CN107835199A - Suitable for solving the method for work of the SDN systems of network security - Google Patents
Suitable for solving the method for work of the SDN systems of network security Download PDFInfo
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- CN107835199A CN107835199A CN201711362500.XA CN201711362500A CN107835199A CN 107835199 A CN107835199 A CN 107835199A CN 201711362500 A CN201711362500 A CN 201711362500A CN 107835199 A CN107835199 A CN 107835199A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/302—Route determination based on requested QoS
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Abstract
The invention discloses it is a kind of be suitable to solve network security SDN systems method of work, this SDN framework, including:Using plane, datum plane and control plane;Wherein datum plane, when any IDS equipment detects that attack threatens in datum plane, notice enters attack type analysis process using plane;Using plane, for analyzing attack type, and corresponding attack is customized according to attack type and threatens processing strategy;Control plane, Processing Interface is threatened to provide attack using plane, and optimal path computation and/or attack threat identification interface are provided for datum plane.The present invention can make network when being threatened by extensive DDoS, and the flow forwarding of routing optimality can be realized according to the real time status of link, while rapid accurately progress DDoS threat identifications and processing respond, full-scope safeguards network communication quality.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to network safety filed, more particularly to a kind of work for being suitable to solve the SDN systems of network security
Method.
Background technology
Currently, the network connected extensively at a high speed has become the important infrastructure of modern society.However, with internet
The expansion of scale, also increasingly show the defects of traditional specificationses system.
The report of national computer network emergence technology processing Consultation Center (CNCERT/CC) newest issue shows:Hacker
Activity is increased, and the attack such as website back door, phishing, Web malice extension horses is in the trend that increases substantially, country, enterprise
Internet security be faced with severe challenge.
Wherein, distributed denial of service attack (Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS) is still to influence
One of internet most important threat safe for operation.In the past few years, the number of ddos attack, size, type be all significantly
Go up.
Software defined network (Software Defined Network, SDN) has can real-time update routing policy and rule
Then, the characteristics such as profound data packet analysis are supported, thus the DDoS that can be directed in complex network ring environment threatens offer more fast
Fast accurately network monitoring and defense function.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of SDN framework, to solve in existing network caused by a large amount of ddos attacks
Network security problem, with realize it is quick, efficiently, comprehensively identification and defending DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problem, the invention provides a kind of SDN framework, including:Put down using plane, data
Face and control plane;Wherein
Datum plane, when any IDS equipment detects that attack threatens in datum plane, notice enters using plane
To attack type analysis process;
Using plane, corresponding attack threat processing is customized for analyzing attack type, and according to attack type
Strategy;
Control plane, Processing Interface is threatened to provide attack using plane, and optimal path computation is provided for datum plane
And/or attack threat identification interface.
Beneficial effects of the present invention:DDoS is threatened monitoring, threatens the business function modules such as protection, routing optimality by the present invention
It is respectively deployed in datum plane, control plane and using plane.Network can be made when being threatened by extensive DDoS, being capable of basis
The real time status of link realizes the flow forwarding of routing optimality, while rapid accurately progress DDoS threat identifications and processing ring
Should, full-scope safeguards network communication quality.
Another aspect, present invention also offers a kind of SDN systems, to solve the technical problem of defending DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problem, the invention provides a kind of SDN systems, including:Controller, IDS decision services
Device, distributed IDS equipment and flow cleaning center;When any IDS equipment detects the message with ddos attack feature,
IDS policy servers are reported to by SSL traffic channel;The IDS policy servers are made and had according to information is reported
There is processing strategy corresponding to the message of ddos attack feature, it is then that the message is by controller shielding or right by message institute
The interchanger access interface flow answered is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered.
Preferably, in order to realize that DDoS is detected in IDS equipment, include in the IDS equipment:Cheat packet check mould
Block, the deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address detect;Packet check module is destroyed, to internetwork layer and transport layer mark
The abnormal behaviour that will position is set is detected;Exception message detection module, the formula attack that flooded to application layer and transport layer are entered
Row detection;Message is entered successively by the deception packet check module, destruction packet check module, exception message detection module
Row detection;And if the message is transferred to IDS decision services when above-mentioned respective behavior be present by any detection module detection outgoing packet
Device.
Preferably, the IDS policy servers when message suitable for having deceptive practices, and attacks and threaten in OpenFlow domains
In, then main frame is shielded by controller;Or threatened when attacking not in OpenFlow domains, then it is by controller that message institute is right
The interchanger access interface flow answered is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;The IDS policy servers are further adapted for working as
Message has abnormal behaviour, then the flow of attacker or attack main frame is shielded by controller;And when message has
The formula that floods attack, then the IDS policy servers are suitable for being accessed the interchanger corresponding to the message by controller
Port flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered.
The third aspect, present invention also offers a kind of fusion DDoS to threaten filtering and the work of the SDN systems of routing optimality
Method, to solve the distributed monitoring to ddos attack, formulating the corresponding technical problem for threatening processing strategy.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problem, present invention also offers a kind of fusion DDoS to threaten filtering and routing optimality
The method of work of SDN systems, comprises the following steps:
Step S100, netinit;Step S200, distributed DDoS threaten monitoring;And step S300, threat processing
And/or routing optimality.
Preferably, in order to preferably realize network configuration, the device bag in the step S100 involved by netinit
Include:Controller, IDS policy servers and distributed IDS equipment;
The step of netinit, is as follows:
Step S101, the IDS policy servers establish special SSL traffic channel with each IDS equipment;
Step S102, the controller build network equipment information binding table, and network equipment information binding table is real
Shi Gengxin is into each IDS equipment;
Step S104, the controller issue the flow table of mirror policy, i.e., all drag of OF interchangers are loaded with into the end of main frame
Mouth traffic mirroring is transmitted to corresponding IDS equipment in domain;And
Step S105, the controller issue DDoS threat identifications rule to corresponding each IDS equipment in each domain.
