CN106503494A - A kind of firmware protection location and guard method with flash memory microcontroller on piece - Google Patents
A kind of firmware protection location and guard method with flash memory microcontroller on piece Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN106503494A CN106503494A CN201610971108.4A CN201610971108A CN106503494A CN 106503494 A CN106503494 A CN 106503494A CN 201610971108 A CN201610971108 A CN 201610971108A CN 106503494 A CN106503494 A CN 106503494A
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- firmware
- encryption
- bootloader
- flash memory
- piece
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 16
- 238000000205 computational method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000005336 cracking Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009467 reduction Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007423 decrease Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012856 packing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000004904 shortening Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000026676 system process Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
- G06F21/121—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs
- G06F21/123—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs by using dedicated hardware, e.g. dongles, smart cards, cryptographic processors, global positioning systems [GPS] devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Technology Law (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of firmware protection location of microcontroller, including the firmware bag that publishes and Bootloader；Disclosed firmware bag instructs the firmware after block and encryption to constitute by encryption；The encryption instructs block to include the information of the encryption regional area of firmware, and which includes side-play amount and length, orients ciphertext region during for decrypting；Also include the random number of 16 bytes, for producing actual working key；Its firmware protection is specific as follows：First by being encrypted to firmware local, every time encryption is encrypted using different keys, then boot loader Bootloader, is carried out one identification code of a machine and is started, rises level decryption firmware, firmware is stored in secure storage section completing.The firmware protection location with flash memory microcontroller on piece of the present invention and guard method, it is allowed to the binary file of open firmware, keep interactive with validated user, and software resource consumes that little, pirate clone's difficulty is high, can the original side of effective protection interests.
Description
Technical field
A kind of the present invention relates to communication apparatus technology, more particularly to firmware protection location with flash memory microcontroller on piece
And guard method.
Background technology
When a communication apparatus successfully researches and develops listing, fast sale, now often there is a hidden danger：Illegal businessman directly plagiarizes
Hardware design, and announced firmware is usurped, rapid release is pirate to clone counterfeit products, so as to cause the company for researching and developing this equipment
Interests suffer damage；It is the product of software particularly with core technology, the imitation of its hardware is not difficult, as long as piracy side obtains
The binary file of firmware has been taken, so that it may the imitation of quick-speed large-scale, therefore, it is necessary to management and control is carried out to firmware, general management and control is led to
Crossing following two directions is carried out：First, it is impossible to from the binary file that open channel obtains firmware, second, it is impossible to direct from equipment
Read the binary file of reduction firmware；But, the epoch prevailing are popularized in mobile Internet, the iteration cycle of software development is big
Big shortening, user interaction participate in the custom of feedback and have formed, thus, user is obtained, is experienced often by refreshing firmware
Value-added service, but above-mentioned management and control measures, it is impossible to channel is obtained to validated user Open Firmware, causes the decline of Consumer's Experience.
Content of the invention
For solving the above problems, the present invention proposes a kind of firmware protection location with flash memory microcontroller on piece and guarantor
Maintaining method, it is allowed to the binary file of open firmware, keeps interactive with validated user, and software resource consumes little, pirate clone
Difficulty is high, can the original side of effective protection interests.
The firmware protection location of the microcontroller of the present invention, including the firmware bag that publishes and Bootloader；Open
Firmware bag by encryption instruct block and encryption after firmware constitute；The encryption instructs block to include the encryption partial zones of firmware
The information in domain, it include side-play amount and length, orient ciphertext region during for decrypting；Also include the random of 16 bytes
Number, for producing actual working key；The working key encryption algorithm adopts AES128, the computational methods of working key
For：AES128-ECB mode encryption computings are carried out to the random number of 16 bytes with master key, and ciphertext result is actually used work
Make key.
Further, the encryption regional area is sensitive critical code area.
A kind of firmware guard method of microcontroller, methods described are specific as follows：
First by being encrypted to firmware local, encryption every time is encrypted using different keys, then start-up loading journey
Sequence Bootloader, carries out a machine one identification code and starts, rises level decryption firmware, firmware is stored in secure storage section completing.
