a computer or processor execution.
The present invention has obvious advantages and beneficial effects compared with the existing technology.By above-mentioned technical proposal, the present invention
A kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method, controller and medium can reach comparable technical progress and reality
With property, and with the extensive utility value in industry, at least have the advantage that
The present invention utilizes the proceeding internal memory mapped file of (SuSE) Linux OS, determines the memory address layout of process, thus
The complete memory of each process in accurate acquisition system, the memory information between each process is mutually indepedent, and then effectively sends out
Malicious code in existing linux system memory, method is simply accurate, improves the safety of system Linux.The present invention is more traditional
System original memory evidence obtaining, avoid the complete acquisition and independent acquisition of each proceeding internal memory, deposit on evidence collecting method inside
With versatility and stability.
The above description is only an overview of the technical scheme of the present invention, in order to better understand the technical means of the present invention,
And it can be implemented in accordance with the contents of the specification, and in order to allow above and other objects, features and advantages of the invention can
It is clearer and more comprehensible, it is special below to lift preferred embodiment, and cooperate attached drawing, detailed description are as follows.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 provides Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method schematic diagram for one embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 2 is all internal storage data schematic diagrames that one embodiment of the invention obtains process based on proceeding internal memory mapped file.
Specific embodiment
It is of the invention to reach the technical means and efficacy that predetermined goal of the invention is taken further to illustrate, below in conjunction with
Attached drawing and preferred embodiment, to a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method proposed according to the present invention, control
The specific embodiment and its effect of device and medium, detailed description is as follows.
The embodiment of the invention provides a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting methods, as shown in Figure 1, packet
Include following steps:
Step S1, all processes of linux system are traversed, the Memory Mapping File of all processes is read；
Step S2, the corresponding all memories of the process are obtained based on each proceeding internal memory mapped file (maps file)
One of fragment data, program file routing information and dynamic library file path information are a variety of, the dynamic library file road
Diameter information includes that the corresponding dynamic library file path information of program file for including and program file are corresponding in Memory Mapping File
Dynamic library file path information；
Wherein, according to the filename character string for including in process maps file, the corresponding program file of process can be obtained
The dynamic library file path information of routing information and dependence.
Step S3, according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information, alternatively, all
The dynamic library file path information for including in memory fragment data and Memory Mapping File, alternatively, the corresponding dynamic of program file
Library file routing information detects the malicious code of the process.
It loops through, until having detected the proceeding internal memory of all evidence obtainings.
As an example, the step S1 includes:
Step S11, linux system process number maximum value is obtained；
It specifically, can be by obtaining linux system kernel setup parameter (/proc/sys/kernel/pid_max), to obtain
Take the maximum value of system process number.
It step S12, is starting point with process number 1 using Linux file directory access characteristics, with the process number maximum value
For terminal, process subdirectory/proc/pid/ under process catalogue/proc is traversed, obtains all processes of system；
Since the process number run in system is limited, which is equally effective for hidden process.It is directed to Linux system simultaneously
Thread in system, it is also the same effective.Process number pid and maps file effective in each ergodic process is corresponded.
Step S13, it is directed to each process subdirectory/proc/pid/, obtains the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process, this
Outside, process can be also obtained simultaneously opens file, the information such as process Parameter File.
During the entire process of traversing evidence obtaining, memory evidence obtaining program operation can also generate a system process, i.e., interior access
Card process, and the process is not centainly malicious process, in addition, kernel thread is also not malicious process, without to memory
Evidence obtaining process and kernel thread carry out memory evidence obtaining, to improve the efficiency of program operation.Therefore, in the traversal process mesh
During process subdirectory/proc/pid/ under record/proc, if traversal is directly skipped, is continued under traversal to default process
One process, the default process include kernel thread and memory evidence obtaining process.
Every row represents a memory segment in maps file, behind be corresponding with file path, i.e. program file path and dynamic
State library file path.Each program file or dynamic library file include several memory segments, and wherein .text segment data is located at each
The first row in memory segment that file is included.The full memory piece segment information of each process is included in process maps file
In, according to every a line in the maps file of process, the memory fragment data of each process is read out, then according to memory
The initial address of segment stores in disk one by one, with the name of memory initial address.As an example, in the step S2,
All internal storage datas of each process are obtained based on the proceeding internal memory mapped file, can pass through system application interface API
Each integrated all segmentation memories are obtained, as shown in Fig. 2, specifically can comprise the following steps that
Step S21, using the process for currently carrying out obtaining memory information as target process, it is corresponding to read the target process
Memory Mapping File parses wherein full memory piece segment information, obtains the initial address and end of each memory segment
Address；
Step S22, calling system debugging function ptrace read each memory segment from initial address to end address it
Between internal storage data；
Step S23, each memory segment that calling system file manipulation function open/write storage is read is corresponding
Internal storage data, until the target process all memory segments reading finish, the internal storage data of the target process is independent
Store a catalogue.
