CN107104791B - A kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity - Google Patents
A kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity Download PDFInfo
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- CN107104791B CN107104791B CN201710198164.3A CN201710198164A CN107104791B CN 107104791 B CN107104791 B CN 107104791B CN 201710198164 A CN201710198164 A CN 201710198164A CN 107104791 B CN107104791 B CN 107104791B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity, comprising the following steps: 1, establish system model；2, ECU registration information in gateway data library before carrying out one-time pad encryption；3, intelligence ECU generates coupling to the manipulation behavior of vehicle between medium, with Vehicular power system, so that car power supply voltage variation has Markov characteristic, true random number is generated, as session key；4, session key timing updates between the ECU for needing to communicate, and prevents Replay Attack；5, the one-time pad data communication based on ECU ciphertext attribute is established, ensure that the secure communication of interior ECU using the attribute of ECU in database according to obtained session key.The present invention generates session key using the stochastic behaviour of interior supply voltage, effectively prevents the information security issues such as distorting, forge；Speed unit is combined with steering wheel, 500ms period dynamic generation speed prevents Replay Attack as the session key of ECU.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the fields such as intelligent network connection automobile, in-vehicle network, one-time pad, more particularly to interior electronic control unit
Secure communications.
Background technique
The Foreign Automobiles giant such as tesla, BMW, general, Ke Laisi takes the lead in being proposed intelligent network connection automobile since 2013
Blank product, but have occurred therewith it is a series of for automobile intelligent net connection system crack and attack.2013
Charlie Miller&CHris Valasek by vehicle-mounted OBD interface cracked Toyota it is general it is sharp this；2014, Bayerische Motorne Werke Aktiengeellschaft because
There are security breaches for its Connected Drive system, recall 2,200,000 automobiles；2015 from Carnegie Mellon University
Information security expert Charlie Miller and the CHris Valasek in the advanced technology research center cooperated with Uber company is sent out
The information security report of 12 sections of intelligent networks connection vehicles of cloth, and disclose the details of information security attack: by the connection of Cherokee
Online amusement music system invades its electronic system, completes the long-range control of travel speed, air-conditioning, wiper, radio station etc. content.
360 company of the same year takes the lead in announcing to have cracked Tesla vehicle remote control function and millimetre-wave radar system, then by BYD
Company's commission has carried out information security attacking and defending test to functions such as the cloud service of BYD automobile, remote driving functions.Day in 2016
It produces LEAF automobile API to be revealed, the remote controlled vehicle of hacker.As Tsinghua University Li Keqiang professor is interpreting Ministry of Industry and Information's publication
" intelligent network join automotive technology development route map " when it is described: " information security technology is the weight of intelligent network connection automobile success or not
Want one of factor ".
Broadcast communication mode is difficult to meet the demand for security under intelligent network connection automotive environment between in-vehicle network ECU node, is
Guarantee the communication security of in-vehicle network under intelligent network connection automotive environment, network broadcasting communication is assisted in the car by domestic and international experts and scholars
A large amount of research, but encryption close with non-once one between in-vehicle network ECU node in many researchs have been done in terms of the safety of view
Mode carries out information exchange, inevitably brings in-vehicle information leakage and the false risk-taking increase of ECU node identities.For this
Truly random characteristic based on in-vehicle network power-supply system it is vehicle-mounted logical to be established the one-time pad based on ECU attribute by problem, this programme
Letter method carries out effective protection to the sensitive information of in-vehicle network.
Summary of the invention
To solve above situation, the invention proposes a kind of more fully safety approach, in the generating process of session key
Middle combination vehicle is considered key updating by the stochastic behaviour of external environment influence, meets truly random requirement, overcomes above lack
Point.It is an object of the present invention to a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity be proposed, to solve
Certainly the private data information of ECU such as is tampered, palms off at the safety problems in in-vehicle network.