Further, described to firmware local be encrypted specific as follows：
Firmware encrypting master key is stored in secure storage section, for the MCU with flash memory on piece, forbids debugging
The passage for accessing flash memory on piece of mouth, makes flash memory on piece become secure storage section, master key is stored in flash memory on piece then
Interior；During firmware encrypting, encrypted using regional area, may specify arbitrary region；During firmware encrypting, using working key encryption, per
Secondary encryption is encrypted using different keys, even if in addition, firmware is constant, when issuing every time, firmware encrypting result still can be inconsistent；
And the firmware bag for publishing, do not include Bootloader, but need to include that block is instructed in an encryption, for informing encryption
Regional area, and the working key that auxiliary generation is actual.
Further, boot loader Bootloader is specific as follows：
Bootloader is stored in secure storage section, i.e., on piece in flash memory, now introduce the chip unique identification of MCU
Code UID testing mechanisms, realize that one identification code of a machine starts；During factory burning Bootloader, Bootloader will read reality
The UID of border MCU, writes the storage address that specifies inside Bootloader, and the UID after now storing becomes Bootloader itself
A part；During starting up, Bootloader reads out UID from specified storage address, is compared with the UID of actual MCU
Compared with unanimously then continuation starts, inconsistent then locked Bootloader；And when upgrading, Bootloader instructs area according to encryption
Block, you can produce actual working key, correctly decrypts regional area, so as to by firmware full backup, be stored in safe storage
In region.
The present invention compared with prior art, the present invention the firmware protection location with flash memory microcontroller on piece and guarantor
Maintaining method, may specify the local cypher of arbitrary region, effectively reduce the software resource expense of encryption and decryption；The encryption of one-time pad,
Can effective protection master key, every time the key of encryption is different, improves the difficulty for cracking；Firmware and Bootloader are deposited in itself
Storage possesses certain difficulty that cracks, and one yard of a machine of Bootloader starts in secure storage areas, improves the difficulty for cracking again
Degree, if on piece flash memory by Brute Force, so as to be read out complete binary file, but now in the binary file
Bootloader, still be able to cannot run directly on the equipment of imitation because UID detections do not pass through；Accordingly, piracy side cannot
Obtain key easily, it is impossible to decrypt firmware, therefore, firmware allows to be disclosed issue, good interaction can be kept with user.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the overall structure diagram of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
As shown in figure 1, the firmware protection location of the microcontroller of the present invention, including the firmware bag that publishes and
Bootloader；Disclosed firmware bag instructs the firmware after block and encryption to constitute by encryption；The encryption instructs block to include
The information of the encryption regional area of firmware, which includes side-play amount and length, orients ciphertext region during for decrypting；Also include one
The random number of individual 16 byte, for producing actual working key.
Further, its AES of the firmware adopts the computational methods of AES128, working key to be：With master key pair
The random number of 16 bytes carries out AES128-ECB mode encryption computings, and ciphertext result is actually used working key.
Further, the encryption regional area is sensitive critical code area；If so that not decrypting, program is just
Cannot correctly start, run, for RTOS systems, the time reference of selectively actuatable system processes function and starts with, for example,
For the ARM Cortex-M series platform products of a new generation, it is preferable that only need to fall the encryption of above 64 bytes, this part
Including most crucial, the crucial parts of ARM Cortex-M, the time reference for wherein just having RTOS processes function SysTick_
The entry address of Handler.
A kind of firmware guard method of microcontroller, methods described are specific as follows：
First by being encrypted to firmware local, encryption every time is encrypted using different keys, then start-up loading journey
Sequence Bootloader, carries out a machine one identification code and starts, rises level decryption firmware, firmware is stored in secure storage section completing.
Embodiment 1：
First, firmware encrypting master key is stored in secure storage section, for the MCU with flash memory on piece, is forbidden
Fall the passage for accessing flash memory on piece of debugging mouth, make flash memory on piece become secure storage section, master key is stored in piece then
In upper flash memory；During firmware encrypting, encrypted using regional area, may specify arbitrary region；During firmware encrypting, using working key plus
Close, every time encryption is encrypted using different keys, even if in addition, firmware is constant, when issuing every time, firmware encrypting result still can not
Unanimously；And the firmware bag for publishing, do not include Bootloader, but need to include that block is instructed in an encryption, for informing
The regional area of encryption, and the working key that auxiliary generation is actual.