Wherein, internal storage data may include program code segments memory, program data section memory, dynamic base memory, stack memory,
Anonymity mapping memory etc..
As an example, the initial address of proceeding internal memory segment and length according to obtained in step S21 (rise end address-
Beginning address), obtain the content of each memory segment of process in a binary fashion, and be saved in file respectively, filename is with memory
The initial address of segment is named.Filename is named with the initial address of memory segment.It loops through, by the memory number of all processes
It is finished according to by step S21- step S23 acquisition.
Further describe step S21- step S23 below by way of a specific example, using system function ptrace into
Journey additional function parameter (PTRACE_ATTACH), is attached to target process, and target process is made to enter debugging mode, operation suspension,
Wait the subsequent operation of ptrace.If the maps file of some pid reads failure, indicate that the process is kernel thread, or
Process there is no etc., then traverse next process pid；If it succeeds, starting the memory read functions parameter of calling ptrace
It (PTRACE_PEEKTEXT), is single according to 4 bytes according to the initial address and length of each memory segment in maps file
Position, sequence read the internal storage data of corresponding length.Each pid individually creates a directory, and stores under catalogue all with Memory slice
The internal storage data file of sector address name.It is finished when memory segment all in maps file is read, calls ptrace function
Process detachment function parameter (PTRACE_DETACH) is detached from from target process, target process is made to resume operation.
After proceeding internal memory in each system is read, then Malicious Code Detection is carried out by step S3, in step S3
Including Through Several Survey Measure, it is illustrated below by way of three embodiments:
Embodiment one,
The malice of the process is detected according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information
Code, comprising:
Step S301, the pre-set code in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process
Section；
Step S302, according to described program file path information acquiring program file；
Step S303, the corresponding program header structure of analysis described program file, obtains the program file corresponding default generation
Code section；
Especially by analysis program file elf structure, corresponding program header structure is obtained, program header contains this document fortune
When row, layout scenarios in memory, program connector (essential tool in code compilation process) is by many program segments
(i.e. sections) is connected as an application heap (i.e. segment), and the purposes of each segment is different with memory permission, has
It reads to execute the segment of (rx) permission to include dynamic relocatable section (.rela.dyn), program chains relocatable section
The sections such as (.rela.plt), code segment (.text), the content that this segment includes are the code assembly instructions of program
Part.As an example, the pre-set code section is .text segment data.
Step S304, by the proceeding internal memory pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section of program file carry out pair
Than different if it exists, then it represents that there are malicious code, to export the program file and corresponding memory fragment data.
Embodiment two,
According to the dynamic library file road for including in the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and Memory Mapping File
The malicious code of the diameter infomation detection process, comprising:
Step S311, the pre-set code in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process
Section；
Step S312, according to the dynamic library file path acquisition of information dynamic library file for including in Memory Mapping File；
Step S313, the corresponding program header file of the dynamic library file is analyzed, it is corresponding pre- to obtain the dynamic library file
If code segment；
Especially by analysis dynamic library file elf structure, corresponding program header structure is obtained, it is as an example, described
Pre-set code section is .text segment data.
Step S314, by the pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section progress of dynamic library file in the proceeding internal memory
Comparison, it is different if it exists, then it represents that there are malicious codes, export dynamic library file and corresponding memory fragment data.
Embodiment three,
According to the malice generation of the corresponding program file of each process corresponding dynamic library file path infomation detection process
Code, comprising:
Step S321, according to the corresponding dynamic library file path information of the corresponding program file of each process, obtaining should be into
The corresponding dynamic library file list of journey；
Step S322, the dynamic library file information for including in the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process is obtained；
Step S323, by the living document information for including in the Memory Mapping File and the dynamic library file list into
Row comparison；
If in step S324, the described Memory Mapping File comprising one or more not in the dynamic library file list
Living document, then it represents that there are malicious code, export the dynamic library file path and corresponding memory fragment data.
It should be noted that three above embodiment is merely illustrative, in actual use, all interior of all processes is being obtained
Deposit fragment data can also be used other malice detection methods and carries out Malicious Code Detection that is, on the basis of memory evidence obtaining.
The embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of controller comprising memory and processor, the memory are stored with meter
Calculation machine program, described program can be realized the Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code when being executed by the processor and take
The step of card method.
The embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of computer readable storage medium, for storing computer instruction, described instruction
The step of realizing the Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method when by a computer or processor execution.