Preferably, distributed DDoS threatens the method for monitoring to include in the step S200:
Abnormal behaviour is set to the deceptive practices of link layer and internet layer address, internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit successively,
And
The formula attack that floods of application layer and transport layer is detected;
If any detection judges that outgoing packet has respective behavior in said process, the message is transferred to step S300.
Preferably, the method that the deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address are detected includes:
Deceptive practices are detected by cheating packet check module, i.e.,
First, network equipment information binding table is called by cheating packet check module;
Secondly, the type for being encapsulated in message in Packet-In message is parsed by cheating packet check module, with
Corresponding source, purpose IP address, MAC Address and the interchanger DPID and port numbers that upload this Packet-In message are obtained,
And above-mentioned each information is compared with the corresponding information in network equipment information binding table respectively;
If the above- mentioned information matching in message, next detection is carried out by message;
If the above- mentioned information in message mismatches, message is transferred to step S300;
The method that internetwork layer and the transport layer flag bit sets abnormal behaviour to be detected includes:
Abnormal behaviour is set to detect flag bit by destroying packet check module, i.e.,
Each flag bit of message is detected, to judge whether each flag bit meets ICP/IP protocol specification;
If each flag bit of message meets, message is transferred to and carries out next detection;
If each flag bit of message is not met, message is transferred to step S300;
The method that formula attack is detected that floods of the application layer and transport layer includes:
The formula attack that floods is detected by exception message detection module, i.e.,
The Hash table for identifying the formula attack message that floods is built in exception message detection module, and according in the Hash table
The threshold values of setting judges whether message has the formula attack that floods, and will determine that result is transferred to step S300.
Preferably, the method for processing and/or routing optimality is threatened to include in the step S300:
If message has deceptive practices, and attacks and threaten in OpenFlow domains, then the IDS policy servers are suitable to logical
Cross controller shielding main frame;And threatened when attacking not in OpenFlow domains, then by controller by corresponding to the message
Interchanger access interface flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;
If message has abnormal behaviour, the IDS policy servers are by controller to attacker or attack main frame
Flow shielded;
If message has the formula attack that floods, the IDS policy servers are by controller by corresponding to the message
Interchanger access interface flow be redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;And/or
Path optimizing is calculated according to link load coefficient, that is, detects the link remaining bandwidth of two adjacent nodes, is somebody's turn to do
The load factor of link, the optimal path of any two points, institute are being obtained according to the load factor and the network topological diagram of initialization
Controller is stated to forward flow table according to corresponding to being drawn the optimal path and issue each interchanger.
Preferably, the IDS policy servers shielding sends the program of message and/or the method for main frame and included:
First, the corresponding Hash table and setting respective threshold of counting are built, i.e.,
The first Hash table counted to deceptive practices, mark are built in unit interval, in the IDS policy servers
Position sets the second Hash table for being counted of abnormal behaviour, and to the 3rd Hash table that the formula attack that floods is counted;
Concurrently set first, second, third threshold values in first, second, third Hash table;
Secondly, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message, i.e.,
For the behavior for the message for being transferred to IDS policy servers, counted using corresponding Hash table, when count value exceedes
During respective thresholds, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
Beneficial effects of the present invention:(1) present invention merges DDoS threat filtering techniques with route-optimization technique, is carrying out
When monitoring, shielding DDOS attack, the congestion of data can't be caused, and by the way that monitoring and threat processing are separated, effectively
The burden of control plane is alleviated, ensure that network is safer, operations of colleges and universities;(2) the invention enables legacy network system frame
The problem that ddos attack is identified and traced to the source can not be forged under structure to address to be fundamentally resolved.Exist in a network
In the case of ddos attack or normal big flow business, controller can be based on the real-time sense to network parameters such as link remaining bandwidths
Know, realize the routing optimality of normal stream amount, the experience of user is substantially improved;(3) processing framework of the invention is using expansible
Modularized design, realize to DDoS threaten efficient detection and flexibly processing;(4) each module obtains packet information and used
Independent Interface design, reduce the coupling relevance of intermodule;(5) each module is careful using the program data structure optimized
Split each processing sub-process, improve the high cohesion characteristic of module.
Brief description of the drawings
In order that present disclosure is more likely to be clearly understood, below according to specific embodiment and with reference to accompanying drawing,
The present invention is further detailed explanation, wherein
Fig. 1 shows the theory diagram of data Layer in software defined network;
Fig. 2 shows ddos attack identification and the theory diagram of guard system based on SDN frameworks;
Fig. 3 shows the workflow diagram of deception packet check module;
Fig. 4 shows the workflow diagram for destroying packet check module;
Fig. 5 shows UDP Floodling overhaul flow chart;
Fig. 6 shows ICMP Floodling overhaul flow chart;
(a) shows the attack frequency that the Web server of unused this ddos attack identification and guard system is born in Fig. 7
The curve map of rate;(b) the attack frequency born using the identification of this ddos attack with the Web server of guard system is shown
Curve map.
Embodiment
To make the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention of greater clarity, with reference to embodiment and join
According to accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in more detail.It should be understood that these descriptions are merely illustrative, and it is not intended to limit this hair
Bright scope.In addition, in the following description, the description to known features and technology is eliminated, to avoid unnecessarily obscuring this
The concept of invention.
Fig. 1 shows the theory diagram of data Layer in software defined network.