Secondly, Bootloader is stored in secure storage section, i.e., on piece in flash memory, now introduce the chip of MCU only
One identification code UID testing mechanism, realizes that one identification code of a machine starts；During factory burning Bootloader, Bootloader will
The UID of actual MCU is read, the storage address that specifies inside Bootloader is write, the UID after now storing becomes
A part of Bootloader itself；During starting up, Bootloader reads out UID from specified storage address, with reality
The UID of MCU is compared, and unanimously then continues to start, inconsistent then locked Bootloader；And when upgrading, Bootloader
Block is instructed according to encryption, you can produce actual working key, correctly decrypt regional area, so as to by firmware full backup,
It is stored in secure storage section.
When a software development cycle of equipment is completed, with working key, execute AES128's to encrypting regional area
Encryption, realize one-time pad, local cypher, then packing firmware, publish external environment condition；The firmware bag for publishing
Security context completes to build.
Above-mentioned master key and UID are stored in inside Bootloader, in the plant produced stage, master key with
Mono- piece of Bootloader is burnt to flash memory on the piece of MCU, and UID then reads when MCU is first powered on, automatically and then writes；
Simultaneously during factory burning Bootloader, the hardware security grade of MCU is improved, is forbidden on the access piece of any external interface
The passage of flash memory, such as debugging mouth so that the data of flash memory on piece cannot be read easily from outside；During follow-up starting up,
Bootloader can execute the detection of one yard of a machine, if the UID of MCU, inconsistent with the UID stored by Bootloader
Words, then locked MCU, does not continue to down execute；During upgrading brush machine (refreshing firmware), Bootloader obtains encryption first and instructs
Block, obtains the area information of encryption, and random number, and calculates actual AES128 working keys；Secondly receive follow-up
Firmware program, and responded according to encryption section information in real time, when firmware program falls in this region, then need to carry out
The decryption reduction of AES128-ECB patterns；Most whole firmware program full backup at last, is stored in flash memory on piece.
Compared with prior art, the firmware guard method of the microcontroller of the present invention may specify arbitrary region to the present invention
Local cypher, effectively reduce the software resource expense of encryption and decryption；The encryption of one-time pad, can effective protection master key, every time
The key of encryption is different, improves the difficulty for cracking；Firmware and Bootloader are stored in secure storage areas in itself, possess one
Fixed cracks difficulty, and one yard of a machine of Bootloader starts, and improves the difficulty for cracking again, if on piece, flash memory is broken by violence
Solution, so as to be read out complete binary file, but the now Bootloader in the binary file, can be because UID be examined
Survey and do not pass through, cannot still run directly on the equipment of imitation；Accordingly, piracy side cannot obtain key easily, it is impossible to decrypt
Firmware, therefore, firmware allows to be disclosed issue, can keep good interaction with user.
With the above-mentioned desirable embodiment according to the present invention as enlightenment, by above-mentioned description, relevant staff is complete
Various change and modification can be carried out entirely in the range of without departing from this invention technological thought.The technology of this invention
Property scope is not limited to the content on specification, it is necessary to determine its technical scope according to right.
Claims (6)
1. the firmware protection location of a kind of microcontroller, it is characterised in that：Including the firmware bag that publishes and Bootloader；
Disclosed firmware bag instructs the firmware after block and encryption to constitute by encryption；The encryption instructs block to include the encryption office of firmware
The information in portion region, it include side-play amount and length, orient ciphertext region during for decrypting；Also include 16 bytes with
Machine number, for producing actual working key.
2. the firmware protection location of microcontroller according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The firmware its AES
Using AES128, the computational methods of working key are：AES128-ECB patterns are carried out with master key to the random number of 16 bytes to add
Close computing, ciphertext result are actually used working key.