To achieve the goals above, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:
A kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity, comprising the following steps: (1) establish system
Unite model: including in electronic control unit ECU, gateway database, interior power supply (engine/electrical source of power etc.), generator with
And true random number generation module；(2) ECU (electronic control unit) is infused in gateway data library before carrying out one-time pad encryption
Volume information, when vehicle is lighted a fire, ECU loads public and private key pair in secure storage, generates the key pair using ELGamal algorithm,
ECU hides private key, and public key is stored in the catalogue of database, enables and the ECU communicated is needed to inquire；(3) intelligence ECU
Using the manipulation behavior of vehicle as medium, coupling is generated between interior power-supply system, so that interior mains voltage variations tool
There is Markov characteristic, using obtained voltage value as true random number, generates session key；(4) it combines speed with steering wheel
Together, 500ms period dynamic generation speed prevents Replay Attack as the session key that ECU is in communication with each other next time；(5)
It is logical to establish the one-time pad data based on ECU ciphertext attribute using the attribute of ECU in database according to obtained session key
Letter, ensure that the secure communication of interior ECU.
Further, step (2) ECU (electronic control unit) is before carrying out one-time pad encryption in gateway data library
Middle registration information, when vehicle is lighted a fire, ECU loads public and private key pair in secure storage, generates the key using ELGamal algorithm
Right, ECU hides private key, and public key is stored in the catalogue of database, enables and the ECU communicated is needed to inquire；Its step
It is as follows:
Step 2.1: when vehicle launch, database of the ECU into gateway initiates application for registration, on it by vehicular manufacturer
The sequence number of face mark is uploaded in database as public key and is waited to be confirmed using after the private key encryption of database；
Step 2.2: oneself private key SK of databaseDBThe sequence number that ECU is uploaded is decrypted, public key set is inquired, if do not had
Corresponding sequence number is found, its registration is allowed, and returns to its confirmation message；Otherwise refusal registration；
After step 2.3:ECU receives confirmation message, ELGamal algorithm will be used to generate a public and private key pair, by private key
SKECUIt is stored in secure storage, by public key PKECUWith the public key PK of databaseDBEncryption uploads in database；
Step 2.4: database is by sequence number and public key PKECUIt is stored in its public key set, with the public key PK of ECUECUAdd
It is sent after close, guarantees the confidentiality of information；
Step 2.5:ECU uses SK after receiving messageECUDecryption, if the information that decryption obtains is identical with the information that oneself sends,
It then succeeds in registration and terminates.Otherwise return step 2.1.
Further, step (3) the intelligence ECU produces the manipulation behavior of vehicle between medium, with interior power-supply system
Raw coupling generates true random number, as session key so that interior mains voltage variations have Markov characteristic；It is false
If a side of communication is ECUA, another party ECUB；Its step are as follows:
Step 3.1: right using the arbitrary excitation influence of microcosmic traffic environment, extranets connection environment in vehicle travel process
Interior power supply under the influence of interior ECU, traffic environment is monitored, and acquires battery voltage, and output obtains true random number sequence；
By first true random number rand1Session key key as step 3.21；
Step 3.2:ECUATo database transmission and ECUBThe request message of communication, and use ECUBPublic keyEncryption
After be sent to ECUB。ECUBVerifyingIt whether is ECUAPublic key.If be proved to be successful, issues confirmation message and walked
Rapid 3.3, refusal information is otherwise issued, key exchange terminates.ECUAUsing method described in this step 3.2 to ECUBPublic key test
Card；
Step 3.3: the ECU of communication is according to respective sequence number, the time of making the product and identification number, respectively using hash function
Generate hashed valueWithAnd using being sent to other side after the public key encryption of other side；
Step 3.4: the information sent between the ECU of communication with respective private key decryption other side, by interior power supply
The random number rand of voltage value2It carries out hash operation and obtains new hashed valueResult after operation is close as session
Key key2；
Step 3.5: both sides verify the consistency of random number encryption result, and both sides use key respectively2Encrypt rand2After send to
Other side, if using key1The rand obtained after decryption1With previous rand2It is identical, show that the session key of both sides generates successfully.
Otherwise, as long as either party generates session key failure it is necessary to return to the generating process that step 3.1 re-starts session key.