As shown in figure 1, in software defined network (Software Defined Network, SDN) framework, when a report
When literary (Packet) reaches interchanger, the flow table of institute's band in interchanger is matched first.If the match is successful, just press
Rule is forwarded according to the action executing that flow table is specified.If it fails to match, the message is encapsulated in Packet In message by interchanger
In, controller is sent to, and interchanger has this message in local cache.Wait controller to make decisions, how to handle
This message.
There are many main frames in network, then it is the Hash table of key to need to establish one to be directed to All hosts in network, is referred to as
" violation number Hash table group ", it includes:Suitable for the first Hash table counted to deception message, suitable for entering to destroying message
The second Hash table that row counts, suitable for the 3rd Hash table counted to the formula attack that floods.Record the violation time of respective hosts
Number, that is, the credibility of main frame.
Packet in network is real-time, so needing to establish a kind of Hash of the threat packet counting in unit interval
Table, and a key in the corresponding Hash table of each main frame, corresponding key assignments are corresponding keys in the unit interval of record
The number for the threat data bag that main frame is sent.Such Hash table at first must be by Hash table in the unit interval " timeslice "
Key assignments corresponding to all keys is set to 0;And the message of every kind of detection has been required for such table, just such as 100 kinds are have detected
Message, it is desirable to 100 such Hash tables.
Moreover, each Hash table must have a corresponding threshold value.As long as one has main frame to tire out in analog value in Hash table
Add counting.Check whether the value exceedes the threshold value of setting after counting.If it exceeds corresponding threshold value, then in violation number Hash table
Key assignments in corresponding record counts.
Also, the parameter such as threshold value, Hash table time leaf length of each Hash table can all be adjusted by interface.
Such as:The Hash table of main frame is:
Unit interval cheats packet counting Hash table
Host1 | Host2 | Host3 | Host4 | Host5 | Host6 | Host7 | Host8 | …… | Host n |
1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | …… | 0 |
Unit interval destroys packet counting Hash table
Host1 | Host2 | Host3 | Host4 | Host5 | Host6 | Host7 | Host8 | …… | Host n |
1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | …… | 0 |
Unit interval SYN counts Hash table
Host1 | Host2 | Host3 | Host4 | Host5 | Host6 | Host7 | Host8 | …… | Host n |
1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | …… | 0 |
Unit interval UDP Flood counts Hash table
Unit interval ICMP Flood counts Hash table
Host1 | Host2 | Host3 | Host4 | Host5 | Host6 | Host7 | Host8 | …… | Host n |
1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 2 | 0 | 0 | …… | 0 |
……
Above all of Hash table is all unit interval count table, and timeslice, which counts, starts that all corresponding key assignments can be set to 0;
Violation number Hash table
On the basis of foregoing invention principle, the specific implementation process of the present embodiment is as follows.
Embodiment 1
The present embodiment 1 provides a kind of SDN framework, including:Using plane, datum plane and control plane;Wherein
Datum plane, when any IDS equipment (i.e. intrusion detection device) detects that attack threatens in datum plane, notice application
Plane enters attack type analysis process;Using plane, for analyzing attack type, and customized according to attack type
Corresponding attack threatens processing strategy;Control plane, Processing Interface is threatened to provide attack using plane, and carried for datum plane
For optimal path computation and/or attack threat identification interface.
The attack threat includes but is not limited to:DDOS attack threatens.
Processing strategy is threatened on attack type analysis, attack using plane, the attack monitoring of datum plane, is attacked
Threat shielding and routing optimality are hit, and attack threat processing, attack threat identification and the optimal path computation of control plane will
Deploy in the following embodiments.
Wherein, it can realize that control plane is realized by controller by IDS policy servers using plane.
Embodiment 2
Embodiment 2 provides a kind of SDN systems, including:Controller, IDS policy servers, distributed IDS equipment and
Flow cleaning center;When any IDS equipment detects the message with ddos attack feature, i.e., by SSL traffic channel
Report to IDS policy servers;The IDS policy servers are made and the report with ddos attack feature according to information is reported
Processing strategy corresponding to literary, then the message is shielded by controller or by the interchanger access interface corresponding to the message
Flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered.
Wherein, ddos attack characterizing definition is:Deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address, to internetwork layer and transmission
The abnormal behaviour that layer flag bit is set, and the formula attack that flooded to application layer and transport layer.
Fig. 2 shows ddos attack identification and the theory diagram of guard system based on SDN frameworks.
As shown in Fig. 2 further, include in the IDS equipment:
Packet check module is cheated, the deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address detect;
Packet check module is destroyed, the abnormal behaviour set to internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit detects;
Exception message detection module, the formula attack that flooded to application layer and transport layer detect;
By the deception packet check module, packet check module, exception message detection module are destroyed successively to message
Detected;And if the message is transferred to IDS decision-makings clothes when above-mentioned respective behavior be present by any detection module detection outgoing packet
Business device.
Further, the IDS policy servers when message suitable for having deceptive practices, and attacks and threaten in OpenFlow domains
In, then main frame is shielded by controller;Or threatened when attacking not in OpenFlow domains, then it is by controller that message institute is right
The interchanger access interface flow answered is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;The IDS policy servers are further adapted for working as
Message has abnormal behaviour, then the flow of attacker or attack main frame is shielded by controller;And when message has
The formula that floods attack, then the IDS policy servers are suitable for being accessed the interchanger corresponding to the message by controller
Port flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered.
The present invention using from deception packet check module to destroy packet check module, then to exception message detection module according to
The order of secondary detection, wherein, each module obtains packet information and uses independent Interface design, and the coupling for reducing intermodule is closed
Connection property;And each module uses the program data structure of optimization, careful to split each processing sub-process, improves the high cohesion of module
Characteristic.This detection ordering improves the detection efficiency to message data, and reduces loss.
Fig. 3 shows the workflow diagram of deception packet check module.