3. the firmware protection location of microcontroller according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Described encryption regional area be
Sensitive critical code area.
4. the firmware guard method of a kind of microcontroller, it is characterised in that：Methods described is specific as follows：
First by being encrypted to firmware local, encryption every time is encrypted using different keys, then boot loader
Bootloader, carries out a machine one identification code and starts, rises level decryption firmware, firmware is stored in secure storage section completing.
5. the firmware guard method of microcontroller according to claim 4, it is characterised in that：Described to firmware local carry out
Encryption is specific as follows：
Firmware encrypting master key is stored in secure storage section, for the MCU with flash memory on piece, forbids debugging mouth
The passage of flash memory on piece is accessed, is made flash memory on piece become secure storage section, then master key is stored on piece in flash memory；Gu
When part is encrypted, encrypted using regional area, may specify arbitrary region；During firmware encrypting, using working key encryption, encrypt every time
Encrypted using different key, even if in addition, firmware is constant, when issuing every time, firmware encrypting result still can be inconsistent；And disclose
The firmware bag of issue, does not include Bootloader, but needs to include that block is instructed in an encryption, for informing the partial zones of encryption
Domain, and the working key that auxiliary generation is actual.
6. the firmware guard method of microcontroller according to claim 4, it is characterised in that：The boot loader
Bootloader is specific as follows：
Bootloader is stored in secure storage section, i.e., on piece in flash memory, now introduce the chip unique identifier of MCU
UID testing mechanisms, realize that one identification code of a machine starts；During factory burning Bootloader, Bootloader will read reality
The UID of MCU, writes the storage address that specifies inside Bootloader, and the UID after now storing becomes Bootloader's itself
A part；During starting up, Bootloader reads out UID from specified storage address, is compared with the UID of actual MCU
Compared with unanimously then continuation starts, inconsistent then locked Bootloader；And when upgrading, Bootloader instructs area according to encryption
Block, you can produce actual working key, correctly decrypts regional area, so as to by firmware full backup, be stored in safe storage
In region.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610971108.4A CN106503494A (en) | 2016-11-05 | 2016-11-05 | A kind of firmware protection location and guard method with flash memory microcontroller on piece |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201610971108.4A CN106503494A (en) | 2016-11-05 | 2016-11-05 | A kind of firmware protection location and guard method with flash memory microcontroller on piece |
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| CN106503494A true CN106503494A (en) | 2017-03-15 |
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| CN201610971108.4A Pending CN106503494A (en) | 2016-11-05 | 2016-11-05 | A kind of firmware protection location and guard method with flash memory microcontroller on piece |
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Cited By (13)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108632024A (en) * | 2017-03-21 | 2018-10-09 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A kind of method and device of operation bootstrap |
| CN108681459A (en) * | 2018-03-26 | 2018-10-19 | 深圳前海有电物联科技有限公司 | A kind of firmware update of intelligent hardware devices, apparatus and system |
| CN109462477A (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2019-03-12 | 芯海科技（深圳）股份有限公司 | Whitepack encryption method based on Internet of Things embedded device |
| CN109495527A (en) * | 2017-09-12 | 2019-03-19 | 北京普源精电科技有限公司 | A kind of upgrade method and oscillograph of oscillograph |
| CN109598105A (en) * | 2018-12-03 | 2019-04-09 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | A kind of microcontroller is safely loaded with the method, apparatus, computer equipment and storage medium of firmware |
| CN109828763A (en) * | 2018-12-24 | 2019-05-31 | 惠州市蓝微电子有限公司 | A kind of method of closed loop burning calibration |
| CN109889333A (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2019-06-14 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | Firmware data encryption method, device, computer equipment and storage medium |