Further, the step (4) combines speed and steering wheel, 500ms period dynamic generation speed, as
The session key that ECU is in communication with each other next time, prevents Replay Attack；Its step are as follows: first, the interior ECU key updating stage,
Its step are as follows:
Step 4.1: vehicle speed value is recorded dynamically with the 500ms period；
Step 4.2: join the excitation of automotive environment by external smart net, considers influence of the speed to interior supply voltage,
Using the vehicle speed value of a cycle as initial random number rands, and first value as true random sequence；
Step 4.3: after step 4.2, utilizing speed randsThe session key encryption that step (3) is obtained, obtain with
The secret value of speed dynamic change, so that random number is unpredictable；
Step 4.4: the ECU for receiving encrypted result decrypts it using the vehicle speed information for issuing it in database, with first
Secondary obtained session key meets Markov property.
Further, the step (5) is according to obtained session key, and using the attribute of ECU in database, foundation is based on
The one-time pad data communication of ECU ciphertext attribute, ensure that the secure communication of interior ECU, its step are as follows:
Step 5.1:ECUAUsing Zu Chongzhi's algorithm, the session key key generated using interior supply voltage1, to car
The private data of ECU communication is encrypted to obtain ciphertext；
Step 5.2: the ciphertext based on ECU attribute is sent to ECU by CAN busB, ECUBUse key2It is close to what is received
Text is decrypted, this process is equally using Zu Chongzhi's algorithm.ECUBTo ECUAThe process of information is sent with step 5.1 to 5.2
Equally；
Step 5.3: due to ECUAAnd ECUBBetween communication channel may be eavesdropped, using step (4) key more
New method generates session key at random；
Step 5.4: true random number sequence is added in obtained session key, and random fluctuation electric energy benefit is carried out to vehicle
It fills, acts on battery, the session key as ECU communication.
Further, the random variation (road conditions, his garage are etc.) of road traffic environment and the random letter of external web environment
Number (upload, downloading, obstruction etc.) collective effect in intelligent network join automobile part, be matchmaker with manipulation behavior of the intelligent cell to vehicle
It is situated between, generates coupling between interior power-supply system, so that interior mains voltage variations have Markov characteristic, meets true
Generating random number requirement, is effectively guaranteed the secure communication of interior ECU.
Further, key updating part considers the update of session key in one-time pad, and session key be with
What machine generated, it is not associated with each other, i.e. rand1, rand2, randsIt is different value.
Further, the interior power-supply system under the influence of people, traffic environment and interior electric-control system is monitored, acquisition stores
Cell voltage；And the battery voltage of acquisition is analyzed and handled, remove identical voltage value, result is made by treated
For the input parameter of true random number generating algorithm, output obtains true random number sequence, realizes to interior ECU private data information
Protection.
Set forth herein a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity, this method has and following has
Beneficial effect:
1) ECU loads public and private key pair in secure storage, generates the key pair using ELGamal algorithm, ECU hides private
Key, and public key is stored in the catalogue of database, enable and the ECU communicated is needed to inquire, ECU identity is prevented to be tampered.
2) speed is combined with steering wheel, 500ms period dynamic generation speed, as ECU phase intercommunication next time
The session key of letter, prevents Replay Attack.
3) key updating part considers the update of session key in one-time pad, and session key is from random raw
At, it is not associated with each other, i.e. rand1, rand2, randsIt is different value.
4) using the attribute of ECU in database, the one-time pad data communication based on ECU ciphertext attribute is established, ensure that
The safety of interior ECU private data information.
5) the random variation (road conditions, his garage are etc.) of road traffic environment and external web environment random signal (on
Pass, downloading, obstruction etc.) collective effect in intelligent network join automobile part, using intelligent cell to the manipulation behavior of vehicle as medium, with
Coupling is generated between interior power-supply system, so that interior mains voltage variations have Markov characteristic, is met truly random
Number, which generates, to be required, and the secure communication of interior ECU is effectively guaranteed.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is overall design drawing of the invention；
Fig. 2 is that ECU registers flow graph in the present invention；
Fig. 3 is ECU session key flow graph in the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the session key update figure in the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Technical solution of the present invention is clearly and completely described below in conjunction with figure embodiment.Side of the invention
Method is application with the database in existing interior power-supply system, several electronic control unit ECU, interior communication unit and gateway
System-based, as shown in Figure 1, mainly include following five part,
Method of the invention mainly includes following five part (all symbols in the present invention are shown in Table 1):
The definition of 1 primary symbols of table
1, system model is established
Including in electronic control unit ECU, gateway database, interior power supply (engine/electrical source of power etc.) and very with
Machine number generation module, traffic environment and network environment are by determining to environment inside car sension unit, intelligent control unit, intelligent driving
The excitation of plan unit etc., STOCHASTIC CONTROL car power-supply system, battery electric energy is supplemented in the case where out of power, as random fluctuation
Energy acts on generator, then reacts on battery again, finally by a truly random generation module, acquires battery not
With the voltage in situation, as random seed.