As shown in figure 3, network equipment information binding table is called by the deception packet check module, and in the IDS
Build the first Hash table that is counted to packet cheating behavior of being suitable in the unit interval in policy server, and setting this
The first threshold values in first Hash table;The deception packet check module, by the class for the message being encapsulated in Packet-In message
Type is parsed, to obtain corresponding source, purpose IP address, MAC Address and the interchanger DPID for uploading Packet-In message
Number and port number information, and each information is compared with the corresponding information in network equipment information binding table respectively;If message
In above- mentioned information matching, then by message be transferred to destroy packet check module;If the above- mentioned information in message mismatches, it is transferred to
The IDS policy servers, are abandoned to message, and deceptive practices are counted simultaneously, when the count value is more than first
During threshold values, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
Specifically, the deception packet check module is used to carry out first time judgement to message, that is, judge message whether be
IP spoofing attack message, port spoofing attack message or MAC spoofing attack messages.
Specific steps include:Parse source, target MAC (Media Access Control) address and interchanger entrance, Ran Hougen in ethernet frames first
Different messages is parsed according to different type of messages.When type of message is IP, ARP, RARP, then parse corresponding source,
Then these information are carried out matching of tabling look-up by purpose IP address to the information in network equipment information binding table, if matching phase
The information answered, then give and destroy packet check resume module.If mismatching, the message is transferred to the processing of IDS policy servers;
And simultaneously to deceptive practices carry out accumulated counts, when the count value is more than the first threshold values, shielding send the message program and/
Or main frame.
Have a device manager module DeviceManagerImpl in Floodlight, when an equipment in a network
Tracking equipment when mobile device, and equipment is defined according to new stream.
Equipment manager learns equipment from PacketIn requests, and device network parameter is obtained from PacketIn messages
Information (information such as source, purpose IP, MAC, VLAN), is made a distinction equipment for interchanger or main frame by entity classification device.It is silent
Entity classification device shows an equipment using MAC Address and/or vlan table in the case of recognizing, and the two attributes can uniquely identify one
Individual equipment.Another important information be equipment mount point (No. DPID of interchanger and port numbers) (, at one
In openflow regions, an equipment can only have a mount point, herein openflow regions refer to it is same
The set of the connected multiple switch of Floodlight examples.Equipment manager is also IP address, mount point, equipment were provided with
Time phase, the last time timestamp foundation whether expired as them are judged.)
Therefore it need to only call what DeviceManagerImpl modules provided inside network equipment information binding table module
IDeviceService, at the same to the service add IDeviceListener monitoring interface.
The monitoring interface that wherein IDeviceListener is provided has:
Interface name | Function |
public void deviceAdded(IDevice device) | Main frame addition response |
public void deviceRemoved(IDevice device) | Main frame removes response |
public void deviceMoved(IDevice device) | Host mobility responds |
public void deviceIPV4AddrChanged(IDevice device) | Host IP address changes response |
public void deviceVlanChanged(IDevice device) | Main frame VLAN changes response |
ISP:IFloodlightProviderService,IDeviceService
Rely on interface:IFloodlightModule,IDeviceListener
Record in table according to the low and high level trigger mechanism of interchanger (netting twine extracts triggering Port Down low level,
Netting twine pulls out triggering Port Up high level) record that can refresh in real time in binding table.
Traditional ddos attack can not touch, change Switch DPID and Switch Port information, using this advantage,
Spoofing attack can more flexibly be detected.
Fig. 4 shows the workflow diagram for destroying packet check module.
It is suitable to set the flag bit of message as shown in figure 4, building in the IDS policy servers in the unit interval
The second Hash table that abnormal behaviour is counted, and set the second threshold values in second Hash table;The destruction message inspection
Survey module to detect each flag bit of message, to judge whether each flag bit meets ICP/IP protocol specification;If message
Each flag bit meets, then message is transferred into exception message detection module;If each flag bit of message is not met, it is transferred to described
IDS policy servers, are abandoned to message, and set abnormal behaviour to count flag bit simultaneously, when the count value surpasses
When crossing the second threshold values, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
Specifically, the destruction packet check module, judges for carrying out second to message, that is, judge message whether be
Attack message with malice flag bit feature.Wherein, the attack message with malice flag bit feature includes but is not limited to IP
Attack message, TCP attack messages.Implementation steps include:IP attack message and TCP/UDP attack messages therein are realized each
The detection of the flag bit of message, that is, identify whether each flag bit meets ICP/IP protocol specification.If meeting, just directly hand over
By abnormal number packet check resume module.If not meeting, it is judged as attack message, is transferred to the processing of IDS policy servers.
Using typical attacks such as Tear Drop as row, there are an offset field and a burst mark (MF) in IP packet header,
If offset field is arranged to incorrect value by attacker, the situation for overlapping or disconnecting, target machine just occurs in IP fragmentation message
System will collapse.
In IP headings, there are a protocol fields, the field specifies which kind of agreement the IP messages carry.The field
Value is less than 100, if attacker sends the IP messages of largely protocol fields of the band more than 100, target machine to target machine
Protocol stack in system will be destroyed, and form attack.
Therefore in packet check module is destroyed, each flag bit of outgoing packet is extracted first, is then checked whether normal.
If normal, subsequent module for processing is given.
If abnormal, the packet is abandoned, and to corresponding Hash table rolling counters forward.If unit interval inside counting
When device exceedes second threshold values of setting, then IDS policy servers are called to be shielded to corresponding program and/or directly shielded
Cover corresponding main frame.
After packet by cheating packet check module filters out, the follow-up number destroyed handled by packet check module
All it is real according to the address in bag.So, effectively avoid target machine and have received destruction message, target may be directly resulted in
The protocol stack collapse of machine, or even target machine directly collapse.