The embodiment of the present invention utilizes the proceeding internal memory mapped file of (SuSE) Linux OS, determines the memory address cloth of process
Office, thus accurately in acquisition system each process complete memory, the memory information between each process is mutually indepedent, in turn
Malicious code effectively in discovery linux system memory, method is simply accurate, improves the safety of system Linux.The present invention
The original memory evidence obtaining of more traditional system avoids the complete acquisition and independent acquisition of each proceeding internal memory, inside access card
There is versatility and stability in method.
The above described is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, be not intended to limit the present invention in any form, though
So the present invention has been disclosed as a preferred embodiment, and however, it is not intended to limit the invention, any technology people for being familiar with this profession
Member, without departing from the scope of the present invention, when the technology contents using the disclosure above make a little change or modification
For the equivalent embodiment of equivalent variations, but anything that does not depart from the technical scheme of the invention content, according to the technical essence of the invention
Any simple modification, equivalent change and modification to the above embodiments, all of which are still within the scope of the technical scheme of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method characterized by comprising
All processes of linux system are traversed, the Memory Mapping File of all processes is read；
The corresponding all memory fragment datas of the process, program file path are obtained based on each proceeding internal memory mapped file
One of information and dynamic library file path information are a variety of, and the dynamic library file path information includes Memory Mapping File
In include the corresponding dynamic library file path information of program file and the corresponding dynamic library file path information of program file；
According to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information, alternatively, all memory segments
According to the dynamic library file path information that includes in Memory Mapping File, alternatively, the corresponding dynamic library file path of program file
The malicious code of the infomation detection process.
2. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that
All processes of the traversal linux system, read the Memory Mapping File of all processes, comprising:
Obtain linux system process number maximum value；
Be starting point with process number 1, using the process number maximum value as terminal, traverse process catalogue/proc under process subdirectory/
Proc/pid/ obtains all processes of system；
For each process subdirectory/proc/pid/, the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process is obtained.
3. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 2, which is characterized in that
During process subdirectory/proc/pid/ under the traversal process catalogue/proc, if traversal to default process, directly
It connects and skips, continue to traverse next process, the default process includes kernel thread and memory evidence obtaining process.
4. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that
All internal storage datas of each process are obtained based on the proceeding internal memory mapped file, comprising:
Using the process for currently carrying out obtaining memory information as target process, the corresponding memory mapping text of the target process is read
Part parses wherein full memory piece segment information, obtains initial address and the end address of each memory segment；
Calling system debugging function ptrace reads internal storage data of each memory segment between initial address to end address；
Calling system file manipulation function open/write stores the corresponding internal storage data of each memory segment read, directly
All memory segments reading to the target process finishes, and the internal storage data of the target process individually stores a catalogue.
5. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 4, which is characterized in that
The malicious code of the process is detected according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and program file routing information,
Include:
The pre-set code section in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process；
According to described program file path information acquiring program file；
The corresponding program header structure of described program file is analyzed, the corresponding pre-set code section of the program file is obtained；
By in the proceeding internal memory pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section of program file compare, if it exists not
Together, then it represents that there are malicious code, export the program file and corresponding memory fragment data.
6. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 4, which is characterized in that
According to the dynamic library file path letter for including in the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process and Memory Mapping File
Breath detects the malicious code of the process, comprising:
The pre-set code section in proceeding internal memory is obtained according to the corresponding all memory fragment datas of each process；
According to the dynamic library file path acquisition of information dynamic library file for including in Memory Mapping File；
The corresponding program header file of the dynamic library file is analyzed, the corresponding pre-set code section of the dynamic library file is obtained；
By in the proceeding internal memory pre-set code section and the corresponding pre-set code section of dynamic library file compare, if it exists not
Together, then it represents that there are malicious codes, export dynamic library file and corresponding memory fragment data.
7. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 5 or 6, which is characterized in that
The pre-set code section is .text segment data.
8. Linux platform proceeding internal memory malicious code evidence collecting method according to claim 4, which is characterized in that
According to the malicious code of the corresponding program file of each process corresponding dynamic library file path infomation detection process, packet
It includes:
According to the corresponding dynamic library file path information of the corresponding program file of each process, the corresponding dynamic base of the process is obtained
Listed files；
Obtain the dynamic library file information for including in the corresponding Memory Mapping File of the process；
The living document information for including in the Memory Mapping File and the dynamic library file list are compared；
If including one or more not living documents in the dynamic library file list, table in the Memory Mapping File
Show there are malicious code, exports the dynamic library file path and corresponding memory fragment data.
9. a kind of controller comprising memory and processor, which is characterized in that
The memory is stored with computer program, and described program can be realized claim 1 when being executed by the processor
The step of to method described in any one of 8 claims.
10. a kind of computer readable storage medium, for storing computer instruction, which is characterized in that
Described instruction is realized when by a computer or processor execution such as any one of claim 1 to 8 claim institute
The step of method stated.
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