2, ECU (electronic control unit) registration information in gateway data library
ECU (electronic control unit) registration information in gateway data library, vehicle point before carrying out one-time pad encryption
When fiery, ECU loads public and private key pair in secure storage, generates the key pair using ELGamal algorithm, and ECU hides private key, and
Public key is stored in the catalogue of database, enables and the ECU communicated is needed to inquire；Process as shown in Fig. 2, specific steps such as
Under:
Step 1: database of the ECU into gateway initiates application for registration, on it by vehicular manufacturer when vehicle launch
The sequence number number of face mark utilizes the private key SK of databaseDBPublic key PK is used as after encryptionECUIt uploads in database and waits
To its confirmation；
Step 2: private key SK of the database with oneselfDBThe sequence number that ECU is uploaded is decrypted, public key set is inquired, if do not looked for
To corresponding sequence number, allow its registration, and returns to its confirmation message accept；Otherwise refusal registration returns to the first step, number
Only allow to have a sequence number according to the public key set in library, cannot be identical, it is registered in systems with usually similar, is not allow for two
A or more identical user name exists；
Step 3: ELGamal algorithm will be used to generate a public and private key pair, by private key after ECU receives confirmation message
SKECUIt is stored in secure storage, by public key PKECUWith the public key PK of databaseDBEncryption uploads in database；
Step 4: database is by sequence number and public key PKECUIt is stored in its public key set, with the public key PK of ECUECUEncryption
After send, guarantee the confidentiality of information；
Step 5: ECU uses SK after receiving messageECUDecryption, if the information that decryption obtains is identical with the information that oneself sends,
It then succeeds in registration and terminates.Otherwise the first step is returned.
3, intelligence ECU generates true random number, as session key to vehicle performance
Intelligent ECU generates coupling between medium, with interior power-supply system to the manipulation behavior of vehicle, so that interior
Mains voltage variations have Markov characteristic, true random number are generated, as session key；Assuming that a side of communication is ECUA,
Another party is ECUB, process is as shown in Figure 3, the specific steps are as follows:
Step 1: using the arbitrary excitation influence of microcosmic traffic environment, extranets connection environment in vehicle travel process, to vehicle
Interior power supply under the influence of interior ECU, traffic environment is monitored, and acquires battery voltage, and output obtains true random number sequence；It will
First true random number rand1Session key key as second step1；
Step 2: ECUATo database transmission and ECUBThe request message of communication, and use ECUBPublic keyAfter encryption
It is sent to ECUB。ECUBVerifyingIt whether is ECUAPublic key.If database authentication success, issues confirmation message
Accept carries out third step, otherwise issues refusal information refuse, and key exchange terminates.ECUAUsing the above method to ECUB's
Public key verifications；
Step 3: the ECU of communication is respectively generated according to information such as respective sequence number, the time of making the product using hash function
Hashed valueWithAnd using being sent to other side after the public key encryption of other side；
Step 4: the information sent between the ECU of communication with respective private key decryption other side, passes through the electricity to interior power supply
The random number rand of pressure value2It carries out hash operation and obtains new hashed valueResult after operation is as session key
key2；
Step 5: both sides verify the consistency of random number encryption result, both sides use key respectively2Encrypt rand2After send to
Other side, if using key1The rand obtained after decryption1With previous rand2It is identical, show that the session key of both sides generates successfully.