It is substantially similar to destroy processing function and the deception packet check handling process of packet check module, distinguishes and is to destroy
What packet check module parsed is the flag bit of each message, whether normal then detects each flag bit.
If normal, just handled directly to follow-up exception message detection module.
If abnormal, the packet is abandoned, and to the corresponding Hash table inside counting device of main frame application reference mechanism
Count.If it exceeds the threshold values of setting, then shield corresponding attacker or directly shielding attack main frame.
The Hash table for identifying the formula attack message that floods is built in the exception message detection module, is determined in the IDS
Build the 3rd Hash table that is counted to the formula attack that floods of being suitable in the unit interval in plan server, and setting this
The 3rd threshold values in 3rd Hash table;The exception message detection module, suitable for being sentenced according to the threshold values set in the Hash table
Whether the message that breaks has attack;If without attack, by data distributing;If having attack, institute is transferred to
IDS policy servers are stated, message is abandoned, and attack is counted simultaneously, when count value is more than the 3rd threshold values
When, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
Specifically, the exception message detection module, for carrying out third time judgement to message, that is, judge message whether be
The formula that floods attack message.
Specific steps include:Using the identification to structure flood formula attack message in Hash table respective record carry out
It is cumulative, and detect whether to exceed threshold value, to judge whether the being formula attack message that floods.
By above-mentioned deception packet check module, destroy filtering out for packet check two modules of module, subsequent module for processing
Packet substantially belong to packet under normal circumstances.However, under normal circumstances, ddos attack generation is also had, existing
In technology, normally only carry out cheating packet check module, destroy packet check module, and in the technical program, in order to the greatest extent may be used
Energy avoids ddos attack.
Following examples are to after carrying out cheating packet check module, destroying packet check modular filtration, then pass through exception
The embodiment of packet check module shield ddos attack.The embodiment is with UDP Flooding and ICMP
Exemplified by Flooding.
Fig. 5 shows UDP Floodling overhaul flow chart.
On UDP Floodling, as shown in figure 5, using mechanism of the udp protocol without establishing connection, sent out to target machine
Send a large amount of UDP messages.Target machine can devote a tremendous amount of time processing UDP messages, and these UDP attack messages can not only make storage
The cache overflow of UDP messages, and substantial amounts of network bandwidth can be taken, target machine can not (or seldom) receive it is legal
UDP messages.
Because different main frames is to a large amount of UDP message bags of single main frame transmission, so having the feelings of udp port occupancy certainly
Condition, so the technical program can receive an ICMP unreachable bag in port.
So the technical program can establish All hosts one Hash table, it is specifically used to receive in the storage unit interval
The number of the unreachable bag in ICMP ports.If it exceeds the threshold values of setting, then directly shield corresponding attacker.
Fig. 6 shows ICMP Floodling overhaul flow chart.
On ICMP Floodling, as shown in fig. 6, directly carrying out unit interval inside counting for ICMP Flooding.
If it exceeds corresponding threshold values, then directly accordingly shielded to respective host, although this method is simple, directly effectively.
Therefore, exception message detection module, if the type of message detected is exception message detection type, phase is carried out
The counter answered detects whether to exceed threshold value, if it does not exceed the threshold, optimal routing policy also can be passed through to the packet
Issue.Threshold value if more than, then corresponding attacker is shielded, or directly respective host is accordingly shielded.
The deception packet check module, destroy any module judgement in packet check module and exception message detection module
When the message is above-mentioned attack message, then the attack message is transferred to IDS policy servers, i.e. abandon the message, and shield
Cover the program and/or main frame for sending the message.
When " deception packet check module ", " destroying packet check module " and " exception message detection module " need to abandon number
When according to bag or needing to shield threat main frame.Directly invoke IDS policy servers and carry out corresponding threat processing operation.
The specific implementation steps of the IDS policy servers include:
The step of abandoning the message, i.e. packet discard includes as follows:
The data envelope can be mounted in Packet In by OpenFlow interchangers in the case of corresponding flow table is not matched
In message, while there is this packet in local caching in exchange opportunity, and packet is deposited in the buffer, there is a buffer area
ID number, this ID number can be also encapsulated in the buffer_id of Packet In message, by Packet out form, simultaneously
Buffer_id in Packet out message fills in the buffer area ID for the packet to be abandoned (in corresponding Packet In message
Buffer_id).
The step of shielding main frame includes as follows:
OpenFlow agreement flow table structures are as follows:
Packet header domain | Counter | Action |
The structure in its middle wrapping head domain is:
The step of IDS policy servers include shielding application program includes as follows:
Step 1:Corresponding matching field is filled in the packet header domain of flow table, and by setting Wildcards mask fields,
To obtain shielding attacker or host information.Wherein, attacker need to be such as shielded, then fills in following in the domain of flow table packet header
With field:IP, MAC, VLAN, Swtich DPID, Swtich Port, protocol type and its port numbers etc..Such as need to shield main frame,
Then filled in the domain of flow table packet header:The matching field such as IP, MAC, VLAN, Swtich DPID, Swtich Port.
Step 2:Flow table action lists are empty, realize the data packet discarding of attacker/main frame.
Step 3:The record value in each Hash table is called, flow table time-out is calculated and is automatically deleted the time.
Step 4:Issue flow table mask program or main frame.
Therefore, the network of the technical program can effectively identify and filter out attack bag.
Optionally, after by above-mentioned each module, by issuing for the real-time optimal routing policy of normal message.
Comprise the following steps that:
Initially enter step S1 come to controller topological interface (API) submit obtain request, then by step S2 come
Obtain full mesh topology.
Then, by carrying out the acquisition of total network links state.Step S3 is initially entered, is then obtained by step S10
Total network links state, then calculate total network links remaining bandwidth.