| CN109934024A (en) * | 2019-03-12 | 2019-06-25 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | A kind of flash data encryption and decryption optimization method and its system |
| CN110008724A (en) * | 2019-03-29 | 2019-07-12 | 记忆科技(深圳)有限公司 | Solid-state hard disk controller method for secure loading, device and storage medium |
| CN110545175A (en) * | 2019-08-23 | 2019-12-06 | 国网湖北省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | A security authentication method for communication protocol between charging pile and electric vehicle |
| CN112100624A (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2020-12-18 | 泰斗微电子科技有限公司 | Firmware protection method and device and terminal equipment |
| CN112231649A (en) * | 2020-10-19 | 2021-01-15 | 迅镭智能（广州）科技有限公司 | A firmware encryption processing method, device, device and medium |
| CN113326512A (en) * | 2021-05-21 | 2021-08-31 | 深圳矽递科技股份有限公司 | Electronic equipment and MCU firmware protection method thereof |
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| CN105574441A (en) * | 2015-11-09 | 2016-05-11 | 北京中电华大电子设计有限责任公司 | Embedded firmware protection method and device |
| CN105808978A (en) * | 2016-03-02 | 2016-07-27 | 上海斐讯数据通信技术有限公司 | Single chip firmware-based hardware pirate preventing method and system |
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| CN103577765A (en) * | 2012-08-08 | 2014-02-12 | 解放日报报业集团 | Method for encrypting and decrypting streaming document and device thereof |
| CN105574441A (en) * | 2015-11-09 | 2016-05-11 | 北京中电华大电子设计有限责任公司 | Embedded firmware protection method and device |
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Cited By (18)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108632024A (en) * | 2017-03-21 | 2018-10-09 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A kind of method and device of operation bootstrap |
| CN109495527B (en) * | 2017-09-12 | 2021-11-02 | 北京普源精电科技有限公司 | An oscilloscope upgrade method and oscilloscope |
| CN109495527A (en) * | 2017-09-12 | 2019-03-19 | 北京普源精电科技有限公司 | A kind of upgrade method and oscillograph of oscillograph |
| CN108681459A (en) * | 2018-03-26 | 2018-10-19 | 深圳前海有电物联科技有限公司 | A kind of firmware update of intelligent hardware devices, apparatus and system |
| CN109598105A (en) * | 2018-12-03 | 2019-04-09 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | A kind of microcontroller is safely loaded with the method, apparatus, computer equipment and storage medium of firmware |
| CN109828763A (en) * | 2018-12-24 | 2019-05-31 | 惠州市蓝微电子有限公司 | A kind of method of closed loop burning calibration |
| CN109462477B (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2021-05-25 | 芯海科技（深圳）股份有限公司 | White box encryption method based on Internet of things embedded equipment |
| CN109462477A (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2019-03-12 | 芯海科技（深圳）股份有限公司 | Whitepack encryption method based on Internet of Things embedded device |
| CN109889333A (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2019-06-14 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | Firmware data encryption method, device, computer equipment and storage medium |
| CN109889333B (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2022-03-29 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | Firmware data encryption method and device, computer equipment and storage medium |
| CN109934024A (en) * | 2019-03-12 | 2019-06-25 | 深圳忆联信息系统有限公司 | A kind of flash data encryption and decryption optimization method and its system |
| CN110008724A (en) * | 2019-03-29 | 2019-07-12 | 记忆科技(深圳)有限公司 | Solid-state hard disk controller method for secure loading, device and storage medium |
| CN110008724B (en) * | 2019-03-29 | 2023-03-21 | 记忆科技(深圳)有限公司 | Solid state hard disk controller safe loading method and device and storage medium |
| CN110545175A (en) * | 2019-08-23 | 2019-12-06 | 国网湖北省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | A security authentication method for communication protocol between charging pile and electric vehicle |
| CN110545175B (en) * | 2019-08-23 | 2022-08-26 | 国网湖北省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | Security authentication method for communication protocol of charging pile and electric vehicle |
| CN112100624A (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2020-12-18 | 泰斗微电子科技有限公司 | Firmware protection method and device and terminal equipment |
| CN112231649A (en) * | 2020-10-19 | 2021-01-15 | 迅镭智能（广州）科技有限公司 | A firmware encryption processing method, device, device and medium |
| CN113326512A (en) * | 2021-05-21 | 2021-08-31 | 深圳矽递科技股份有限公司 | Electronic equipment and MCU firmware protection method thereof |
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Application publication date: 20170315 |