Otherwise, as long as either party generates session key failure it is necessary to return to the generating process that the first step re-starts session key.4,
Session key timing updates between ECU
Speed and steering wheel are combined, 500ms period dynamic generation speed is in communication with each other next time as ECU
Session key, prevent Replay Attack, the key updating stage is as shown in Figure 4, the specific steps are as follows:
Step 1: the relationship of speed and steering wheel under different traffic environments is observed, speed when such as taking a sudden turn, and according to
The difference of frictional ground force, 500ms period dynamically record vehicle speed value；
Step 2: joining the excitation of environment by extranets, vehicle speed value is acted on into interior supply voltage, a cycle
Vehicle speed value is as initial random number rands, supply voltage sequence before moves to left one, so that initial random number is as truly random
First value of sequence,；
Step 3: utilizing speed rand after second stepsShifting function is carried out to the session encryption that step 3 obtains, is made
The session key for obtaining second of communication is unrelated with first time session key, meets the truly random characteristic of markov；
Step 4: the private data that speed is communicated as key pair car is encrypted, the ECU for receiving encrypted result utilizes number
It is decrypted according to the vehicle speed information for issuing it in library.
5, in application database ECU attribute, establish the one-time pad data communication based on ECU ciphertext attribute
One time one based on ECU ciphertext attribute is established using the attribute of ECU in database according to obtained session key
Ciphertext data communication, ensure that the secure communication of interior ECU, its step are as follows:
Step 1: ECUAUsing Zu Chongzhi's algorithm, the session key key generated using interior supply voltage1, to interior ECU
The private data of communication is encrypted to obtain ciphertext；
Step 2: the ciphertext based on ECU attribute is sent to ECU by CAN busB, ECUBUse key2To the ciphertext received
It is decrypted, this process is equally using Zu Chongzhi's algorithm.ECUBTo ECUAThe process of information is sent with the first step to second step
Equally；
Step 3: due to ECUAAnd ECUBBetween communication channel may be eavesdropped, utilize the key updating of step 4
Method generates session key at random；
Step 4: true random number sequence is added in obtained session key, and random fluctuation electric energy supplement is carried out to vehicle,
Battery is acted on, the session key as ECU communication.
In the description of this specification, reference term " one embodiment ", " some embodiments ", " illustrative examples ",
The description of " example ", " specific example " or " some examples " etc. means specific features described in conjunction with this embodiment or example, knot
Structure, material or feature are included at least one embodiment or example of the invention.In the present specification, to above-mentioned term
Schematic representation may not refer to the same embodiment or example.Moreover, specific features, structure, material or the spy of description
Point can be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more of the embodiments or examples.
Although an embodiment of the present invention has been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that: not
A variety of change, modification, replacement and modification can be carried out to these embodiments in the case where being detached from the principle of the present invention and objective, this
The range of invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity, which comprises the steps of:
Step 1: establish system model: including in electronic control unit ECU, gateway database, interior power supply, generator and
True random number generation module；
Step 2:ECU registration information in gateway data library before carrying out one-time pad encryption, when vehicle is lighted a fire, ECU is pacifying
Public and private key pair is loaded in full storage, generates the key pair using ELGamal algorithm, ECU hides private key, and public key is stored in number
The ECU communicated is needed to inquire according to enabling in the catalogue in library；
Step 3: intelligent ECU generates coupling between interior power-supply system using the manipulation behavior of vehicle as medium, so that vehicle
Interior power voltage change has Markov characteristic, using obtained voltage value as true random number, generates session key；
Step 4: periodically dynamically acquiring speed, as the session key that ECU is in communication with each other next time, prevent Replay Attack；
Step 5: being established using the attribute of ECU in database based on the primary of ECU ciphertext attribute according to obtained session key
The communication of one ciphertext data, guarantees the secure communication of car ECU；
The realization of the step 3 includes:
Step 3.1: utilizing the arbitrary excitation shadow of microcosmic traffic environment, external smart net connection automotive environment in vehicle travel process
It rings, the interior power supply under the influence of interior ECU, traffic environment is monitored, acquire battery voltage, output obtains true random number
Sequence；By first true random number rand1Session key key as step 3.21；
Step 3.2:ECUATo database transmission and ECUBThe request message of communication, and use ECUBPublic key PKECUBIt is sent after encryption
To ECUB；ECUBVerifyingIt whether is ECUAPublic key；If be proved to be successful, issues confirmation message and carries out step 3.3,
Otherwise refusal information is issued, key exchange terminates；ECUAUsing method described in this step 3.2 to ECUBPublic key verifications；
Step 3.3: the ECU of communication is respectively generated according to respective sequence number, the time of making the product and identification number, using hash function
Hashed valueWithAnd using being sent to other side after the public key encryption of other side；
Step 3.4: the information sent between the ECU of communication with respective private key decryption other side passes through the voltage to interior power supply
The random number rand of value2It carries out hash operation and obtains new hashed valueResult after operation is as session key
key2；
Step 3.5: both sides verify the consistency of random number encryption result, and both sides use key respectively2Encrypt rand2After send to pair
Side, if using key1The rand obtained after decryption1With previous rand2It is identical, show that the session key of both sides generates successfully；It is no
Then, as long as either party generates session key failure, the generating process that step 3.1 re-starts session key is moved back to.
2. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity according to claim 1, feature
It is, the realization of the step 2 includes:
Step 2.1: when vehicle launch, database of the ECU into gateway initiates application for registration, and vehicular manufacturer is marked above it
The sequence number of will is uploaded in database as public key and is waited to be confirmed using after the private key encryption of database；
Step 2.2: oneself private key SK of databaseDBThe sequence number that ECU is uploaded is decrypted, public key set is inquired, if do not found
Corresponding sequence number allows its registration, and returns to its confirmation message；Otherwise refusal registration；
After step 2.3:ECU receives confirmation message, a public and private key pair is generated using ELGamal algorithm, by private key SKECUIt protects
There are in secure storage, by public key PKECUWith the public key PK of databaseDBEncryption uploads in database；
Step 2.4: database is by sequence number and public key PKECUIt is stored in its public key set, with the public key PK of ECUECUAfter encryption
It sends, guarantees the confidentiality of information；
Step 2.5:ECU uses SK after receiving messageECUDecryption is infused if the information that decryption obtains is identical with the information that oneself sends
Volume success simultaneously terminates；Otherwise return step 2.1.
3. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity according to claim 1, feature
It is, the realization of the step 4 includes:
Step 4.1: vehicle speed value is recorded dynamically with the 500ms period；
Step 4.2: joining the excitation of automotive environment by external smart net, consider influence of the speed to interior supply voltage, by the
The vehicle speed value of a cycle is as initial random number rands, and first value as true random sequence；
Step 4.3: after step 4.2, utilizing speed randsTo the session key encryption that step 3 obtains, obtain dynamic with speed
The secret value of state variation, so that random number is unpredictable；
Step 4.4: the ECU for receiving encrypted result decrypts it using the vehicle speed information for issuing it in database, obtained decryption
The session key that key and step 3.1 generate meets Markov property.
4. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity according to claim 1, feature
It is, the realization of the step 5 includes:
Step 5.1:ECUAUsing Zu Chongzhi's algorithm, the session key key generated using interior supply voltage1, logical to interior ECU
The private data of letter is encrypted to obtain ciphertext；
Step 5.2: the ciphertext based on ECU attribute is sent to ECU by CAN busB, ECUBUse key2To the ciphertext received into
Row decryption, this process is equally using Zu Chongzhi's algorithm；ECUBTo ECUAThe process of information is sent with step 5.1 to 5.2 one
Sample；
Step 5.3: being directed to ECUAAnd ECUBBetween communication channel can be eavesdropped, using the key updating method of step 4, with
Machine generates session key；
Step 5.4: true random number sequence is added in obtained session key, and random fluctuation electric energy supplement is carried out to vehicle, is made
Session key for battery, as ECU communication.
5. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity according to claim 1, feature
It is, the method also includes: the interior power-supply system under the influence of people, traffic environment and interior electric-control system is monitored,
Acquire battery voltage；And the battery voltage of acquisition is analyzed and handled, remove identical voltage value, by treated
Input parameter of the voltage value as true random number generating algorithm, output obtain true random number sequence, realize to interior ECU privacy number
It is believed that the protection of breath.
6. a kind of in-vehicle network one-time pad communication means hidden based on ECU identity according to claim 1, feature
It is, the period described in step 4 is 500ms.
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