Then it is exactly the calculating of real-time optimal path, algorithm is changed to using classical dijkstra's algorithm, the weights of algorithm
The inverse for the total network links remaining bandwidth that previous step obtains, this ensures that the path calculated is most unobstructed, propagation delay time
Minimum path.(specific algorithm of optimal path is referring to related content in embodiment 3)
Finally, the optimal path calculated is converted into the real-time optimal path strategy being made up of flow table, passes through step S11
Issue.
Step S1 uses topological interface, and the api interface that a kind of controller carries, using LLDP, (link layer finds association
View) and broadcast packet discovery link, then controller calculate network topology automatically.
The topological interface of step S2 controllers is opened up to " the full mesh topology acquisition module " of " real-time optimal path computation module "
Flutter the feedback for obtaining request.
In step S3, " total network links state acquisition module " files a request to " switch query interface module ", obtains complete
Network chain line state.Wherein, " switch query interface module " is " the interchanger characteristic enquiry module " carried in controller and " handed over
Change planes state-query module " on the basis of expand, realize calculating and the query function of link remaining bandwidth.
Then, " switch query module " by step S4, all interchangers into network send interchanger property requests
Broadcast packet.The message fed back come interchanger characteristic in automatic network is received by step S5 again, parses the curr inside outgoing packet
Field, obtain each switch ports themselves current bandwidth B.
Next, the module is by step S6, all interchangers into network send the broadcast packet that switch status is asked,
Bag number is sent including port, port sends byte number, port receives the message status such as byte number, port receiver packet number.Then, should
Module receives the message fed back come switch status in automatic network by step S7, parses tx_bytes fields, is sent
Byte number N1, obtain current time t1。
Next, the module is by step S8, all interchangers into network send the broadcast packet that switch status is asked,
Then, the message that the module is fed back by S9 receptions come switch status in automatic network, timing stop, and obtain current time t2。
Tx_bytes fields are parsed, obtain sending byte number N2。
Present port remaining bandwidth, which can then be calculated, is:B-(N2-N1)/(t2-t1)。
Then, the network topology of acquisition is recycled to carry out the remaining bandwidth calculating of each of the links:
If the connection between interchanger and interchanger, then obtain the tape remaining of the switch ports themselves of this both link ends
Width, the remaining bandwidth of the link is the smaller in two port remaining bandwidths.
If the connection between main frame and interchanger, then the remaining bandwidth of the switch ports themselves of connection main frame is obtained, should
Bar link remaining bandwidth is the switch ports themselves remaining bandwidth for connecting the main frame.
Step S4 controllers send Feature Request message in the form of broadcasting to all interchangers of the whole network.
Step S5 controllers, which receive, carrys out the Feature Reply message that interchanger in automatic network feeds back to controller.
Step S6 controllers send Stats Request message in the form of broadcasting to all interchangers of the whole network.
Step S7 controllers, which receive, carrys out the Stats Reply message that interchanger in automatic network feeds back to controller.
Step S8 controllers send Stats Request message in the form of broadcasting to all interchangers of the whole network.
Step S9 controllers, which receive, carrys out the Stats Reply message that interchanger in automatic network feeds back to controller.
Step S10 switch queries interface is by the link remaining bandwidth feedback of the information calculated to " total network links state obtains
Modulus block ".
Step S11 routing policies issue the real-time optimal routing policy that module calculates, and the flow table calculated is passed through into step
Rapid S12 is handed down to the interchanger of correlation.
The step S12 interfaces are the api interfaces that controller carries, for issuing the optimal routing policy calculated.
It is while DDOS attack is defendd by the optimal path strategy, the average transmission delay of network does not swash
Increase.
Embodiment 3
A kind of fusion DDoS on the basis of embodiment 1 and embodiment 2 threatens filtering and the work of the SDN systems of routing optimality
Make method, by distributed detection and the processing of centralization, effectively to alleviate the work load of controller, improve inspection
Survey efficiency and data transmission rate.
The fusion DDoS of the present invention threatens filtering and the method for work of the SDN systems of routing optimality, comprises the following steps:
Step S100, netinit;Step S200, distributed DDoS threaten monitoring;And step S300, threat processing
And/or routing optimality.
Further, the device in the step S100 involved by netinit includes:Controller, IDS policy servers
With distributed IDS equipment;
The step of netinit, is as follows:
Step S101, the IDS policy servers establish special SSL traffic channel with each IDS equipment;Step S102,
The controller builds network equipment information binding table, and by network equipment information binding table real-time update to each IDS equipment
In;Step S104, the controller issue the flow table of mirror policy, i.e., all drag of OF interchangers are loaded with into the port flow of main frame
Mirror image is transmitted to corresponding IDS equipment in domain;And step S105, the controller issue DDoS threat identifications rule to every
Corresponding each IDS equipment in individual domain.
Distributed DDoS threatens the method for monitoring to include in the step S200:Successively to link layer and internet layer address
Deceptive practices, internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit set abnormal behaviour, and the formula attack that floods of application layer and transport layer
Detected;If any detection judges that outgoing packet has respective behavior in said process, the message is transferred to step S300.
Specific implementation steps include:
Step S210, the deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address detect.
Step S220, the abnormal behaviour set to internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit detect.
Step S230, the formula attack that floods to application layer and transport layer detect.
Step S240, if after message is passed sequentially through into the step S210, step S220, step S230, either step is sentenced
When disconnected outgoing packet has deception, exception, attack, then the message is transferred to step S300.
The method that deceptive practices in the step S210 to link layer and internet layer address are detected includes following step
Suddenly:Step S211, network equipment information binding table is called by cheating packet check module;Step S212, by cheating message
Detection module is parsed the type for being encapsulated in message in Packet-In message, with obtain corresponding source, purpose IP address,
MAC Address and the interchanger DPID and port numbers for uploading this Packet-In message, and by above-mentioned each information respectively with network
Corresponding information in facility information binding table is compared;If the above- mentioned information matching in message, step is transferred to by message
S220;If the above- mentioned information in message mismatches, message is transferred to step S300.
The method for setting abnormal behaviour to be detected internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit in the step S220 includes:It is right
Each flag bit of message is detected, to judge whether each flag bit meets ICP/IP protocol specification;If each flag bit of message
Meet, then message is transferred to S230;If each flag bit of message is not met, message is transferred to step S300.
The method that the formula attack that floods in the step S230 to application layer and transport layer is detected includes as follows
Step:Step S231, the Hash table for identifying the formula attack message that floods is built in exception message detection module;Step S232,
Judge whether the message is the formula attack report that floods according to the threshold values set in the Hash table by exception message detection module
Text, and will determine that result is transferred to step S300, even without attack, then data are normally issued or by above-mentioned optimal path
Policy distribution;If having attack, corresponding shielding measure is taken.
The method of processing and/or routing optimality is threatened to include in the step S300:
If message has deceptive practices, and attacks and threaten in OpenFlow domains, then the IDS policy servers are suitable to logical
Cross controller shielding main frame;And threatened when attacking not in OpenFlow domains, then by controller by corresponding to the message
Interchanger access interface flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;
If message has abnormal behaviour, the IDS policy servers are by controller to attacker or attack main frame
Flow shielded;Specific implementation steps include:For destroying message aggression, due to the currently processed message of IDS equipment
Deception packet check is passed through, so the message address is real.IDS policy servers need to only be connect by the north orientation of controller
Mouth issues action and shields the flow of attacker or attack main frame for Drop flow table.But this is all the decision-making of coarseness,
It is only applicable to attack and wraps a small amount of destruction message aggression.
If message has the formula attack that floods, the IDS policy servers are by controller by corresponding to the message
Interchanger access interface flow be redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;Optionally, the safety of flow cleaning center is set
It is standby that the result of protection can also be fed back to controller, network strategy is adjusted, SDN is realized and is mixed with legacy network feelings
Multidimensional protection under condition.
Further, path optimizing is calculated according to link load coefficient, that is, detects the link remaining bandwidth of two adjacent nodes,
The load factor of the link is obtained, the optimal road of any two points is being obtained according to the load factor and the network topological diagram of initialization
Footpath, the controller forward flow table according to corresponding to being drawn the optimal path and issue each interchanger.
The specific algorithm flow of path optimizing is as follows:
If rn, (n+1) is the link remaining bandwidth of two adjacent nodes, then its link load coefficient is:/ * by controller calculate link load coefficient */
Load factors of the U (a, b) between any two points and:
If initial network topology figure is G0, the optimal path between any two points is calculated,
The IDS policy servers shielding, which sends the program of message and/or the method for main frame, to be included:
First, the corresponding Hash table and setting respective threshold of counting are built, i.e.,
The first Hash table counted to deceptive practices, mark are built in unit interval, in the IDS policy servers
Position sets the second Hash table for being counted of abnormal behaviour, and to the 3rd Hash table that the formula attack that floods is counted;
Concurrently set first, second, third threshold values in first, second, third Hash table;
Secondly, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message, i.e.,
For the behavior for the message for being transferred to IDS policy servers, counted using corresponding Hash table, when count value exceedes
During respective thresholds, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
Embodiment 4
The SDN frameworks and system of the present invention can define SDNQA (SDN Communication Quality
Assurance Strategy) it is SDN communication quality guarantee strategies.
Target design and scene deployment dependence test.
Present invention has been deployment and test, prevailing test environment and test content are as follows:
(1) agreements of OpenFlow 1.3 are based on, test threatens filtering to ensure component with communication quality equipped with DDoS
Communication between Floodlight controllers, OF interchangers, IDS equipment and IDS policy servers.
(2) test IDS equipment whether abnormal aggression flow that can be in real time monitoring network, and believed by SSL traffic
Road reports IDS policy servers.
(3) test IDS policy servers whether the information that can be reported according to IDS equipment, make the corresponding attack of processing
The strategy of threat, and issued by the northbound interface of controller.
(4) whether test controller can generate according to network real time status and issue the forward-path of real-time optimization, carry
Rise Consumer's Experience.
The specific deployment of experiment scene, it is middle based on network area, have two empty nets.Wherein empty net A deploys this
SDNQA systems, and empty net B is not yet disposed, and some ddos attack puppet machines all be present in each empty net.Right side is experiment effect
Contrast district, including a Web server and two subscriber's main stations, Tomcat is run wherein on Web server Web is externally provided
Service, subscriber's main station A, B are empty net A, the B of access main frame respectively.Left side is attack simulating region, there is a ddos attack machine,
Attack plane controls puppet's machine in empty net A and empty net B to initiate hybrid-type ddos attack to Web server using as main control computer.
Based on above-mentioned experimental situation, the performance of SDNQA frameworks is verified in terms of two:(1) contrast hybrid-type
The attack frequency that Web server end is born under ddos attack;(2) the network average transmission caused by contrasting the formula attack that floods is prolonged
Late.
First, situation is flowed into Web server end flow to analyze.Puppet's machine in each empty net of attack plane control is simultaneously
Hybrid-type ddos attack initiated Web server, and its highest frequency is 55Hz, a length of 100 seconds during attack.Intercept Web service
All sequence of data packet of device, and the request sequence of each empty net is isolated, show that empty net A and empty net B flow into server respectively
Request sequence, scheme in attack frequency contrast such as Fig. 7 that Web server is born shown in (a) and figure (b).
As can be seen that SDNQA systems quickly identify typical ddos attack within 0s~5s periods, and 0s~
Filter protection measure is taken in 40s period.After 40s, network traffics tend to be normal, and test subscriber's main station A is always
Web-page requests response can normally be obtained.And do not dispose in the empty net B of SDNQA systems has substantial amounts of attack traffic to flow into always, survey
Examination subscriber's main station B can not obtain web-page requests response.
Secondly, we extract test subscriber's main station A from the sequence of data packet intercepted before and test subscriber's main station B's
Request sequence, the time delay of the average transmission of statistical data packet from each request sequence, draw two empty average transmissions netted
Delay contrast.
As can be seen that by routing optimality, void net A average transfer delay is not increased sharply with the increase of data volume.
As can be seen here, SDNQA frameworks can be optimized based on the perception to network real time status, convection current forward-path, so as in net
Ensure optimal user experience in the case of ddos attack or normal big flow business in network being present.
It should be appreciated that the above-mentioned embodiment of the present invention is used only for exemplary illustration or explains the present invention's
Principle, without being construed as limiting the invention.Therefore, that is done without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention is any
Modification, equivalent substitution, improvement etc., should be included in the scope of the protection.In addition, appended claims purport of the present invention
Covering the whole changes fallen into scope and border or this scope and the equivalents on border and repairing
Change example.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of fusion DDoS threatens filtering and the method for work of the SDN systems of routing optimality, it is characterised in that including following step
Suddenly:
Step S100, netinit;
Step S200, distributed DDoS threaten monitoring;And
Step S300, threaten processing and/or routing optimality;
Distributed DDoS threatens the method for monitoring to include in the step S200:
Abnormal behaviour is set to the deceptive practices of link layer and internet layer address, internetwork layer and transport layer flag bit successively, and
The formula attack that floods of application layer and transport layer is detected;
If any detection judges that outgoing packet has respective behavior in said process, the message is transferred to step S300.
2. the method for work of SDN systems according to claim 1, it is characterised in that
The method that deceptive practices to link layer and internet layer address are detected includes:
Deceptive practices are detected by cheating packet check module, i.e.,
First, network equipment information binding table is called by cheating packet check module;
Secondly, the type for being encapsulated in message in Packet-In message is parsed by cheating packet check module, to obtain
Corresponding source, purpose IP address, MAC Address and the interchanger DPID and port numbers that upload this Packet-In message, and will
Above-mentioned each information is compared with the corresponding information in network equipment information binding table respectively;
If the above- mentioned information matching in message, next detection is carried out by message;
If the above- mentioned information in message mismatches, message is transferred to step S300;
The method that internetwork layer and the transport layer flag bit sets abnormal behaviour to be detected includes:
Abnormal behaviour is set to detect flag bit by destroying packet check module, i.e.,
Each flag bit of message is detected, to judge whether each flag bit meets ICP/IP protocol specification;
If each flag bit of message meets, message is transferred to and carries out next detection;
If each flag bit of message is not met, message is transferred to step S300;
The method that formula attack is detected that floods of the application layer and transport layer includes:
The formula attack that floods is detected by exception message detection module, i.e.,
Build for identifying the Hash table for the formula attack message that floods in exception message detection module, and set according in the Hash table
Threshold values judge whether message has and flood formula attack, and will determine that result is transferred to step S300.
3. the method for work of SDN systems according to claim 2, it is characterised in that threat is handled in the step S300
And/or the method for routing optimality includes:
If message has deceptive practices, and attacks and threaten in OpenFlow domains, then the IDS policy servers are suitable to pass through control
Device processed shields main frame;And when attack threaten not in OpenFlow domains, then by controller by the message corresponding to exchange
Machine access interface flow is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;
If message has abnormal behaviour, the IDS policy servers are by controller to attacker or the stream of attack main frame
Amount is shielded;
Flooded formula attack if message has, the IDS policy servers by controller by the message corresponding to friendship
Access interface flow of changing planes is redirected to flow cleaning center and filtered;And/or
Path optimizing is calculated according to link load coefficient, that is, detects the link remaining bandwidth of two adjacent nodes, obtains the link
Load factor, according to the load factor and initialization network topological diagram obtain any two points optimal path, the control
Device processed forwards flow table according to corresponding to being drawn the optimal path and issues each interchanger.
4. the method for work of SDN systems according to claim 3, it is characterised in that the IDS policy servers shielding hair
The program of text of delivering newspaper and/or the method for main frame include:
First, the corresponding Hash table and setting respective threshold of counting are built, i.e.,
The first Hash table counted to deceptive practices is built in unit interval, in the IDS policy servers, flag bit is set
Put the second Hash table that abnormal behaviour is counted, and to the 3rd Hash table that the formula attack that floods is counted;
Concurrently set first, second, third threshold values in first, second, third Hash table;
Secondly, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message, i.e.,
For the behavior for the message for being transferred to IDS policy servers, counted using corresponding Hash table, when count value exceedes accordingly
During threshold values, shielding sends the program and/or main frame of the message.
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CN111277609A (en) * | 2020-02-24 | 2020-06-12 | 深圳供电局有限公司 | SDN network monitoring method and system |
CN111683162A (en) * | 2020-06-09 | 2020-09-18 | 福建健康之路信息技术有限公司 | IP address management method and device based on flow identification |
CN111683162B (en) * | 2020-06-09 | 2022-10-25 | 福建健康之路信息技术有限公司 | IP address management method based on flow identification |
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CN108063765B (en) | 2021-07-16 |
CN108040057A (en) | 2018-05-15 |
CN104539594B (en) | 2018-02-23 |
CN108040057B (en) | 2021-08-06 |
CN104539594A (en) | 2015-04-22 |
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